Common Sense Prevails: SCOTUS Broadens Primary Liability for Fraudulent Schemes

For quite some time, the courts have struggled with the concept of primary liability for a lying liar and secondary liability for a liar who passes on the lie knowing that it was a lie. Scotus, in the Lorenzo decision has now said that is a distinction without a difference.

It is not a secondary issue of aiding and abetting, it is a primary issue where the agent, employee, officer or representative of the liar is equally liable for the dissemination of a lie if they know it is a lie.

BUT you still need to prove intent to lie along with the other elements of fraud. A lie is not actionable if the recipient knew it was untrue or should have known or did not rely upon it. If the lie is not material then it is presumed to belie upon which nobody relied.

Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult or check us out on www.lendinglies.com. Order a PDR BASIC to have us review and comment on your notice of TILA Rescission or similar document.
I provide advice and consultation to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key required elements of a scam — in and out of court. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM.
A few hundred dollars well spent is worth a lifetime of financial ruin.
PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORM WITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION. OUR PRIVACY POLICY IS THAT WE DON’T USE THE FORM EXCEPT TO SPEAK WITH YOU OR PERFORM WORK FOR YOU. THE INFORMATION ON THE FORMS ARE NOT SOLD NOR LICENSED IN ANY MANNER, SHAPE OR FORM. NO EXCEPTIONS.
Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345 or 954-451-1230. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
========================

see https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/supreme-court-adopts-broad-interpretation-of-primary-liability-in-sec-antifraud-case

See Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange Commission

The interesting part of this decision is that it is parallel to false securitization claims where various lawyers, servicers and others say things that are lies to mislead the recipient of such information into thinking that the trust has assets that everyone who knows, knows that the trust doesn’t have those assets (i.e., loans).

Justice Breyer writes:

Petitioner Francis Lorenzo, while the director of investment banking at an SEC-registered brokerage firm, sent two e-mails to prospective investors. The content of those e-mails, which Lorenzo’s boss supplied, described a potential investment in a company with “confirmed assets” of $10 million. In fact, Lorenzo knew that the company had recently disclosed that its total assets were worth less than $400,000.

Some quotes from an article (see link above) on this highly important decision:

In a decision beneficial to the US Securities and Exchange Commission, the US Supreme Court has affirmed that those persons who disseminate statements containing material misrepresentations or omissions are primarily liable for such misstatements even if they did not directly make them.Private securities litigants will likely rely on Lorenzo v. SEC to assert claims against secondary actors—including bankers, lawyers, and accountants—who disseminate statements made by others that they allegedly know are materially misleading, and the Commission is now clear to charge such persons as primary violators without demonstrating that the person who actually made the statement also violated federal securities laws.
*
the Court endorsed the SEC’s approach to scheme liability against those who distribute materially misleading statements with scienter, regardless of whether they are actually the maker of the statements. By holding that a nonmaker can still violate Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, it is expected that private securities litigants will rely on Lorenzo to assert claims against secondary actors who, with scienter, disseminate alleged misstatements made by others. Lorenzo may also further embolden the Commission to allege primary violations against “gatekeepers” and others who did not make the alleged misstatements, but are nonetheless alleged to have been involved in their dissemination.
*
At the request of his supervisor, Lorenzo, an investment banker, sent two emails that he did not draft to prospective investors. Lorenzo’s supervisor provided the content of the two emails, which Lorenzo merely copy and pasted into his own emails. Lorenzo then transmitted the emails and included his signature block with a note that he could be contacted with any questions, but also stated in each email that he had sent it at the request of his supervisor. Although Lorenzo did not draft the content of the emails, the Commission found he acted with intent to defraud because he knew some of the content was false or misleading when he sent them.
*
Before Lorenzo, the Janus and Central Bank decisions seemed to impose strict limits on claims brought by private plaintiffs. The Supreme Court’s new decision affirms that those who disseminate misstatements can commit a primary violation of Rule 10b-5, rather than just a secondary aiding and abetting violation, for which there is no private right of action. Accordingly, Lorenzo may curtail the effect of Janus and Central Bank, and could be interpreted to mean that a secondary actor (e.g., banker, lawyer, accountant) may, under similar facts, be held primarily liable under a scheme liability theory.[19]
*
It will therefore be left to lower courts to determine how far Lorenzo—which on its face appears to limit primary liability to “those who disseminate false statements with intent to defraud”—will stretch primary liability in private actions, if at all. Indeed, plaintiffs will still be required to plead with particularity that the “nonmaker” had such an intent.

A Replay of 2008 in the Works

Amongst the constant placement of article promoted and paid for by the banks that celebrate our supposed recovery from the mortgage meltdown is a new spate of articles that say otherwise. Rather than recovering we have merely papered over the problem allowing the banks to do it again. And worse, I would add, is the continuation of a general policy and perception that foreclosures are the way out of the mess created by the banks.

See LOVE AFFAIR WITH REPACKAGED DEBT

I know this stuff is dense and filled with financial concepts that can only be understood by those of us who have direct knowledge, experience, training and certification in securities and securitization of debt, but the lay articles at least give you a sense of what is truly happening. The above linked article by an investment banker, warning of the continuing moral and financial hazards, states it plainly.

A decade ago, the high-yield investment du jour pushed by Wall Street was mortgage-backed securities — home mortgages that had been packaged up and sold as “safe” investments all over the world. Nowadays bankers and traders are pushing another form of supposedly “safe” investment, the “collateralized loan obligation,” or C.L.O.

C.L.O.s are nothing more than a package of risky corporate loans made to companies with less than stellar credit. The big Wall Street banks make these loans to their corporate clients and then seek to move them off their balance sheets as quickly as possible, in the same way that a decade ago they packaged up and offloaded risky mortgage securities.

What is missing from all analyses of “repackaging” or “securitization” is that the failure of government to regulate this practice opens the door to extreme moral hazards enabling the banks to create financial weapons of mass destruction.

One backdoor risk is exacerbated by a tactic of some all-too-clever hedge fund managers. They buy a little of the debt of risky companies at a discount, and then buy a much larger amount of insurance on that debt — so-called “credit default swaps” — to theoretically hedge their risk. These wiseguys then do everything they can to force the company into a bankruptcy filing, which contractually triggers the insurance payoff on the debt. Since the insurance payment exceeds by far the overall cost of the discounted debt, the hedge fund profits handsomely.

The problem, of course, is that the bankruptcy filing can send the company and its creditors, including investors in C.L.O.s, into a downward spiral, hurting everyone but the architect of the scheme [e.s.]That’s what happened to Windstream, an Arkansas-based telecom company that was sent into bankruptcy protection in February. These “empty creditors,” as Henry Hu, a professor of law at the University of Texas has dubbed them, are rewarded for pushing companies into an otherwise unnecessary bankruptcy. That’s not the way the markets are supposed to work.

Sound familiar? It’s still happening with residential loans. The legal and policy question is whether it is good for the economy or good for society to have people profit off of a bad loan — especially when the the loan was intentionally made bad so it would fail? The architects of the scheme are the major investment banks. They never lose because they never actually take a risk. They know the loans will fail and manage to get investors to sell them credit default swaps and other disguised sale products so that the investors lose, but not the bank. Then the investors pass on the debt (risk of loss) to still more investors who are buying “minibonds” (coined by Lehman Brothers).

The end result is that the “borrower” is just a pawn. Instead of a traditional loan model, we have something far more sinister: the product sold by borrowers is their signature and from that signature the bank and hedge fund players make $10-$20 for each dollar that is described as a loan. The actual debt is disbursed to dozens if not hundreds of investors who have no direct right, title or interest to enforce the debt, note or mortgage.

And yet the debt, note and mortgage is allowed to be enforced by courts who don’t care about anything except that the loan once existed and even if it no longer exists the courts want to see it enforced.

Adding insult to injury, remote vehicles commissioned by the conduit players get still more “profit” by selling property that was foreclosed in the name of an entity that either doesn’t exist or has no interest in the debt, note  or mortgage and is so thinly capitalized that it cannot answer to even awards of costs and fees for unsuccessful attempts to enforce fabricated documents. The proceeds of sale go not to any named claimant but to a party claiming the proceeds as “recovery” of advances that were never funded by the “Master Servicer.”

This is insane. It has always been insane. I’m a capitalist, a former investment banker, commercial banker, and attorney who represented financial institutions. Generically speaking securitization is the bedrock of capitalism. But like a car driven into a crowd of people it can become a vehicle of terror.

As it is currently practiced, securitization of debt is constantly undermining our financial system and our society because it is not balanced by any assumption of risk.

The problem is laziness and billions of dollars in “donations” or “contributions” from the bank that enabled the banks to thwart reasonable regulation of mortgage backed securities to make sure they are at least backed by mortgages in a meaningful way and to make sure they are regulated securities. As it stands, MBS are not backed by the assets referenced in the offering documents. That means they are not MBS. And that means the exemption for MBS contracts does not apply and they should be regulated as securities.

And one more thing. The banks are going to hate this. The issuance of notes and mortgages by homeowners or corporate borrowers is not a traditional loan contract. It is an essential part of a securitization scheme. Without it, the scheme can’t exist. So notes and mortgages should be treated as securities. The definition of a security requires this categorization. The purchase of the debt, note or mortgage is no longer a purchase of a loan receivable. It is a passive vehicle for passive income generated by trading.

 

Gary Dubin: Proposed Mortgage Integrity Act (MIA):

For ten years, Gary Dubin in Hawaii has been practicing law defending homeowners from foreclosure. He has preached his own version of how to combat foreclosure fraud. And he has practiced what he preached. I find his work enlightening and refreshing. So when I read his Proposed Mortgage Integrity Act (MIA) I decided to republish it in its entirety. Some of what he proposes is new but most of it, in my opinion, is a much needed tune-up of the wording of existing law.

His article and proposals are extremely well-written, objectively stated, reasonable and necessary. In my opinion Dubin’s quest  should be supported by homeowners and non homeowners alike as it proposes to correct a deficit in our legal system, our economic system, and our society. The inequality of wealth that was exacerbated by what amounts to outright theft by a handful of banks can be corrected and our economic system can be stabilized if we return to the rule of law.

I have added commentary where I thought it might help readers understand WHY homeowners should win and how the current system is rewarding theft.

Go here listen to replays of previous Gary Dubin shows and find reference documents:
http://www.foreclosurehour.com/past-broadcasts.html

——————————-
By Gary Dubin

The Proposed Mortgage Integrity Act (MIA): Some Common Sense Urgently Needed Practical Institutional Reforms For A Foreclosure System Completely Out Of Service…

I am entering my tenth year as a radio commentator specializing in developments in the foreclosure field following the Mortgage Crisis of 2008.

Despite isolated legislative and judicial attempts at reform during the last ten years discussed on The Foreclosure Hour, for the vast majority of American homeowners facing foreclosure little unfortunately has really changed.

False documentation and myopic judicial oversight still predominate in foreclosure courts, while hundreds of millions of dollars in hard earned equity is literally stolen in the loan securitization process in one of the largest fraudulent transfers of wealth to a few inside traders in United States history.

[EDITOR’S NOTE: He’s right. The direct meaning of this is that a handful of investment banks received trillions in investments. Then they originated or acquired loans eventually using the fictitious name of a nonexistent trust. But it was the investment bank that was the real player.
Then they sold the debt and the paper multiple times through disguised derivatives. This disbursed claims to debt ownership to dozens of players, who eventually came to rely on the value of the paper (contract or derivative) they acquired as set by the marketplace in private transactions rather than the intrinsic value of the debt, thus freeing the investment bank from ever accounting for the debt.
In short, none of the players are desirous or expecting any payment from parties who were borrowers with a debt that has now been completely satisfied. And claimants in foreclosure neither expect nor receive the remedy (foreclosure) that lawyers claim. The proceeds of foreclosure sale never go to the party named as claimant.
So the bottom line is that the investment bank is behind everything and it has long since received multiples of its investment in the loan. Having raked in an average of $3-$4 million on each $200,000 loan “repayment” of the loan was irrelevant and unwarranted. Neither the original investors nor the borrowers are given any credit for the receipt of proceeds of sale of the debt.
But foreclosure served as a vehicle to galvanize the myth that the debt still existed (and the note and mortgage could be enforced) and was owned by at least someone in the orbit of the investment bank, when it had long since departed. Judicial oversight has both failed and refused to consider the possibility that any alleged owner of the debt has already been paid in full and many times over.
That recognition of these basic facts produces a windfall for the homeowner and a death blow to the shadow banking market is not a consequence of anything the borrowers did, but rather a consequence of running a PONZI scheme. The windfall aspect might be corrected through the use of equitable doctrines; but in all events the promissory note and mortgage cannot be enforced to collect on a debt that has been sold to third parties.
The actual truth is that the actual claims to the debt, note and mortgage are buried deep within the shadow banking market and cannot be traced because they are, according to law, private contracts that need not be registered anywhere and are transferred in trading that is never recorded anywhere. The current remedy allowed by the courts is based entirely on the premise that someone who actually owns the debt is getting paid from the proceeds of liquidation of the “collateral.” This is entirely untrue. It never happens except for instances where the original lender is still the creditor.
The declaration of delinquency or default from a lawyer purporting to represent a nonexistent trust or an existing servicer when the declaration relates to a party who is entirely removed from ownership or any right to the debt, note or mortgage is obviously fatally defective, as many court cases have demonstrated. But the players, for a fee, must pretend that the debt is real and the the note and mortgage need to be enforced. That is the origin of the need for fabrication, backdating, forgery and robosigning.]

Backlogged courts applying mostly outdated traditional mortgage concepts remain ill-equipped to protect American homeowners from mortgage abuse.

Waging a foreclosure defense is still beyond the financial means of most homeowners, and those that can find the money to hire an attorney, find that few if any attorneys are trained in foreclosure defense and those that are, are usually less than adequately competent.

New and reform minded decisions by State Supreme Courts are nevertheless rarely adhered to by many of their state trial courts.

Hundreds of billions of dollars in sanctions levied by state and federal governments against lenders and loan servicers detailing mortgagee abuses have nevertheless failed to stop such identical abuses, and sanction money earmarked to assist borrowers has been largely diverted to other State uses.

Meanwhile, there is literally a war against foreclosure defense attorneys still taking place in our courts and among attorney regulators who think homeowners in foreclosure are just deadbeats and attorneys representing them are just preying on vulnerable defendants.

The present mortgage and trust deed foreclosure systems in the States simply do not work except for lenders and pretender lenders, whereas the federal banking system, specifically the Government Sponsored Enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as well as MERS, are the real cause of and not the cure for most of the present serious problems in the foreclosure field.

Nevertheless, the reforms that are needed are not expensive nor complex, just a matter of simple common sense adjustments to a foreclosure system that is centuries old and no longer compatible with the needs of a democratic society under siege by greedy and unscrupulous quick-buck securitization thieves.

On today’s show John and I unveil our view of the general outlines of a proposed overhaul of the foreclosure system in the States, what we call legislation wise “The Mortgage Integrity Act” (MIA for short).

We intend to present this proposal later this year in the format of model legislation for adoption by State Legislatures.

Meanwhile, we hope to get our listeners’ comments and suggestions before drafting the actual Legislation in the form of a Model Act to be sent to the judiciary committees of every State Legislature.

The Model Act will have three main parts. Part One will address the nature of the emergency, Part Two will address the enacted institutional reforms, and Part Three will address transitional issues.

Part One, to be drafted in whereas clauses, will state the following:

1. Keeping record track of and protecting interests in land within each State has historically been an exclusive State function in the United States presumably protected by the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;

2. Such protection has also been a strong State public policy, affecting the economic as well as the social and political well being and health of citizens in each State since respective statehood.

3. That exclusively State function has been recently undermined by the federal government in numerous ways and is responsible for the present mortgage crisis.

4. The result has been the fostering of corruption at virtually all levels of state foreclosure systems.

5. As a result, the State Legislature hereby declares a State Emergency, requiring a restructuring of the State foreclosure system through immediate institutional reforms as well as transitional measures to safeguard the wealth and well being of our citizens from increasing confiscatory forfeitures.

6. Ironically a foreclosure system said to have its goal to stabilize real estate markets in the United States has to the contrary destabilized real estate markets in this State, driving down the value of properties and dislocating tens of thousands of homeowners annually.

Part Two, to be drafted in enactment clauses, will state the following:

1. The existing foreclosure related statutes in this jurisdiction [setting forth the affected statutes by name and number] are hereby amended, abolished and/or replaced, as follows;

2. The exercise of personal jurisdiction by State Courts shall henceforth require service of all complaints by personal service, the proof of which shall henceforth require contemporaneous photographs of those being served. Substitute service is abolished.

3. Service by publication in lieu of personal service shall require attempts to serve defendants first by certified mail, return receipt requested, and next by certification first that an independent investigative agency licensed by the State has made a diligent effort to locate the defendant and within a reasonable time no shorter than two months has failed to do so, using nationwide tracking services.

4. There shall be only one form of combined promissory note and mortgage (or deed of trust) enforced in this jurisdiction, an inseparable ‘Mortgage Note”, which shall only be valid and enforceable if and when duly recorded at a County or Statewide recording office, and which shall not be classified as a negotiable instrument, which may only be transferred by an assignment similarly required to be recorded to be valid and enforceable.

5. Recording offices shall be staffed by attorneys who shall be responsible for researching and approving the standing of all claimed holders of recordable Mortgage Notes prior to their recordation, their compensation to be adequately funded through increases in recording fees taxed upon recorders of securitized trust instruments.

6. Enforcement of Mortgage Notes shall require proof of notices of default consisting of return receipt requests together with personal knowledge affidavits attesting to preparation and mailing by the preparers and mailers.

7. Enforcement of Mortgage Notes shall also require verification of the entire loan general ledger by an independent CPA with no institutional connections, direct or indirect, to the foreclosing plaintiff or its representatives or affiliates.

8. The State Insurance Commissioner is directed to investigate providing mortgage default insurance for the benefit of homeowners.

9. There shall be a specialized foreclosure court in every County in the State, whose Judges shall be prohibited from directly or indirectly having any ownership interest in or any other connection with any financial institution.

10. Mortgage defaults shall by law be considered confidential and not disclosed to anyone other than the affected borrowers, accommodating mortgagors, and guarantors under penalty of fines and imprisonment, to avoid foreclosure blight lowering the market value of affected properties.

11. Foreclosure complaints shall similarly be considered confidential and filed under seal, to avoid foreclosure blight lowering the market value of affected properties.

12. Foreclosure auctions are hereby abolished. Properties subject to foreclosure shall be sold in the ordinary market place by licensed real estate brokers and listed in the Multiple Listing Service as directed by the Foreclosure Court.

13. Deficiency judgments are hereby abolished.

14. In cases in which the Foreclosure Court finds that there is little or no equity remaining after payments required to be made to a foreclosing plaintiff, a foreclosure defendant must vacate the premises within a reasonable time no less than 90 days or must elect to forfeit ownership in exchange for an immediate lease agreement preserving possession for a stated period of time including indefinitely as determined by the Foreclosure Court provided a monthly market leasehold rental payment is agreed to and timely paid.

15. In cases where the Foreclosure Court finds that there is substantial equity remaining after payments required to be made to a foreclosing plaintiff, a foreclosure defendant my elect to retain possession as a tenant as aforesaid and shall have the right to recover title including therefore his equity in the property within a time period of at least one year to be determined by the Foreclosure Court provided at the time of the exercise of that right the foreclosure defendant reimburses the foreclosing plaintiff for whatever amounts may then be due on the mortgage note.

Part Three, covering transitional matters, as follows:

1. The dates of effectiveness of the various enactments will have to be tailored to existing conditions and between new and existing secured loans.

2. The respective powers between the States and the federal government in various respects above will likely require negotiation and litigation. Fortunately, the United States Supreme Court has recently shown deference to the States in related issues involving financial regulation.

Please join John and me today and email us your comments and suggestions. Let us know if you think we missed anything and if there any other way you can think of to change a system so badly out of service?

——————————-
Gary Victor Dubin
Dubin Law Offices
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813
Office: (808) 537-2300
Email: gdubin@dubinlaw.net
Licensed in California and Hawaii

Facially Invalid Recorded Documents

The view proffered by the banks would require them to accept declarations of fact from potential borrowers without any indicia of truth or reliability. It is opposite to the manner in which they do business. Currently they have it both ways, to wit: for purposes of borrowing you must submit documents that are facially valid without reference to external evidence and which can be easily confirmed but for purposes of foreclosure, none of those conditions apply. 

As part of the the scheme of “securitization fail” (see Adam Levitin) banks, servicers and third party vendors have been creating, fabricating and executing documents that are not facially valid nor do they comply with industry standards or even common sense. But once recorded judges take them “at face value” by assuming that somehow the document makes sense, when it clearly does not comport with law or logic. Defenders of foreclosure act at their peril when they fail to attack the facial validity of the documents upon which the foreclosure claims rely.

In a recent article written by Dale Whitman for the ABA he states the following “Conclusion. The recording system is archaic and fraught with the potential for yielding wrong conclusions. Conversion by many recording jurisdictions to computer-based electronic indexes has been helpful, but most of the legally problematic flaws continue to exist. Title insurance has been invaluable in making the weight of the recording system bearable, but it adds a further layer of complexity as buyers try to understand the limitations of their title policies. It seems unlikely that major changes will occur, so it is essential that real estate lawyers understand the peculiarities and limitations of our present system.” (e.s.)

As he points out recording is not required to make a document valid, but once it is recorded the document takes on a life of its own. It also presents numerous trapdoors and pitfalls that should be analyzed before answering the initiation of a foreclosure proceeding with any action on behalf of the homeowner including the motion to dismiss in judicial states, the answer, affirmative defenses and the Petition for TRO or lawsuit for wrongful foreclosure.

see what you didn_t know about recording acts_whitman (2).authcheckdam

==============================
Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult or check us out on www.lendinglies.com. Order a PDR BASIC to have us review and comment on your notice of TILA Rescission or similar document.
I provide advice and consultation to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key required elements of a scam — in and out of court. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM.
A few hundred dollars well spent is worth a lifetime of financial ruin.
PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORM WITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION. OUR PRIVACY POLICY IS THAT WE DON’T USE THE FORM EXCEPT TO SPEAK WITH YOU OR PERFORM WORK FOR YOU. THE INFORMATION ON THE FORMS ARE NOT SOLD NOR LICENSED IN ANY MANNER, SHAPE OR FORM. NO EXCEPTIONS.
Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345 or 954-451-1230. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
==========================

Common sense tells you that for a document to mean anything it must say enough that a reasonable person would be able to confidently draw meaning from it. Analyzing the facial validity of documents used in foreclosure reveals a pattern of misrepresenting the facial validity and misdirecting judges into NOT looking closely at the documents from which they are making assumptions and thence to legal conclusions that bind homeowners into proving matters beyond their control.

I proffer here an analysis that I just completed (our TERA report) as an example.

  1. We have already seen documentary proof that BONY Mellon does not receive the proceeds of the sale of property subject to the power of sale in a nonjudicial state or the forced sale in a judicial state. There are many reasons for this.
  2. Analysis of the facial validity of the use of various names and descriptions reveals the absence of an actual party, unless extrinsic “parole) evidence is added. Hence the documents upon which the above language relies does not support facial validity.
  3. BONY Mellon is said to be the “successor to JP Morgan Chase.” It is not and never has been a successor to JPMorgan Chase. There is nothing in the public domain to support that assertion. There is no instrument attached and no description of any transaction in which, as to this subject property and loan, we can ascertain how BONY Mellon became the successor to JPM Morgan Chase. Hence the documents in which BONY Mellon appears are not facially valid and are defective in terms of proof of title. This could be corrected by affidavit or any process that is allowed in the state where the property is located but it hasn’t been done on record, and there is no evidence to suggest that it has been done but is not recorded. The usual and acceptable manner of phrasing such a succession, if it were true, would be “as successor to JP Morgan Chase pursuant to that certain agreement of transfer by and between JPMorgan Chase (and /or other parties) and BONY Mellon dated July 6, 200X.” The absence of such description leaves the reader to pursue extrinsic or parole evidence to determine if the succession is documented and if so whether that documentation is facially valid. This is all absent.
  4. The succession suggests that it is in the role of trustee. There is no instrument attached and no description of any transaction in which, as to this subject property and loan, we can ascertain how BONY Mellon became the successor Trustee to JPM Morgan Chase. Hence the documents in which BONY Mellon appears as trustee are not facially valid and are defective in terms of proof of title. This could be corrected by affidavit or any process that is allowed in the state where the property is located but it hasn’t been done on record, and there is no evidence to suggest that it has been done but is not recorded. The usual and acceptable manner of phrasing such a succession, if it were true, would be “as successor to JP Morgan Chase, trustee pursuant to that certain agreement of transfer by and between JPMorgan Chase (and /or other parties) and BONY Mellon dated July 6, 200X.” The absence of such description leaves the reader to pursue extrinsic or parole evidence to determine if the succession is documented and if so whether the documentation is facially valid. This is all absent. The absence of a description of a specific trust and trust instrument is yet another factor that renders the instrument facially invalid, but theoretically correctible.
  5. This leads to a further question of extrinsic evidence being required. Other than by the use of parole evidence (outside the information contained on the document itself) the reader cannot ascertain the existence or description of a specific trust organized and existing under the laws of any jurisdiction. In addition, the issue of a transfer or change of trustees of a trust, if one can be found, is not supported by language such as “pursuant to the provisions of the trust agreement dated the 3rd day of May, 200Y in which the trust named ‘Structured Asset Mortgage Investment II, Inc. Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust’ was created under the laws of the State of New York”. Without such reference the facial validity of the instruments remains invalid although theoretically correctible. Without the knowledge of the legal existence of the trust being confirmable by public record, there is no support for the implied trust. Without support for the implied trust and the trust agreement creating it, there is no obvious support for how trustees could exist or be changed. Without support on the face of the instruments for how trustees of a trust could be changed, the description of the change of trustees is merely a declaration that is not supported by anything on the face of the document.
  6. JPMorgan is implied to have been the trustee of the potentially nonexistent trust. Once again the implied assertion leaves the reader to determine if the trust was created pursuant to the laws of any jurisdiction, and if JPMorgan was named as trustee for the trust.
  7. In either event both BONY Mellon and JPMorgan are described to be acting in a representative capacity on behalf of “holders… of pass through certificates” and not as “trustees” of any “trust.” The certificates are identified as Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2004-12. The reference to being a “trustee” and the implied representation of the holders of certificates would be acceptable if the “holders” were described as beneficiaries. The extrinsic evidence often shows that such holders are not beneficiaries. This leads to the question of how and why there is representation of the holders, apart from the alleged trust, Is the representation implied from the trust agreement that is not described? Is the representation the result of some other trust or agency agreement? It is not possible to ascertain the answers to these vital questions without resort to extrinsic evidence, thus making the instruments relying upon such language, facially invalid.

Every state has statutory requirements for an instrument to be facially valid. A deed between Donald Duck and Mickey Mouse as Grantor and Grantee respectively would not be facially valid because both the grantor nor the grantee are fictitious names of cartoon characters and unless used as a egla fictitious name for an actual entity doing business under that name the document could not be corrected to become a valid document suitable for recording.

Yet county recorders are allowing the recordation of millions of documents across the country with exactly that defect. By allowing such documents to be recorded they are lending support to the legal presumption that Donald and Mickey are real people with rights to transfer interests in real property and even foreclose on real property. At the end of the chain of written documents someone holds paper that is recorded but based upon a chain of title with two large gaps in it — Donald and Mickey, and by the time the foreclosure occurs probably Minnie Mouse as well (or maybe Fannie or Freddie whose names are being used, just like the “REMIC trustees”, but who have no part in any transaction involving the subject loan).

Back to Real Property 101.

  1. Who is the grantor? If that cannot be readily determined from the face of the instrument the instrument is facially invalid.
  2. Who is the grantee? If that cannot be readily determined from the face of the instrument the instrument is facially invalid.
  3. What is the effective date of transfer? If that cannot be readily determined from the face of the instrument the instrument is facially invalid.
  4. What is being transferred? If that cannot be readily determined from the face of the instrument the instrument is facially invalid — or, in the case of a mortgage or beneficial interest in a deed of trust if the instrument declares a transfer but without the underlying debt, the instrument is facially invalid and unenforceable both because of state statutes regarding facial validity and the UCC Article 9 requiring value to be paid (see above linked article).
  5. What is the legal description of the property affected? If that cannot be readily determined from the face of the instrument the instrument is facially invalid.

An instrument that is not facially valid should be returned by the recording office with notes specifying what needs to be corrected. This vital step is being overlooked on all documents relating to foreclosures. If rules, laws and procedures were followed with regard to such documents there would not be any foreclosure or, if the corrections could actually be made, there would be no defense. It is in the valley between those two notions that all foreclosures based on “successors” are based.

By overlooking the obvious lack of clarity on the face of the documents county recorders keep creating a vacuum that the banks are only too happy to fill with MERS — an IT platform that is the opposite of tamper-proof allowing virtually anyone with a login and password to create the illusion of authority where none existed before. Hence the use of MERS and other systems to give depth to the illusion of facial validity.

The conclusion is that documents containing the language described above should not have been recorded.  The county recorder should have rejected such documents as being facially invalid, requiring additional documents to be attached, if they existed.

Such language is a substantial deviation from custom and practice as well as common sense and logic.  Custom and practice of the same banks that are listed in the language described above requires that they not accept such language without the additional documentation and confirmation of facts that are declared on the face of the instrument.  Common sense dictates that the reason why such custom and practice exists is that most fraudulent schemes involve written instruments in which various declarations are made that are untrue or lack support.  For purposes of recording, any declaration on the face of the instrument that requires the attachment or description of documents that are readily available in the public domain would be unacceptable, much as, for example, a deed without a signature.  The property must be described with precision (or later corrected by affidavit), the grantor must be described with precision (or later corrected) and the grantee must be described with precision (or later corrected).  Without the required corrections, the documents are facially invalid.

For purposes of case analysis, the absence of facially valid documents, even though they were improperly recorded, negates the potential use of legal presumptions arising from the facial validity of documents.  Therefore such documents should be rejected without proper foundation in connection with the use of such documents for any purpose, and the attempt to introduce such documents into evidence in any court or administrative proceeding.

In the case currently under analysis, this means that the proceedings in which the property was allegedly foreclosed, were themselves all improper and based upon invalid terms.  Whether this renders the proceedings void or voidable depends upon case law and interpretations of constitutional due process.

However it is safe to say that based upon the above analysis, it is obvious that all such documents including the deed upon foreclosure are defective in several material respects.  Therefore, our conclusion is that the current title chain in the county records regarding this property is at best clouded.  The procedures for correcting clouded title vary from state to state and are subject to both federal and state laws.  Individual research on each case in each state is required before taking any action.

The view proffered by the banks would require them to accept declarations of fact from potential borrowers without any indicia of truth or reliability. It is opposite to the manner in which they do business. Currently they have it both ways, to wit: for purposes of borrowing you must submit documents that are facially valid without reference to external evidence and which can be easily confirmed but for purposes of foreclosure, none of those conditions apply. 

 

Rogue REMICs? 2016 Study Reveals Lack of Standing

I read a lot. I came across this article today published in 2016. Nobody has paid attention to it but as far as I can tell on first skim, the author has both coined the name “rogue REMIC” and described it well enough to come to a conclusion, to wit: everything about them is a scam and no legal standing exists with respect to them. I would only add that the author is incorrectly assuming that any securitization took place or if it was, as Adam Levitin coined the phrase, “Securitization Fail.”

see campbell – capstone inquiry into rogue remics

Significant quote from the abstract of the article:

The business of privatized mortgage loan securitization (Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits or “REMICS”) is so arcane and specialized that few people outside of that realm of investment knowledge understand, or even care to understand how loan securitization functions. However, if the difference between a legitimate REMIC and a Rogue REMIC is adequately explained, one can begin to understand why Rogue REMICs must be exposed as unlawful enterprises whose affiliates are not only able to disregard existing federal securities and tax laws, but are also able to circumvent state and local foreclosure laws at will. [e.s.] These ongoing violations result from the intentional and commonplace shortcutting of the proper mortgage loan securitization processes during the several years preceding the 2008 financial crisis. This Inquiry will not focus primarily on how and why Rogue REMICS violate federal tax and securities laws [e.s.]; although those aspects are part of the discussion by necessity. I will argue that all Rogues lack the perquisite legal standing to prosecute both judicial and non-judicial foreclosures. I will present compelling evidence that, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, foreclosures by Rogues may have exceeded 10% of all foreclosures. I will further argue that county officials may be violating state laws by recording the documents that impart false legal standing to the Rogues. I will conclude with a suggestion to homeowners on how to proceed if a mortgage assignment to a Rogue turns up in the local County public records. [e.s.]

And then there is this:

federal government regulators have no will to criminally prosecute the Rogues for financial crimes against individual homeowners even though the crimes are being committed by nationally-chartered investment banks. And so individual homeowners are left to fend for themselves against these behemoths. As a result, a hodge-podge of civil cases in State courts have created such a plethora of conflicting decisions that, in the aggregate, only serve to obfuscate the overriding principle of standing.

and this:

If a borrower’s loan did not leave the “warehouse” timely (if ever) to be incorporated into any REMIC, which includes memorializing that transfer in the local county, the REMIC trustee cannot create standing years later by filing a bogus assignment. As Levitin (2010) explains that “Securitization is the legal apotheosis of form over substance, and if securitization is to work it must adhere to its proper, prescribed form punctiliously” (p. 3).

and finally diagrams of a Rogue REMIC which is an empty pool (something I have been railing about for 12 years). The author describes it as

“A REMIC in name only. A shell of financial instrument. It never had any mortgages assigned to it when it was created and, years later, it is now closed to the introduction of new loans.”

Reaching the conclusion

homeowners were unwitting participants in an elaborate pump and dump scheme to deceive and profit from unwitting REMIC investors. By failing to record assignments during the warehouse phase of REMIC creation, the big investment banks created REMICs that existed in name only; then sold shares of them to the public as if they were the real thing.

And then they foreclosed on homeowners using the fake trusts as the name of the claimant, never revealing the true parties in interest because that would expose them to investigation aid discovery in which their lies would be obvious.

WELCOME TO LIVINGLIES

FREE Information, Resources and Help with Your Mortgage Loans – Over 13,000,000 Visitors

ABOUT LIVINGLIES AND LENDINGLIES

FREE REVIEW

**************************

Thursdays LIVE! Click in to current episodes of

The Neil Garfield Show

or prior episodes

Or call in at (347) 850-1260, 6pm Eastern Thursdays

*******************************

About Neil F Garfield

Schedule Private Consultation

Purchase Services

Submit Case Interview Form – Receive Customized Recommended Services

Q & A – What can you do for me?

Contact Information:

GTC Honors, Inc.

Phone: 954-451-1230

Email: info@lendinglies.com

Services include: Expert Consultation Services, Strategy, Qualified Written Requests, Case Review and Reports, Forensic Analysis Referrals, Discovery , Motions, Pleadings, Complaints to AF and CFPB, Title and Encumbrance Analysis, and Case Analysis. We coach lawyers and pro se litigants. ALL 50 STATES.

MISSION STATEMENT: I believe that the mortgage crisis has produced manifest evil and injustice in our society. Pretenders with more money and more lawyers than any consumer or borrower are stealing homes from homeowners while they undermine the investments by Pension Funds.

LivingLies is the vehicle for a collaborative movement to provide homeowners with sufficient forensic and legal resources to combat banks who are using fictitious names and entities to cover up their malfeasance.

We provide thousands of pages of free forms, articles and discussion of statutes, case precedent and policy on this site. On www.lendinglies.com I provide paid crucial analytic and presentation services that enable lawyers and homeowners to confront the lies in attempted foreclosures.

Ask about our CONSULTATION SERVICES and LITIGATION SUPPORT.

Educate Yourself and Your Lawyer: Read this Blog and Purchase Books & Services from www.lendinglies.com

Pope Francis: Help from an Unexpected Source — Derivative Markets “Ethically Unacceptable”

Warren Buffett saw it 15 years ago after analysis performed on the derivative markets. He said that the derivatives, as they were then (and now) being used, were “financial weapons of mass destruction.” If he was ignored what chance does anyone else have?

Enter Pope Francis from the perspective of income and wealth inequality and arriving at the conclusion that the aim of the derivative market was to create and trade on poverty and financial distress.

And he called out the financial system as a whole as being a “ticking time bomb,” something that many of us have been saying for years, starting (like Buffett) from before the manifestation of the Ponzi scheme that was ridiculously named “securitization.”

GET A CONSULT

GO TO LENDINGLIES to order forms and services. Our forensic report is called “TERA“— “Title and Encumbrance Report and Analysis.” I personally review each of them for edits and comments before they are released.

Let us help you plan your answers, affirmative defenses, discovery requests and defense narrative:

954-451-1230 or 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult. You will make things a lot easier on us and yourself if you fill out the registration form. It’s free without any obligation. No advertisements, no restrictions.

Purchase audio seminar now — Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense including 3.5 hours of lecture, questions and answers, plus course materials that include PowerPoint Presentations.

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

===================================

see – Pope Francis Calls Derivatives and Credit Default Swaps Immoral

The financial markets have long identified themselves as being “amoral.” Just part of the capitalistic system which is code for “if you do it for money, then it’s OK.” Accepting that argument would mean that a perfect defense to a murder charge is that it was based upon the desire to get money.

The Pope assails “unbridled global capitalism.” He isn’t a socialist. The Vatican is merely pointing out that the chaos we call society has tilted the playing field such that capitalism has moved from a system of finance to a system of governance.

Instead of government reigning in and holding the banks accountable for targeting people of low income and people in poverty (along with everyone else) politicians have (a) taken Wall Street assertions as though they were the product of thorough investigation and (b) blamed the victims and forced them to bear the cost of the blow out that only the Wall Street could have created.

Mainstream media succumbed to this phenomenon. They started off with exposes and investigative journalism only to abandon the follow-up that might have educated the consumer population. Some journalists were told point blank to lay off critical pieces on banks. That became increasingly difficult as verdicts and settlements started pouring like rain all based upon fraud, which the Pope references. They were all based upon investigations, administrative findings and allegations from all attorneys general in the country and many if not most of the investors who were duped into buying worthless “certificates” that existed only in the digital world.

The Vatican analysts came to the same conclusion I did in 2006. Dozens of other analysts across the world came to the same conclusion, some before me and most after me.

The conclusion reached by this group of writers and investigators was basically the same although phrased differently, person to person, to wit: virtually all “loans” generated over the past 20 years have been based upon fiction —  a fictional value for the home, a fictional value for the household income (ability to repay) a fictional value for the “certificates” issued by a fictionally named “trust” that was in fact the bank doing business under the fictitious name of the “trust.”

In 2003, Buffett warned of crisis if the government did not intervene in the proliferation of derivative trading and underwriting. The predicted crisis arrived. Now the Vatican is warning of another one perhaps worse than the 2008 crash. Nobody wants to hear that.

Federal and State lending laws state that the responsibility for determining whether the debt will be repaid lies with the bank underwriting the “loan.” Yet the banks were the only entities to come out of the Great 2008 Recession not only whole, but bigger and stronger. The consumer is seen and treated as meat for the hungry bear. Just ask anyone on Wall Street.

Ultimately the responsibility for what governance is acceptable lies with voters. But they only exercise that control when they vote. The status quo is elevating our financial system to a governance system. It leaves the banks in control of most domestic and global issues. Democrats and Republicans are both guilty of the same things: (a) their sole driving  force is retention of power and (b) pushing down fresh new candidates who actually want to accomplish something. The Banks agree.

If you want something different, then VOTE!

 

The Role of Dynamic Dark Pools in Ponzi Schemes Masquerading as Securitized Loan Pools

The bottom line is that there are no financial transactions in today’s securitization schemes. There is only fabricated paper. If you don’t understand the DDP, you don’t understand “securitization fail,” a term coined by Adam Levitin.

GET A CONSULT

GO TO LENDINGLIES to order forms and services. Our forensic report is called “TERA“— “Title and Encumbrance Report and Analysis.” I personally review each of them for edits and comments before they are released.

Let us help you plan your answers, affirmative defenses, discovery requests and defense narrative:

954-451-1230 or 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult. You will make things a lot easier on us and yourself if you fill out the registration form. It’s free without any obligation. No advertisements, no restrictions.

Purchase audio seminar now — Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense including 3.5 hours of lecture, questions and answers, plus course materials that include PowerPoint Presentations.

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

===================================

I received a short question today to which I gave a long answer. The question is “What happens when an investor decides that he or she wants to cash it in does someone redeem their certificate ?”

Here is my answer:

YES they get paid, most of the time. It is masked as a “trade” on the proprietary trading desk of the CMO Dept. which is completely unregulated and reports nothing. As long as the Ponzi scheme is going strong, the underwriter issues money from the investor pool of money (dynamic dark pool -DDP). It looks like a third party bought the “investment.” If the scheme collapses then the underwriter reports to investors that the market is frozen and there are no buyers.

 *
There is no redemption because there are no certificates. They are all digital entries on a server. Since the 1998 law deregulated the certificates, reporting is limited or nonexistent. The entries can be changed, erased, altered, amended or modified at will without any regulator or third party knowing. There is no paper trail. Thus the underwriter will say, if they were ever asked, whatever suits them and there is no way for anyone to confirm or rebut that. BUT in discovery, the investors have standing to ask to see the records of such transactions. That is when the underwriter settles for several hundred million or more.
 *
They discount the settlement based upon “market” values and by settling for pennies on the dollar with small community banks who do not have resources to fight. Thus if they received $2 billion for a particular “securitized pool” that is allocated to a named trust they will instantly make about 10-20 times the normal underwriting fee by merely taking money before or after the money hits the DDP. Money is paid to the investors as long as sales of certificates are robust. Hence the DDP is constantly receiving and disbursing money from many more sources than a fixed group of homeowners or investors.
 *
It is all about gaps and absences. If a debt was properly securitized, the investor would pay money to the underwriter in exchange for ownership of a certificate. The money would then be subject to fees paid to the underwriter and sellers of the certificates. The balance would be paid into a trust account on which the signatory would be a trust officer of the Trustee bank.
 *
If a scheme is played, then the money does not go into the trust. It goes to the DDP. From there the money is funneled through conduits to the closing table with the homeowner. By depositing the exact and expected amount of money into the trust account of the closing agent, neither the closing agent nor the homeowner understands that they are being played. They don’t even have enough information to arouse suspicion so that they can ask questions.
 *
Hence if you combine the proper securitization scheme with the improper one you see that the money is diverted from the so-called plan. This in turn causes the participants to fabricate documents if there is litigation. They MUST fabricate documents because if they produced real documents they would have civil and criminal liability for theft, embezzlement in investor litigation and fraud and perjury in foreclosure litigation.
 *
It is only by forcing a peek around the multiple layers of curtains fabricated by the players that you can reveal the absence of ownership, authority or even an economic interest — other than the loss of continued revenue from servicing and resales of the same loan through multiple investment vehicles whose value is completely derived from the presumed existence of a party who is the obligee of the debt (owner of the debt, or creditor).
 *
That party is the DDP — fund that is partially authorized for “reserve” and which the prospectus and trust instrument (PSA) state (1) that the mortgage loan schedule is not the real one and is presented as an example and (2) that the investors acknowledge that they might be paid from their own money from the “reserve.”
 *
The gap is that the DDP and the reserve are two different accounts. The “reserve” is a pool of money held in trust by, for example, U.S. Bank as trustee for the trust. There is no such account. The DDP is controlled by the underwriter but ownership is intentionally obscured to avoid or evade detection and the liability that would attach if the truth were revealed.
 *
We win cases not by proving theft from investors but by hammering on the fact that the documents are fabricated, which is true in virtually all cases involving a named trust. We will win a large award if we can show that the intended beneficiaries of the foreclosure were parties other than the obligee on the debt.
 *
Thus the attorneys, servicers and trustee are protecting their ill-gotten gains and seeking to grab more money and property at the expense of the unnamed investors and homeowners. They are then transforming an expected revenue stream into the illusion of a secured debt owed not to the funding sources but to the intermediaries.
Go to LENDINGLIES for more help.

Same Old Story: Paper Trail vs, Money Trail (Freddie Mac)

Payment by third parties may not reduce the debt but it does increase the number of obligees (creditors). Hence in every one of these foreclosures, except for a minuscule portion, indispensable parties were left out and third parties were in reality getting the proceeds of liquidation from foreclosure sales.

The explanations of securitization contained on the websites of the government Sponsored Entities (GSE’s) clearly demonstrate what I have been writing for 11 years and reveal a pattern of illusion and deception.

The most important thing about a financial transaction is the money. In every document filed in support of the illusion of securitization, it steadfastly holds firm to discussion of paper instruments and not a word about the actual location of the money or the actual identity of the obligee of that money debt.

Each explanation avoids the issue of where the money goes and how it was “processed” (i.e., stolen, according to me and hundreds of other scholars.)

It underscores the fact that the obligee (“debt owner” or “holder in due course” is never present in any legal proceeding or actual transaction or transfer of of the debt. This leaves us with only one  conclusion. The debt never moved, which is to say that the obligee was always the same, albeit unaware of their status.

Knowing this will help you get traction in the courtroom but alleging it creates a burden of proof for you to prove something that you know is true but can only be confirmed with access to the books, records an accounts of the parties claiming such transactions ands transfers occurred.

GET A CONSULT

GO TO LENDINGLIES to order forms and services. Our forensic report is called “TERA“— “Title and Encumbrance Report and Analysis.” I personally review each of them for edits and comments before they are released.

Let us help you plan your answers, affirmative defenses, discovery requests and defense narrative:

954-451-1230 or 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult. You will make things a lot easier on us and yourself if you fill out the registration form. It’s free without any obligation. No advertisements, no restrictions.

Purchase audio seminar now — Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense including 3.5 hours of lecture, questions and answers, plus course materials that include PowerPoint Presentations.

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

===================================

For one such example see Freddie Mac Securitization Explanation

And the following diagram:

Freddie Mac Diagram of Securitization

What you won’t find anywhere in any diagram supposedly depicting securitization:

  1. Money going to an originator who then lends the money to the borrower.
  2. Money going to a named REMIC “Trust” for the purpose of purchasing loans or anything else.
  3. Money going to the alleged unnamed beneficiaries of a named REMIC “Trust.”
  4. Money going to the alleged unnamed investors who allegedly purchased “certificates” allegedly issued by or on behalf of a named REMIC “Trust.”
  5. Money going to the originator for sale of the debt, note and mortgage package.
  6. Money going to originator for endorsement of note to alleged transferee.
  7. Money going to originator for assignment of mortgage.
  8. Money going to the named foreclosing party upon liquidation of foreclosed property. 
  9. Money going to the homeowner as royalty for use of his/her/their identity forming the basis of value in issuance of derivatives, hedge products and contract, insurance products and synthetic derivatives.
  10. Money being credited to the obligee’s loan receivable account reducing the amount of indebtedness (yes, really). This is because the obligee has no idea where the money is coming from or why it is being paid. But one thing is sure — the obligee is receiving money in all circumstances.

Payment by third parties may not reduce the debt but it does increase the number of obligees (creditors). Hence in every one of these foreclosures, except for a minuscule portion, indispensable parties were left out and third parties were in reality getting the proceeds of liquidation from foreclosure sales.

BLOOMBERG: Mortgage Crisis Still Unresolved, New Crisis Looming

No two financial crises are ever quite the same. The next one won’t be like the last. But history teaches lessons, and there’s no excuse for ignoring them.

Regulators have done a lot to reform the financial system since the 2008 crisis, but they still haven’t fixed the market where the trouble started: U.S. mortgages. It’s an omission they need to put right before the next crisis hits.

GO TO LENDINGLIES to order forms and services

Let us help you plan your answers, affirmative defenses, discovery requests and defense narrative:

954-451-1230 or 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult. You will make things a lot easier on us and yourself if you fill out the registration form. It’s free without any obligation. No advertisements, no restrictions.

Purchase now Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar including 3.5 hours of lecture, questions and answers, plus course materials that include PowerPoint Presentations. Presenters: Attorney and Expert Neil Garfield, Forensic Auditor Dan Edstrom, Attorney Charles Marshall and and Private Investigator Bill Paatalo. The webinar and materials are all downloadable.

Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 954-451-1230 or 202-838-6345. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

GO TO WWW.LENDINGLIES.COM OR https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies toschedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

===================================

see https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-04-30/america-s-mortgage-market-is-still-broken

David Shipley, Senior Editor for Bloomberg Views has hit the nail on the head. While there are some errors in his article, they are understandable.

He’s right when he says that the servicers lacked the necessary incentives and resources and still lack those incentives and resources. But when he talks about “delinquencies” he fails to grasp the fact that those “delinquencies” are based upon a debt that neither the servicer nor its client is authorized to administer.

This failure of perception is understandable. It is difficult to to accept the fact that the debt went up in smoke and therefore no creditor has authorized the administration or collection of the debt. It is challenging to accept the notion that the banks engineered this scheme so they could step in as if they were creditors without actually saying so.

But he gets very close when he says

Private-label mortgages (which aren’t guaranteed by the government) were packaged into securities with extremely poor mechanisms for deciding who — investors, packagers or lenders — would take responsibility for bad or fraudulent loans.

The whole idea was to make it unclear who would be injured by nonpayment of a debt. That was how the banks, as intermediaries, transformed themselves into apparent principals and how entities created the illusion of self proclaimed servicers. Or as Shipley puts it

The parties involved in securitizations became embroiled in legal battles about who owed what to whom — litigation that goes on to this day.

So even amongst the principals of the scheme coined as “securitization fail” (Adam Levitin) there is no agreement and in fact fierce court battles as to the identity of the injured party. In other words their pleadings in court constitute admissions that are inconsistent with the pleadings in foreclosure cases. If there is no identified party with injury then there is no legal standing.

What is clear now is that the money taken from investors was not used to fund REMIC trusts, that the REMIC Trusts never bought any debts and in fact never bought any of the dubious paper that was issued in connection with origination or transfer of the “loans.” Those investors were largely not becoming beneficiaries of the trust; instead they were becoming creditors of the trust.

Knowing that, investors are stuck — if they blow the whistle on the diversion of their money into a completely different “investment” than the one they thought they were buying, they are undermining their potential claim based upon the “security” offered by the mortgages. And they are undercutting the value of the certificates they bought. That is what threatens a large segment of the shadow banking market.

The fix that Shipley thinks should happen will never come to fruition because the government has been convinced that a fix would eviscerate the shadow banking market where derivatives are traded. Nobody knows what the outcome will be if that market fails.

But in the meanwhile current policy reflects a decision to let investors and borrowers take the entire brunt of the scheme that ultimately left the banks in solid control and rising profits despite small settlements compared to the amount of money siphoned out of the US economy. So the Federal reserve and American taxpayers continue the bailout by lending support to the false presumption that the RMBS derivatives are based upon mortgage loans owned by a trust.

Shipley narrowly misses the point when he says

Advancing payments to investors when loans go delinquent — a core responsibility of servicers — demands a lot of cash. It also requires ample capital to absorb possible losses on servicing rights, an asset whose value can quickly evaporate if defaults and prepayments eat into expected fees.

Think about it. Why would a company guarantee payments from a third party? Who would take that risk on loans known to be at best fragile? Where is the money coming from to make those payments? Is it really the “servicer.” And if the money is “recovered” as “servicer advances” when the property is liquidated, is the foreclosure really a disguised suit to force the recovery of servicer advances rather than a true foreclosure — contrary to the interests of the certificate holders?

And if Ocwen was actually entitled to receive and expected to receive recovery of servicer advances why would it be teetering on the edge of bankruptcy? The more likely scenario is that subservicers like Ocwen have nothing at all to do with servicer advances. They don’t make them, they don’t initiate them and they don’t collect them. The Wall Street playbook has the real puppet masters hidden behind several layers of curtains. Ocwen, like so many others, is just there to get tossed under the bus to make people happy that they extracted a pound of flesh — except there was no skin in the game.

Lehman to Pay $2.4 Billion out of Bankrupt Estate

“Lehman’s own documents show it was aware of the widespread problems and deteriorating performance of the loans it had securitized,” with half the loans at one point containing material misrepresentations, the trustees said in a court filing.

Editor’s Note: The difference is money — investors have it and borrower’s don’t. So while investors are successfully litigating fraud and deceit, the borrowers can’t afford to litigate the same issues. The idea that Lehman was somehow honest with borrowers and not with investors is preposterous.

Lehman recently closed out a $2 billion dispute with Citigroup Inc. over derivatives, and similar litigation over derivatives with Credit Suisse Group AG is the last major remaining contest.

Around 14 large institutional holders, including Goldman Sachs Asset Management LP and BlackRock Financial Management, broke ranks with hedge funds and accepted a settlement last year valuing claims around $2.4 billion. Chapman noted that these “sophisticated players” held around 24 percent of the RMBS.

GO TO LENDINGLIES to order forms and services

Let us help you plan your answers, affirmative defenses, discovery requests and defense narrative:

954-451-1230 or 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult. You will make things a lot easier on us and yourself if you fill out the registration form. It’s free without any obligation. No advertisements, no restrictions.

Purchase now Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar including 3.5 hours of lecture, questions and answers, plus course materials that include PowerPoint Presentations. Presenters: Attorney and Expert Neil Garfield, Forensic Auditor Dan Edstrom, Attorney Charles Marshall and and Private Investigator Bill Paatalo. The webinar and materials are all downloadable.

Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 954-451-1230 or 202-838-6345. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

GO TO WWW.LENDINGLIES.COM OR https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

===========================

See Lehman Brothers Knew 1/2 the loans were misrepresented to both borrowers and investors

The trustees representing RMBS holders are Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., Law Debenture Trust Co. of New York, U.S. Bank National Association and Wilmington Trust Co., according to court papers.

A group of hedge funds, including Whitebox Advisors LLC, Deer Park Road Management Co. and Tilden Park Capital Management LP, was formed in 2016, and expanded in May 2017 to include Prophet Capital Management LP, Tricadia Capital Management LLC, BlueMountain Capital Management LLC and others, according to court records.

The case is In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 08-13555, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan.)

Practice note: Dig into the pleadings and exhibits in these cases and you will find a treasure trove of information that supports your contention at trial that the documents are unreliable and therefore the proof of the matters asserted must be proven with facts, not assumptions. You will probably uncover inconsistent allegations from Deutsch, Credit Suisse et al. They are most likely saying one thing in court with borrowers and another in court with investors.

An important note here is that these actions are based upon the presumptive finding of the US Bankruptcy trustee as to Lehman misrepresentations.

 

 

Wells Fargo “Lending” Securities It Didn’t Own

Translation: WFB was the “custodian” of alleged “mortgage-backed” certificates issued for the benefit of investors who paid billions of dollars for ownership of the certificates. WFB “Loaned” those alleged securities to brokers. The brokers in exchange provided “collateral” the proceeds of which were reinvested by WFB. In short, WFB was laundering the investors money for the sole benefit of WFB and not for the investors who owned the certificates and certainly to the detriment of the brokers and their buyers of derivative instruments based upon the loan of the securities.

This case reveals the flowering of multiple levels arising from false claims of securitization. First WFB issues certificates from a fictitious trust that owns nothing. Then it keeps both the money paid for those certificates and it keeps the certificates as well. On Wall Street this practice is called holding securities in “street name.” Then WFB engages in trading on securities it doesn’t own, but which are worthless anyway because the certificates only represent a promise from the REMIC trusts that exists only on paper.

It is all based upon outright lies. And that is why the banks get nervous when the issue of ownership of a debt, security or derivative becomes an issue in litigation. In this case the bank represented the trades as ownership or derivative ownership of “high grade money market instruments” such as “commercial paper or bank time deposits and CDs.”

None of it was true. WFB simply says that it thought that the “instruments” were safe. The lawsuit referred to in the linked article says they knew exactly what they were doing and didn’t care whether the instruments were safe or not. If the attorneys dig deeper they will find that the certificates’ promise to pay was not issued by an actual entity, that certificates were never mortgage-backed, and that WFB set it up so when there were losses it would not fall on WFB even though WFB was using the named trust basically as a fictitious name under which it operated.

So I continue to inquire: why does any court accept any document from WFB as presumptively valid? Why not require the actual proof?

Let us help you plan your defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.

Purchase now Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar including 3.5 hours of lecture, questions and answers, plus course materials that include PowerPoint Presentations. Presenters: Attorney and Expert Neil Garfield, Forensic Auditor Dan Edstrom, Attorney Charles Marshall and and Private Investigator Bill Paatalo. The webinar and materials are all downloadable.

Get a Consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

===========================

Hat Tip Bill Paatalo

see  WFB Securities Lending Scheme

The investments by WFB went into “mortgage backed assets.” Really? So let’s see how that works. First they create the certificates and sell them to investors even though neither the investors nor the trust have any interest in mortgage assets. Then they “loan” the same certificates to brokers, who provide collateral to WFB so that WFB can “reinvest” investor money using commingled investor money from a variety of sources.

Then derivatives on derivatives are sold as private contracts or insurance policies in which when the nonexistent trust assets are declared by WFB to have failed, in which WFB collects all the proceeds. The investors from all layers are screwed. And borrowers, as was originally planned, are screwed.

The lender to the borrower in the real world (where money is exchanged) are be the investors whose money was in the dynamic dark pool when the loan of money occurred. But the investors have no proof of ownership of the debt because of the false documents created by the “underwriter” bank.  The money from the second tier of investors is used to “purchase” the certificates WFB is “printing”. And then derivatives and hybrid derivatives and synthetic derivatives are sold multiplying the effect of every certificate issued. Such has the control over currency shifted from central banks who control around $8 trillion of fiat currency to the TBTF banks who boast a shadow banking market of $1 quadrillion ($1,000,000,000,000,000.00).

This every loan and every certificate is multiplied in the shadow banking market and converted into real money in the real world. Based upon prior securities analysis and review of disclosures from the publicly held banks it thus became possible for a “bank” to receive as much as $4.2 million on a $0.1 Million loan (i..e, $100,000). But in order to maintain the farce they must foreclose and not settle which will devalue the derivatives.

Then having done all that through control of a dynamic dark pool of investor money they must of course create the illusion of a robust lending market. True this particular case involves a business acquired when WFB acquired Wachovia. But WFB acquired Wachovia because it was the actual party in control of a false securitization scheme in which Wachovia acted primarily as originator and not lender.

WFB barely cares about the interest rate because they know the loans that are being approved won’t last anyway. But its trading desk secures extra profits by selling loans with a high interest rate, as though the loans had a low interest rate thereby guaranteeing two things: (1) guaranteed defaults that WFB can insure and (2) buying low (with investor money) and selling high (to investors).

All of which brings us back to the same point I raised when I first wrote (circa 2007) about the systemic fraud in securitization not as an idea, but in the way it had been put into practice. Using established doctrines in tax litigation there are two doctrines that easily clear up the intentional obfuscation by the banks: (1) The single transaction doctrine and (2) the step transaction doctrine. Yes it is that simple. If the investors didn’t part with their money then the loan of money would have never reached the desk of the closing agent. If the homeowners had not been similarly duped as to who and what was being done, they would never have signed on the dotted line.

To assume otherwise would be the same as assuming that borrowers were looking for a way to waste money on non-deductible down payments, improvements and furniture in exchange for a monthly payment that everyone knew they couldn’t afford.

 

New Florida Law Sneaks Under the Radar

BE CAREFUL HOW AND WHEN YOU FILE BANKRUPTCY PETITIONS

Governor Scott, admits 30 other bills signed SB 220 into law. You can barely find it using search engines. The law is   confusing at best and probably unconstitutional but here it is.

The new law makes BKR filings by Petitioner into presumptions in judicial foreclosures — but only the filings of the Petitioner (raising all sorts of constitutional issues). The filings by parties claiming to be creditors do not raise the same presumption unless other legal presumptions should be applied.

So now foreclosing parties can use the filings of the Petitioner against himself. As I have repeatedly stated, BKR filings by homeowners are generally misleading or wrong. Petitioners are admitting the lien and they temporarily surrender the property. The usual computer program that creates the Petition and schedules of bankruptcy makes it difficult to file anything but the wrong schedules.

This new law enables banks and servicers to use the interim period where the home is technically owned by U.S. Trustee in Bankruptcy, disregarding the fact that the Trustee typically abandons any such interest by the end of the BKR proceedings. The logic is the homeowner lacks standing to raise defenses because he/she has surrendered the  property to the court. It gets even worse when the schedules admit the debt and admit the security instrument. ALL OF THIS CAN BE USED AS PRESUMPTIVE (AND TREATED AS CONCLUSIVE) EVIDENCE IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS.

Bottom Line: Florida has enacted a law that is out of context and fails to treat debtors and creditors equally with respect to their filings in bankruptcy court. Homeowners in bankruptcy might be blocked from using the proceeding to stop a foreclosure, although the party claiming the status of “creditor” must still apply to lift the stay. Under the new law, the filing of a BKR petition  would essentially be a confession of judgment in foreclosure judicial proceedings blocking homeowners from raising any meritorious defenses because they no longer own the property.

Meanwhile the property records still show the homeowner as owner, and will continue to do so until the foreclosure judgment is entered and the judicial sale is complete together with a certificate of title to the bidder, who in most cases is a sham creditor claiming the right to submit a sham credit bid instead of paying for the home.

Let us help you plan your Bankruptcy petition, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.
Purchase now Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar including 3.5 hours of lecture, questions and answers, plus course materials that include PowerPoint Presentations. Presenters: Attorney and Expert Neil Garfield, Forensic Auditor Dan Edstrom, Attorney Charles Marshall and and Private Investigator Bill Paatalo. The webinar and materials are all downloadable.
Get a Consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

===========================

see New Florida Law Traps Homeowners Who File for Bankruptcy Protection

So instead of getting protection from creditors, a Petitioner for Bankruptcy Relief gets the opposite -screwed out of meritorious defenses. This is what happens when nobody is watching and we keep voting for people who will vote or sign for any legislation against the homeowners and for the banks.

This is a law of evidence and until challenged, ruled unconstitutional or invalid, it MUST be followed by judges unless the judge in a foreclosure case rules the new Florida law is invalid. Good luck with that. Not likely.

PRACTICE POINTER: I have often seen Proofs of Claim (and exhibits attached thereto) filed for parties claiming to be creditors that differ materially from the filings in the court where the foreclosure is being heard. Those too could be admissions under existing rules of evidence. POCs are generally sworn documents.

And also keep in mind that if a creditor doesn’t file a timely proof of claim the debtor can file one for the creditor which can say almost anything. If your schedules don’t list a creditor with a secured interest and instead show that you don’t admit this party has that status many people have found that there is no admission that an be used in other courts.

===========================

702.12 Actions in foreclosure.— 19

(1)(a) A lienholder, in an action to foreclose a mortgage, 20 may submit any document the defendant filed under penalty of 21 perjury in the defendant’s bankruptcy case for use as an 22 admission by the defendant. 23

(b) A rebuttable presumption that the defendant has waived 24 any defense to the foreclosure is created if a lienholder 25 submits documents filed in the defendant’s bankruptcy case 26 which: 27

1. Evidence the defendant’s intention to surrender to the 28 lienholder the property that is the subject of the foreclosure; 29

2. Have not been withdrawn by the defendant; and ENROLLED 2018 Legislature SB 220 2018220er Page 2 of 2 CODING: Words stricken are deletions; words underlined are additions. 30

3. Show that a final order has been entered in the 31 defendant’s bankruptcy case which discharges the defendant’s 32 debts or confirms the defendant’s repayment plan that provides 33 for the surrender of the property. 34

(2) Pursuant to s. 90.203, a court shall take judicial 35 notice of an order entered in a bankruptcy case upon the request 36 of a lienholder. 37

(3) This section does not preclude the defendant in a 38 foreclosure action from raising a defense based upon the 39 lienholder’s action or inaction subsequent to the filing of the 40 document filed in the bankruptcy case which evidenced the 41 defendant’s intention to surrender the mortgaged property to the 42 lienholder. 43

(4) This section applies to any foreclosure action filed on 44 or after October 1, 2018. 45 Section 2. This act shall take effect October 1, 2018.

 

DARK POOLS OF SECURITIES AND MONEY FUNDED MORTGAGE LOANS

In answer to questions frequently asked of me, the term “dark pool” was not coined by me nor was it discovered by me as an instrumentality of obscuring financial transactions. I have understood the workings of dark pools since my Wall Street days. But back then, in the 1960’s and 1970’s they were not so common.

What I did discover was a dark pools were in widespread use in the era of false claims of securitization — a discovery provoked by reading the prospectuses and pooling and servicing agreements (Trust instruments) for the issuance of of “certificates” a/k/a “mortgage bonds.”  There, in black and white, was a “reserve fund” consisting of money from investors who bought the certificates from underwriters using the fictitious name of a Trust that never existed. And it was stated therein that investors could be paid from this reserve — i.e.,. paid using their own money.

There were virtually no restrictions on the use of the “reserve fund.” The more I read and the more I asked my tipsters, it became very apparent that the reserve funds were interconnected, that the Trusts did not exist and so the reserve fund was actually a dark pool — a trading ground for securities and money. It is also the locale where the the most gross violations of law occur because they are hidden from public view and often hidden even from the financial statements of the participants.

Let us help you plan your cross examination, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.
Purchase now Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar including 3.5 hours of lecture, questions and answers, plus course materials that include PowerPoint Presentations. Presenters: Attorney and Expert Neil Garfield, Forensic Auditor Dan Edstrom, Attorney Charles Marshall and and Private Investigator Bill Paatalo. The webinar and materials are all downloadable.
Get a Consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

===========================

see DARK POOLS DEFINED — https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-landmark-resolutions-barclays-and-credit-suisse-fraudulent

Securitization was at first disclaimed by all the banks and servicers 10-15 years ago. Most people don’t remember that. The defense was “What Trust?”

Forensic researchers then discovered that underwriters or others had uploaded “securitization” documents to the SEC website and later added mortgage loan schedules, (that trend out to be false and fabricated) in which certain “REMIC” trusts claimed ownership of the “mortgage loans.”

Going with the flow, the banks and servicers then filed foreclosures in the name of the nonexistent trusts — and they got away with it. Today we have a mixed blend of claims of trust ownership of loans (i.e., the underwriter using the fictitious name of the nonexistent trust) and claims of corporate ownership of loans where a major bank or “successor” trust initiates foreclosure.

But in the end what they filed in foreclosures was antithetical to the claim they were making. None of the Trusts ever acquired loans from a settlor or trustor. Nor did any trust receive the proceeds of investor capital. By definition, securitization never actually happened. Adam Levitin calls this “securitization fail.”

The true money trail starts with the dark pool consisting of all proceeds of the sale of certificates or bonds issued by the underwriter in the name of the nonexistent trust. Hence the money is not in the trust; it is in the dark pool where money and trading, deposits and withdrawals occur in great frequency. Hence the underwriter has performed a Texas two step — on the one hand it claims that ownership is in the name of the fictitious REMIC Trust while at the same time funding the origination and acquisition of loans from the dark pool.

This is critically relevant to the foreclosures. In virtually all cases, the money came from the dark pool (not a trust) to originate (not allowed under the prospectus) or acquire loans. Careful securities analysis reveals a simple fact, to wit: that there IS a money trail but it leads back to the dark pools. Hence the paper trail that leads to the successors and “trusts” are documenting transactions that never occurred between the parties named on the written instruments. This in turn means that the certificates and bonds issued in the name of the named trust were neither backed by notes or mortgages and were most certainly not backed by debts.

A careful reading of certificates indicates that most of them have a disclaimer of any interest in the underlying debts, notes and mortgages. The investors acknowledge that all they are receiving is a promise to pay issued by in the name of the trust (but not issued By the trust). The real party in interest is the underwriter who also poses as “Master Servicer” for assets owned by the named Trust. But there are no such assets; so in the end we should be dealing with, and litigating with the underwriter.

Investors gave money to the underwriter believing their money would be deposited into the “REMIC” Trust. It wasn’t. Instead their money ended up in a dark pool with no rules. The money in the dark pool should be considered as deposits by investors rather than investments since the certificates were bogus. To consider it otherwise would be to deprive investors of the last vestige of ownership of the debts, notes and mortgages that were to be conveyed into the trust in exchange for the money paid to the “trust” by investors and then paid out by the “Trustee.” No such thing ever happened.

So the answer to the frequently asked question of “then where did the money come from” is that it came from an unregulated, undisclosed dark pool invented for the purpose of defrauding investors and homeowners. And the answer to the the other frequently asked question of “how do I prove that” is you don’t prove it. You prove the inevitable gaps that show that no financial transaction occurred anywhere along the paper trail.

Remember: documenting a false transaction doesn’t make it real. The document (note, mortgage, assignment, etc.) is either tethered to a real transaction in the real world that can be disclosed or it is untethered to any real transaction. If there is no real transaction in the real world the document becomes only a piece of paper. If there is a real transaction in the real world that your opposition can prove resulted in the creation of the document, then they win — simple as that. If there is no such transaction then the claimed liability does not exist, hence there can be no default. You can’t default on a nonexistent obligation. But obviously the investors have an equitable right to the loans funded with their money.

 

When and What is Consummation of Contract?

Like many other “Black letter law” situations, when it comes to foreclosures the courts are ignoring all precedent, statutes, rules and regulations when they consider a loan contract consummated when one party signs documents — without the other side showing it signed documents and performed its obligations. Without consideration passing both ways, there is no contract to enforce.

The argument that there is nothing for the lender to sign is without merit. The further argument that therefore the only signature that counts in a written contract is the signature of one side is equally ridiculous. It is true that lenders don’t sign the notes and mortgages. But for lenders, their part of the contract only comes alive when they comply with TILA and perform — i.e., they give the loan of money.

To view it any other way would be saying that performance by the “lender” is optional. And that would by all accounts be an executory contract that would be unenforceable until the optional performance was completed. Hence consummation can only be (a) when the money appears (b) from the “lender” identified on the disclosure documents.

The banks craftily spotted the loophole that lenders don’t sign the actual instruments that provide evidence of a written loan contract. But those instruments may not be used to sidestep mutuality and reciprocity that MUST be present in every situation where a party is relying upon paper instruments instead of proving the loan from scratch. If a third party performs the duties promised by the originator there is no enforceable contract even if there is a separate remedy for recovery of money.

Consummation and consideration should be treated as fair game in discovery instead of annoying protests from the homeowner. The Courts have the power to make legal decisions — not political ones.

Let us help you plan your discovery requests: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.
Register now for Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar.
Get a Consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

Hat tip to Greg (cement boots)

Consummation vs Closing

Seems like various state laws redefine “consummation” as not the actual consummation (the initial fulfillment of promises made by both parties to a contract – think marriage) but instead, make it apply to the moment that a written obligation of a debtor (the wife) is signed at a “closing” in a loan transaction… These definitions do not take into account the duty of the originator or alleged lender (the husband) to timely perform their duties, especially to provide a record of the funding in the purported debtor’s name toward the discharge of the contracted obligation. This occurs most often in “refinance” deals where there is no seller or buyer, simply a rearranging of computer entries between financial institutions. This leaves the alleged debtor (the wife) wanting for proof of fidelity, consideration and performance while operating under the presumed legal disability created by the state’s definition. As you can imagine, and we have seen, this can have a deleterious effect on a judge’s or debtor’s ability to accurately calculate the deadline to timely file a TILA rescission notice within the three year statute of repose.

I think this comment is correct. By defining consummation as the moment when one party signs documents without regard to when or even whether the other party signs and performs contractual duties, the courts are letting originators off the hook for fraud, TILA violations and more. Like the debt itself the obligation is not open ended to anyone who claims it. It is owed to the party that owns the debt or obligation.

In normal contract law there is some fuzziness about consummation and sometimes rules of estoppel apply. But the normal rule is simply that the transaction is consummated and the documents are effective when the documentation is completed and executed by both sides, and consideration has passed both ways.

By considering consummation to be when only one party signs the courts are ignoring a basic legal doctrine that has been solid for centuries — consideration must pass before the documents can be used for enforcement.

This is particularly important in the modern era where “lenders” have been replaced by “originators.” In many cases the originator is not the lender. Hence no enforceable contract can be said to exist unless there is proof that the originator was acting for a third party Lender.

If the third party was not disclosed they would be admitting to a TILA violation. If the third party is not a lender either but rather a conduit, then we have (a) no consideration and (b) nondisclosure at “closing” as to the identity of the lender.

By “no consideration” I don’t mean that the homeowner did not receive money or the benefits of a disbursement.  I mean that nobody in the chain starting with the originator has paid that consideration and thus nobody in that chain of command is party to an enforceable contract. Like the fabricated assignments, allonges and endorsements, the existence of a paper instrument even if signed does not mean that the provisions contained therein are enforceable. Under contract law it is the transaction that must have consummated between the parties to the written contract. THAT is something that does not occur, even in the c leanest of cases, until after the closing and sometimes months or even years after.

By revealing the absence of a payment by the originator, one accomplishes two things. (1) the written loan contract (note and mortgage or Deed of Trust) was never enforceable and thus cannot be enforced by successors. (2) clear violations of TILA disclosure requirements have been violated.

BUT none of this means that there is no debt — assuming that money appeared after closing. The debt exists. The homeowner does owe money. And while the homeowner does not owe just anyone, he/she owes money to the person or parties who are out of pocket for the loan. Their remedy is probably an action in equity seeking to claim the paperwork AFTER they have proven that they are the real parties in interest. Or, their remedy would be simply the equitable action for unjust enrichment. In the first case they MIGHT preserve the mortgage encumbrance. In the second, they have no collateral.

Banks Fighting Subpoenas From FHFA Over Access to Loan Files

Whilst researching something else I ran across the following article first published in 2010. Upon reading it, it bears repeating.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

WHAT IF THE LOANS WERE NOT ACTUALLY SECURITIZED?

In a nutshell this is it. The Banks are fighting the subpoenas because if there is actually an audit of the “content” of the pools, they are screwed across the board.

My analysis of dozens of pools has led me to several counter-intuitive but unavoidable factual conclusions. I am certain the following is correct as to all residential securitized loans with very few (2-4%) exceptions:

  1. Most of the pools no longer exist.
  2. The MBS sold to investors and insured by AIG and the purchase and sale of credit default swaps were all premised on a general description of the content of the pool rather than a detailed description with the individual loans attached on a list.
  3. Each Prospectus if it carried any spreadsheet listing loans, contained a caveat that the attached list was by example only and not the real loans.
  4. Each distribution report contained a caveat that the parties who created it and the parties who delivered it did not guarantee either authenticity or reliability of the report. They even had specific admonitions regarding the content of the distribution report.
  5. NO LOAN ACTUALLY MADE IT INTO ANY POOL. The evidence is clear: nothing was done to assign, indorse or deliver the note to the investors directly or indirectly until a case went into litigation AND a hearing was scheduled. By that time the cutoff date had been breached and the loan was non-performing by their own allegation and therefore was not acceptable into the pool.
  6. AT ALL TIMES LEGAL TITLE TO THE PROPERTY WAS MAINTAINED BY THE HOMEOWNER EVEN AFTER FORECLOSURE AND SALE. The actual creditor who submitted a credit bid was not the creditor. The sale is either void or voidable.
  7. AT ALL TIMES LEGAL TITLE TO THE LOAN WAS MAINTAINED BY THE ORIGINATING “LENDER”. Since there was no assignment, indorsement or delivery that could be recognized at law or in fact, the originating lender still owns the loan legally BUT….
  8. AT ALL TIMES THE OBLIGATION WAS BOTH CREATED AND EXTINGUISHED AT, OR CONTEMPORANEOUSLY WITH THE CLOSING OF THE LOAN. Since the originating lender was in fact not the source of funds, and did not book the transaction as a loan on their balance sheet (in most cases), the naming of the originating lender as the Lender and payee on the note, both created a LEGAL obligation from the borrower to the Lender and at the same time, the LEGAL obligation was extinguished because the LEGAL Lender of record was paid in full plus exorbitant fees for pretending to be an actual lender.
  9. Since the Legal obligation was both created and extinguished contemporaneously with each other, any remaining obligation to any OTHER party became unsecured since the security instrument (mortgage or deed of trust) refers only to the promissory note executed by the borrower.
  10. At the time of closing, the investor-lenders were the real parties in interest as lenders, but they were not disclosed nor were the fees of the various intermediaries who brought the investor-lender money and the borrower’s loan together.
  11. ALL INVESTOR-LENDERS RECEIVED THE EQUIVALENT OF A BOND — A PROMISE TO PAY ISSUED BY A PARTY OTHER THAN THE BORROWER, PREMISED UPON THE PAYMENT OR RECEIVABLES GENERATED FROM BORROWER PAYMENTS, CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS, CREDIT ENHANCEMENTS, AND THIRD PARTY INSURANCE.
  12. Nearly ALL investor-lenders have been paid sums of money to satisfy the promise to pay contained in the bond. These payments always exceeded the borrowers payments and in many cases paid the obligation in full WITHOUT SUBROGATION.
  13. NO LOAN IS IN ACTUAL DEFAULT OR DELINQUENCY. Since payments must first be applied to outstanding payments due, payments received by investor-lenders or their agents from third party sources are allocable to each individual loan and therefore cure the alleged default. A Borrower’s Non-payment is not a default since no payment is due.
  14. ALL NOTICES OF DEFAULT ARE DEFECTIVE: The amount stated, the creditor, and other material misstatements invalidate the effectiveness of such a notice.
  15. NO CREDIT BID AT AUCTION WAS MADE BY A CREDITOR. Hence the sale is void or voidable.
  16. ANY BALANCE DUE FROM THE BORROWER IS SUBJECT TO DEDUCTIONS FOR THIRD PARTY PAYMENTS.
  17. ANY BALANCE DUE FROM THE BORROWER IS SUBJECT TO AN EQUITABLE CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT THAT IS UNSECURED.
  18. ANY BALANCE DUE FROM THE BORROWER IS SUBJECT TO AN EQUITABLE CLAIM FOR A LIEN TO REFLECT THE INTENTION OF THE INVESTOR-LENDER AND THE INTENTION OF THE BORROWER.  Both the investor-lender and the borrower intended to complete a loan transaction wherein the home was used to collateralize the amount due. The legal satisfaction of the originating lender is not a deduction from the equitable satisfaction of the investor-lender. THUS THE PARTIES SEEKING TO FORECLOSE ARE SUBJECT TO THE LEGAL DEFENSE OF PAYMENT AT CLOSING BUT THE INVESTOR-LENDERS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THAT DEFENSE.
  19. The investor-lenders ALSO have a claim for damages against the investment banks and the string of intermediaries that caused loans to be originated that did not meet the description contained in the prospectus.
  20. Any claim by investor-lenders may be subject to legal and equitable defenses, offsets and counterclaims from the borrower.
  21. The current modification context in which the securitization intermediaries are involved in settlement of outstanding mortgages is allowing those intermediaries to make even more money at the expense of the investor-lenders.
  22. The failure of courts to recognize that they must apply the rule of law results not only in the foreclosure of the property, but the foreclosure of the borrower’s ability to negotiate a settlement with an undisclosed equitable creditor, or with the legal owner of the loan in the property records.

Loan File Issue Brought to Forefront By FHFA Subpoena
Posted on July 14, 2010 by Foreclosureblues
Wednesday, July 14, 2010

foreclosureblues.wordpress.com

Editor’s Note….Even  U.S. Government Agencies have difficulty getting
discovery, lol…This is another excellent post from attorney Isaac
Gradman, who has the blog here…http://subprimeshakeout.blogspot.com.
He has a real perspective on the legal aspect of the big picture, and
is willing to post publicly about it.  Although one may wonder how
these matters may effect them individually, my point is that every day
that goes by is another day working in favor of those who stick it out
and fight for what is right.

Loan File Issue Brought to Forefront By FHFA Subpoena

The battle being waged by bondholders over access to the loan files
underlying their investments was brought into the national spotlight
earlier this week, when the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the
regulator in charge of overseeing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, issued
64 subpoenas seeking documents related to the mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) in which Freddie and Fannie had invested.
The FHFA
has been in charge of overseeing Freddie and Fannie since they were
placed into conservatorship in 2008.

Freddie and Fannie are two of the largest investors in privately
issued bonds–those secured by subprime and Alt-A loans that were often
originated by the mortgage arms of Wall St. firms and then packaged
and sold by those same firms to investors–and held nearly $255 billion
of these securities as of the end of May. The FHFA said Monday that it
is seeking to determine whether issuers of these so-called “private
label” MBS misled Freddie and Fannie into making the investments,
which have performed abysmally so far, and are expected to result in
another $46 billion in unrealized losses to the Government Sponsored
Entities (GSE).

Though the FHFA has not disclosed the targets of its subpoenas, the
top issuers of private label MBS include familiar names such as
Countrywide and Merrill Lynch (now part of BofA), Bear Stearns and
Washington Mutual (now part of JP Morgan Chase), Deutsche Bank and
Morgan Stanley. David Reilly of the Wall Street Journal has written an
article urging banks to come forward and disclose whether they have
received subpoenas from the FHFA, but I’m not holding my breath.

The FHFA issued a press release on Monday regarding the subpoenas
(available here). The statement I found most interesting in the
release discusses that, before and after conservatorship, the GSEs had
been attempting to acquire loan files to assess their rights and
determine whether there were misrepresentations and/or breaches of
representations and warranties by the issuers of the private label
MBS, but that, “difficulty in obtaining the loan documents has
presented a challenge to the [GSEs’] efforts. FHFA has therefore
issued these subpoenas for various loan files and transaction
documents pertaining to loans securing the [private label MBS] to
trustees and servicers controlling or holding that documentation.”

The FHFA’s Acting Director, Edward DeMarco, is then quoted as saying
““FHFA is taking this action consistent with our responsibilities as
Conservator of each Enterprise. By obtaining these documents we can
assess whether contractual violations or other breaches have taken
place leading to losses for the Enterprises and thus taxpayers. If so,
we will then make decisions regarding appropriate actions.” Sounds
like these subpoenas are just the precursor to additional legal
action.

The fact that servicers and trustees have been stonewalling even these

powerful agencies on loan files should come as no surprise based on

the legal battles private investors have had to wage thus far to force

banks to produce these documents. And yet, I’m still amazed by the

bald intransigence displayed by these financial institutions. After

all, they generally have clear contractual obligations requiring them

to give investors access to the files (which describe the very assets

backing the securities), not to mention the implicit discovery rights

these private institutions would have should the dispute wind up in

court, as it has in MBIA v. Countrywide and scores of other investor

suits.

At this point, it should be clear to everyone–servicers and investors
alike–that the loan files will have to be produced eventually, so the
only purpose I can fathom for the banks’ obduracy is delay. The loan
files should, as I’ve said in the past, reveal the depths of mortgage
originator depravity, demonstrating convincingly that the loans never
should have been issued in the first place. This, in turn, will force
banks to immediately reserve for potential losses associated with
buying back these defective mortgages. Perhaps banks are hoping that
they can ward off this inevitability long enough to spread their
losses out over several years, thereby weathering the storm caused (in
part) by their irresponsible lending practices. But certainly the
FHFA’s announcement will make that more difficult, as the FHFA’s
inherent authority to subpoena these documents (stemming from the
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008) should compel disclosure
without the need for litigation, and potentially provide sufficient
evidence of repurchase obligations to compel the banks to reserve
right away. For more on this issue, see the fascinating recent guest
post by Manal Mehta on The Subprime Shakeout regarding the SEC’s
investigation into banks’ processes for allocating loss reserves.

Meanwhile, the investor lawsuits continue to rain down on banks, with
suits by the Charles Schwab Corp. against Merrill Lynch and UBS, by
the Oregon Public Employee Retirement Fund against Countrywide, and by
Cambridge Place Investment Management against Goldman Sachs, Citigroup
and dozens of other banks and brokerages being announced this week. If
the congealing investor syndicate was looking for political cover
before staging a full frontal attack on banks, this should provide
ample protection. Much more to follow on these and other developments
in the coming days…
Technorati Links • Save to del.icio.us • Digg This! • Stumble It!

Posted by Isaac Gradman at 3:46 PM

Ally $52 Million settlement for “Deficient Securitization”

All of these adjectives describing securitization add up to one thing: the claims were false. For the most part none of the securitizations ever happened.

And that means that the REMIC trusts never purchased the debt, note or mortgage.

And THAT means the “servicer” claiming the right to administer a loan on behalf of the trust is false.

And THAT arguably means the business records of the servicer are not business records of the creditor.

And THAT my friends means what I have been saying for 10 years: virtually none of the foreclosures were legal, moral or justified. The real transaction was never revealed and never documented. The “closing” documents were fake, void and fraudulent. And THAT is grounds for cancellation of the note and mortgage.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

see http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/news/compliance-regulation/ally-to-pay-52m-to-settle-subprime-rmbs-investigation-1091364-1.html

It is hard to imagine any scenario under which Government cannot know what I have been saying for years — that the claims of securitization are false and the documents for the loans were fraudulent. Government has decided to ignore the facts thus transforming a nation of laws into a nation of men.

In plain English the decision was made to let the chips fall on borrowers, who were victims of the double blind fraud, despite clear and irrefutable evidence that the banks malevolent behavior caused the 2008 meltdown. The choice was made: based upon information from the birthplace of securitization fraud, Government decided that it was better to artificially prop up the securities markets and TBTF banks than to preserve the purchasing power and household wealth of the ordinary man and woman. The economy — driven by consumer spending (70% of GDP) — had the rug pulled out from under it. And THAT is why the effects of rescission are still with us 8 years after the great meltdown.

The fact that there are 7,000 community banks, credit unions and savings banks using the exact same electronic payments platform as the TBTF banks was washed aside by the enormous influence exerted by a dozen banks who controlled Washington, DC, the state legislatures, and the executive branch in most of the states.

The American voter came to understand that they had been screwed by their representatives in Government. They voted for Sanders, they voted for Trump and they voted for anyone who was for busting up government. But they still face daunting challenges as they continue to crash into a rigged system that favors a handful of merciless bankers who have bought their way into the Federal and State Capitals.

Chipping away at the monolithic Government Financial complex individual homeowners are winning case after case in court without notice by the media. It isn’t noticed because in most instances the cases are settled, even after judgment, with a seal of confidentiality. Most people don’t fight it at all. They sweep up and leave the keys on the counter believing they have committed some wrong and now they must pay the price. THAT is because they have not received the necessary information to realize that they can and should fight back.

Goldman Sachs Fined $5 Billion for Violations Dating Back to 2008

…should anyone who owns a home that is subject to claims of securitization of their mortgage be at risk of losing their property?

…the government should stop the arrogant policy of letting most of the burden fall onto middle class property owners.

For a description of our services  click here: https://wordpress.com/post/livinglies.wordpress.com/32498

So we have another “settlement” with one of the major players in the greatest economic crime in human history. But the cover-up of the actual transgressions  emanating from corruption on Wall Street continues. Government investigators should have had a press conference in which they clearly stated the nature of the violations — all of them. People deserve to hear the truth; and the government should stop the arrogant policy of letting most of the burden fall onto the middle class property owners.

The defects in government intervention give rise the illusion that these settlements only have effect on the investors and other financial institutions who were defrauded. Both the charges and the settlements seem far away from the ground level loans and foreclosures. But that is only because of deals in which the government’s continued complicity in “protecting the banking system — a policy that has rewarded trillion dollar banks and given them unfair advantage over the 7,000 other banks and credit unions.

Government now knows the truth about what Wall Street did. But they are restricting their comments in the fear that maybe notes and mortgages would be obviously void, making the MBS bonds worthless causing some world-wide panic and even aggression against the United States for allowing these enormous crimes to occur and continue.

For example, if the government investigators actually said that the REMIC Trusts were never funded, then the cases pending in which the REMIC Trust is named as the initiator of the foreclosure would dissolve into nothing. There would be no Plaintiff in judicial states and there would be no beneficiary in non-judicial states. Thus the filing of a substitution of trustee on a deed of trust would be void. It would raise jurisdictional issues in addition to the absence of any foundation for the assertion of the right to foreclose.

If government investigators identified patterns of conduct in the fabrication, forgery and utterance of false instruments, recording false instruments, then presumptions of validity might not apply to documents presented in court as evidence. Instead of the note being all the evidence needed from a “holder”, the actual underlying transactions would need to be proven by parties seeking foreclosure. If those transactions don’t actually exist, then it follows that the note, mortgage and claim are worthless.

And a borrower could point to the finding by administrative agencies and law enforcement agencies that these practices constitute customary and usual practices in the industry — a statement that would go a long way to convincing a judge that he or she should not assume or presume anything without proof of payment (consideration) in the origination of the loan with whoever ended up as Payee on the note. The same analysis would apply for the alleged acquisition of the “loan.”

If the party on the note or the party claiming they acquired the loan was NOT a party to an actual transaction in which they made the loan or paid to acquire it, then the note is evidence of a transaction that does not exist. Instead government is continuing to cover-up the fact that a policy decision has been made in which borrowers can fend for themselves against perpetrators of financial violence.

The view from the bench still presumes that they would not have a case to decide if there wasn’t a valid loan transaction and a valid acquisition of the loan. They see defects in documentation as splitting hairs. And to make matters worse I have personally seen judges strike virtually all discovery requests that address the issue of whether real transactions took place. And I have seen lawyers retreat over the one issue that would mean success or failure for their client. The task of defending illegal foreclosures would be far easier if the consensus view from the bench was that all the loans are suspect and need to be proven as to ownership, balance and authority.

These issues are almost impossible to prove at trial because the parties with the actual information and proof are not even at the trial. But they can be reached in discovery where on a motion to compel answers and a hearing on the objections from the “bank” or “servicer” the homeowner presses his demand for data and documents that show the actual existence or nonexistence of these transactions.

It would seem that the U.S. Department of Justice is coming out of the shadows on this. They are looking back to 10 years ago when the violations were at their most extreme. We may yet see criminal prosecutions. But putting people in jail does not address the essential issue, to wit: should anyone who owns a home that is subject to claims of securitization of their mortgage be at risk of losing their property?

 

The Devil is in the Details — The Mortgage Cannot Be Enforced, Even If the Note Can Be Enforced

Cashmere v Department of Revenue

For more information on foreclosure offense, expert witness consultations and foreclosure defense please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688. We offer litigation support in all 50 states to attorneys. We refer new clients without a referral fee or co-counsel fee unless we are retained for litigation support. Bankruptcy lawyers take note: Don’t be too quick admit the loan exists nor that a default occurred and especially don’t admit the loan is secured. FREE INFORMATION, ARTICLES AND FORMS CAN BE FOUND ON LEFT SIDE OF THE BLOG. Consultations available by appointment in person, by Skype and by phone.

————————————

Editor’s Introduction: The REAL truth behind securitization of so-called mortgage loans comes out in tax litigation. There a competent Judge who is familiar with the terms of art used in the world of finance makes judgements based upon real evidence and real comprehension of how each part affects another in the “securitization fail” (Adam Levitin) that took us by surprise. In the beginning (2007) I was saying the loans were securitized and the banks were saying there was no securitization and there was no trust.

Within a short period of time (2008) I deduced that there securitization had failed and that no Trust was getting the money from investors who thought they were buying mortgage backed securities and therefore the Trust could never be a holder in due course. I deduced this from the complete absence of claims that they were holders in due course. Whether they initiated foreclosure as servicer, trustee or trust there was no claim of holder in due course. This was peculiar because all the elements of a holder in due course appeared to be present because that is what was required in the securitization documents — at least in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement and prospectus.

If the foreclosing party was a holder in due course they would merely have to show what the securitization required — a purchase in good faith of the loan documents for value without knowledge of any of borrower’s defenses.  This would bar virtually any defense by the borrower and allow them to get a judgment on the note and a foreclosure based upon the auxiliary contract for collateral — the mortgage. But they didn’t allege that for reasons that I have described in recent articles — they could not, as part of their prima facie case, prove that any party in their “chain” had funded or paid any money for the loan.

After analyzing this case, consider the possibility that there is no party in existence who has the power to foreclose. The Trust beneficiaries clearly don’t have that right. The Trust doesn’t either because they didn’t pay anything for it. The Trustee doesn’t have that right because it can only assert the rights of the Trust and Trust beneficiaries. The servicer doesn’t have that right because it derives its authority from the Pooling and Servicing Agreement which does not apply because the loan never made it into the Trust. The originator doesn’t have the right both because they never loaned the money and now disclaim any interest in the mortgage.

Then consider the fact that it is ONLY the investors who have their money at risk but that they failed to get any documentation securing their “involuntary loans.” They might have actions to recover money from the borrower, but those actions are far from secured, and certainly subject to numerous defenses. The investors are barred from enforcing either the note or the mortgage by the terms of the instruments, the terms of the PSA and the rule of law. They are left with an unsecured common law right of action to get what they can from a claim for unjust enrichment or some other type of claim that actually reflects the true facts of the original transaction in which the borrower did receive a loan, but not from anyone represented at the loan closing.

Now we have the Cashmere case. The only assumption that the Court seems to get wrong is that the investors were trust beneficiaries because the court was assuming that the Trust received the proceeds of sale of the bonds. This does not appear to be the case. But the case also explains why the investors wanted to take the position that they were trust beneficiaries in order to get the tax treatment they thought they were getting. So here we have the victims and perpetrators of the fraud taking the same side because of potentially catastrophic results in tax treatment — potentially treating principal payments as ordinary income. That would reduce the return on investment below zero. They lost.

http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Cashmere-v-Dept-of-Revenue.pdf

I have changed fonts to emphasize certain portion of the following excerpts from the Case decision:

“Cashmere’s investments merely gave Cashmere the right to receive specific cash flows generated by the assets of the trust at specific times. But if the REMIC trustee failed to pay Cashmere according to the terms of the investment, Cashmere had no right to sell the mortgage loans or the residential property or any other asset of the trust to satisfy this obligation. Cf. Dep’t of Revenue v. Sec. Pac. Bank of Wash. Nat’/ Ass’n, 109 Wn. App. 795, 808, 38 P.3d 354 (2002) (deduction allowed because mortgage companies transferred ownership of loans to taxpayer who could sell the oans in event of default). Cashmere’s only recourse would be to sue the trustee for performance of the obligation or attempt to replace the trustee. The trustee’s successor would then take legal title to the underlying securities or other assets of the related trust. At no time could Cashmere take control of trust assets and reduce them to cash to satisfy a debt obligation. Thus, we hold that under the plain language of the statute, Cashmere’s investments in REMICs are not primarily secured by mortgages or deeds of trust.
12
“Cashmere argues that the investments are secure because the trustee is obligated to protect the investors’ interests and the trustee has the right to foreclose. But, this is not always the case. The underlying mortgages back all of the tranches, and a trustee must balance competing interests between investors of different tranches. Thus, a default in one tranche does not automatically give the holders of that tranche a right to force foreclosure. We hold that if the terms of the trust do not give beneficiaries an investment secured by trust assets, the trustee’s fiduciary obligations do not transform the investment into a secured investment.

“In a 1990 determination, DOR explained why interest earned from investments in REMICs does not qualify for the mortgage tax deduction. see Wash. Dep’t of Revenue, Determination No. 90-288, 10 Wash. Tax Dec. 314 (1990). A savings and loan association sought a refund of B&O taxes assessed on interest earned from investments in REMICs. The taxpayer argued that because interest received from investments in pass-through securities is deductible, interest received on REMICs
should be too. DOR rejected the deduction, explaining that with pass-through securities, the issuer holds the mortgages in trust for the investor. In the event of individual default, the issuer, as trustee, will foreclose on the property to satisfy the terms of the loan. In other words, the right to foreclose is directly related to homeowner defaults-in the event of default, the trustee can foreclose and the proceeds from foreclosure flow to investors who have a beneficial ownership interest in the underlying mortgage. Thus, investments in pass-through securities are “primarily secured by” first mortgages.

“By contrast, with REMICs, a trustee’s default may or may not coincide with an individual homeowner default. So, there may be no right of foreclosure in the event a trustee fails to make a payment. And if a trustee can and does foreclose, proceeds from the sale do not necessarily go to the investors. Foreclosure does not affect the trustee’s obligations vis-a-vis the investor. Indeed, the Washington Mutual REMIC here contains a commonly used form of guaranty: “For any month, if the master servicer receives a payment on a mortgage loan that is less than the full scheduled payment or if no payment is received at all, the master servicer will advance its own funds to cover the shortfall.” “The master servicer will not be required to make advances if it determines that those advances will not be recoverable” in the future. At foreclosure or liquidation, any proceeds will go “first to the servicer to pay back any advances it might have made in the past.” Similarly, agency REMICs, like the Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 2000-38, guarantee payments even if mortgage borrowers default, regardless of whether the issuer expects to recover those payments. Moreover, the assets held in a REMIC trust are often MBSs, not mortgages.

“So, if the trustee defaults, the investors may require the trustee to sell the MBS, but the investor cannot compel foreclosure of individual properties. DOR also noted that it has consistently allowed the owners of a qualifying mortgage to claim the deduction in RCW 82.04.4292. But the taxpayer who invests in REMICs does not have any ownership interest in the MBSs placed in trust as collateral, much less any ownership interest in the mortgage themselves. By contrast, a pass-through security represents a beneficial ownership of a fractional undivided interest in a pool of first lien residential mortgage loans. Thus, DOR concluded that while investments in pass-through securities qualify for the tax deduction, investments in REMICs do not. We should defer to DOR’s interpretation because it comports with the plain meaning of the statute.

“Moreover, this case is factually distinct. Borrowers making the payments that eventually end up in Cashmere’s REMIC investments do not pay Cashmere, nor do they borrow money from Cashmere. The borrowers do not owe Cashmere for use of borrowed money, and they do not have any existing contracts with Cashmere. Unlike HomeStreet, Cashmere did not have an ongoing and enforceable relationship with borrowers and security for payments did not rest directly on borrowers’ promises to repay the loans. Indeed, REMIC investors are far removed from the underlying mortgages. Interest received from investments in REMICs is often repackaged several times and no longer resembles payments that homeowners are making on their mortgages.

“We affirm the Court of Appeals and hold that Cashmere’s REMIC investments are not “primarily secured by” first mortgages or deeds of trust on nontransient residential real properties. Cashmere has not shown that REMICs are secured-only that the underlying loans are primarily secured by first mortgages or deeds of trust. Although these investments gave Cashmere the right to receive specific cash flows generated by first mortgage loans, the borrowers on the original loans had no obligation to pay Cashmere. Relatedly, Cashmere has no direct or indirect legal recourse to the underlying mortgages as security for the investment. The mere fact that the trustee may be able to foreclose on behalf of trust beneficiaries does not mean the investment is “primarily secured” by first mortgages or deeds of trust.

Editor’s Note: The one thing that makes this case even more problematic is that it does not appear that the Trust ever paid for the acquisition or origination of loans. THAT implies that the Trust didn’t have the money to do so. Because the business of the trust was the acquisition or origination of loans. If the Trust didn’t have the money, THAT implies the Trust didn’t receive the proceeds of sale from their issuance of MBS. And THAT implies that the investors are not Trust beneficiaries in any substantive sense because even though the bonds were issued in the name of the securities broker as street name nominee (non objecting status) for the benefit of the investors, the bonds were issued in a transaction that was never completed.

Thus the investors become simply involuntary direct lenders through a conduit system to which they never agreed. The broker dealer controls all aspects of the actual money transfers and claims the amounts left over as fees or profits from proprietary trading. And THAT means that there is no valid mortgage because the Trust got an assignment without consideration, the Trustee has no interest in the mortgage and the investors who WERE the original source of funds were never given the protection they thought they were getting when they advanced the money. So the “lenders” (investors) knew nothing about the loan closing and neither did the borrower. The mortgage is not enforceable by the named “originator” because they were not the lender and they did not close as representative of the lenders.

There is no party who can enforce an unenforceable contract, which is what the mortgage is here. And the note is similarly defective — although if the note gets into the hands of a party who DID PAY value in good faith without knowledge of the borrower’s defenses and DID GET DELIVERY and ACCEPT DELIVERY of the loans then the note would be enforceable even if the mortgage is not. The borrower’s remedy would be to sue the people who put him into those loans, not the holder who is suing on the note because the legislature adopted the UCC and Article 3 says the risk of loss falls on the borrower even if there were defenses to the loan. The lack of consideration might be problematic but the likelihood is that the legislative imperative would be followed — allowing the holder in due course to collect from the borrower even in the absence of a loan by the so-called “originator.”

Powers of Attorney — New Documents Magically Appear

For more information on foreclosure offense, expert witness consultations and foreclosure defense please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688. We offer litigation support in all 50 states to attorneys. We refer new clients without a referral fee or co-counsel fee unless we are retained for litigation support. Bankruptcy lawyers take note: Don’t be too quick admit the loan exists nor that a default occurred and especially don’t admit the loan is secured. FREE INFORMATION, ARTICLES AND FORMS CAN BE FOUND ON LEFT SIDE OF THE BLOG. Consultations available by appointment in person, by Skype and by phone.

————————————

BONY/Mellon is among those who are attempting to use a Power of Attorney (POA) that they say proves their ownership of the note and mortgage. In No way does it prove ownership. But it almost forces the reader to assume ownership. But it is not entitled to a presumption of any kind. This is a document prepared for use in litigation and in no way is part of normal business records. They should be required to prove every word and every exhibit. The ONLY thing that would prove ownership is proof of payment. If they owned it they would be claiming HDC status. Not only doesn’t it PROVE ownership, it doesn’t even recite or warrant ownership, indemnification etc. It is a crazy document in substance but facially appealing even though it doesn’t really say anything.

The entire POA is hearsay, lacks foundation, and is irrelevant without the proper foundation be laid by the proponent of the document. I do not think it can be introduced as a business records exception since such documents are not normally created in the ordinary course of business especially with such wide sweeping powers that make no sense — unless you recognize that they are dealing with worthless paper that they are trying desperately to make valuable.

They should have given you a copy of the settlement agreement referred to in the POA and they should have identified the original PSA that is referred to in the settlement agreement. Those are the foundation documents because the POA says that the terms used are defined in the PSA, Settlement agreement or both. I want all documents that are incorporated by reference in the POA.

If you have asked whether the Trust ever paid for your loan, I would like to see their answer.

If CWALT, Inc. or CWABS, Inc., or CWMBS, Inc is anywhere in your chain of title or anywhere else mentioned in any alleged origination or transfer of your loan, I assume you asked for those and I would like to see them too.

The PSA requires that the Trust pay for and receive the loan documents by way of the depositor and custodian. The Trustee never takes possession of the loan documents. But more than that it is important to distinguish between the loan documents and the debt. If there is no debt between you and the originator (which means that the originator named on the note and mortgage never advanced you any money for the loan) then note, which is only evidence of the debt and allegedly containing the terms of repayment is only evidence of the debt — which we know does not exist if they never answered your requests for proof of payment, wire transfer or canceled check.

If you have been reading my posts the last couple of weeks you will see what I am talking about.

The POA does not warrant or even recite that YOUR loan or anything resembling control or ownership of YOUR LOAN is or was ever owned by BONY/Mellon or the alleged trust. It is a classic case of misdirection. By executing a long and very important-looking document they want the judge to presume that the recitations are true and that the unrecited assumptions are also true. None of that is correct. The reference to the PSA only shows intent to acquire loans but has no reference or exhibit identifying your loan. And even if there was such a reference or exhibit it would be fabricated and false — there being obvious evidence that they did not pay for it or any other loan.

The evidence that they did not pay consists of a lot of things but once piece of logic is irrefutable — if they were a holder in due course you would be left with no defenses. If they are not a holder in due course then they had no right to collect money from you and you might sue to get your payments back with interest, attorney fees and possibly punitive damages unless they turned over all your money to the real creditors — but that would require them to identify your real creditors (the investors who thought they were buying mortgage bonds but whose money was never given to the Trust but was instead used privately by the securities broker that did the underwriting on the bond offering).

And the main logical point for an assumption is that if they were a holder in due course they would have said so and you would be fighting with an empty gun except for predatory and improper lending practices at the loan closing which cannot be brought against the Trust and must be directed at the mortgage broker and “originator.” They have not alleged they are a holder in course.

The elements of holder in dude course are purchase for value, delivery of the loan documents, in good faith without knowledge of the borrower’s defenses. If they had paid for the loan documents they would have been more than happy to show that they did and then claim holder in due course status. The fact that the documents were not delivered in the manner set forth in the PSA — tot he depositor and custodian — is important but not likely to swing the Judge your way. If they paid they are a holder in due course.

The trust could not possibly be attacked successfully as lacking good faith or knowing the borrower’s defenses, so two out of four elements of HDC they already have. Their claim of delivery might be dubious but is not likely to convince a judge to nullify the mortgage or prevent its enforcement. Delivery will be presumed if they show up with what appears to be the original note and mortgage. So that means 3 out of the four elements of HDC status are satisfied by the Trust. The only remaining question is whether they ever entered into a transaction in which they originated or acquired any loans and whether yours was one of them.

Since they have not alleged HDC status, they are admitting they never paid for it. That means the Trust is admitting there was no payment, which means they were not entitled to delivery or ownership of the note, mortgage, or debt.

So that means they NEVER OWNED THE DEBT OR THE LOAN DOCUMENTS. AS A HOLDER IN COURSE IT WOULD NOT MATTER IF THEY OWNED THE DEBT — THE LOAN DOCUMENTS ARE ENFORCEABLE BY A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE EVEN IF THERE IS NO DEBT. THE RISK OF LOSS TO ANY PERSON WHO SIGNS A NOTE AND MORTGAGE AND ALLOWS IT TO BE TAKEN OUT OF HIS OR HER POSSESSION IS ON THE PARTY WHO TOOK IT AND THE PARTY WHO SIGNED IT — IF THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION, THE DOCUMENTS ARE ONLY SUCCESSFULLY ENFORCED WHERE AN INNOCENT PARTY PAYS REAL VALUE AND TAKES DELIVERY OF THE NOTE AND MORTGAGE IN GOOD FAITH WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF THE BORROWER’S DEFENSES.

So if they did not allege they are an HDC then they are admitting they don’t own the loan papers and admitting they don’t own the loan. Since the business of the trust was to pay for origination of loans and acquisition of loans there is only one reason they wouldn’t have paid for the loan — to wit: the trust didn’t have the money. There is only one reason the trust would not have the money — they didn’t get the proceeds of the sale of the bonds. If the trust did not get the proceeds of sale of the bonds, then the trust was completely ignored in actual conduct regardless of what the documents say. Which means that the documents are not relevant to the power or authority of the servicer, master servicer, trust, or even the investors as TRUST BENEFICIARIES.

It means that the investors’ money was used directly for fees of multiple people who were not disclosed in your loan closing, and some portion of which was used to fund your loan. THAT MEANS the investors have no claim as trust beneficiaries. Their only claim is as owner of the debt, not the loan documents which were made out in favor of people other than the investors. And that means that there is no basis to claim any power, authority or rights claimed through “Securitization” (dubbed “securitization fail” by Adam Levitin).

This in turn means that the investors are owners of the debt but lack any documentation with which to enforce the debt. That doesn’t mean they can’t enforce the debt, but it does mean they can’t use the loan documents. Once they prove or you admit that you did get the loan and that the money came from them, they are entitled to a money judgment on the debt — but there is no right to foreclose because the deed of trust, like a mortgage, is made out to another party and the investors were never included in the chain of title because the intermediaries were  making money keeping it from the investors. More importantly the “other party” had no risk, made no money advance and was otherwise simply providing an illegal service to disguise a table funded loan that is “predatory per se” as per REG Z.

And THAT is why the originator received no money from successors in most cases — they didn’t ask for any money because the loan had cost them nothing and they received a fee for their services.

%d bloggers like this: