Investors Were Not Injured By Non Payment from Homeowners. They Were Injured by Non Payment from Investment Banks

The trap door is thinking that investors were hurt by borrowers failing to make payments when in fact they were injured by brokerage companies not paying them regardless of how much money was being received and created. This trap door inevitably leads one into thinking that the money proceeds from a forced sale of property in foreclosure are being paid to investors. That is just not true.

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Exchange between me and fairly knowledgeable client:

Client: “But if investors put up the money then they would be the injured party if borrowers don’t pay, or at least if things were normal.”

From me:

Incorrect. Investors were injured by  the failure of brokerage firms to make payments to them that were purely optional. Investors were not injured by failure of borrowers to pay their mortgage payments as defined in the promissory note.

At the option of the investment bank, the investors who paid value for the certificates issued by the investment bank, continue to receive payments. Those payments come from a reserve pool of money funded entirely by the investors initial purchase of certificates (but they are labeled “Servicer advances”).

You are falling through the trap door that the banks and their lawyers have created. Investors did not put up money to purchase your loan or acquire it or originate your loan. They had no legal part in that unless a judge were to enter an order stating that while the form of the transaction says they had nothing to do with your loan, the investors were nonetheless substantively the “lenders.” The banks and the investors would argue against that since it would make investors liable for lending and servicing violations.

You are presuming something that the banks want you to presume. The truth is that the investors were told that they would be paid by the brokerage firm that set up the plan of what they called “securitization.”

The promise received by investors was from the brokerage firm not the borrower. The money on deposit with the brokerage firm was used to originate or acquire loans as a cost of doing business, to wit: the business of issuing and trading in derivative securities to which neither the investors nor “borrowers” were parties and therefore received no compensation despite the fact that without them none of those trades could have taken place.

The promise (certificate or mortgage bond) was issued in the name of a “trust” that at best was inchoate” under law (i.e., “sleeping”). The trust name was merely a business name under which the brokerage firm was doing business. The promise was not secured by any interest in the debt, note or mortgage on any loan. In fact, at the time of investment there were no loans in any portfolio that were the subject of the investment. There was a promise to aggregate such a portfolio and the list of loans attached to the prospectus is subject to the disclaimer that it is not the real list but rather an example of the kind of data the investors will see when the offering of certificates is complete.

The certificates themselves do not convey and right, title or interest to the debt, note or mortgage on any loan. The investors merely hold an unsecured promise to pay where the promissor is the brokerage firm (Investment bank) and the amount of payments to be received by investors are indexed on the data for an aggregate of loans; but such payments are entirely dependent upon the sole discretion of the investment bank (Brokerage firm) and the performance of the index — i.e., the performance of borrowers.

Investors thus receive money as long as the investment bank wants them to receive money regardless of actual performance of loans. The non performance of borrowers represents an excuse for the investment bank to stop paying the entire amount of their promise, if the managers of the investment bank so choose.

But since the investment bank (brokerage firm) was using money deposited on account the net result is that the investors paid value for the origination or acquisition of the debt but never got to own it under current law.

And the investment bank briefly became the “owner” of the debt without having actually paid for it, and then created a “sale” at its trading desk in which the loans were “sold” to the “trust” at an enormous premium (second tier yield spread premium) from the amount that was actually loaned to borrowers at much higher interest rates than the amount demanded by the investors. 

Bottom Line: Under current law in all jurisdictions nobody qualifies as the owner of the debt by reason of having paid for it because those two functions were split by the investment bank.

The value was paid by investors who did not receive ownership of the debt. The ownership of the debt as in the hands of the brokerage firm that started the securitization scheme and then transferred to itself using the name of the fictional trust. Hence the brokerage firm, directly or indirectly continued to “own” the debt without having actually paid for it. This is legally impossible under current law.

Under current law, nobody can claim to own or enforce a debt without having paid value for it. A transfer of rights to a mortgage is a legal nullity unless there is a concurrent payment of value for the debt. The only possible claimant in a court of equity is the investment bank, but they continue to hide behind multiple layers of sham conduits who actually have no contractual or other relationship with the investment bank. All such “securitized” loans are therefore orphans under current law where the debt, note and mortgage cannot be legally enforced.

The only way they have been enforced has the acceptance by the courts of erroneous presumptions that effectively reconstitute the debt, note and mortgage out of the prior transactions that split it all up. This produced the opportunity for profits that were far in excess of the loan itself which was viewed by the investment bank as simply a cost of doing business rather than an actual loan. Besides violating current law under the Uniform Commercial Code it also violates public policy as explicitly enunciated under the Federal Truth in Lending Act and public policy stated in various state laws prohibiting deceptive lending and servicing practices.

Those excessive profits should, in my opinion, be the subject of reallocation that includes the investors and borrowers without whom those profits could not exist. These are the actions for disgorgement and recoupment to which I have referred elsewhere on this blog. But in order to have real teeth I believe it is necessary to join the investment banks who had a role in the claimed “securitization.”

In affirmative defenses you can name a third party but you must express the defense as something for which the actual named claimant is vicariously accountable. Otherwise you need to file a counterclaim, the downside of which is that many such claims are barred by the statute of limitations whereas affirmative defenses are not usually subject to the statute of limitations.

The reason you can’t get a straight answer to discovery is that ownership and payment have been split between two entirely different parties. Yet current law demands that the enforcing party be (a) the owner of the debt, note and mortgage and (b) the party who paid value for the loan. In most situations involving claims of securitization that requirement cannot and is not meant to be fulfilled.

Clearly  changes in the law are required to allow for securitizations as practiced. But in order to do that the laws regarding disclosures to investors and borrowers must get far more specific and rigorous so that freer market forces can apply. With transparency market corrections for excessive or even unconscionable transactions are possible — allowing both borrowers and investors to bargain for a share of the bounty created by securitization arising from the investment of investors and borrowers.

Current law supports disgorgement of such profits because they were not disclosed. But current law fails to identify such “trading profits” as arising from the the actual transaction with investors, on one hand, and the borrowers on the other hand. This might be accomplished in the courts.

But a far better alternative is to level the playing field with clearly worded statutes that prevent what had been merely intermediaries from draining of money and other value from the only two real parties in interest as defined by both the single transaction doctrine and the step transaction doctrine.

The Solution to Defective Securitization of Mortgage Debt: The Bare Legal Truth About Securitization of Mortgage Debt

The basic truth is that current law cannot accommodate securitization of mortgage debt as it has been practiced. In short, what they (the investment banks) did was illegal. It could be reformed. But until the required legal steps are taken that address all stakeholders virtually all foreclosures ever conducted were at best problematic and at worst the product of a fraudulent scheme employing illegal tactics, false documents and false arguments of law and fact.

Without specifically saying so the courts have treated the situation as though the correction has already occurred. It hasn’t.

It is through no fault of the borrower that the investors put up money without acquiring the debt. That doesn’t mean they were not the ones who paid value for the debt. Therefore the only conceivable party, in equity, who should be able to enforce the mortgage is the investors but they cannot because they contractually barred from doing so. 

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I think it is worth noting that securitization of loans was never completed in most scenarios. Value was paid by the Investors who, contrary to popular belief, never received ownership of the debt, note or mortgage.
  1. Cash flow was promised by the investment banker doing business as an alleged Trust, but the investors who were the recipients of that promise had no recourse to the mortgages (or the notes and underlying debts) and hence no recourse to enforce them.
  2. The alleged Trust never acquired the debt. Neither the trust nor any trustor or settlor ever entered into a transaction in which value was paid for the debt as required under Article 9 § 203 of the Uniform Commercial Code. It should be emphasized the this is not a guideline. It is statutory law in all U.S. jurisdictions. People get confused by court rulings in which ownership of the debt was presumed. Those decisions are not running contrary to Article 9 § 203 of the Uniform Commercial Code. To the contrary, those decisions seek to conform to that statutory requirement and the common law Doctrine that any reported transfer of the mortgage without transfer of ownership of the debt is a legal nullity. In short they avoid the issue by presuming compliance — contrary to the actual facts. 
  3. Under Article 3 of The Uniform Commercial Code it is possible that the trust acquired the note but under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code the trust could not have acquired the mortgage, unless the transferor had sold the debt to the trust or the transferor was a party to the trust and had paid value for the debt. This is black-letter law.
  4. Endorsement of the note is of questionable legality since the endorser did not own the debt. In addition, the endorser had no legal right to claim a representative capacity for the investors who had paid value for the promise of the Investment Bank  (ie, they did not pay value for the debt). 
  5. I think that the only way an endorsement could be valid is if the endorser owned the debt or has legal authority to represent the owners of the debt who had paid value for the debt. I don’t believe that such a party exists.
  6. The only party who had barely legal title to the debt, the investment banker, had sold all or part of the cash flow from the mortgage loans for amounts in excess of the amount due on the debts. The remaining attributes of the debt or indirectly sold by financial instruments whose value was derived from the value of the derivative certificates issued in the name of the trust.
  7. There is no one party who has legal ownership of the debt and who has paid value for it. The brokerage of the note was merely a process of laundering title and rights to the debt to create the illusion that someone had both. The actual owner of the debt is a collection of legal entities that are not in privity with each other. That Gap was intentional and that is what enabled the Investment Bank to effectively sell the same loan an average of 12 times — for its own benefit.
  8. A Court of equity needs to allocate those sales proceeds. The implied contract with borrowers required disclosure of all compensation arising from the loan transaction. The implied contract with investors was the same. Both would have bargained for a piece of the pie that was generated by the investment bank. Neither one could do that because the large accrual of  heretofore impossible profits and compensation was both unknown and actively concealed from any reporting by investment banks.
  9. It is through no fault of the borrower that the investors put up money without acquiring the debt.
  10. The only way to bridge this problem is by somebody pleading Reformation or some other Equitable remedy in which the liability on the note or the liability on the debt is canceled.
    1. Anything less than that leaves the borrower with an additional prospective liability on either the debt or the note.
    2. But for the court to consider such a remedy in a court of equity it must restructure the relationship between the Investors and either the debt or the note and mortgage.
    3. And in turn it must then restructure the relationship between the party claiming a representative capacity to enforce the mortgage and the investors.
    4. In short, the investors must be declared to be the owner of the debt and the owner of the mortgage who has paid value for the debt.
    5. Only after a court order is entered to that effect may the investors then enforce the mortgage.
    6. The only way the Investors could enforce the mortgage would be if they were each named as the claimant and the investor(s) were receiving the proceeds of foreclosure sale to reduce or eliminate the debt.
    7. They could act through a collective entity, such as a trustee under a trust agreement in which the trustee was directly representing the investors. In that event the named trust in the Foreclosure action could be ratified and come into full legal existence as the legal claimant.
    8. Until then virtually all foreclosures naming a trust as claimant or naming “certificate holders” as unnamed claimants are fatally defective requiring dismissal with prejudice.
  11. However, this restructuring could interfere with the other derivative products sold on the basis of the performance of the certificates. The proceeds of such sales went to the Investment Bank and Affiliates who assisted in the selling of the additional derivative products.
  12. I repeat that none of this was caused by borrowers or investors or even known to be in existence.
  13. And the problem would not exist but for the persistence of the investment banks in maximizing Revenue at the expense and detriment of both investors and Borrowers.
  14. The problem with my solution is that much of the revenue collected by the investment Banks would accrue to the benefit of the investors.
  15. So the court would need to claw back a substantial amount of the revenue collected by the Investment Bank in each securitization scheme and then allocate the proceeds as to principal and interest on the underlying debt. Hence principal balances on the debt and the accrual of interest could be affected by the restructuring.

Just to be clear, MERS is absolutely nothing.

For some reason I have been getting more questions about MERS lately. My analogy has always been that MERS is like a holograph of an empty paper bag. So here are some basic factors for the checklist and analysis:

  1. MERS never signed any contract with any borrower.
  2. MERS never has any contractual or other legal relationship with investors (certificate holders) or Government Sponsored Entities (GSEs) like Fannie, Freddie or Sallie.
  3. MERS never signed any agreement or contract with most named “lenders.”
  4. MERS never signed any agreement or contract with respect to any specific loan transaction or acquisition.
  5. MERS was never the Payee on any note from a borrower.
  6. MERS never loaned any money in any residential loan transaction.
  7. MERS never paid any money for the acquisition of any residential loan agreement, debt, note or mortgage.
  8. MERS never handled any money arising from the origination of the loan.
  9. MERS never handled any money raising from administration of the loan.
  10. MERS never received a loan payment.
  11. MERS never disbursed any money to any creditor of a debt created by a loan.
  12. MERS does not conduct meeting of its board of directors to authorize any officer to sign any document.
  13. MERS never asserts warrants that the information maintained on its platform is true, correct or even secure from manipulation.
  14. MERS’ members can enter the system to insert any data  they want to insert, delete, or change.
  15. MERS never claims any right, title or interest in any debt, note or mortgage. In fact, its website disclaims such an interest.
  16. MERS never maintains any agency relationship with any actual lenders.
  17. MERS never retains any agency relationship with any named lenders who are creditors after the loan is consummated.
  18. MERS has no successors.
  19. MERS never has power on its own to assign any right, title or interest to any debt, note or mortgage.
  20. MERS never has power as an agent to assign any right, title or interest  to any debt, note or mortgage except for a principal who does have a right, title or interest to whatever is assigned.
  21. MERS never warrants that it has any agency relationship or power of attorney on behalf of any party whom it warrants is its principal and who owns the right, title or interest to any debt, note  or mortgage.
  22. MERS never has any legal relationship or retainer with any lawyer seeking to enforce the note or mortgage in any transaction or court proceeding.
  23. MERS never has any legal relationship or agreement with any company asserted to be an administrator or servicer of a residential loan.
  24. MERS never has any legal relationship or agreement with any trustee of any REMIC trust.
  25. MERS has been sanctioned, banned and fined in many states along with the parties who claim rights through the use of MERS. Despite that MERS has never changed its practices or procedures.
  26. Any document of transfer of rights to a security instrument that shows a signature of a person who is identified as an officer or employee of MERS is a false document, with a false signature containing one or more false utterances.
  27. MERS is always a naked nominee possessed with no powers, rights or obligations and possessed with no rights, title or interests in any loans originated or acquired by third parties; however the courts have held that if a new party had paid for the debt, then it may instruct MERS to execute an assignment even if the original principal no longer exists.
  28. MERS is never party to any part of any loan transaction or loan acquisition in which consideration is paid.
  29. MERS is always a diversion from the true facts. In 2008 16 banks took my deposition for 5 1/2 days straight regarding the status of MERS. I said then and I say now that the use of MERS is less meaningful than using the name of a fictional character like Donald Duck.
  30. Despite thousands of attacks on me and my work over 12 years, not one memo, treatise or article has ever been published that said otherwise.
  31. No expert opinion has ever been given by affidavit or in live testimony to the contrary.
  32. In fact, not even a blog article or fake news article has ever said MERS is either a legitimate alternative to tracing title through county recording or a legitimate beneficiary under a deed of trust or a legitimate mortgagee under a mortgage. 
  33. The asserted presence of MERS on any document or pleading or notice always means that the lawyers, servicers and other third parties are seeking to conceal material facts from the borrower and from the courts.

What is Fair?

The question should not be the bipolar question of who gets a “free house,” with the answer being the borrower or a party claiming entitlement to enforce. The question should be how to create a new equitable and legal infrastructure to clean up the mess that the banks created without unnecessarily penalizing either the investors who put up the money in the first place and the borrowers who put up their lives.

This is a question that BOTH the courts and the legislatures must face for failure to do so compounds the already compounding chaos and tragedy that befell our nation when the scheme initially collapsed in 2008.

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GET FREE HELP: Just click here and submit  the confidential, free, no obligation, private REGISTRATION FORM. The key to victory lies in understanding your own case.
Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 954-451-1230. Ask for a Consult or check us out on www.lendinglies.com. Order a PDR BASIC to have us review and comment on your notice of TILA Rescission or similar document.
I provide advice and consultation to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key required elements of a scam — in and out of court. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM.
PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORM 
Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 954-451-1230. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
========================
The borrower was lured into a loan contract in which she thought that the named lender had a financial interest in the outcome of the contract. The actual lender was a remote investment bank about whom she had received no disclosure and, as an average person of ordinary knowledge and means, had no access to information that would revealed the true nature of the contract.
*
Rather than seeking to conform to law in selling such loan products the real lender sought to avoid the law.
*
Rather than making money through the receipt of interest payments, the real lender intended and quickly divested itself of any interest or expectation of receiving interest or principal payments. The real lender also divested itself all of all risk of loss associated with payments. In short, the real purpose of the loan was to create multiple vehicles that could be sold as private contracts, resulting in the receipt of money that far exceeded the principal amount of the loan made to the borrower.
*
While ordinary residential homeowners normally rely on the premise that the loan’s purpose was to generate revenue and profit for the lender through the receipt of interest payments, her named lender would not and did not receive interest payments and had no profit except from fees paid by the remote investment bank through conduits.
*
Thus the actual lender entered into a loan arrangement without contract for the sole purpose of selling various attributes of the loan to as many investors as possible using as many complex financial instruments as they could conjure. The borrower had entered the arrangement believing that the named lender was the actual lender and that all compensation arising from the consummation of the loan was disclosed.
*
The actual lender retained no direct interest in the performance or outcome of the loan. The borrower was unaware that they had signed up for an arrangement in which the other side of the equation would create millions of dollars in “trading profits” arising from the declared existence of the loan, along with her name, reputation, signature and the collateral of her home.
*
Hence the goal of the lender was to create such loans regardless of quality. In fact, the lower the quality the more profit they made. And foreclosures became the vehicle by which the actual lender (investment bank) covered up the violation of federal and state lending statutes and common law doctrines of fair dealing and public policy.
*
Since judges thought that the proceeds of a foreclosure sale would go to the owner of the debt, and thus pay down the debt, they thought that there was little harm in granting foreclosures even if the paperwork was somewhat “dodgy.” But an increasing number of judges are questioning two main issues.
*
The first issue, which has been repeatedly voiced by hundreds of judges since 2008, is why there have been so many changes in the name of the servicer who supposedly was authorized to administer the loan and whether the servicer was actually administering the loan for or on behalf of an owner of the debt as required by law. Because without that its records would not  be allowed in as an exception to the hearsay rule. (The claimed “servicer” would just be a company that had intervened for its own financial interest which included fees for enabling a successful foreclosure. Hence their records would not have intrinsic credibility of a third party who had no interest in the outcome of litigation).
*
The second issue which is being raised with increasing frequency is why it was necessary to create documents of dubious origin and authenticity? In an industry that created virtually all the paperwork required for closing loan transactions, and created the industry standards for maintenance of such documents how and why did they manage to lose or destroy the original promissory note so often? (And why was it necessary to fabricate any documents?)
*
And a third issue which is only now being discussed with some earnest, is whether the right to resell the loan automatically includes the the right to use the personal data of the borrower for many sales of many of the loan attributes that were not contemplated by the borrower because they were hidden from the borrower.
*
Europe is ahead of the U.S. in understanding that personal data is a property right. But laws in the U.S. do answer the question. Where the contract in known by only one side to have attributes that are withheld from the other side it is subject to the doctrine of implied contract (assumpsit) in which the party discovering the true nature of the contract may enforce a right to receive compensation for the attributes that were previously unknown.
*
There can be little doubt that nearly all loan arrangements for residential property as collateral since 1996 have all the elements of an implied contract that is far beyond the scope of the written contract. Hence there can be no doubt that the borrowers are entitled to some form of compensation or damages arising from the implied contract and/or the violation of disclosure requirements in the Truth in Lending Act and state lending laws.
*
The scope of this issue is a fact. In 1983 there was zero in nominal or actual value of instruments deriving their value from debt. Today there is over 1 quadrillion ($1,000,000,000,000,000) dollars in the shadow banking market. The total amount of fiat (actual) currency in the world is only 85 trillion ($85,000,000,000,000) dollars.
*
The meaning is clear: for every dollar ($1.00) in real transactions of fiat currency there is, on average, $11.75 in trading profits for the banks and investors who trade in that market. That means that for the average of loan of $200,000 it is almost certain that the profits generated from the origination or acquisitions that loans was on average $2,352,941. In other words, payoff on the loan was incidental to the loan transaction — not the point of the loan arrangement.
*
The current claim by the banks is that this enormous profit from lending is the result of separate contracts and transactions that should not be included as part of the original contract with borrowers.
*
The claim by borrowers, while phrased in different ways, is that somehow the borrowers should be receiving some compensation or allowance as part of the package since the base transactions from which all value was derived for further instruments or agreements was their own signature, name, reputation and home as at least apparent collateral. Borrowers consider the non disclosure of the actual intention of the actual lender to be base violations of TILA and state lending laws.
*
In addition, with the proceeds of foreclosure sale being distributed as revenue rather than the payoff of a loan receivable, existing law is insufficient to deal with the crisis of nonpayment by borrowers most of whom have been paying servicers who have been feeding such payments into large pools of cash from which payments are made to the holders of “certificates” who only have a right to receive payments from the investment banker who was doing  business under the name of a nonexistent trust.
*
In some sense the holders of such certificates are the ones most likely to be considered owners of the debt. But the certificates themselves and the accompanying contracts (prospectus) clearly state that the certificates convey no right, title or interest in the borrower’s debt, note or mortgage.
*
There is no right of investors to enforce the certificates against borrowers and the certificates are not “mortgage backed” despite claims to the contrary. This has already been decided in several tax cases. Their exemption from securities regulation is therefore unfounded.
*
This has resulted in various parties posing as authorized enforcers of the debt and the security instrument ( mortgage or deed of trust). Regardless of their claimed title or status, all such entities share one controlling characteristic: they all initially or eventually claim to be acting in a representative capacity even when they present themselves as the “holder” of the note or any other claim to rights to enforce the note or mortgage.
*
The evolution of such claims lends some perspective. Initially foreclosures were brought in the name of “servicers” and when challenged the servicing claims were then accompanied by an denial of securitization or the existence of any trust that owned the debt, note or mortgage. As it turned out the lawyers for such entities were telling the truth — there was no such trust nor would it have been the owner of the debt, note or mortgage even it had existed.
*
In addition foreclosures were brought in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS).
*
Neither the servicers nor MERS ever could assert or allege that they had any right, title or interest in debt, note or mortgage. In the case of MERS it could not even alleged possession of the note or mortgage and had handled no money whatsoever in relation to any loan.
*
And in all cases the proceeds of foreclosure sales permitted by the courts were distributed as revenue to several participant claiming authority to act, including the lawyers, servicers, master servicers, and the investment bank. In no case were such proceeds distributed to the owners of certificates issued in the name of a “trust.” Several forensic analysts tracked the “credit bids” and quickly discovered that those bids were not submitted by a creditor.
*
The existence of the actual debt from the borrower has been converted from actual to theoretical; this explains the lack of any identified party who is the owner of the debt. This is not a problem created by borrowers who knew nothing of this scheme nor do they now understand it.
*
This all results in the posing of three issues that need to be addressed head on if this crisis is to end.
  • The first which everyone has voiced since the beginning of the crisis is whether the homeowner should get a “free house” merely because the paperwork is now out of order.
  • The second is whether the current parties receiving revenue from the sale of foreclosed homes should be allowed to receive a “free house.”
  • The third is whether the borrowers have always been entitled to receive compensation for the larger implied contract in which compensation and revenue was generated from the origination or acquisition of their loan.
*
Since this is a pervasive issue occurring through tens of millions of loan contracts, the best possible vehicle for addressing a remedy is through government action that goes far beyond the nominal settlements that have been announced thus far.
*
All stakeholders should be given a voice at this table. Any approach that is punitive only to one particular class of stakeholders should be rejected. Laws need to be changed to reflect the modernization of financial instruments, only after consideration of the effects of such changes. Any law that simply makes it easier to foreclose or to merely cover up the title and legal errors that have been occurring for 20 years should also be rejected.
*
If we are to make sense out of this chaos that was in fact conjured and created by investment banks, then we need changes in our property laws, contract laws, securities laws, lending laws, laws of civil procedure and due process, and laws of evidence. If the banks have put themselves in a position where they cannot foreclose on mortgages, that should not be the end of the inquiry.
*
The question should not be the bipolar question of who gets a “free house,” with the answer being the borrower or a party claiming entitlement to enforce. The question should be how to create a new equitable and legal infrastructure to clean up the mess that the banks created without unnecessarily penalizing either the investors who put up the money in the first place and the borrowers who put up their lives. 

The Truth about US Bank

Lawyers and pro se litigants continue to ignore the basics when mounting a challenge to foreclosures in which US Bank is asserted to be a trustee of a name that is then treated as though it was trust or REMIC Trust. If you look closely, the name is word salad, containing references or names to several named entities and other categories of entities.
*
 A typical presentation asserts no presence of US Bank in its individual capacity, so the institutional implication is false. It is appearing strictly in a representative capacity and an court award of costs against the “claimant” would not, according to US Bank, attach liability to US Bank but to rather whoever was being represented by US Bank “as trustee.” On that we have word salad presenting many options such as
  1. US Bank, as trustee
  2. as successor to Bank of America, as trustee
  3. as successor by merger to LaSalle Bank, as trustee
  4. for the holders of certificates entitled
  5. XYZ Corp.
  6. Mortgage pass through Certificates series 200x-a1

If anyone can tell me  from that description who would be liable for costs I applaud them. But I can tell you who would pay the costs regardless of actual legal liability. It would be a company claiming to be an authorized servicer who in fact is getting the money from the investment bank through conduits.

The issue of what if anything was transferred between LaSalle Bank and Bank of AMerica and thus what if anything was transferred between Bank of America and US Bank has actually not been litigated.

My answer is that LaSalle Bank had no duties as trustee, was subjected to the impact of three mergers — ABN AMRO, Citi and Bank of America — and that a trustee only exists for a legally existing trust in which the subject matter (Loan) was entrusted to the trustee for administration of the active affairs of the “trust.” With none of those elements present, nothing could have been transferred.

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Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 954-451-1230. Ask for a Consult or check us out on www.lendinglies.com. Order a PDR BASIC to have us review and comment on your notice of TILA Rescission or similar document.
I provide advice and consultation to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key required elements of a scam — in and out of court. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM.
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Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 954-451-1230. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
========================
As to U.S. Bank, Deutsch, BONY etc. there are two categories that must be considered. If US Bank is named in a Pooling and Servicing agreement then the reasons for its non existence (or more specifically lack of legal presence in court or any other foreclosure proceeding) in fact and at law remain as previously stated in prior articles —- but exclude one central issue that has not been litigated.
*
If US Bank has been asserted as successor to another alleged trustee then all sorts of other issues pop up. The main one that has not been litigated is whether the position of trustee can be transferred or sold like a commodity without consent of the beneficiaries or some other authorized party.
*
In truth the only real “beneficiary” would be the investment bank — if only the trust legally existed. And in truth the investment bank indemnified US Bank from liability in exchange for the use of the US Bank name to create the illusion of institutional involvement.
*
And in truth the only real party in interest is the investment bank, and if the trust actually existed the investment bank would be the only real beneficiary in an arrangement in which the trust name is used as a shield or sham conduit to hold bare naked legal title to paper that fabricates the illusion of debt ownership, much like MERS.
*
And of course the whole use of the term “successor” is constantly used to distract lawyers, judges and homeowners from the fact that the previous party had no interest or right to administer, own, or enforce the subject debt, note or mortgage — unless they are able to produce authorization from the investment bank.
*
But the investment banks have been loath to even hint that they could or would issues such authorization because that would be an admission that they were or are the real party in interest — an admission which probably would subject them to many levels of liability for fraud and statutory violations.
*
It may well be that the pursuit of court costs and discovery available to do that might be the achilles heel of this house of imaginary cards. It would reveal the absence of any party to pay them, which would reveal the absence of a claimant, which would reveal the absence of a claim which would reveal the absence of a client, which would reveal false representations by the foreclosure mill.

No the Mortgages Are Not Securities, But the “Certificates” Do Not Qualify for Exemption As “Mortgaged Backed”

For those straining to find a way to categorize mortgage loans as securities I offer this based upon my licensing, training and experience as a Wall Street Broker and Investment Banker and as an attorney who has practiced law, including securities law for over 42 years.

You are climbing the right tree but you are on the wrong branch, in my opinion. Despite possible legal and logical arguments for your point of view there is no way any court is going to take the common mortgage loan and say it is a security, and therefore was subject to regulation, registration, disclosure and sales restrictions. And the secondary market does not rise to the level of a free exchange. While loans appear to be traded under the guise of securitization they are not actually traded.

BUT
I like your reasoning when applied to (a) certificates issued by investment banks in which the investment bank makes promises to pay a passive income stream and (b) derivative and hedge contracts issued on the basis of deriving their value from the certificates.
*
The specific challenge I think should be on the status of the certificates or “bonds” issued by the investment banks. If securitization in theory were a reality then under the 1998 exemption they would not be treated as securities and could not be regulated.
*
That would mean that the fictitious name used by the investment bank was a real entity, an existing Trust (or special purpose vehicle) (a) organized and existing under the laws of some jurisdiction and (b) the trust actually acquired loans through (i) purchase for value or (ii) through  conveyance from a trustor/settlor who owned the loans, debts, notes and mortgages.
*
But that isn’t what happened in practice. The entire business plan of the investment banks who participated in this scheme was predicated on their ability to sell the loans multiple times in multiple ways to multiple layers and classes of investors, thus creating profits far in excess of the amount of  the loan.
*
Right now each of those sales is considered a separate private contract that is (a) separate and apart from the loan agreement and (b) not subject to securities regulation due to exemption under the 1998 law that does not allow securities regulation of mortgage-backed instruments.
*
So the goal should be to show that
*
(a) the securitization scheme was entirely based on the loan agreement under the single transaction and step transaction doctrines and therefore was not separate from the loan transactions
*
(b) the certificates or bonds were not mortgage-backed because the holders have no right, title or interest to the loan agreements, debts, notes or mortgages and
*
(c) the derivative and hedge contracts deriving their value from the certificates were securities based upon the certificates (“bonds”) that are more in the nature of warrants and options on the value of the certificates rather than any direct interest in the debt, note or mortgage of any borrower.
*
Hence both the certificates and hedge contracts and all other derivatives of the certificates would be subject to regulation as securities. Based upon information I have that is very suggestive although not conclusive, it appears that the Internal Revenue Service has already arrived at the conclusion that the certificates are not mortgage-backed and the trusts are not viable entities because in order to have a valid trust it must have assets and active affairs. It must also have identifiable beneficiaries, a trustor etc.
*
None of those elements are present or even alleged or asserted by the lawyers for the foreclosure mills. The only “beneficiary” is the investment bank, not the certificate holders who all expressly or impliedly disclaim any right, title or interest in the loans, debts, notes or mortgages and have no right to enforce. This has already been decided in tax court. The owners of certificates are not the holders of secured debt.
*
There is no “res” or “thing” that is entrusted to the named Trustee of the so-called REMIC Trust for the benefit of identifiable beneficiaries. There is no settlor who conveyed loans to the Trustee to hold in trust for identifiable beneficiary except that as a catch-all the investment bank is named as beneficiary of any title to anything that might be attributed to the trust, if only the trust existed.
*
Attacking this from the top down is the job of regulators who refuse to do so. But the attack can occur from the bottom up in courts. As shown above, in any case where a trust is referenced in a foreclosure there is no legal standing. That is there is no existing entity that owns the debt. The investment bank funded the origination or acquisition of the loan but contemporaneously sold off the value of the debt, the risk of loss, the cash flow and other attributes of the loan.
*
The notes had to be destroyed and a new culture based upon images had to be put in place even if it violated law. The problem with the courts is not that they don;t get it; I think a lot of judges get it but don’t like the outcome of applying the law as it currently exists. So they wink and nod at fabricated notes, assignments and endorsements.
But those same judges, when confronted with unexplained deficiencies are forced to rule in favor of borrowers. And they do. This would best be done in mass joinder, class action or some other vehicle where resources could be pooled, but the procedural deck is stacked against such efforts.

===============================
GET FREE HELP: Just click here and submit  the confidential, free, no obligation, private REGISTRATION FORM. The key to victory lies in understanding your own case.
Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 954-451-1230. Ask for a Consult or check us out on www.lendinglies.com. Order a PDR BASIC to have us review and comment on your notice of TILA Rescission or similar document.
I provide advice and consultation to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key required elements of a scam — in and out of court. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM.
PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORM 
Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 954-451-1230. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
========================

How the loan was sold multiple times.

 

THE CLAIM FOR HOMEOWNER ROYALTIES

It is like any hedge contract. The buyer of the hedge contract is the investment bank, sometimes working through sham conduits. It is saying it wishes to ensure stability of its “portfolio.” It provides triple agency rating and “insurance” from AIG for instance while at the same time buying insurance from  AIG based on the premise that hedge funds are selling hedge contracts. It looks like a safe bet as long as you don’t peek under the hood where you see that the debt, note and mortgage were split at inception and the enforcement of the debt, note and mortgage is at best a long shot if all the facts are revealed.

*
The hedge funds and insurance companies make money because they are receiving fees from the investment bank for assuming the risk. It’s income pure and simple. The risk is seen as nonexistent. But in fact a small move in the value of the certificates whose value is entirely derived from the investment bank’s promise to pay certificate holders is a discretionary promise controlled exclusively by the vinestment bank. So Goldman can reduce payments and cause the certificates to decrease in value thus triggering the insurance and hedge contracts. Goldman can also, in its sole discretion declare that the value has reached the trigger point. And the counterparties expressly disclaim subrogation or any claims to the certificates, debts, notes or mortgages.
*
In many cases the initial hedge contract was created for the highest tier of the tranches containing AAA rated mortgages. But the tier 1 tranche had received fees for issuing a hedge contract on the lowest tranche. The certificates were based upon the value of the tranche including the hedge contracts which investors thought were exclusively to protect the Tier 1 tranche but in fact contained a commitment to absorb losses for the Z tranche that contained 15% mortgages. So the modest but lucrative fees paid to hedge funds to assume the risk for stabilizing the Tier 1 tranche was in fact a guarantee of the entire Z tranche.
*
When Z tranche failed as everyone knew it would, it took down the tier 1 tranche and through similar devices the entire issuance of that “trust” was reduced to rubble with investment bank getting the full amount of the investment (by certificate investors) paid to the investment bank (not the certificate investors) in mortgages that had (a) not failed and (b) did not have nearly the effect on perceived loss of value that was reported.
*
Hence the investment bank sold, using the trust name as a fictitious name for the investment bank, to the investors who bought certificates whose value was perceived as derived from “underlying mortgages” and then sold again the same mortgages under guise of hedge fund and insurance contracts. In fact the value of the certificates was entirely derived from the value of the promise made by the  viestment bank with no right, title or interest to the indexed fictitious portfolio of debts, notes and mortgages arising out of the origination of or acquisition of residential mortgage loans.
*
When the credit market collapsed (nobody was willing to trade in derivatives) Goldman and others had insurance contracts pending with AIG et al. The bailout was used to fund AIG so that GOldman could receive $150 Billion on losses never incurred by Goldman and which were never attributed to anyone who might be construed as having purchased the debt. Goldman was not lobbying to recover losses made from risky investments. Goldman was lobbying and did so successfully in protecting a windfall expectancy from hedge contracts and insurance procured through false pretenses. Losses on the loans had nothing to do with it.
*
Goldman and Citi were successful at manipulating the story. TARP and FED and US Treasury and FDIC bailouts were at first predicated on losses caused by defaults on mortgages. But that is only part of the story. Mortgage Defaults actually were not a major cause of any collapse except in a few instances that Goldman PR seized on to make it appear that was what was happening marketwide. Most mortgage debt and all risk of loss had been sold multiple times. There simple was no owner of any debt in which the claimed “holder” had an pecuniary interest. Hence today we have no creditor — a proposition that virtually everyone finds unacceptable.
*
So TARP evolved from Troubled mortgages to troubled Certificates. And when the promise was revealed to come not from homeowners but form the investment banks, TARP evolved again into a generic ill-defined “troubled asset ” classification that meant anything the banks decided. The stuff that simply could not be reconciled was put into the maiden lane entities and then later recycled out as new securitizations as though there was nothing wrong with the inherently defective and illegal nature of lending, servicing, selling and profiting from the sale of loan products that were guaranteed to fail in many instances and whose failure was central to the bank business model in which they would profit from the failure.
*
What I am saying is that the infrastructure for all of that was established before the loans were made. That infrastructure and the expectancy of windfall revenues and profits from the origination or acquisition of loans was absolutely essential (condition precedent) to granting loans, whether they were viable or not. The funding of the loan was essential to getting the borrower’s name, signature and reputation as well as their house as collateral. Without that all the tranches, insurance contracts, hedge products and more advanced derivative products were never have been written, much less sold. This process did not, as was advertised, diversify risk. It concentrated it on borrowers, government and investors in that order.
*
Note that the banks are left out of that equation because they were intermediaries as it relates to risk and they were principals as it relates to profits. It is my contention that this was an implied contract in which the homeowners should be compensated for their essential part and focal point, but for which the rest of the scheme, undisclosed to borrowers, could not have occurred.
*
Consulting with insiders the average gross revenue from the loan of $1 was between $10 and $20 dollars. So for an average loan of $250,000 the gross revenue was in excess of $2, 500,000 and frequently topped $5,000,000. The average was $8,000,000. Royalties and license fees usually run from as low as 1.5% to an average of 6% and are applied to gross revenues. The implied contract that included the borrower and the investment bank thus computes as $480,000 plus statutory interest which at this point would average around 9% per year for an average of $43,200 per year for an average of 10 years or $432,000. Hence the value of the claim by each borrower is on average $900,000 for each $250,000 loan.
*
In addition there exists a further claim for recovery of all undisclosed compensation as outlined above amounting to several times the above estimate. this presents an unparalleled profitable opportunities to good litigators. Pro se litigators are not invited. The theory is simple and if presented correctly will almost definitely survive a motion to dismiss and could be the subject of mass joinder, class action and even Qui Tam relief.
*
While a DC group is forming I would be willing to help in the creation and development of a new group whose sole focus was on this theory.

Common Sense Prevails: SCOTUS Broadens Primary Liability for Fraudulent Schemes

For quite some time, the courts have struggled with the concept of primary liability for a lying liar and secondary liability for a liar who passes on the lie knowing that it was a lie. Scotus, in the Lorenzo decision has now said that is a distinction without a difference.

It is not a secondary issue of aiding and abetting, it is a primary issue where the agent, employee, officer or representative of the liar is equally liable for the dissemination of a lie if they know it is a lie.

BUT you still need to prove intent to lie along with the other elements of fraud. A lie is not actionable if the recipient knew it was untrue or should have known or did not rely upon it. If the lie is not material then it is presumed to belie upon which nobody relied.

Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult or check us out on www.lendinglies.com. Order a PDR BASIC to have us review and comment on your notice of TILA Rescission or similar document.
I provide advice and consultation to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key required elements of a scam — in and out of court. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM.
A few hundred dollars well spent is worth a lifetime of financial ruin.
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Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345 or 954-451-1230. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
========================

see https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/supreme-court-adopts-broad-interpretation-of-primary-liability-in-sec-antifraud-case

See Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange Commission

The interesting part of this decision is that it is parallel to false securitization claims where various lawyers, servicers and others say things that are lies to mislead the recipient of such information into thinking that the trust has assets that everyone who knows, knows that the trust doesn’t have those assets (i.e., loans).

Justice Breyer writes:

Petitioner Francis Lorenzo, while the director of investment banking at an SEC-registered brokerage firm, sent two e-mails to prospective investors. The content of those e-mails, which Lorenzo’s boss supplied, described a potential investment in a company with “confirmed assets” of $10 million. In fact, Lorenzo knew that the company had recently disclosed that its total assets were worth less than $400,000.

Some quotes from an article (see link above) on this highly important decision:

In a decision beneficial to the US Securities and Exchange Commission, the US Supreme Court has affirmed that those persons who disseminate statements containing material misrepresentations or omissions are primarily liable for such misstatements even if they did not directly make them.Private securities litigants will likely rely on Lorenzo v. SEC to assert claims against secondary actors—including bankers, lawyers, and accountants—who disseminate statements made by others that they allegedly know are materially misleading, and the Commission is now clear to charge such persons as primary violators without demonstrating that the person who actually made the statement also violated federal securities laws.
*
the Court endorsed the SEC’s approach to scheme liability against those who distribute materially misleading statements with scienter, regardless of whether they are actually the maker of the statements. By holding that a nonmaker can still violate Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, it is expected that private securities litigants will rely on Lorenzo to assert claims against secondary actors who, with scienter, disseminate alleged misstatements made by others. Lorenzo may also further embolden the Commission to allege primary violations against “gatekeepers” and others who did not make the alleged misstatements, but are nonetheless alleged to have been involved in their dissemination.
*
At the request of his supervisor, Lorenzo, an investment banker, sent two emails that he did not draft to prospective investors. Lorenzo’s supervisor provided the content of the two emails, which Lorenzo merely copy and pasted into his own emails. Lorenzo then transmitted the emails and included his signature block with a note that he could be contacted with any questions, but also stated in each email that he had sent it at the request of his supervisor. Although Lorenzo did not draft the content of the emails, the Commission found he acted with intent to defraud because he knew some of the content was false or misleading when he sent them.
*
Before Lorenzo, the Janus and Central Bank decisions seemed to impose strict limits on claims brought by private plaintiffs. The Supreme Court’s new decision affirms that those who disseminate misstatements can commit a primary violation of Rule 10b-5, rather than just a secondary aiding and abetting violation, for which there is no private right of action. Accordingly, Lorenzo may curtail the effect of Janus and Central Bank, and could be interpreted to mean that a secondary actor (e.g., banker, lawyer, accountant) may, under similar facts, be held primarily liable under a scheme liability theory.[19]
*
It will therefore be left to lower courts to determine how far Lorenzo—which on its face appears to limit primary liability to “those who disseminate false statements with intent to defraud”—will stretch primary liability in private actions, if at all. Indeed, plaintiffs will still be required to plead with particularity that the “nonmaker” had such an intent.

A Replay of 2008 in the Works

Amongst the constant placement of article promoted and paid for by the banks that celebrate our supposed recovery from the mortgage meltdown is a new spate of articles that say otherwise. Rather than recovering we have merely papered over the problem allowing the banks to do it again. And worse, I would add, is the continuation of a general policy and perception that foreclosures are the way out of the mess created by the banks.

See LOVE AFFAIR WITH REPACKAGED DEBT

I know this stuff is dense and filled with financial concepts that can only be understood by those of us who have direct knowledge, experience, training and certification in securities and securitization of debt, but the lay articles at least give you a sense of what is truly happening. The above linked article by an investment banker, warning of the continuing moral and financial hazards, states it plainly.

A decade ago, the high-yield investment du jour pushed by Wall Street was mortgage-backed securities — home mortgages that had been packaged up and sold as “safe” investments all over the world. Nowadays bankers and traders are pushing another form of supposedly “safe” investment, the “collateralized loan obligation,” or C.L.O.

C.L.O.s are nothing more than a package of risky corporate loans made to companies with less than stellar credit. The big Wall Street banks make these loans to their corporate clients and then seek to move them off their balance sheets as quickly as possible, in the same way that a decade ago they packaged up and offloaded risky mortgage securities.

What is missing from all analyses of “repackaging” or “securitization” is that the failure of government to regulate this practice opens the door to extreme moral hazards enabling the banks to create financial weapons of mass destruction.

One backdoor risk is exacerbated by a tactic of some all-too-clever hedge fund managers. They buy a little of the debt of risky companies at a discount, and then buy a much larger amount of insurance on that debt — so-called “credit default swaps” — to theoretically hedge their risk. These wiseguys then do everything they can to force the company into a bankruptcy filing, which contractually triggers the insurance payoff on the debt. Since the insurance payment exceeds by far the overall cost of the discounted debt, the hedge fund profits handsomely.

The problem, of course, is that the bankruptcy filing can send the company and its creditors, including investors in C.L.O.s, into a downward spiral, hurting everyone but the architect of the scheme [e.s.]That’s what happened to Windstream, an Arkansas-based telecom company that was sent into bankruptcy protection in February. These “empty creditors,” as Henry Hu, a professor of law at the University of Texas has dubbed them, are rewarded for pushing companies into an otherwise unnecessary bankruptcy. That’s not the way the markets are supposed to work.

Sound familiar? It’s still happening with residential loans. The legal and policy question is whether it is good for the economy or good for society to have people profit off of a bad loan — especially when the the loan was intentionally made bad so it would fail? The architects of the scheme are the major investment banks. They never lose because they never actually take a risk. They know the loans will fail and manage to get investors to sell them credit default swaps and other disguised sale products so that the investors lose, but not the bank. Then the investors pass on the debt (risk of loss) to still more investors who are buying “minibonds” (coined by Lehman Brothers).

The end result is that the “borrower” is just a pawn. Instead of a traditional loan model, we have something far more sinister: the product sold by borrowers is their signature and from that signature the bank and hedge fund players make $10-$20 for each dollar that is described as a loan. The actual debt is disbursed to dozens if not hundreds of investors who have no direct right, title or interest to enforce the debt, note or mortgage.

And yet the debt, note and mortgage is allowed to be enforced by courts who don’t care about anything except that the loan once existed and even if it no longer exists the courts want to see it enforced.

Adding insult to injury, remote vehicles commissioned by the conduit players get still more “profit” by selling property that was foreclosed in the name of an entity that either doesn’t exist or has no interest in the debt, note  or mortgage and is so thinly capitalized that it cannot answer to even awards of costs and fees for unsuccessful attempts to enforce fabricated documents. The proceeds of sale go not to any named claimant but to a party claiming the proceeds as “recovery” of advances that were never funded by the “Master Servicer.”

This is insane. It has always been insane. I’m a capitalist, a former investment banker, commercial banker, and attorney who represented financial institutions. Generically speaking securitization is the bedrock of capitalism. But like a car driven into a crowd of people it can become a vehicle of terror.

As it is currently practiced, securitization of debt is constantly undermining our financial system and our society because it is not balanced by any assumption of risk.

The problem is laziness and billions of dollars in “donations” or “contributions” from the bank that enabled the banks to thwart reasonable regulation of mortgage backed securities to make sure they are at least backed by mortgages in a meaningful way and to make sure they are regulated securities. As it stands, MBS are not backed by the assets referenced in the offering documents. That means they are not MBS. And that means the exemption for MBS contracts does not apply and they should be regulated as securities.

And one more thing. The banks are going to hate this. The issuance of notes and mortgages by homeowners or corporate borrowers is not a traditional loan contract. It is an essential part of a securitization scheme. Without it, the scheme can’t exist. So notes and mortgages should be treated as securities. The definition of a security requires this categorization. The purchase of the debt, note or mortgage is no longer a purchase of a loan receivable. It is a passive vehicle for passive income generated by trading.

 

Gary Dubin: Proposed Mortgage Integrity Act (MIA):

For ten years, Gary Dubin in Hawaii has been practicing law defending homeowners from foreclosure. He has preached his own version of how to combat foreclosure fraud. And he has practiced what he preached. I find his work enlightening and refreshing. So when I read his Proposed Mortgage Integrity Act (MIA) I decided to republish it in its entirety. Some of what he proposes is new but most of it, in my opinion, is a much needed tune-up of the wording of existing law.

His article and proposals are extremely well-written, objectively stated, reasonable and necessary. In my opinion Dubin’s quest  should be supported by homeowners and non homeowners alike as it proposes to correct a deficit in our legal system, our economic system, and our society. The inequality of wealth that was exacerbated by what amounts to outright theft by a handful of banks can be corrected and our economic system can be stabilized if we return to the rule of law.

I have added commentary where I thought it might help readers understand WHY homeowners should win and how the current system is rewarding theft.

Go here listen to replays of previous Gary Dubin shows and find reference documents:
http://www.foreclosurehour.com/past-broadcasts.html

——————————-
By Gary Dubin

The Proposed Mortgage Integrity Act (MIA): Some Common Sense Urgently Needed Practical Institutional Reforms For A Foreclosure System Completely Out Of Service…

I am entering my tenth year as a radio commentator specializing in developments in the foreclosure field following the Mortgage Crisis of 2008.

Despite isolated legislative and judicial attempts at reform during the last ten years discussed on The Foreclosure Hour, for the vast majority of American homeowners facing foreclosure little unfortunately has really changed.

False documentation and myopic judicial oversight still predominate in foreclosure courts, while hundreds of millions of dollars in hard earned equity is literally stolen in the loan securitization process in one of the largest fraudulent transfers of wealth to a few inside traders in United States history.

[EDITOR’S NOTE: He’s right. The direct meaning of this is that a handful of investment banks received trillions in investments. Then they originated or acquired loans eventually using the fictitious name of a nonexistent trust. But it was the investment bank that was the real player.
Then they sold the debt and the paper multiple times through disguised derivatives. This disbursed claims to debt ownership to dozens of players, who eventually came to rely on the value of the paper (contract or derivative) they acquired as set by the marketplace in private transactions rather than the intrinsic value of the debt, thus freeing the investment bank from ever accounting for the debt.
In short, none of the players are desirous or expecting any payment from parties who were borrowers with a debt that has now been completely satisfied. And claimants in foreclosure neither expect nor receive the remedy (foreclosure) that lawyers claim. The proceeds of foreclosure sale never go to the party named as claimant.
So the bottom line is that the investment bank is behind everything and it has long since received multiples of its investment in the loan. Having raked in an average of $3-$4 million on each $200,000 loan “repayment” of the loan was irrelevant and unwarranted. Neither the original investors nor the borrowers are given any credit for the receipt of proceeds of sale of the debt.
But foreclosure served as a vehicle to galvanize the myth that the debt still existed (and the note and mortgage could be enforced) and was owned by at least someone in the orbit of the investment bank, when it had long since departed. Judicial oversight has both failed and refused to consider the possibility that any alleged owner of the debt has already been paid in full and many times over.
That recognition of these basic facts produces a windfall for the homeowner and a death blow to the shadow banking market is not a consequence of anything the borrowers did, but rather a consequence of running a PONZI scheme. The windfall aspect might be corrected through the use of equitable doctrines; but in all events the promissory note and mortgage cannot be enforced to collect on a debt that has been sold to third parties.
The actual truth is that the actual claims to the debt, note and mortgage are buried deep within the shadow banking market and cannot be traced because they are, according to law, private contracts that need not be registered anywhere and are transferred in trading that is never recorded anywhere. The current remedy allowed by the courts is based entirely on the premise that someone who actually owns the debt is getting paid from the proceeds of liquidation of the “collateral.” This is entirely untrue. It never happens except for instances where the original lender is still the creditor.
The declaration of delinquency or default from a lawyer purporting to represent a nonexistent trust or an existing servicer when the declaration relates to a party who is entirely removed from ownership or any right to the debt, note or mortgage is obviously fatally defective, as many court cases have demonstrated. But the players, for a fee, must pretend that the debt is real and the the note and mortgage need to be enforced. That is the origin of the need for fabrication, backdating, forgery and robosigning.]

Backlogged courts applying mostly outdated traditional mortgage concepts remain ill-equipped to protect American homeowners from mortgage abuse.

Waging a foreclosure defense is still beyond the financial means of most homeowners, and those that can find the money to hire an attorney, find that few if any attorneys are trained in foreclosure defense and those that are, are usually less than adequately competent.

New and reform minded decisions by State Supreme Courts are nevertheless rarely adhered to by many of their state trial courts.

Hundreds of billions of dollars in sanctions levied by state and federal governments against lenders and loan servicers detailing mortgagee abuses have nevertheless failed to stop such identical abuses, and sanction money earmarked to assist borrowers has been largely diverted to other State uses.

Meanwhile, there is literally a war against foreclosure defense attorneys still taking place in our courts and among attorney regulators who think homeowners in foreclosure are just deadbeats and attorneys representing them are just preying on vulnerable defendants.

The present mortgage and trust deed foreclosure systems in the States simply do not work except for lenders and pretender lenders, whereas the federal banking system, specifically the Government Sponsored Enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as well as MERS, are the real cause of and not the cure for most of the present serious problems in the foreclosure field.

Nevertheless, the reforms that are needed are not expensive nor complex, just a matter of simple common sense adjustments to a foreclosure system that is centuries old and no longer compatible with the needs of a democratic society under siege by greedy and unscrupulous quick-buck securitization thieves.

On today’s show John and I unveil our view of the general outlines of a proposed overhaul of the foreclosure system in the States, what we call legislation wise “The Mortgage Integrity Act” (MIA for short).

We intend to present this proposal later this year in the format of model legislation for adoption by State Legislatures.

Meanwhile, we hope to get our listeners’ comments and suggestions before drafting the actual Legislation in the form of a Model Act to be sent to the judiciary committees of every State Legislature.

The Model Act will have three main parts. Part One will address the nature of the emergency, Part Two will address the enacted institutional reforms, and Part Three will address transitional issues.

Part One, to be drafted in whereas clauses, will state the following:

1. Keeping record track of and protecting interests in land within each State has historically been an exclusive State function in the United States presumably protected by the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;

2. Such protection has also been a strong State public policy, affecting the economic as well as the social and political well being and health of citizens in each State since respective statehood.

3. That exclusively State function has been recently undermined by the federal government in numerous ways and is responsible for the present mortgage crisis.

4. The result has been the fostering of corruption at virtually all levels of state foreclosure systems.

5. As a result, the State Legislature hereby declares a State Emergency, requiring a restructuring of the State foreclosure system through immediate institutional reforms as well as transitional measures to safeguard the wealth and well being of our citizens from increasing confiscatory forfeitures.

6. Ironically a foreclosure system said to have its goal to stabilize real estate markets in the United States has to the contrary destabilized real estate markets in this State, driving down the value of properties and dislocating tens of thousands of homeowners annually.

Part Two, to be drafted in enactment clauses, will state the following:

1. The existing foreclosure related statutes in this jurisdiction [setting forth the affected statutes by name and number] are hereby amended, abolished and/or replaced, as follows;

2. The exercise of personal jurisdiction by State Courts shall henceforth require service of all complaints by personal service, the proof of which shall henceforth require contemporaneous photographs of those being served. Substitute service is abolished.

3. Service by publication in lieu of personal service shall require attempts to serve defendants first by certified mail, return receipt requested, and next by certification first that an independent investigative agency licensed by the State has made a diligent effort to locate the defendant and within a reasonable time no shorter than two months has failed to do so, using nationwide tracking services.

4. There shall be only one form of combined promissory note and mortgage (or deed of trust) enforced in this jurisdiction, an inseparable ‘Mortgage Note”, which shall only be valid and enforceable if and when duly recorded at a County or Statewide recording office, and which shall not be classified as a negotiable instrument, which may only be transferred by an assignment similarly required to be recorded to be valid and enforceable.

5. Recording offices shall be staffed by attorneys who shall be responsible for researching and approving the standing of all claimed holders of recordable Mortgage Notes prior to their recordation, their compensation to be adequately funded through increases in recording fees taxed upon recorders of securitized trust instruments.

6. Enforcement of Mortgage Notes shall require proof of notices of default consisting of return receipt requests together with personal knowledge affidavits attesting to preparation and mailing by the preparers and mailers.

7. Enforcement of Mortgage Notes shall also require verification of the entire loan general ledger by an independent CPA with no institutional connections, direct or indirect, to the foreclosing plaintiff or its representatives or affiliates.

8. The State Insurance Commissioner is directed to investigate providing mortgage default insurance for the benefit of homeowners.

9. There shall be a specialized foreclosure court in every County in the State, whose Judges shall be prohibited from directly or indirectly having any ownership interest in or any other connection with any financial institution.

10. Mortgage defaults shall by law be considered confidential and not disclosed to anyone other than the affected borrowers, accommodating mortgagors, and guarantors under penalty of fines and imprisonment, to avoid foreclosure blight lowering the market value of affected properties.

11. Foreclosure complaints shall similarly be considered confidential and filed under seal, to avoid foreclosure blight lowering the market value of affected properties.

12. Foreclosure auctions are hereby abolished. Properties subject to foreclosure shall be sold in the ordinary market place by licensed real estate brokers and listed in the Multiple Listing Service as directed by the Foreclosure Court.

13. Deficiency judgments are hereby abolished.

14. In cases in which the Foreclosure Court finds that there is little or no equity remaining after payments required to be made to a foreclosing plaintiff, a foreclosure defendant must vacate the premises within a reasonable time no less than 90 days or must elect to forfeit ownership in exchange for an immediate lease agreement preserving possession for a stated period of time including indefinitely as determined by the Foreclosure Court provided a monthly market leasehold rental payment is agreed to and timely paid.

15. In cases where the Foreclosure Court finds that there is substantial equity remaining after payments required to be made to a foreclosing plaintiff, a foreclosure defendant my elect to retain possession as a tenant as aforesaid and shall have the right to recover title including therefore his equity in the property within a time period of at least one year to be determined by the Foreclosure Court provided at the time of the exercise of that right the foreclosure defendant reimburses the foreclosing plaintiff for whatever amounts may then be due on the mortgage note.

Part Three, covering transitional matters, as follows:

1. The dates of effectiveness of the various enactments will have to be tailored to existing conditions and between new and existing secured loans.

2. The respective powers between the States and the federal government in various respects above will likely require negotiation and litigation. Fortunately, the United States Supreme Court has recently shown deference to the States in related issues involving financial regulation.

Please join John and me today and email us your comments and suggestions. Let us know if you think we missed anything and if there any other way you can think of to change a system so badly out of service?

——————————-
Gary Victor Dubin
Dubin Law Offices
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813
Office: (808) 537-2300
Email: gdubin@dubinlaw.net
Licensed in California and Hawaii

Facially Invalid Recorded Documents

The view proffered by the banks would require them to accept declarations of fact from potential borrowers without any indicia of truth or reliability. It is opposite to the manner in which they do business. Currently they have it both ways, to wit: for purposes of borrowing you must submit documents that are facially valid without reference to external evidence and which can be easily confirmed but for purposes of foreclosure, none of those conditions apply. 

As part of the the scheme of “securitization fail” (see Adam Levitin) banks, servicers and third party vendors have been creating, fabricating and executing documents that are not facially valid nor do they comply with industry standards or even common sense. But once recorded judges take them “at face value” by assuming that somehow the document makes sense, when it clearly does not comport with law or logic. Defenders of foreclosure act at their peril when they fail to attack the facial validity of the documents upon which the foreclosure claims rely.

In a recent article written by Dale Whitman for the ABA he states the following “Conclusion. The recording system is archaic and fraught with the potential for yielding wrong conclusions. Conversion by many recording jurisdictions to computer-based electronic indexes has been helpful, but most of the legally problematic flaws continue to exist. Title insurance has been invaluable in making the weight of the recording system bearable, but it adds a further layer of complexity as buyers try to understand the limitations of their title policies. It seems unlikely that major changes will occur, so it is essential that real estate lawyers understand the peculiarities and limitations of our present system.” (e.s.)

As he points out recording is not required to make a document valid, but once it is recorded the document takes on a life of its own. It also presents numerous trapdoors and pitfalls that should be analyzed before answering the initiation of a foreclosure proceeding with any action on behalf of the homeowner including the motion to dismiss in judicial states, the answer, affirmative defenses and the Petition for TRO or lawsuit for wrongful foreclosure.

see what you didn_t know about recording acts_whitman (2).authcheckdam

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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Common sense tells you that for a document to mean anything it must say enough that a reasonable person would be able to confidently draw meaning from it. Analyzing the facial validity of documents used in foreclosure reveals a pattern of misrepresenting the facial validity and misdirecting judges into NOT looking closely at the documents from which they are making assumptions and thence to legal conclusions that bind homeowners into proving matters beyond their control.

I proffer here an analysis that I just completed (our TERA report) as an example.

  1. We have already seen documentary proof that BONY Mellon does not receive the proceeds of the sale of property subject to the power of sale in a nonjudicial state or the forced sale in a judicial state. There are many reasons for this.
  2. Analysis of the facial validity of the use of various names and descriptions reveals the absence of an actual party, unless extrinsic “parole) evidence is added. Hence the documents upon which the above language relies does not support facial validity.
  3. BONY Mellon is said to be the “successor to JP Morgan Chase.” It is not and never has been a successor to JPMorgan Chase. There is nothing in the public domain to support that assertion. There is no instrument attached and no description of any transaction in which, as to this subject property and loan, we can ascertain how BONY Mellon became the successor to JPM Morgan Chase. Hence the documents in which BONY Mellon appears are not facially valid and are defective in terms of proof of title. This could be corrected by affidavit or any process that is allowed in the state where the property is located but it hasn’t been done on record, and there is no evidence to suggest that it has been done but is not recorded. The usual and acceptable manner of phrasing such a succession, if it were true, would be “as successor to JP Morgan Chase pursuant to that certain agreement of transfer by and between JPMorgan Chase (and /or other parties) and BONY Mellon dated July 6, 200X.” The absence of such description leaves the reader to pursue extrinsic or parole evidence to determine if the succession is documented and if so whether that documentation is facially valid. This is all absent.
  4. The succession suggests that it is in the role of trustee. There is no instrument attached and no description of any transaction in which, as to this subject property and loan, we can ascertain how BONY Mellon became the successor Trustee to JPM Morgan Chase. Hence the documents in which BONY Mellon appears as trustee are not facially valid and are defective in terms of proof of title. This could be corrected by affidavit or any process that is allowed in the state where the property is located but it hasn’t been done on record, and there is no evidence to suggest that it has been done but is not recorded. The usual and acceptable manner of phrasing such a succession, if it were true, would be “as successor to JP Morgan Chase, trustee pursuant to that certain agreement of transfer by and between JPMorgan Chase (and /or other parties) and BONY Mellon dated July 6, 200X.” The absence of such description leaves the reader to pursue extrinsic or parole evidence to determine if the succession is documented and if so whether the documentation is facially valid. This is all absent. The absence of a description of a specific trust and trust instrument is yet another factor that renders the instrument facially invalid, but theoretically correctible.
  5. This leads to a further question of extrinsic evidence being required. Other than by the use of parole evidence (outside the information contained on the document itself) the reader cannot ascertain the existence or description of a specific trust organized and existing under the laws of any jurisdiction. In addition, the issue of a transfer or change of trustees of a trust, if one can be found, is not supported by language such as “pursuant to the provisions of the trust agreement dated the 3rd day of May, 200Y in which the trust named ‘Structured Asset Mortgage Investment II, Inc. Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust’ was created under the laws of the State of New York”. Without such reference the facial validity of the instruments remains invalid although theoretically correctible. Without the knowledge of the legal existence of the trust being confirmable by public record, there is no support for the implied trust. Without support for the implied trust and the trust agreement creating it, there is no obvious support for how trustees could exist or be changed. Without support on the face of the instruments for how trustees of a trust could be changed, the description of the change of trustees is merely a declaration that is not supported by anything on the face of the document.
  6. JPMorgan is implied to have been the trustee of the potentially nonexistent trust. Once again the implied assertion leaves the reader to determine if the trust was created pursuant to the laws of any jurisdiction, and if JPMorgan was named as trustee for the trust.
  7. In either event both BONY Mellon and JPMorgan are described to be acting in a representative capacity on behalf of “holders… of pass through certificates” and not as “trustees” of any “trust.” The certificates are identified as Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2004-12. The reference to being a “trustee” and the implied representation of the holders of certificates would be acceptable if the “holders” were described as beneficiaries. The extrinsic evidence often shows that such holders are not beneficiaries. This leads to the question of how and why there is representation of the holders, apart from the alleged trust, Is the representation implied from the trust agreement that is not described? Is the representation the result of some other trust or agency agreement? It is not possible to ascertain the answers to these vital questions without resort to extrinsic evidence, thus making the instruments relying upon such language, facially invalid.

Every state has statutory requirements for an instrument to be facially valid. A deed between Donald Duck and Mickey Mouse as Grantor and Grantee respectively would not be facially valid because both the grantor nor the grantee are fictitious names of cartoon characters and unless used as a egla fictitious name for an actual entity doing business under that name the document could not be corrected to become a valid document suitable for recording.

Yet county recorders are allowing the recordation of millions of documents across the country with exactly that defect. By allowing such documents to be recorded they are lending support to the legal presumption that Donald and Mickey are real people with rights to transfer interests in real property and even foreclose on real property. At the end of the chain of written documents someone holds paper that is recorded but based upon a chain of title with two large gaps in it — Donald and Mickey, and by the time the foreclosure occurs probably Minnie Mouse as well (or maybe Fannie or Freddie whose names are being used, just like the “REMIC trustees”, but who have no part in any transaction involving the subject loan).

Back to Real Property 101.

  1. Who is the grantor? If that cannot be readily determined from the face of the instrument the instrument is facially invalid.
  2. Who is the grantee? If that cannot be readily determined from the face of the instrument the instrument is facially invalid.
  3. What is the effective date of transfer? If that cannot be readily determined from the face of the instrument the instrument is facially invalid.
  4. What is being transferred? If that cannot be readily determined from the face of the instrument the instrument is facially invalid — or, in the case of a mortgage or beneficial interest in a deed of trust if the instrument declares a transfer but without the underlying debt, the instrument is facially invalid and unenforceable both because of state statutes regarding facial validity and the UCC Article 9 requiring value to be paid (see above linked article).
  5. What is the legal description of the property affected? If that cannot be readily determined from the face of the instrument the instrument is facially invalid.

An instrument that is not facially valid should be returned by the recording office with notes specifying what needs to be corrected. This vital step is being overlooked on all documents relating to foreclosures. If rules, laws and procedures were followed with regard to such documents there would not be any foreclosure or, if the corrections could actually be made, there would be no defense. It is in the valley between those two notions that all foreclosures based on “successors” are based.

By overlooking the obvious lack of clarity on the face of the documents county recorders keep creating a vacuum that the banks are only too happy to fill with MERS — an IT platform that is the opposite of tamper-proof allowing virtually anyone with a login and password to create the illusion of authority where none existed before. Hence the use of MERS and other systems to give depth to the illusion of facial validity.

The conclusion is that documents containing the language described above should not have been recorded.  The county recorder should have rejected such documents as being facially invalid, requiring additional documents to be attached, if they existed.

Such language is a substantial deviation from custom and practice as well as common sense and logic.  Custom and practice of the same banks that are listed in the language described above requires that they not accept such language without the additional documentation and confirmation of facts that are declared on the face of the instrument.  Common sense dictates that the reason why such custom and practice exists is that most fraudulent schemes involve written instruments in which various declarations are made that are untrue or lack support.  For purposes of recording, any declaration on the face of the instrument that requires the attachment or description of documents that are readily available in the public domain would be unacceptable, much as, for example, a deed without a signature.  The property must be described with precision (or later corrected by affidavit), the grantor must be described with precision (or later corrected) and the grantee must be described with precision (or later corrected).  Without the required corrections, the documents are facially invalid.

For purposes of case analysis, the absence of facially valid documents, even though they were improperly recorded, negates the potential use of legal presumptions arising from the facial validity of documents.  Therefore such documents should be rejected without proper foundation in connection with the use of such documents for any purpose, and the attempt to introduce such documents into evidence in any court or administrative proceeding.

In the case currently under analysis, this means that the proceedings in which the property was allegedly foreclosed, were themselves all improper and based upon invalid terms.  Whether this renders the proceedings void or voidable depends upon case law and interpretations of constitutional due process.

However it is safe to say that based upon the above analysis, it is obvious that all such documents including the deed upon foreclosure are defective in several material respects.  Therefore, our conclusion is that the current title chain in the county records regarding this property is at best clouded.  The procedures for correcting clouded title vary from state to state and are subject to both federal and state laws.  Individual research on each case in each state is required before taking any action.

The view proffered by the banks would require them to accept declarations of fact from potential borrowers without any indicia of truth or reliability. It is opposite to the manner in which they do business. Currently they have it both ways, to wit: for purposes of borrowing you must submit documents that are facially valid without reference to external evidence and which can be easily confirmed but for purposes of foreclosure, none of those conditions apply. 

 

Rogue REMICs? 2016 Study Reveals Lack of Standing

I read a lot. I came across this article today published in 2016. Nobody has paid attention to it but as far as I can tell on first skim, the author has both coined the name “rogue REMIC” and described it well enough to come to a conclusion, to wit: everything about them is a scam and no legal standing exists with respect to them. I would only add that the author is incorrectly assuming that any securitization took place or if it was, as Adam Levitin coined the phrase, “Securitization Fail.”

see campbell – capstone inquiry into rogue remics

Significant quote from the abstract of the article:

The business of privatized mortgage loan securitization (Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits or “REMICS”) is so arcane and specialized that few people outside of that realm of investment knowledge understand, or even care to understand how loan securitization functions. However, if the difference between a legitimate REMIC and a Rogue REMIC is adequately explained, one can begin to understand why Rogue REMICs must be exposed as unlawful enterprises whose affiliates are not only able to disregard existing federal securities and tax laws, but are also able to circumvent state and local foreclosure laws at will. [e.s.] These ongoing violations result from the intentional and commonplace shortcutting of the proper mortgage loan securitization processes during the several years preceding the 2008 financial crisis. This Inquiry will not focus primarily on how and why Rogue REMICS violate federal tax and securities laws [e.s.]; although those aspects are part of the discussion by necessity. I will argue that all Rogues lack the perquisite legal standing to prosecute both judicial and non-judicial foreclosures. I will present compelling evidence that, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, foreclosures by Rogues may have exceeded 10% of all foreclosures. I will further argue that county officials may be violating state laws by recording the documents that impart false legal standing to the Rogues. I will conclude with a suggestion to homeowners on how to proceed if a mortgage assignment to a Rogue turns up in the local County public records. [e.s.]

And then there is this:

federal government regulators have no will to criminally prosecute the Rogues for financial crimes against individual homeowners even though the crimes are being committed by nationally-chartered investment banks. And so individual homeowners are left to fend for themselves against these behemoths. As a result, a hodge-podge of civil cases in State courts have created such a plethora of conflicting decisions that, in the aggregate, only serve to obfuscate the overriding principle of standing.

and this:

If a borrower’s loan did not leave the “warehouse” timely (if ever) to be incorporated into any REMIC, which includes memorializing that transfer in the local county, the REMIC trustee cannot create standing years later by filing a bogus assignment. As Levitin (2010) explains that “Securitization is the legal apotheosis of form over substance, and if securitization is to work it must adhere to its proper, prescribed form punctiliously” (p. 3).

and finally diagrams of a Rogue REMIC which is an empty pool (something I have been railing about for 12 years). The author describes it as

“A REMIC in name only. A shell of financial instrument. It never had any mortgages assigned to it when it was created and, years later, it is now closed to the introduction of new loans.”

Reaching the conclusion

homeowners were unwitting participants in an elaborate pump and dump scheme to deceive and profit from unwitting REMIC investors. By failing to record assignments during the warehouse phase of REMIC creation, the big investment banks created REMICs that existed in name only; then sold shares of them to the public as if they were the real thing.

And then they foreclosed on homeowners using the fake trusts as the name of the claimant, never revealing the true parties in interest because that would expose them to investigation aid discovery in which their lies would be obvious.

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Pope Francis: Help from an Unexpected Source — Derivative Markets “Ethically Unacceptable”

Warren Buffett saw it 15 years ago after analysis performed on the derivative markets. He said that the derivatives, as they were then (and now) being used, were “financial weapons of mass destruction.” If he was ignored what chance does anyone else have?

Enter Pope Francis from the perspective of income and wealth inequality and arriving at the conclusion that the aim of the derivative market was to create and trade on poverty and financial distress.

And he called out the financial system as a whole as being a “ticking time bomb,” something that many of us have been saying for years, starting (like Buffett) from before the manifestation of the Ponzi scheme that was ridiculously named “securitization.”

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GO TO LENDINGLIES to order forms and services. Our forensic report is called “TERA“— “Title and Encumbrance Report and Analysis.” I personally review each of them for edits and comments before they are released.

Let us help you plan your answers, affirmative defenses, discovery requests and defense narrative:

954-451-1230 or 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult. You will make things a lot easier on us and yourself if you fill out the registration form. It’s free without any obligation. No advertisements, no restrictions.

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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see – Pope Francis Calls Derivatives and Credit Default Swaps Immoral

The financial markets have long identified themselves as being “amoral.” Just part of the capitalistic system which is code for “if you do it for money, then it’s OK.” Accepting that argument would mean that a perfect defense to a murder charge is that it was based upon the desire to get money.

The Pope assails “unbridled global capitalism.” He isn’t a socialist. The Vatican is merely pointing out that the chaos we call society has tilted the playing field such that capitalism has moved from a system of finance to a system of governance.

Instead of government reigning in and holding the banks accountable for targeting people of low income and people in poverty (along with everyone else) politicians have (a) taken Wall Street assertions as though they were the product of thorough investigation and (b) blamed the victims and forced them to bear the cost of the blow out that only the Wall Street could have created.

Mainstream media succumbed to this phenomenon. They started off with exposes and investigative journalism only to abandon the follow-up that might have educated the consumer population. Some journalists were told point blank to lay off critical pieces on banks. That became increasingly difficult as verdicts and settlements started pouring like rain all based upon fraud, which the Pope references. They were all based upon investigations, administrative findings and allegations from all attorneys general in the country and many if not most of the investors who were duped into buying worthless “certificates” that existed only in the digital world.

The Vatican analysts came to the same conclusion I did in 2006. Dozens of other analysts across the world came to the same conclusion, some before me and most after me.

The conclusion reached by this group of writers and investigators was basically the same although phrased differently, person to person, to wit: virtually all “loans” generated over the past 20 years have been based upon fiction —  a fictional value for the home, a fictional value for the household income (ability to repay) a fictional value for the “certificates” issued by a fictionally named “trust” that was in fact the bank doing business under the fictitious name of the “trust.”

In 2003, Buffett warned of crisis if the government did not intervene in the proliferation of derivative trading and underwriting. The predicted crisis arrived. Now the Vatican is warning of another one perhaps worse than the 2008 crash. Nobody wants to hear that.

Federal and State lending laws state that the responsibility for determining whether the debt will be repaid lies with the bank underwriting the “loan.” Yet the banks were the only entities to come out of the Great 2008 Recession not only whole, but bigger and stronger. The consumer is seen and treated as meat for the hungry bear. Just ask anyone on Wall Street.

Ultimately the responsibility for what governance is acceptable lies with voters. But they only exercise that control when they vote. The status quo is elevating our financial system to a governance system. It leaves the banks in control of most domestic and global issues. Democrats and Republicans are both guilty of the same things: (a) their sole driving  force is retention of power and (b) pushing down fresh new candidates who actually want to accomplish something. The Banks agree.

If you want something different, then VOTE!

 

The Role of Dynamic Dark Pools in Ponzi Schemes Masquerading as Securitized Loan Pools

The bottom line is that there are no financial transactions in today’s securitization schemes. There is only fabricated paper. If you don’t understand the DDP, you don’t understand “securitization fail,” a term coined by Adam Levitin.

GET A CONSULT

GO TO LENDINGLIES to order forms and services. Our forensic report is called “TERA“— “Title and Encumbrance Report and Analysis.” I personally review each of them for edits and comments before they are released.

Let us help you plan your answers, affirmative defenses, discovery requests and defense narrative:

954-451-1230 or 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult. You will make things a lot easier on us and yourself if you fill out the registration form. It’s free without any obligation. No advertisements, no restrictions.

Purchase audio seminar now — Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense including 3.5 hours of lecture, questions and answers, plus course materials that include PowerPoint Presentations.

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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I received a short question today to which I gave a long answer. The question is “What happens when an investor decides that he or she wants to cash it in does someone redeem their certificate ?”

Here is my answer:

YES they get paid, most of the time. It is masked as a “trade” on the proprietary trading desk of the CMO Dept. which is completely unregulated and reports nothing. As long as the Ponzi scheme is going strong, the underwriter issues money from the investor pool of money (dynamic dark pool -DDP). It looks like a third party bought the “investment.” If the scheme collapses then the underwriter reports to investors that the market is frozen and there are no buyers.

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There is no redemption because there are no certificates. They are all digital entries on a server. Since the 1998 law deregulated the certificates, reporting is limited or nonexistent. The entries can be changed, erased, altered, amended or modified at will without any regulator or third party knowing. There is no paper trail. Thus the underwriter will say, if they were ever asked, whatever suits them and there is no way for anyone to confirm or rebut that. BUT in discovery, the investors have standing to ask to see the records of such transactions. That is when the underwriter settles for several hundred million or more.
 *
They discount the settlement based upon “market” values and by settling for pennies on the dollar with small community banks who do not have resources to fight. Thus if they received $2 billion for a particular “securitized pool” that is allocated to a named trust they will instantly make about 10-20 times the normal underwriting fee by merely taking money before or after the money hits the DDP. Money is paid to the investors as long as sales of certificates are robust. Hence the DDP is constantly receiving and disbursing money from many more sources than a fixed group of homeowners or investors.
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It is all about gaps and absences. If a debt was properly securitized, the investor would pay money to the underwriter in exchange for ownership of a certificate. The money would then be subject to fees paid to the underwriter and sellers of the certificates. The balance would be paid into a trust account on which the signatory would be a trust officer of the Trustee bank.
 *
If a scheme is played, then the money does not go into the trust. It goes to the DDP. From there the money is funneled through conduits to the closing table with the homeowner. By depositing the exact and expected amount of money into the trust account of the closing agent, neither the closing agent nor the homeowner understands that they are being played. They don’t even have enough information to arouse suspicion so that they can ask questions.
 *
Hence if you combine the proper securitization scheme with the improper one you see that the money is diverted from the so-called plan. This in turn causes the participants to fabricate documents if there is litigation. They MUST fabricate documents because if they produced real documents they would have civil and criminal liability for theft, embezzlement in investor litigation and fraud and perjury in foreclosure litigation.
 *
It is only by forcing a peek around the multiple layers of curtains fabricated by the players that you can reveal the absence of ownership, authority or even an economic interest — other than the loss of continued revenue from servicing and resales of the same loan through multiple investment vehicles whose value is completely derived from the presumed existence of a party who is the obligee of the debt (owner of the debt, or creditor).
 *
That party is the DDP — fund that is partially authorized for “reserve” and which the prospectus and trust instrument (PSA) state (1) that the mortgage loan schedule is not the real one and is presented as an example and (2) that the investors acknowledge that they might be paid from their own money from the “reserve.”
 *
The gap is that the DDP and the reserve are two different accounts. The “reserve” is a pool of money held in trust by, for example, U.S. Bank as trustee for the trust. There is no such account. The DDP is controlled by the underwriter but ownership is intentionally obscured to avoid or evade detection and the liability that would attach if the truth were revealed.
 *
We win cases not by proving theft from investors but by hammering on the fact that the documents are fabricated, which is true in virtually all cases involving a named trust. We will win a large award if we can show that the intended beneficiaries of the foreclosure were parties other than the obligee on the debt.
 *
Thus the attorneys, servicers and trustee are protecting their ill-gotten gains and seeking to grab more money and property at the expense of the unnamed investors and homeowners. They are then transforming an expected revenue stream into the illusion of a secured debt owed not to the funding sources but to the intermediaries.
Go to LENDINGLIES for more help.

Same Old Story: Paper Trail vs, Money Trail (Freddie Mac)

Payment by third parties may not reduce the debt but it does increase the number of obligees (creditors). Hence in every one of these foreclosures, except for a minuscule portion, indispensable parties were left out and third parties were in reality getting the proceeds of liquidation from foreclosure sales.

The explanations of securitization contained on the websites of the government Sponsored Entities (GSE’s) clearly demonstrate what I have been writing for 11 years and reveal a pattern of illusion and deception.

The most important thing about a financial transaction is the money. In every document filed in support of the illusion of securitization, it steadfastly holds firm to discussion of paper instruments and not a word about the actual location of the money or the actual identity of the obligee of that money debt.

Each explanation avoids the issue of where the money goes and how it was “processed” (i.e., stolen, according to me and hundreds of other scholars.)

It underscores the fact that the obligee (“debt owner” or “holder in due course” is never present in any legal proceeding or actual transaction or transfer of of the debt. This leaves us with only one  conclusion. The debt never moved, which is to say that the obligee was always the same, albeit unaware of their status.

Knowing this will help you get traction in the courtroom but alleging it creates a burden of proof for you to prove something that you know is true but can only be confirmed with access to the books, records an accounts of the parties claiming such transactions ands transfers occurred.

GET A CONSULT

GO TO LENDINGLIES to order forms and services. Our forensic report is called “TERA“— “Title and Encumbrance Report and Analysis.” I personally review each of them for edits and comments before they are released.

Let us help you plan your answers, affirmative defenses, discovery requests and defense narrative:

954-451-1230 or 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult. You will make things a lot easier on us and yourself if you fill out the registration form. It’s free without any obligation. No advertisements, no restrictions.

Purchase audio seminar now — Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense including 3.5 hours of lecture, questions and answers, plus course materials that include PowerPoint Presentations.

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

===================================

For one such example see Freddie Mac Securitization Explanation

And the following diagram:

Freddie Mac Diagram of Securitization

What you won’t find anywhere in any diagram supposedly depicting securitization:

  1. Money going to an originator who then lends the money to the borrower.
  2. Money going to a named REMIC “Trust” for the purpose of purchasing loans or anything else.
  3. Money going to the alleged unnamed beneficiaries of a named REMIC “Trust.”
  4. Money going to the alleged unnamed investors who allegedly purchased “certificates” allegedly issued by or on behalf of a named REMIC “Trust.”
  5. Money going to the originator for sale of the debt, note and mortgage package.
  6. Money going to originator for endorsement of note to alleged transferee.
  7. Money going to originator for assignment of mortgage.
  8. Money going to the named foreclosing party upon liquidation of foreclosed property. 
  9. Money going to the homeowner as royalty for use of his/her/their identity forming the basis of value in issuance of derivatives, hedge products and contract, insurance products and synthetic derivatives.
  10. Money being credited to the obligee’s loan receivable account reducing the amount of indebtedness (yes, really). This is because the obligee has no idea where the money is coming from or why it is being paid. But one thing is sure — the obligee is receiving money in all circumstances.

Payment by third parties may not reduce the debt but it does increase the number of obligees (creditors). Hence in every one of these foreclosures, except for a minuscule portion, indispensable parties were left out and third parties were in reality getting the proceeds of liquidation from foreclosure sales.

BLOOMBERG: Mortgage Crisis Still Unresolved, New Crisis Looming

No two financial crises are ever quite the same. The next one won’t be like the last. But history teaches lessons, and there’s no excuse for ignoring them.

Regulators have done a lot to reform the financial system since the 2008 crisis, but they still haven’t fixed the market where the trouble started: U.S. mortgages. It’s an omission they need to put right before the next crisis hits.

GO TO LENDINGLIES to order forms and services

Let us help you plan your answers, affirmative defenses, discovery requests and defense narrative:

954-451-1230 or 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult. You will make things a lot easier on us and yourself if you fill out the registration form. It’s free without any obligation. No advertisements, no restrictions.

Purchase now Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar including 3.5 hours of lecture, questions and answers, plus course materials that include PowerPoint Presentations. Presenters: Attorney and Expert Neil Garfield, Forensic Auditor Dan Edstrom, Attorney Charles Marshall and and Private Investigator Bill Paatalo. The webinar and materials are all downloadable.

Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 954-451-1230 or 202-838-6345. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

GO TO WWW.LENDINGLIES.COM OR https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies toschedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

===================================

see https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-04-30/america-s-mortgage-market-is-still-broken

David Shipley, Senior Editor for Bloomberg Views has hit the nail on the head. While there are some errors in his article, they are understandable.

He’s right when he says that the servicers lacked the necessary incentives and resources and still lack those incentives and resources. But when he talks about “delinquencies” he fails to grasp the fact that those “delinquencies” are based upon a debt that neither the servicer nor its client is authorized to administer.

This failure of perception is understandable. It is difficult to to accept the fact that the debt went up in smoke and therefore no creditor has authorized the administration or collection of the debt. It is challenging to accept the notion that the banks engineered this scheme so they could step in as if they were creditors without actually saying so.

But he gets very close when he says

Private-label mortgages (which aren’t guaranteed by the government) were packaged into securities with extremely poor mechanisms for deciding who — investors, packagers or lenders — would take responsibility for bad or fraudulent loans.

The whole idea was to make it unclear who would be injured by nonpayment of a debt. That was how the banks, as intermediaries, transformed themselves into apparent principals and how entities created the illusion of self proclaimed servicers. Or as Shipley puts it

The parties involved in securitizations became embroiled in legal battles about who owed what to whom — litigation that goes on to this day.

So even amongst the principals of the scheme coined as “securitization fail” (Adam Levitin) there is no agreement and in fact fierce court battles as to the identity of the injured party. In other words their pleadings in court constitute admissions that are inconsistent with the pleadings in foreclosure cases. If there is no identified party with injury then there is no legal standing.

What is clear now is that the money taken from investors was not used to fund REMIC trusts, that the REMIC Trusts never bought any debts and in fact never bought any of the dubious paper that was issued in connection with origination or transfer of the “loans.” Those investors were largely not becoming beneficiaries of the trust; instead they were becoming creditors of the trust.

Knowing that, investors are stuck — if they blow the whistle on the diversion of their money into a completely different “investment” than the one they thought they were buying, they are undermining their potential claim based upon the “security” offered by the mortgages. And they are undercutting the value of the certificates they bought. That is what threatens a large segment of the shadow banking market.

The fix that Shipley thinks should happen will never come to fruition because the government has been convinced that a fix would eviscerate the shadow banking market where derivatives are traded. Nobody knows what the outcome will be if that market fails.

But in the meanwhile current policy reflects a decision to let investors and borrowers take the entire brunt of the scheme that ultimately left the banks in solid control and rising profits despite small settlements compared to the amount of money siphoned out of the US economy. So the Federal reserve and American taxpayers continue the bailout by lending support to the false presumption that the RMBS derivatives are based upon mortgage loans owned by a trust.

Shipley narrowly misses the point when he says

Advancing payments to investors when loans go delinquent — a core responsibility of servicers — demands a lot of cash. It also requires ample capital to absorb possible losses on servicing rights, an asset whose value can quickly evaporate if defaults and prepayments eat into expected fees.

Think about it. Why would a company guarantee payments from a third party? Who would take that risk on loans known to be at best fragile? Where is the money coming from to make those payments? Is it really the “servicer.” And if the money is “recovered” as “servicer advances” when the property is liquidated, is the foreclosure really a disguised suit to force the recovery of servicer advances rather than a true foreclosure — contrary to the interests of the certificate holders?

And if Ocwen was actually entitled to receive and expected to receive recovery of servicer advances why would it be teetering on the edge of bankruptcy? The more likely scenario is that subservicers like Ocwen have nothing at all to do with servicer advances. They don’t make them, they don’t initiate them and they don’t collect them. The Wall Street playbook has the real puppet masters hidden behind several layers of curtains. Ocwen, like so many others, is just there to get tossed under the bus to make people happy that they extracted a pound of flesh — except there was no skin in the game.

Lehman to Pay $2.4 Billion out of Bankrupt Estate

“Lehman’s own documents show it was aware of the widespread problems and deteriorating performance of the loans it had securitized,” with half the loans at one point containing material misrepresentations, the trustees said in a court filing.

Editor’s Note: The difference is money — investors have it and borrower’s don’t. So while investors are successfully litigating fraud and deceit, the borrowers can’t afford to litigate the same issues. The idea that Lehman was somehow honest with borrowers and not with investors is preposterous.

Lehman recently closed out a $2 billion dispute with Citigroup Inc. over derivatives, and similar litigation over derivatives with Credit Suisse Group AG is the last major remaining contest.

Around 14 large institutional holders, including Goldman Sachs Asset Management LP and BlackRock Financial Management, broke ranks with hedge funds and accepted a settlement last year valuing claims around $2.4 billion. Chapman noted that these “sophisticated players” held around 24 percent of the RMBS.

GO TO LENDINGLIES to order forms and services

Let us help you plan your answers, affirmative defenses, discovery requests and defense narrative:

954-451-1230 or 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult. You will make things a lot easier on us and yourself if you fill out the registration form. It’s free without any obligation. No advertisements, no restrictions.

Purchase now Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar including 3.5 hours of lecture, questions and answers, plus course materials that include PowerPoint Presentations. Presenters: Attorney and Expert Neil Garfield, Forensic Auditor Dan Edstrom, Attorney Charles Marshall and and Private Investigator Bill Paatalo. The webinar and materials are all downloadable.

Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 954-451-1230 or 202-838-6345. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

GO TO WWW.LENDINGLIES.COM OR https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

===========================

See Lehman Brothers Knew 1/2 the loans were misrepresented to both borrowers and investors

The trustees representing RMBS holders are Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., Law Debenture Trust Co. of New York, U.S. Bank National Association and Wilmington Trust Co., according to court papers.

A group of hedge funds, including Whitebox Advisors LLC, Deer Park Road Management Co. and Tilden Park Capital Management LP, was formed in 2016, and expanded in May 2017 to include Prophet Capital Management LP, Tricadia Capital Management LLC, BlueMountain Capital Management LLC and others, according to court records.

The case is In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 08-13555, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan.)

Practice note: Dig into the pleadings and exhibits in these cases and you will find a treasure trove of information that supports your contention at trial that the documents are unreliable and therefore the proof of the matters asserted must be proven with facts, not assumptions. You will probably uncover inconsistent allegations from Deutsch, Credit Suisse et al. They are most likely saying one thing in court with borrowers and another in court with investors.

An important note here is that these actions are based upon the presumptive finding of the US Bankruptcy trustee as to Lehman misrepresentations.

 

 

Wells Fargo “Lending” Securities It Didn’t Own

Translation: WFB was the “custodian” of alleged “mortgage-backed” certificates issued for the benefit of investors who paid billions of dollars for ownership of the certificates. WFB “Loaned” those alleged securities to brokers. The brokers in exchange provided “collateral” the proceeds of which were reinvested by WFB. In short, WFB was laundering the investors money for the sole benefit of WFB and not for the investors who owned the certificates and certainly to the detriment of the brokers and their buyers of derivative instruments based upon the loan of the securities.

This case reveals the flowering of multiple levels arising from false claims of securitization. First WFB issues certificates from a fictitious trust that owns nothing. Then it keeps both the money paid for those certificates and it keeps the certificates as well. On Wall Street this practice is called holding securities in “street name.” Then WFB engages in trading on securities it doesn’t own, but which are worthless anyway because the certificates only represent a promise from the REMIC trusts that exists only on paper.

It is all based upon outright lies. And that is why the banks get nervous when the issue of ownership of a debt, security or derivative becomes an issue in litigation. In this case the bank represented the trades as ownership or derivative ownership of “high grade money market instruments” such as “commercial paper or bank time deposits and CDs.”

None of it was true. WFB simply says that it thought that the “instruments” were safe. The lawsuit referred to in the linked article says they knew exactly what they were doing and didn’t care whether the instruments were safe or not. If the attorneys dig deeper they will find that the certificates’ promise to pay was not issued by an actual entity, that certificates were never mortgage-backed, and that WFB set it up so when there were losses it would not fall on WFB even though WFB was using the named trust basically as a fictitious name under which it operated.

So I continue to inquire: why does any court accept any document from WFB as presumptively valid? Why not require the actual proof?

Let us help you plan your defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.

Purchase now Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar including 3.5 hours of lecture, questions and answers, plus course materials that include PowerPoint Presentations. Presenters: Attorney and Expert Neil Garfield, Forensic Auditor Dan Edstrom, Attorney Charles Marshall and and Private Investigator Bill Paatalo. The webinar and materials are all downloadable.

Get a Consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

===========================

Hat Tip Bill Paatalo

see  WFB Securities Lending Scheme

The investments by WFB went into “mortgage backed assets.” Really? So let’s see how that works. First they create the certificates and sell them to investors even though neither the investors nor the trust have any interest in mortgage assets. Then they “loan” the same certificates to brokers, who provide collateral to WFB so that WFB can “reinvest” investor money using commingled investor money from a variety of sources.

Then derivatives on derivatives are sold as private contracts or insurance policies in which when the nonexistent trust assets are declared by WFB to have failed, in which WFB collects all the proceeds. The investors from all layers are screwed. And borrowers, as was originally planned, are screwed.

The lender to the borrower in the real world (where money is exchanged) are be the investors whose money was in the dynamic dark pool when the loan of money occurred. But the investors have no proof of ownership of the debt because of the false documents created by the “underwriter” bank.  The money from the second tier of investors is used to “purchase” the certificates WFB is “printing”. And then derivatives and hybrid derivatives and synthetic derivatives are sold multiplying the effect of every certificate issued. Such has the control over currency shifted from central banks who control around $8 trillion of fiat currency to the TBTF banks who boast a shadow banking market of $1 quadrillion ($1,000,000,000,000,000.00).

This every loan and every certificate is multiplied in the shadow banking market and converted into real money in the real world. Based upon prior securities analysis and review of disclosures from the publicly held banks it thus became possible for a “bank” to receive as much as $4.2 million on a $0.1 Million loan (i..e, $100,000). But in order to maintain the farce they must foreclose and not settle which will devalue the derivatives.

Then having done all that through control of a dynamic dark pool of investor money they must of course create the illusion of a robust lending market. True this particular case involves a business acquired when WFB acquired Wachovia. But WFB acquired Wachovia because it was the actual party in control of a false securitization scheme in which Wachovia acted primarily as originator and not lender.

WFB barely cares about the interest rate because they know the loans that are being approved won’t last anyway. But its trading desk secures extra profits by selling loans with a high interest rate, as though the loans had a low interest rate thereby guaranteeing two things: (1) guaranteed defaults that WFB can insure and (2) buying low (with investor money) and selling high (to investors).

All of which brings us back to the same point I raised when I first wrote (circa 2007) about the systemic fraud in securitization not as an idea, but in the way it had been put into practice. Using established doctrines in tax litigation there are two doctrines that easily clear up the intentional obfuscation by the banks: (1) The single transaction doctrine and (2) the step transaction doctrine. Yes it is that simple. If the investors didn’t part with their money then the loan of money would have never reached the desk of the closing agent. If the homeowners had not been similarly duped as to who and what was being done, they would never have signed on the dotted line.

To assume otherwise would be the same as assuming that borrowers were looking for a way to waste money on non-deductible down payments, improvements and furniture in exchange for a monthly payment that everyone knew they couldn’t afford.

 

New Florida Law Sneaks Under the Radar

BE CAREFUL HOW AND WHEN YOU FILE BANKRUPTCY PETITIONS

Governor Scott, admits 30 other bills signed SB 220 into law. You can barely find it using search engines. The law is   confusing at best and probably unconstitutional but here it is.

The new law makes BKR filings by Petitioner into presumptions in judicial foreclosures — but only the filings of the Petitioner (raising all sorts of constitutional issues). The filings by parties claiming to be creditors do not raise the same presumption unless other legal presumptions should be applied.

So now foreclosing parties can use the filings of the Petitioner against himself. As I have repeatedly stated, BKR filings by homeowners are generally misleading or wrong. Petitioners are admitting the lien and they temporarily surrender the property. The usual computer program that creates the Petition and schedules of bankruptcy makes it difficult to file anything but the wrong schedules.

This new law enables banks and servicers to use the interim period where the home is technically owned by U.S. Trustee in Bankruptcy, disregarding the fact that the Trustee typically abandons any such interest by the end of the BKR proceedings. The logic is the homeowner lacks standing to raise defenses because he/she has surrendered the  property to the court. It gets even worse when the schedules admit the debt and admit the security instrument. ALL OF THIS CAN BE USED AS PRESUMPTIVE (AND TREATED AS CONCLUSIVE) EVIDENCE IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS.

Bottom Line: Florida has enacted a law that is out of context and fails to treat debtors and creditors equally with respect to their filings in bankruptcy court. Homeowners in bankruptcy might be blocked from using the proceeding to stop a foreclosure, although the party claiming the status of “creditor” must still apply to lift the stay. Under the new law, the filing of a BKR petition  would essentially be a confession of judgment in foreclosure judicial proceedings blocking homeowners from raising any meritorious defenses because they no longer own the property.

Meanwhile the property records still show the homeowner as owner, and will continue to do so until the foreclosure judgment is entered and the judicial sale is complete together with a certificate of title to the bidder, who in most cases is a sham creditor claiming the right to submit a sham credit bid instead of paying for the home.

Let us help you plan your Bankruptcy petition, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.
Purchase now Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar including 3.5 hours of lecture, questions and answers, plus course materials that include PowerPoint Presentations. Presenters: Attorney and Expert Neil Garfield, Forensic Auditor Dan Edstrom, Attorney Charles Marshall and and Private Investigator Bill Paatalo. The webinar and materials are all downloadable.
Get a Consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

===========================

see New Florida Law Traps Homeowners Who File for Bankruptcy Protection

So instead of getting protection from creditors, a Petitioner for Bankruptcy Relief gets the opposite -screwed out of meritorious defenses. This is what happens when nobody is watching and we keep voting for people who will vote or sign for any legislation against the homeowners and for the banks.

This is a law of evidence and until challenged, ruled unconstitutional or invalid, it MUST be followed by judges unless the judge in a foreclosure case rules the new Florida law is invalid. Good luck with that. Not likely.

PRACTICE POINTER: I have often seen Proofs of Claim (and exhibits attached thereto) filed for parties claiming to be creditors that differ materially from the filings in the court where the foreclosure is being heard. Those too could be admissions under existing rules of evidence. POCs are generally sworn documents.

And also keep in mind that if a creditor doesn’t file a timely proof of claim the debtor can file one for the creditor which can say almost anything. If your schedules don’t list a creditor with a secured interest and instead show that you don’t admit this party has that status many people have found that there is no admission that an be used in other courts.

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702.12 Actions in foreclosure.— 19

(1)(a) A lienholder, in an action to foreclose a mortgage, 20 may submit any document the defendant filed under penalty of 21 perjury in the defendant’s bankruptcy case for use as an 22 admission by the defendant. 23

(b) A rebuttable presumption that the defendant has waived 24 any defense to the foreclosure is created if a lienholder 25 submits documents filed in the defendant’s bankruptcy case 26 which: 27

1. Evidence the defendant’s intention to surrender to the 28 lienholder the property that is the subject of the foreclosure; 29

2. Have not been withdrawn by the defendant; and ENROLLED 2018 Legislature SB 220 2018220er Page 2 of 2 CODING: Words stricken are deletions; words underlined are additions. 30

3. Show that a final order has been entered in the 31 defendant’s bankruptcy case which discharges the defendant’s 32 debts or confirms the defendant’s repayment plan that provides 33 for the surrender of the property. 34

(2) Pursuant to s. 90.203, a court shall take judicial 35 notice of an order entered in a bankruptcy case upon the request 36 of a lienholder. 37

(3) This section does not preclude the defendant in a 38 foreclosure action from raising a defense based upon the 39 lienholder’s action or inaction subsequent to the filing of the 40 document filed in the bankruptcy case which evidenced the 41 defendant’s intention to surrender the mortgaged property to the 42 lienholder. 43

(4) This section applies to any foreclosure action filed on 44 or after October 1, 2018. 45 Section 2. This act shall take effect October 1, 2018.

 

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