Why Antitrust Legislation Should be Applied Against the mega banks

Securitization of data that is mischaracterized as securitization of debt has enabled the securities firms to write off the loan concurrently with funding it

I believe there is a very strong case for applying antitrust legislation against the big winners in the securitization game because they could and did apply multiple incentives to borrowers to accept loan products that were clearly losers from a business perspective. This blocked competitors who wanted to make real loans with real lenders and raised the risk of loss to consumers without any disclosure to the consumer, to government regulators or anyone else. All of this was performed at the same time that the risk of financial loss was entirely eliminated on any transaction with homeowners that was characterized as a loan.

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The big securities brokerage firms acting as investment “banks” were able to fund loans and then sell securities that were completely dependent upon data released by the same securities firms about the performance of the data, as announced by the securities brokerage firm in its sole discretion. Effectively and substantively they sold the same loan multiple times. But nominally there was no reduction in the loan receivable account because there was no loan receivable account.

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 This effectively forced small community banks, credit unions and other lenders into the position of not competing — if they had offered the same incentives on real loans to homeowners, they would have suffered catastrophic loss. So they had to step out of lending, which would have been catastrophic or originate loans “for sale.”

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The result was an undisclosed reduction of risk of loss for everyone on the “lending” side. But the more pernicious result was that the bank practices also flooded the market with money such that salespeople were selling payments instead of price and the accuracy of appraisals was reduced as a factor in granting loans. This created a second antitrust impact — the price of homes was driven up by cheap money rather than demand for housing. But values remained the same because median income has been flat.
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The effect on consumers was that they all bought or financed homes based upon appraisals that were based upon the amount of the intended loan rather than the value of the property. So the net effect was that homeowners were forced into deals where they were taking an immediate loss of as much as 65% of the “price” of acquisition of the home or new loan. This was a hidden increase in the cost of credit. Amortizing the likely loss over the likely period of retention of the home increases the cost of credit far beyond usury prohibitions.
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The overall bottom line is that the big banks acting as unregulated lenders have grabbed a market share for lending that controls more than 80% of the market and heavily influences the rest of the market.
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Consumers suffer because they are not dealing with a party who could answer for damages resulting from violations of TILA and other lending and servicing statutes and because they are not left with either a lender or a loan account in real terms that is maintained as an asset on the books of any business. They are left with a toxic transaction in which they are strictly on their own when they discover the deficiencies in the lending process. They’re on their own because there is no actual creditor who claims ownership of their debt, note or mortgage.
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The risk of foreclosure is high, especially on those transactions in which the appraisal is far higher than the value of the home and especially where the transaction is labeled as an option loan in which the homeowner gets reduced payments for some specified period of time. In short, the failure to regulate the securities brokerage firms acting as investment “banks” and then as licensed commercial “banks” has so distorted the marketplace that no borrower can find a source of funds who will admit to being part of the the transaction, much less the lender in any specific transaction.
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Securitization of data that is mischaracterized as securitization of debt has enabled the securities firms to write off the loan concurrently with funding it, while at the same time pursuing foreclosures and other enforcement or “modification” processes in which they have been successful at pretending the loan account exists, that a party owns it, that a loss was sustained as a result of the homeowner’s “failure” to make payments on a nonexistent loan account.

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Neil F Garfield, MBA, JD, 73, is a Florida licensed trial attorney since 1977. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business and law. He is a former investment banker, securities broker, securities analyst, and financial analyst.
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  • But challenging the “servicers” and other claimants before they seek enforcement can delay action by them for as much as 12 years or more.
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Just like I said: Megabanks are doing just fine despite economic downturn — at the expense of investors, taxpayers and homeowners.

Major banks, including CitigroupJPMorgan and Morgan Stanley used massive trading revenues to beat profit expectations despite the continued struggles of the United States economy during the coronavirus pandemic. Those trading units tend to perform best when markets are volatile, helping to guard the major banks against economic struggles.

see https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/17/without-big-wall-street-trading-arms-regional-banks-lean-on-mortgages-and-fees-to-beat-earnings.html

Way back in 2006 and 2007 and when I first started publishing articles about the mortgage meltdown (before most people realized there was a meltdown) I reported that the major banks were siphoning off much of the wealth contained inside the U.S.

I said that these mega banks were parking ill-gotten gains off-shore in various assets, — frequently using  a tax avoidance scheme based in Bermuda. And I said that they would repatriate that money only when they needed to do so.  And because they had taken trillions of dollars, they would forever use it to consistently report higher earnings whenever they needed to do so in order to maintain the value of their stock.

I said that they would do it by reporting higher trading profits. They are reporting higher trading profits merely by creating false trades at their trading desks between fictitious entities in which one of the subsidiaries is the “seller” who is reporting a profit.

Sure enough that is exactly what is happening. Small and regional banks don’t have that “nest egg.” They must rely on old fashioned fees and interest to earn money. But the big banks are reporting “trading profits” to offset deficits in interest and fee income caused by the huge economic downturn caused by coronavirus.

Part of those trading profits also come from foreclosures. The proceeds go to the megabanks, who have retained little or no financial interest in the alleged loans much less any losses from the alleged default.

There was no default in any obligation owed to any creditor because there is no creditor who maintains an accounting record on which it claims to own any homeowner debt, note or mortgage by reason of having paid value for it in exchange for a conveyance of ownership of the debt, note or mortgage from one who legally owns it.

Simple common sense. If you don’t own the debt you have no reason or authority to mark it “paid” even if you receive the money.  Homeowners and their lawyers should stop taking that leap of faith in which they admit the existence of a default. A default cannot exist on an obligation in which there is a complete absence of a legal creditor. Homeowners didn’t create this mess. It was all the megabanks who made a fortune stealing from investors and homeowners.

A default is the failure to perform an obligation or duty owed to a particular person — not a failure to perform a duty owed to the world in general.

There could be many reasons for the absence of a legal creditor — including the simple fact that everyone has received sufficient payments and settlements such that nobody needs to step into the shoes of a lender which could produce liability for violations of lending and servicing laws.

IT SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN THE BURDEN OF HOMEOWNERS TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF THE REAL CREDITOR. There isn’t one and the banks and their lawyers have been laughing at us for 20 years over getting away with that one. 

It was the mega banks that created loans without lenders — i.e., transactions in which there was no legal person or entity claiming ownership of the obligation.

The banks are using smoke and mirrors. They claim (through third party intermediaries) a “default” in the obligation to pay a nonexistent creditor. The money they receive from foreclosure is pure revenue offset only by the fees they pay to the other intermediary foreclosure players who exist solely to produce profits for themselves and the megabanks.

And pro se homeowners and even lawyers are confounded by this system. They admit the basic elements of the claim even though the basic legal elements are missing.

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Neil F Garfield, MBA, JD, 73, is a Florida licensed trial attorney since 1977. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business and law. He is a former investment banker, securities broker, securities analyst, and financial analyst.
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Who is PennyMac and Why Was It Needed by Wall Street Banks?

I received an email from one of my most prolific contributors that I am republishing here because virtually everything in it is entirely correct. I especially approve of her point about the fact that servicer advances are funded from proceeds of public offerings of stock that were all purchased by the Wall Street banks who did the underwriting.  Substance over form: the banks were giving PennyMac the money to make servicer advances. The banks were using the investor sourced money supply to buy the fake stock offering. None of it was real.

The end result is that all roads lead back to one thing, to wit: all of the money trail and all of the paper trails lead back to a handful of Wall Street banks who had “successfully” created a void between the real parties in interest — investors and homeowners — and the found a way to create the illusion of filling the void that cut out the financial interests of those real parties in interest. 

The banks were only intermediaries. They successfully posed as the real parties in interest when they were trading and issuing derivatives. But at the other end of the stick they maintained their position as intermediaries who had no interest in the debt and therefore could not be defined as lenders subject to the obligations and restrictions imposed by statutory and common law governing lending, consumer practices, servicing or anything else.

All of the fabricated documents that ensued were designed to cover up the fact that there was no person or entity that owned the underlying debt of any homeowner. Hence nobody could claim financial injury — a basic requirement for getting into court or making any claim.

who is PennyMac (PM) and why are they needed.
I think we need to look back at the PM history to answer this question.
PennyMac is a renamed Countrywide Financial which now operates at least 4 (four) known to me organizations.
1. PennyMac (one of most criminal, with Kurland and Spector)
2. Caliber Home Loan Inc, a middle-level intermediary, operated by Chris Mozilo who pass money from table pools to homebuyers via Black Knight (originator)  and smaller “Lenders”
3. BAC Home Loans
4. LandSafe Appraisal (purchased by CoreLogic) . In 2014 BOA sold a very similarly named system, LoanSafe to VA which is now handles all appraisals; plus CoreLogic gradually purchased most smaller appraisal companies*
Why Bank of America needed PennyMac to appear as a Large Lender and a Biggest servicer?
For the same reason why Countrywide needed American’s Wholesale Lender; and Fidelity National needed two (2) DocX,LLC and LPS – to create an additional corporate curtain to cover for the real parties.
Plus to use PennyMac and other “Servicers” as recipients for new bailouts.
If you take a closer look at PennyMac’s finances, here are nothing even close to $368+ billions worth of mortgages financed and 2 million homes serviced by PennyMac.
Moreover, if you see their Prospectuses, you will find out that the underwriters of PM securities (issued by PennyMac) are the same Stockbrokers who purchased PM’s securities, leaving about $29 million in fees to Penny Mac. I doubt is BOA or GS actually “purchased” anything from PM under this “offering” which they issued under glimpse of PennyMac.
But according to the legend, PennyMac now has to pay pay “servers’ advances” to “investors” for four months from their “own funds” until GSE’s (who sold their bonds to Fed. R. in advance) who cover these MBS, will step in and pick up the payments on “behalf of taxpayers  – while  GSE cannot even identify any Trusts where mortgages were pooled.
These GSE SOLD their unsecured bonds to Federal Reserve who buy about $30 Billion per WEEK from GSE beginning March 2020 to present time. Note that no Trusts were involved in these sales and no one homeowner was informed about the cage of ownership of their “debt”
I don’t know which “Servicers’ advances” and to whom PennyMac “pays” now, when the ownership of the “MBS” bonds was passed to Federal Reserve. At least Federal Reserve keeps it secret.
Apparently Kurland and know all risks involved and decided to steal some data from BK to create more money for themselves.
On May 2, 2019 they sent me a letter that “servicing” was transferred to them – but not mentioned by whom.
On May 3, 2019 PM sent a letter to BK informing them that PM is not going to extend their contract.
soon after Black Knight claimed that they “noticed some irregularities of use” their system by PM – apparently after I brought it to their attention. This is why no assignments were recorded reflecting the “sale” of my loan to PennyMac who cannot identify the Seller.
Since Oct. 31st  BK terminated PM as a client .
In Complaint  filed by PM against BK, they insist that the owner/investor is Ginnie Mae (who sold their MBS to Federal Reserve) – but continue to lie to me and DIFS that PennyMac is “owner/investor” in my loan.
The bottom line, as Neil said – these “servicers” and “lenders” are nothing. They are thin-capitalized clowns for hire and nobody sold any loans to GSEs because loans were destroyed at the beginning to create “manipulated data” in Black Knight system which Big Banks  sold as unsecured derivatives which GSE either sell to Federal Reserve or obtain payments from Stockbrokers directly, like FHFA v. Goldman Sachs
“GSE’s ownership” is the same myth to force people paying a long-time non existing “debt”.
So-called “universal income” proposed by Democrats is a camouflaged attempt to make Big Banks  pay royalties from trades to people .
Of course the Government cannot disclose the Truth since it will reveal that during last 40 years they allowed Stockbrokers to destroy property Titles to virtually ALL homes in America; plus create a slavery never existed before, where a small group of people enjoy tax-free profits from free servitude provided to them by the rest of the Country – plus income from stolen homes.
*Lagow worked at LandSafe, Inc., an appraisal company owned by Countrywide Financial and ultimately acquired by Bank of America, from 2004-2008. According to his unsealed complaint, Mr. Lagow observed widespread disregard for laws that regulate Federal Housing Administration (FHA) underwriting and home appraisals.

Specifically, he claimed that Countrywide conspired with LandSafe and homebuilder KB Homes to inflate the appraised value of homes, boosting the size of the lending giant’s loans to homebuyers. In order to accomplish this, the lending giant allegedly used a number of strong-arm tactics to pressure appraisers to report favorable home values.
Neil F Garfield, MBA, JD, 73, is a Florida licensed trial attorney since 1977. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business and law. He is a former investment banker, securities broker, securities analyst, and financial analyst.
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It’s time to reassess the role of investment banks, originators, servicers and other players claiming “securitization” before the next foreclosure tidal wave.

Since foreclosures are about to start another meteoric rise, this would be a good time to write a new article on what went wrong the last time, what is going on now, and what is still likely to go wrong this time.
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I know that some of the rantings on the internet seem like the spillage of conspiracy theorists and some of them are just that. But overall they are right.
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The bottom line is that back in 1993, investment banks latched onto a scheme that had been partially developed by Michael Milken, who went to prison. The new scheme was patently illegal, which made it one step over the line that Milken actually didn’t cross. His junk bonds were perfectly legal. Drexel Burnham disclosed the real risks. But Michael had bigger plans. The plan was to raise the perception of junk bonds to investment grade.
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But then he went to jail. But upon release he was immediately paid $50 million and then hundreds of millions more to help devise the scheme. His actual role is subject to conjecture.
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The goal was to tap the largest market for debt in the world — home lending. It required all the major investment banks (Citi, Goldman, JPM, Credit Suisse) to “cooperate” (i.e., conspire).
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They had to each support the “securitization” schemes of each other, entice other lesser investment banks into playing (Lehman, Bear Stearns) and then influence or buy off fund managers (pension funds) to purchase the junk bonds they were issuing as “Certificates.”
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It as the “holy grail” of investment banking. Issuing trash securities as though it was for a third party issuer when in fact the issuer was the investment bank itself.
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To justify the purchases by stable managed funds, the investment banks paid off and coerced the insurers into issuing insurance contracts and the rating agencies to issue highest quality ratings based upon false assumptions about diversification of risk. The error is simple: diversification is irrelevant if the entire group of loans is (a) not owned and (b) tainted by bad underwriting.
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And the insurance contracts were payable not to the investors nor even for their benefit but rather for the profit of the investment bank who purchased it. The contracts were based upon index performance not actual losses.
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The same is true for the bailouts that occurred. No losses were paid off because the parties receiving the benefits of insurance or bailout had no loss. See the evolution of the definition of TARP from something covering loan losses, to something covering losses on certificates issued by investment banks, to an undefined toxic asset category.
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The now infamous AIG bailout was primarily for the benefit of Goldman Sachs. Having installed their former CEO as US Treasury Secretary, a very reluctant President Bush was convinced to bailout AIG on the false premise that the financial markets would collapse if he didn’t. But the proceeds went to Goldman Sachs as pure profit.
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AIG took the money to pay off Goldman for its bet that the certificates would decline in value. The decline in value was based upon a contractual provision that gave Goldman the sole right in its sole discretion to declare the event. The money covered no losses because Goldman had no losses. It was pure profit. And when the money was received (around $50 billion from the bailout, bonuses, parties and lavish spending ensued.
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Meanwhile the only two real parties to the scheme — investors and homeowners — were left out in the cold.
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At the end of each securitization cycle, the goal was to avoid liability for violations of lending and securities laws. Avoiding lending laws was easy. They used sham entities to act as “originators” who served for a fee and who appeared on the note and mortgage as a lender.
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Avoiding violations of securities was also easy. they disclosed enough to be able to say they told investors what they were doing, the investors were sophisticated and should have been able to ascertain the risks, and through leveraging the typical herd mentality on Wall Street they created a stampede in all securities brokerage firms to buy and sell the certificates. The world was hooked on a financial weapon of mass destruction.
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Eliminating the liability of a lender in form and substance meant that the role of creditor or lender had to be eliminated. That was accomplished by actually eliminating the homeowner’s debt without notice to the homeowner. Hence the “boarding process” asserted in court is fake. There can be no boarding of a debt that does not exist and a history of payments on the nonexistent debt is irrelevant.
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Each party other than the investor got paid in full. But the homeowner never received any notice of reduction due to receipt of payment because nobody maintained an accounting entry on any books of record that showed that the debt was owed or owned.
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The debt could not be owned without a corresponding entry that showed value being paid for the debt. No such transaction had never occurred since the only actual value was paid by investors, who didn’t own the debt.
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The investor never purchased any debt, note or mortgage. At the end of the day there was no person or entity that legally owned any debt, note or mortgage and therefore no lender or lender successor who could be liable for violations of Federal and State lending laws.
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The scheme then required foreclosure on debts that had already been fully paid several times over. To do this the investment banks had to again resort to using sham entities who would fake their roles using fabricated, false, forged and backdated instruments literally manufactured out of thin air. Despite numerous settlements in all US jurisdictions for such practices, they continue unabated.
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And the proceeds of foreclosure are ultimately received by the investment banks who pay out lavish compensation for the players who contributed to the foreclosure process. *
Since no loss is covered or paid or recorded on any books of account, the money is literally free money in which for tax purposes, is falsely reported as payment on loans. So the foreclosure proceeds are pure profit which is untaxed, at least up until this point in time. Investors never see a penny and homeowners are never the wiser that their debt does not exist anywhere.
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In order to accomplish all this the banks needed to coordinate their activities. enter Black Knight who is literally a  successor to DOCX, which was acquired by Lender Processing Systems (LPS). Lorraine Browne took one for the team when she became the only person in the scheme to go to jail for fabrication of documents.
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Somehow the courts continue to apply presumptions that are supposed to only raise from inherent credibility of documents that are patently false. This results in foreclosure on the erroneous assumption that even if the paperwork is somehow false or even fabricated the proceeds will find their way to the investors. That presumption is wrong.
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Black Knight is the hub in which all things are centralized to prevent foreclosure of the same homeowner transaction by more than one entity — something that would expose the false nature of all of the foreclosures.
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By getting a foreclosure judgment the investment banks succeeded in getting a legal stamp of approval on everything that had transpired before the foreclosure was initiated and the grounds on which they could report the proceeds as return of loan. Basically all fabricated false documentation emanates by or at the direction of Black Knight.
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Judges of all stripes have always been curious about the muscle chairs strategy of presenting several servicers, plaintiffs and other parties. Maybe this time, with a little help from the press, they might be open to considering the fact that the investment banks are not saving the economy, they are stealing from investors and homeowners alike. And if they start asking for fake bailouts again they are stealing from the government and taxpayers. 

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New foreclosure rocket dockets will emerge unless these practices are controlled or stopped. If the claimant is not the owner of the debt, present, existing, black letter law, does not allow foreclosure. In fact, enforcement of the note or separately, the debt, is not allowed unless the right to enforce comes from the owner of the debt. The law is clear, unless someone pays value, they can’t own the debt. Assignments of mortgage without the debt are a legal nullity.
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To “save” the economy the only legal option available is to reassess the homeowner transaction using the equitable powers of the court. It might be true that the homeowner obligation can be enforced after such a reassessment — but only after the facts are all exposed and all stakeholders are brought to the table.
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This would require that the court hear a properly filed pleading requesting equitable reformation of the contract to allow for maintaining the homeowner obligation because without that, the entire securitization infrastructure is in danger of collapse — even though nobody in the securitization infrastructure actually ever owns the debt or suffers a loss from nonpayment.
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To make the homeowner obligation enforceable the court must allow a designee or nominee to pose as creditor. Further the court must adopt procedures that allow a party to act as the designator, even though neither the designee nor the designator own the debt and will suffer no loss from any payment or nonpayment by a homeowner. The current practice of allowing such designees to reap such rewards is  not legally sustainable and probably unjust and unfair.
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The legal analysis requires a beginning point of analysis the contracting intent of the contracting parties. And that in turn requires an analysis of the identity of the contracting parties.
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That analysis results in an indisputable truth: taken separately there was no meeting of the minds — because the homeowner wanted a loan and the investment bank , acting through the originator, wanted the issuance of securities — the note and mortgage — without anyone assuming the substantive role of a lender.
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But taken together a contract can be fashioned in which the homeowner transaction can be treated as a loan contract and the absence of any creditor can be adjusted to insert a designee or creditor who can enforce. but ti do that, the entire contract must be taken into consideration.
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If the homeowner was seeking an actual loan under lending laws but didn’t get it, what is the consideration for entering into a deal that was so profitable for the other contracting parties, whether they were stated or concealed?
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If the answer is nothing, then the court must determine the proper amount of consideration that the homeowner should have received for being drafted into a risky securities scheme — a scheme in which his rights as a consumer, borrower or customer were virtually eviscerated by the substance of the deal.
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The only other legal option is common law rescission. That will result in dismantling the entire securitization scheme.
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Neil F Garfield, MBA, JD, 73, is a Florida licensed trial attorney since 1977. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business and law. He is a former investment banker, securities broker, securities analyst, and financial analyst.
*

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*
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FORECLOSURE DEFENSE IS NOT SIMPLE. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE OF A FAVORABLE RESULT. THE FORECLOSURE MILLS WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO WEAR YOU DOWN AND UNDERMINE YOUR CONFIDENCE. ALL EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT NO MEANINGFUL SETTLEMENT OCCURS UNTIL THE 11TH HOUR OF LITIGATION.
*
Please visit www.lendinglies.com for more information.

Coming this fall! A new wave of illegal foreclosure claims. Will we get it right this time?

Some have pointed to some articles indicating that the securitization ponzi scheme collapsed already.

It might be more accurate to say that the scheme was reorganized rather than collapsed. But even if it collapsed the Wall Street banks will continue sending servicers and foreclosure mills into the field to file foreclosures. After, all, it’s free money if they win, and there is so far, a statistical certainty that in nearly all cases they will win simply because of the erroneous belief by homeowners that they have done something wrong and that they have a moral obligation to leave the house, once they stop paying.

So homeowner will give their precious house to people who have no right to receive it.

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We are a long way from when homeowners realize that they were flim flammed from the very start and that taking the substance of the homeowner transaction in total and in perspective, the homeowner (a) did not owe any money to anyone claiming it and (b) the homeowner was probably owed more money from the investment bank than he/she could possibly owe under the note and mortgage that was issued.
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It wasn’t a loan and we should stop calling it that. The “lender” side had no lending intent. At the conclusion of the process there was no creditor holding the homeowner obligation as an asset. Therefore they were not lenders or even creditors and accordingly not liable or accountable to act in accordance with lending and servicing statutes.
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The confusion emanates from the fact that all homeowners entered into the transaction with borrower intent. But there was no lending intent from the other side. The other side masked the real transaction as a loan to deceive the homeowner into accepting the label “borrower”.
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The real transaction was payment to the homeowner for issuance of note and mortgage to start the securitization processes. It was in reality a simple commercial transaction, to wit: the investment bank, through intermediaries agrees to pay money to the homeowner in exchange for the homeowner issuing a note and mortgage and putting up their home as collateral for an obligation that offsets the payment received. It could have been a loan, but it wasn’t.
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Because the banks lied about the transaction to the homeowner and to further make it look like a loan, they got the homeowner to issue a note and mortgage in most cases to an entity that never paid any money. This might negate the consideration for the transaction altogether because they were making a payment  but also getting a promise to pay even more to unknown creditors who would be illegally designated later. That part is a close question.
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But in quantum meruit, quasi contract and reformation, the only legal way that their designation system could be made legal is by getting consent from the homeowner to that system of designation of a creditor to act as a lawful creditor even though it wasn’t. That was the real reason for MERS, the use of Originators and the offering of “modifications.” The players on paper are designees or nominees — not real players. They are using the language of the notes and mortgages to imply consent to a “no creditor” transaction.
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But that is not informed consent or real consent, nor is it legal without other language of contract. A binding contract must have offer, acceptance, clear terms and consideration between the parties to the contract. In most cases the homeowner transactions were therefore not binding contracts. The Payee on the note was not a creditor. The doctrine of merger cannot apply when the payee is different from the source of funds unless there is a specific express contractual provision stating that. The mortgagee is usually a nominee which I think is a tacit admission that there is no creditor.
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In order to foreclose, the party asking for foreclosure remedy must be a creditor. A creditor is only one who either (a) owns the debt or (b) represents someone who owns the debt. Ownership of the debt is only accomplished in one way — payment of value in exchange for an instrument conveying title to the debt from an owner of the debt to a new owner of the debt.
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The ONLY time any value was paid was by investors. But they did not get any instrument of conveyance of the debt. Quite the contrary. The intent was to make certain that they would never be considered lenders. What they received was a discretionary promise from the investment bank dba REMIC trust to make payments that were partially indexed on but not dependent upon receipt of payments from homeowners.
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It is therefore impossible for any transaction to have occurred wherein value was paid for ownership of the debt after the investors paid the investment bank. Even if someone wanted to pay value in exchange for an instrument of conveyance of ownership of the debt, there was nobody to pay.
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The only party who paid value was the group of investors or arguably the investment bank. But neither of those entities had ever received any instrument of conveyance of ownership of the debt and in fact they disclaimed any such ownership because it would have made them lenders subject to TILA and other lending and servicing laws.
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BUT in order to foreclose, the papers filed by the foreclosure mill would need to show that a creditor was applying for the remedy of forfeiture. See Article 9 §203 UCC. So that required assignments of mortgage to be prepared, executed and recorded even though there was no financial transaction between the parties. In short, the scheme required the preparation, execution and recording of false utterances in false documents that were forged and illegally recorded.
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Since the homeowner has always assumed the homeowner transaction was a loan agreement, almost nobody has thought to credibly and properly challenge these assignments as legal nullities.
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The credible challenge would be not only that there was no consideration paid for the assignment, but that the payment of consideration was not a commercially reasonable basis for the execution and recording of the instrument, since the only consideration came from parties who did not and do not want ownership of the debt.
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The absence of any valid assignment is not just a fact; it is legally impossible under current securitizations schemes to have a valid legal assignment. The investment banks as intermediaries between investors and homeowners have structured the cash flow such that the investment banks get most of the benefits from the securitization process at the cost to and detriment of investors and homeowners — the only two real parties in interest in the homeowner transaction which is mistakenly called a “loan.”
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The note, payable to a party with whom the homeowner unknowingly conducted no actual business, creates a liability under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code regardless of the lack of consideration. The maker of the note has defenses to be sure, but if someone buys the note for value, without knowledge of the maker’s defenses, and in good faith, then the maker must pay the note and the only remedy available to the maker is by making a claim against the Payee on the note and anyone else that induced him to execute a note in favor of someone who gave him/her nothing.
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The foreclosure mills for claimants in foreclosure do not plead status as a holder in due course because they can’t prove the elements: payment, good faith and lack of knowledge of borrower’s defenses. But they induce both homeowners, their attorneys and the courts to treat the claimant as a holder in due course because of the complexity of legal analysis in distinguishing between an HDC, holder, possessor and anyone with rights to enforce.
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As a result, because the position is not properly challenged, the court then often reduces or even eliminates discovery on the central issue — whether the claimant is a creditor of the homeowner.
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The “rights to enforce” argument almost always leaves out the presumed component that is a condition precedent to any such analysis, to wit: that the creditor has authorized the enforcement. But if there is no creditor — i.e., anyone holding the debt as an asset — then such authority cannot legally exist.
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This explains the appearance of false, fabricated, forged, backdated and robo signed documents that are still regularly used. Since there is no creditor the pursuit of foreclosure is a pursuit of profit rather than restitution for an unpaid debt. It is not recovery on a loan.
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And if the transaction was unraveled from its complex appearance, it is plain as day that the homeowner is entitled to credits and probably payments from the investment bank under quantum meruit and quasi contract for being drafted into a highly profitable securitizations scheme that gave the homeowner nothing for initiating the scheme.
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We are about to be besieged with new foreclosure claims. Let’s get it right this time. The “flood of litigation” argument for rocket dockets is not valid because it presumes that the claimant does have status as a creditor and that the foreclosure is for restitution of an unpaid debt.
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Aggressive and persistent demands for identification of the claimant and for evidence of proof payment for value — along with thoughtful, credible and persuasive presentation might well result in prevention of a flood of foreclosures because there is no entity that actually stands to lose any money arising from the action or inaction of any homeowner.
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They won’t plead injury because there is no injury. They can’t prove any injury. They can only induce the court to presume it based upon erroneous application of legal presumptions arising from the apparent facial validity of documents that are neither facially valid nor true representations of any transaction in the real world. 

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Neil F Garfield, MBA, JD, 73, is a Florida licensed trial attorney since 1977. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business and law. He is a former investment banker, securities broker, securities analyst, and financial analyst.
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Has any homeowner transaction ever been sold to investors? No? Then why are we accepting the bank myth that it was securitized?

Bob gives me a mortgage and I sign a note for $300k. Bob assigns the mortgage and note to Steve in exchange for “certificates / securities.” Bob retains the note and pledges to Jim in a collateral assignment to raise money to fund more loans. (i.e. WaMu and the Federal Home Loan Banks). I stop paying and soon Steve declares a default and tries to foreclose. My defense is that Steve doesn’t have the note, never took the note, and the note was collaterally assigned elsewhere before Steve filed the foreclosure action. If so, we can make that same defensive argument in every case it would seem.

No that is not a good defense. Your defense should be centered on who owns the debt. And only someone who has paid value for the debt can own it. If someone pays value in exchange for ownership of either the note or mortgage, then it is presumed that they own the debt — and it would be very hard to rebut that presumption.

So if someone pays money without getting or being entitled to a document that transfers the ownership of the debt from the current owner to the new owner, they have not acquired the debt.

Similarly, if someone has not paid value for the debt or note and they do get such a conveyance of ownership of the debt, even from one who is the owner of the debt, they too don’t own the debt. And a non-owner of the debt cannot issue any rights or instructions regarding the debt without deriving authority from an owner of the debt who paid for it.

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The transaction between Bob and Steve was a sale. Steve paid value unless the certificates or securities he used as payment were known to be worthless at the time of the sale. The fact that Bob retained possession of the note does not change the analysis. When Steve seeks to enforce the note he either has to get Bob to produce it or if he can’t, then he needs to plead a lost note. The transaction that you have used as an example does not convert the note to a security.

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Steve also has the option of suing Bob in the event that Bob is reluctant to turn out for possession of the note. but in all events Steve can show that he bought the note, which means that he bought the debt, and therefore is probably a holder in due course or at least a holder with rights to enforce as the owner of the debt.
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But the analysis does change if the example is changed slightly. If Bob was loaning you money because Steve was contemporaneously taking Bob out of the loan, then in substance the conduct of the parties shows that Steve was the actual lender and that Bob was simply an intermediary. This is the essence of a table funded loan which is against public policy as set forth in the Truth in Lending Act.
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So if Steve did not take possession of the note because Steve did not want to be accountable or liable for violations of lending laws as a lender, there is a case to be made that the nature of the transaction shifted. And if Steve gave Bob the money to lend to you because Steve was contemporaneously divesting himself from any risk of loss on the loan, then the argument would go one of two ways.
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Either the next person in the chain acquired ownership interest in the debt and note — or if Steve was merely selling derivatives whose value was indexed on the performance of your loan, then then the debt and note probably lost a creditor who could legally claim rights to enforce. As I see it, this would definitely be true if nobody in the chain was carrying the debt and note as an asset after Steve made his sale of derivatives.
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But I don’t think that under Securities analysis, the latter example would result in finding that the note had been converted to a security. It’s hard to see any analysis that would support that conclusion. If nobody was paying for legal ownership of the note then how would the note be converted?
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Of course that could be one possibility that would preserve the securitization infrastructure. And maybe if the courts catch the Wall Street banks with their hands in the cookie jar, the banks themselves might push that idea.
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Given the political climate that allows Wall Street to make up its own rules, that might happen, leaving both investors and homeowners out in the cold. That is why I’m starting to push Reformation as the better alternative which takes all stakeholders into account.

HELOC Securitization Analysis — Why Are There Two “wet ink” Signatures? What Rights Does MERS Possess?

“a transfer of the mortgage without the debt is a nullity, and no interest is acquired by it”

“because MERS was never the lawful holder or assignee of the notes described and identified in the consolidation agreement, the corrected assignment of mortgage is a nullity, and MERS was without authority to assign the power to foreclose to the plaintiff. Consequently, the plaintiff failed to show that it had standing to foreclose.”

The writer of this article shall remain anonymous. He sent me the following. I concur with his analysis:

I came across your June 17th post about the mortgage exec that double-pledged some notes.  This is a subject I’ve been looking into for a while, thanks to Nye Lavalle’s writings – damn him for sending me down that rabbit-hole.  You might also look at:

https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/former-comptroller-mortgage-lender-charged-bank-fraud-and-wire-fraud and the incitement at https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/press-release/file/1017921/download

As I came to realize that this isn’t a one-off scam…  I got to thinking about why do all closings require two wet-ink originals?  Not only for “sum certain” mortgages but for HELOC’s too.  So, I darned my tinfoil hat and let my mind wander into the conspiracy abyss.  I’ve always been uncomfortable with the double-document signing at closings.

As I carefully nit-pick through my own documents, I can’t help noticing that, often is the case that the County recording uses one set of the wet-inks, while the bank uses the other.  Is this just a matter of convenience, whereby the closing title/abstract company sends one set to the county clerk and the other to the lender, for its MERS recording.  Of course, the counties don’t record notes, only mortgages, so that’s a bit of a chink in the armor there.

Then I realized that the Clerk set isn’t indorsed because that process comes later (albeit not much later, actually depending on the county’s back-log it could be sooner than later) – OK, no big deal – BUT WAIT – it’s not like they wait to get the recorded set back and then indorse it – no – they just indorse the other set.  So, the secondary-market set is not the recorded set.  Hmmm, Ok, a bit nefarious, but is it a non-starter for foreclosure –  probably not.

But then I realized that my HELOC had the same slipperiness.  In HELOC foreclosures (at least mine with Citibank), the bank presents the endorsed HELOC (HELOC-CEMA because it’s NY) as its prima facie evidence for standing, swearing that it’s the “indorsed note”; while sometimes also swearing that it’s not securitized it never left the bank’s hands (holding), which in-and-of itself is curious, because if it never transferred, then why is it indorsed?

TIME OUT:  No Neil, I didn’t make a spelling mistake (indorsed vs endorsed), but I am messing with you, because so are the banks.  Of course, you know (but your readers probably don’t, and many judges probably miss the subtlety too).  “Endorse” means accredit by bestowing recognition; whereas “Indorse” means to sign a negotiable instrument for transfer as per the UCC.  Sadly, many dictionaries, especially software and web-based lexicons make these two words synonymous, which they are not.  Some lexicons don’t sanction“indorse” as a correct spelling, which it is, but as a different word, not just an alternate British/American spelling choice.

OK, back to the bank’s slip & slide of portending that they are presenting an indorsed note.  Nope, a revolving line of credit agreement (HELOC or Reverse mortgage) is not a note.  It’s not a “sum certain” so it can’t be a note, because a “note” is a negotiable instrument (as per article 3 — but even article 9 provides the same definition albet enables transfer by assignment because it may not be indorsed, hence non-negotiable).

This lack of “sum certainty” restricting “note” status was adjudicated in NY Appellate 2nd Dept. in 2018 (i.e. it’s not a note)

But it’s rarely cited – probably best, since most lawyers would mess-up the citing and blow it for those of us who know how to use it – i.e. hand judges opportunities to make bad precedential decisions.

An observing-eye reminds us that a note is a one-sided promise, whereas an agreement is a two-sided contract (signed and countersigned – regardless of adhesion); thus, not really assignable, carte blanche, it requires a blessing by both parties but that step never transpires – imagine that…

Anywho: This is just the jumping-off point, the next part is the fun stuff.

So, the bank provides affidavits and exhibitions swearing (a/k/a perjuring) up-and-down that the indorsed note is right there in front of the judge.  Sure, it may look like a HELOC agreement, but the plaintiff’s attorney assures the judge, it’s a note – pointing to the prima facie doc – look right there, there’s the indorsement, so it must be a note – Right?  WRONG!  i.e. your long-standing argument about “presumption”.

Well, first of all, we (you and I) believe that the HELOC was securitized, so they don’t, or shouldn’t really, have a copy of the document anyway.  But we haven’t really dug much deeper, because we believe it’s impossible to get anywhere  with the dastardly banks in discovery.  So, I did some digging…. albeit without the help of formal discovery.

HELOCs (revolving lines of credit) can’t be securitized, because securitizations require fixed assets for valuations, and a revolving line of credit isn’t a fixed asset, it can’t be valued “sum certain” from its “four corners.”  But wait, that’s ridiculous, because we all know that HELOCS, Reverse mortgages, Credit Cards, etc. ARE securitized; perhaps not as RMBSs but rather as ABSs or other permutations.  So, what the hell am I talking about, saying they can’t, it’s impossible, bla bla bla…

You guessed it, there’s a work-around; and it’s documented.  The bank (the originator) transfers the HELOCs to a flimflam trust.  To do this they “endorse” the Agreement in-blank, which looks exactly like an “indorsement-in-blank” but the endorsement is an accreditation, not a negotiation.  Now the trustee (a/k/a “the Issuer”) does his sorting and stacking of the pool and – and this is the magic part – then, he (or she) makes notes against the HELOCs.  Yes, of course, it’s a legal fiction, and they have a name for it,  – “HELOC-backed notes” and it is those notes (the HELOC-backed notes) that are securitized.

The originator (who is often the servicer) retains the HELOC agreement & mortgage (a/k/a “lien”) since it is supposedly the “PETE”, but is it?  Is it really?  Does it matter?  Well, not until the servicer has the enviable task of foreclosure of a HELOC that has been pledged elsewhere, likely to an ABS that’s vaporized into the secondary market either-zone.  Hence, the foreclosing bank has nowhere to send the proceeds from the foreclosure – oh well – that’s a shame.

There’s more, but I sense you’re getting bored.  HELOC-backed notes – interesting.  Think about the Article 9 maxim “the mortgage follows the note;” A maxim laid down over a-hundred years ago by Justice Noah Swayne (Appointed to SCOTUS by Abraham Lincoln – a republican – LOL)

“The note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident.  An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity.”  Carpenter v. Longan (USA 1872)

Words that still carry-the-day in such recent stare decisis cases as Bank of NY v. Silverberg (NY 2nd Dept. 2011).

Ironically, this HELOC-backed note means that the note follows the mortgage(a/k/a HELOC Agreement, with a mortgage nested inside it).

“The issue presented on this appeal is whether a party has standing to commence a foreclosure action when that party’s assignor — in this case, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (hereinafter MERS) — was listed in the underlying mortgage instruments as a nominee and mortgagee for the purpose of recording, but was never the actual holder or assignee of the underlying notes. We answer this question in the negative.

Bank of N.Y. v. Silverberg, 86 A.D.3d 274, 275 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)”

because MERS was never the lawful holder or assignee of the notes described and identified in the consolidation agreement, the corrected assignment of mortgage is a nullity, and MERS was without authority to assign the power to foreclose to the plaintiff. Consequently, the plaintiff failed to show that it had standing to foreclose.

Bank of N.Y. v. Silverberg, 86 A.D.3d 274, 283 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)

Bank of N.Y. v. Silverberg, 86 A.D.3d 274, 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (“ “a transfer of the mortgage without the debt is a nullity, and no interest is acquired by it” ( Merritt v Bartholick36 NY 44, 45 [1867]; see Carpenter v Longan83 US 271, 274 [an assignment of the mortgage without the note is a nullity]; US Bank N.A. v Madero80 AD3d 751, 752US Bank, N.A. v Collymore68 AD3d at 754Kluge v Fugazy145 AD2d 537, 538 [plaintiff, the assignee of a mortgage without the underlying note, could not bring a foreclosure action]; Flyer v Sullivan284 App Div 697, 698 [mortgagee’s assignment of the mortgage lien, without assignment of the debt, is a nullity]; Beak v Walts266 App Div 900). A “mortgage is merely security for a debt or other obligation and cannot exist independently of the debt or obligation” ( FGB Realty Advisors v Parisi265 AD2d 297, 298). Consequently, the foreclosure of a mortgage cannot be pursued by one who has no demonstrated right to the debt ( id.; see 1 Bergman on New York Mortgage Foreclosures § 12.05 [1] [a] [1991]).”)

Bank of N.Y. v. Silverberg, 86 A.D.3d 274, 281-82 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (“as “nominee,” MERS’s authority was limited to only those powers which were specifically conferred to it and authorized by the lender ( see Black’s Law Dictionary 1076 [8th ed 2004] [defining a nominee as “(a) person designated to act in place of another, (usually) in a very limited way”]). Hence, although the consolidation agreement gave MERS the right to assign the mortgages themselves, it did not specifically give MERS the right to assign the underlying notes, and the assignment of the notes was thus beyond MERS’s authority as nominee or agent of the lendersee Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Weisblum85 AD3d 95, 108 [2d Dept 2011]; HSBC Bank USA v Squitieri29 Misc 3d 1225[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 52000[U]; LNV Corp. v Madison Real Estate, LLC2010 NY Slip Op 33376[U]; LPP Mtge. Ltd. v Sabine Props., LLC2010 NY Slip Op 32367[U]; Bank of N.Y. v Mulligan, 28 Misc 3d 1226[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51509[U]; OneWest Bank, F.S.B. v Drayton29 Misc 3d 1021Bank of N.Y. v Alderazi28 Misc 3d 376, 379-380 [the “party who claims to be the agent of another bears the burden of proving the agency relationship by a preponderance of the evidence”]; HSBC Bank USA, NA. v Yeasmin27 Misc 3d 1227[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50927[U]; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Vasquez24 Misc 3d 1239[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51814[U]; Bank of NY. v Trezza14 Misc 3d 1201[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 52367[U]; LaSalle Bank Nat’l. Assn. v Lamy12 Misc 3d 1191[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 51534[U]; In re Agard, 444 BR 231; but see US Bank N.A. u Flynn, 27 Misc 3d 802).”)

Bank of N.Y. v. Silverberg, 86 A.D.3d 274, 278 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (“”Mortgage lenders and other entities, known as MERS members, subscribe to the MERS system and pay annual fees for the electronic processing and tracking of ownership and transfers of mortgages. Members contractually agree to appoint MERS to act as their common agent on all mortgages they register in the MERS system” ( Matter of MERSCORP, Inc. v Romaine8 NY3d at 96 [footnotes omitted]).”)

Bank of N.Y. v. Silverberg, 86 A.D.3d 274, 278-79 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (“This leaves borrowers and the local county or municipal recording offices unaware of the identity of the true owner of the note, and extinguishes a source of revenue to the localities. According to MERS, any loan registered in its system is “inoculated against future assignments because MERS remains the mortgagee no matter how many times servicing is traded.” Moreover, MERS does not lend money, does not receive payments on promissory notes, and does not service loans by collecting loan payments.”)

Bank of N.Y. v. Silverberg, 86 A.D.3d 274, 279-80 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (“Where, as here, the issue of standing is raised by a defendant, a plaintiff must prove its standing in order to be entitled to relief ( see U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore68 AD3d 752, 753Wells Fargo Bank Minn., N.A. v Mastropaolo42 AD3d at 242). In a mortgage foreclosure action, a plaintiff has standing where it is both the holder or assignee of the subject mortgage and the holder or assignee of the underlying note at the time the action is commenced ( seeU.S. Bank, NA. v Collymore68 AD3d at 753Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v Gress68 AD3d 709, 709Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Marchione69 AD3d 204, 207-208Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v Coakley41 AD3d 674, 674Federal Nat’l. Mtge. Assn. v Youkelsone303 AD2d 546, 546-547First Trust Nat’l. Assn. v Meisels, 234 AD2d 414).”)

What is Real in “Securitization”?

The first thing to remember about securitization is that it isn’t real. No Investor ever bought any debt, note or mortgage on residential property. That makes all the documents used in foreclosure of “securitized” loans totally fake. And that is why there was a 50 state settlement and hundreds of other settlements with regulators, attorneys general and investors.

What was left out of all those settlements was any means by which illegal foreclosures could be stopped and any credits earned by homeowners or any credit which reduced the amount owed by the homeowners. As it turns out — nothing ever reduces the homeowner’s debt. Not even payment. Not even foreclosure. 

This could only be true if there was no account on any books of account in which the homeowner’s debt was held as  an asset. You cannot reduce what isn’t there. So failure to credit the nonexistent account is somehow treated as a completely legal event. think about it.

There is nothing wrong about hypothecating an asset in service of a financial transaction. As Wall Street has shown us anything could be an asset and therefore subject to a legal transaction. what they didn’t show us is that there was no legal transaction, which means nobody paid money except at the front end. And those who paid — the investors — didn’t buy any debt, note or mortgage.

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If I issue a note to someone who actually did give me money as a loan, and he asks me for collateral, I can conditionally assign my rights to a mortgage I actually own because someone issued me a note and secured it with a mortgage. How “conditional” is the assignment? That depends upon state law and the contents of the assignment.
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And in turn the Payee on the note I issued now has an asset upon which he can borrow. etc. The asset is the receivable from me that he has on his books which got there because he paid out money. So he debited CASH and Credited ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE. Classic double entry bookkeeping.
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The ONLY question is whether the paperwork is a memorialization of actual events in the real world or if the paperwork is merely an attempt to create fake facts, an illusion that supports the designee of a non creditor to foreclose on property.
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If all the events are real then the law allows it and recognizes it and enforces it. But that enforceability under current law stops at the door of paperwork that does not memorialize an actual financial event in the real world.
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People think that it isn’t so simple. But it is. People say that there would be no foreclosures if I was right. But it is they who are wrong because they don’t understand legal procedure and the banks not only understand it, they were also responsible for writing it.
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So by codifying into law the proposition that the holder of a note is presumed to own the debt until rebutted, they have thus created a vehicle for deceit because judges are not presented with evidence in rebuttal. The truth is that the claimants are not even “holders”. And dig a little deeper they are not even possessors because the original note was destroyed.
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And because judges are sloppy people just like the rest of us, they will often treat a non creditor claiming to possess a note as a holder in due course — thus denying homeowner attempts at discovery. All without any allegation of HDC status or any evidence that the claimant is a party who paid value in good faith without knowledge of the borrower’s defenses.
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Neil F Garfield, MBA, JD, 73, is a Florida licensed trial attorney since 1977. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business and law. He is a former investment banker, securities broker, securities analyst, and financial analyst.
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Why Reformation Makes Sense as a Response to Illegal Claims of Servicing, Collection or Enforcement of Homeowner Mortgage Obligations

In the world of pretend REMICs, there can be no debate that investors who buy “certificates” are unsecured creditors of the investment banks and that investment banks are not legally creditors of homeowners. So why are we allowing investment banks to administer, collect and enforce homeowner obligations?

This has been my point from the beginning in 2006 when I started writing and appearing on TV and Radio. The “Securitization” never happened. Investors became unsecured creditors of the investment bank (IB) not secured creditors of homeowners. In turn the investment bank also wanted to avoid accountability and liability as lender so the IB never accepted any legal document saying that it had paid for and it owned the underlying homeowner obligation.

But for purposes of enforcement through foreclosure the IB designates a non-creditor to initiate foreclosure proceedings. There is no basis in law for this behavior and it is both illegal and inequitable for this conduct to be allowed.

  • The claim that  the action is brought on behalf of  or for the benefit of investors who own certificates is false.
  • The implied assertion that whatever deficiencies exist in the presentation of parties and documents in foreclosures, the granting of a foreclosure will result in payment to a creditor who would otherwise have suffered a loss is also false.
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That leaves nobody to own the debt. Under current law, absent a contract that says otherwise, nobody can administer, collect or enforce a debt without owning it or representing someone who owns it. Since nobody owns it nobody satisfied that condition precedent as set forth in Article 9 §203 UCC.
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In the absence of a creditor the obligation can only be enforced by a designee or nominee that is accepted by the debtor.
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It will take a court decision to decree that since there is no alternative remedy at law, the homeowner is consenting to the designation of a party to enforce who then becomes the lender for purposes of accountability or liability under lending and servicing laws.

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There is no contract that says otherwise  unless and until a court declares it under the rules of reformation, quasi contract and quantum meruit.
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So in all homeowner transactions arising within the scope of claimed securitization, homeowners lost their access to any party who claimed to be a lender or creditor except the originator who was not lending any money and who was in most cases thinly capitalized such that penalties for lending and servicing violations would simply result in bankruptcy and no relief to homeowners. 

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And in the underwriting process, despite the obvious and expressly stated requirements of law no lender was left who had any stake or risk of loss in ensuring the validity of the appraisal or the viability of the loan.
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They might call it a loan transaction, but it wasn’t. It was deceitful process for obtaining the homeowner’s participation in a highly profitable securitization scheme. A scheme where the profits were neither disclosed as to existence or amount and that withheld consideration from the homeowner for his/her participation.
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As such the apparent “loan agreement” was simply a cover and a vehicle for concealment of the true nature of the transaction with the homeowner.
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Neil F Garfield, MBA, JD, 73, is a Florida licensed trial attorney since 1977. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business and law. He is a former investment banker, securities broker, securities analyst, and financial analyst.
*

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FORECLOSURE DEFENSE IS NOT SIMPLE. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE OF A FAVORABLE RESULT. THE FORECLOSURE MILLS WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO WEAR YOU DOWN AND UNDERMINE YOUR CONFIDENCE. ALL EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT NO MEANINGFUL SETTLEMENT OCCURS UNTIL THE 11TH HOUR OF LITIGATION.
*
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Regulatory Capture and Monopoly of Residential Lending by Wall Street

It is simply not true and has not been true for 20 years that lending is subject to free market forces or that lenders are subject to regulation. 

all of this has resulted from extraordinary illegal Market Control which has resulted in the complete inability of small financial institutions to compete with lending practices sponsored by investment banks on Wall Street.

As a result consumers are negatively affected. Contrary to the requirements of law they do not have the right to choose the party with whom they are dealing, they do not have the protections of the truth in Lending Act, and they are lured into a dangerous transaction in which the counterparties have an incentive merely to bring a transaction into existence and label it as a loan.

When it comes to regulation, it is the legislature that deems who is worthy of regulating and on what terms. The legislature then enacts into law those terms and creates the agency or enforcement mechanism.
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Regulatory Capture occurs when persons and companies whom the legislature has deemed worthy of regulating have control over the agency or enforcement mechanisms. This happens all the time when the regulators are persons formerly, currently or intended to be employed by the companies that they are supposed to regulate.
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I am sure, now that it has been pointed out, that there has been in a concerted strategy of regulatory capture that has negatively impacted the legal profession and therefore chilled access to the courts and to counsel. This has enabled a monopoly that has so constrained free market forces as to make them virtually irrelevant. It is simply not true and has not been true for 20 years that lending is subject to free market forces or that lenders are subject to regulation.
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Even the most uninformed lay person knows by now that the Wall Street banks screwed the market and the marketplace. True, they don’t understand how it was done. But they know it happened, which is why I have counseled persons running for public office to run against the banks, because right now, almost everyone hates the Wall Street securities firms that call themselves “investment banks.”  But very little is being done to counter their illegal impact on free markets, consumer rights, and the hallmark of any capitalist economic system — competition.
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This has shown up in regulation and discipline of lawyers. Lawyers who advance false claims in court go with both impunity and immunity. Lawyers who defend homeowners from those false claims almost always find themselves the target some investigation, complaint discipline, sanctions or judgements from Bar associations, the FTC or the attorney general of some state.
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The result is entirely predictable. Most trial lawyers won’t take on cases involving foreclosure defense because they fear for their livelihood. Consumers are the ones who suffer the most because they can’t find a lawyer to take their case. So they try to appear pro se and they lose because only lawyers know how to navigate the judicial system. It’s a perfect storm for the Wall Street firms.
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I am also sure that all of this has resulted from extraordinary illegal Market Control which has resulted in the complete inability of small financial institutions to compete with lending practices sponsored by investment banks on Wall Street.
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Homeowner transactions sponsored by Wall Street do not rely upon profits from the transactions with homeowners. They rely entirely upon profits from false claims arising out of securitization Cycles. so it is literally possible and often happens that the marketing and other expenses associated with generating transactions with homeowners are much higher than any cash flow that could be considered Revenue. This makes it possible to offer incentives and lower interest rates for the sole purpose of initiating another securitization cycle, which is the source of all actual profit.
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As a result consumers are negatively affected. Contrary to the requirements of law they do not have the right to choose the party with whom they are dealing, they do not have the protections of the truth in Lending Act, and they are lured into a dangerous transaction in which the counterparties have an incentive merely to bring a transaction into existence and label it as a loan.
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Those counterparties also have an incentive to see the transactions fail, since they have knowingly created obligations based upon false appraisals and false assessments of viability. In doing that they have guaranteed themselves additional profit simply by insuring the certificates that are indexed on the performance of the homeowner transactions. And they further profit from false claims leading to forced sale of property for profit rather than restitution for an unpaid obligation.
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Thus this monopolistic control causes homeowners to enter into transactions that they think are loans but instead are investments into securitization schemes. The terms and incentives for conduct are far different than the reasonable expectation of any reasonable consumer borrower. 
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The other class negatively impacted by this strong arm behavior is the U.S. class of approximately 7,000 community banks, credit unions and savings and loan associations that would otherwise be able to compete for loan business but can’t because they are presented with a bad choice: either they serve merely as sham conduits to feed securitization or their loan business virtually fails. In turn this negatively impacts their ability to cross market for depository business and other bank services. 
My point is that just like 100 + years ago when the big trusts were considered impregnable, they were brought down with a thud by claims that they had ruined the free markets with both economic control and asymmetry of information. Regulatory capture was of course a perk that enabled them to write and make laws that made their ruinous behavior totally legal — until the courts and Congress said it wasn’t legal.

Plaintiffs present this evidence as a prototypical example of “regulatory capture,” a term coined by public choice economists to indicate when members of a regulated occupation also dominate the regulatory and law-making process in their field. Professor Todd Zywicki of George Mason University School of Law, a leading scholar in law and economics, testified that the limitations on funeral home ownership in Maryland are consistent with the principles of regulatory capture. He stated that in his opinion the Morticians Act appears to be:

an effort to create governmentally imposed barriers to entry in the funeral home industry and thereby to transfer wealth to a discrete, well-organized interest group at the expense of consumers of funeral home services and the public at large. The result of this regulation is reduced competition in the provision of funeral home services and higher prices and reduced choice in funeral home products and services for consumers.

Brown v. Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d 547, 553 (D. Md. 2007)

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Neil F Garfield, MBA, JD, 73, is a Florida licensed trial attorney since 1977. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business and law. He is a former investment banker, securities broker, securities analyst, and financial analyst.
*

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FORECLOSURE DEFENSE IS NOT SIMPLE. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE OF A FAVORABLE RESULT. THE FORECLOSURE MILLS WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO WEAR YOU DOWN AND UNDERMINE YOUR CONFIDENCE. ALL EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT NO MEANINGFUL SETTLEMENT OCCURS UNTIL THE 11TH HOUR OF LITIGATION.
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Please visit www.lendinglies.com for more information.

How to Use the Real Deal On Securitization to Homeowner’s Advantage

Like citizenship in this country litigation is not easy. We keep banging our heads against the same wall expecting a different result. We need a strategy that directly addresses the inescapable realities of every homeowner transaction and every securitization cycle.

My substantive analysis of the transaction is that the homeowner was drafted into a securitization scheme which in my opinion clearly triggers quasi contract and quantum meruit — the only possibility for inquiring into the adequacy of consideration. Lawyers and litigants have shied away from this because of its complexity and because they don’t know how to approach it.
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In simple terms the homeowner transaction was a “”Qualified Financial Contract” (QFC), part of which contained some apparent attributes of a loan, but which went much further and diverged extensively from a “loan” as the term is currently used in custom and practice in the financial industry and society in general.
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The QFC is not some invented term for this article. it is defined in all securitization documents. Investment banks knew they were not creating a loan. The job of litigants and their attorneys is to point out and argue that the documents submitted as a foundation for their claim of legal standing contains language that opens the door to quasi contract and quantum meruit. 
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In logistical terms, the homeowner delivered the only service the investment bank was seeking, to wit: issuance of the note and mortgage. Neither the investment bank nor the originator designee of the investment bank was at all interested in making a loan, collecting revenue from repayment nor assuming any meaningful risk of loss.
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Although the homeowner entered the transaction desiring a loan he/she didn’t receive a loan. If there is no legally responsible lender or creditor at the conclusion of that transaction, it isn’t a loan.
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And since too many bona fide third party transactions have occurred to rescind or unwind the transaction the only possibility remaining is to have a court reframe the agreement to include the basis upon which the investment bank entered into the transaction — i.e., the creation, issuance, selling, trading and hedging of unregulated securities.
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We know the investment bank had no intention of becoming a lender and that there was no intention to make investors lenders.
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And we know that the investment banks funded the origination or acquisition of the loan through originators and aggregators.
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Further we know that investors paid value for the certificates which excluded any right, title or interest in any debt, note or mortgage.
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The result, obviously intended, is that while parties were paying value, none of them ever received a conveyance of ownership of the debt, note or mortgage.
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And we can easily see that anyone who received such a conveyance (a) did not pay value and (b) was not acting as an authorized agent or representative of anyone who paid value in exchange for a conveyance of an ownership interest in the subject debt, note or mortgage.
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It was partly a scheme for avoidance or evasion of lending and securities laws.
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The reason for this is blatantly stated in all of the promotional material for sale of certificates, to wit: no liability for violation of lending or servicing laws using “bankruptcy remote” vehicles  for origination and acquisition of homeowner obligations.
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And scratch the surface and you discover that the only thing that makes the transactions bankruptcy remote is that the underlying obligation, note and mortgage are not included in the schedules of bankruptcy because they were never owned by the originator or aggregator.
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The problem for the last 20 years has been that nobody has been asking the obvious question: “if they don’t own the loan, then who does?” Or at least nobody has followed up on that question in which they truly persisted in aground war to get the answer.
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So any such conveyance was either a legal nullity (mortgage assignment) or did not carry the right to enforce (note). If the conveyance didn’t include the obligation there are very specific rules that apply.
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Authority to enforce the note can only come from one who is entitled to enforce. And the premier person who has the right to enforce is owner of the underlying debt that the note is supposed to memorialize. Under the laws of all jurisdictions nobody gets to own the obligation without paying value.
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This seems to be challenging not only for the courts but for defense lawyers. It is a very simple logical progression. In the end enforcement of the note is intended to pay the debt. If it doesn’t pay the debt the maker of the note is subject to multiple liabilities for the same transaction. And that is what happened. Since the originator did not substantively fund the homeowner transaction the issuing of the note and mortgage in favor of the originator was a legal nullity. The issuance of the note created a new liability that was not merged with the underlying obligation to repay the money, if any, that was received or paid on behalf of the homeowner.
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So the reason I mention all of this is that I have somewhat reluctantly but persistently arrived at the conclusion that the homeowner transaction was not a loan and yet the obligation to make payment survives even in quasi contract or quantum meruit.
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This is an unavoidable conclusion because we know that where money was funded to the homeowner or on his/her behalf and where the homeowner issued a promise to pay money, the obligation to pay arises and can be secured by a lien (mortgage or deed of trust) which in fact is enforceable.
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But note that since there is no lender or creditor at the conclusion of the securitization cycle, the intent of the homeowner is thwarted — i.e., he/she does not have a loan agreement. It is something else. And that is where quasi contract and  quantum meruit come into play.
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The homeowner could have bargained away reasonable compensation or consideration for his/her role in initiating the only documents that made securitization claims possible — i.e., the note and mortgage.
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Our legal system is not designed to correct stupid mistakes in bargaining or negotiation in transactions or agreements.
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Our system is designed to enforce the intent of the parties. So we can’t get away from the intent to create an obligation and the intent to have that obligation enforceable and memorialized by a note and mortgage. In fact, I propose we should embrace it.
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The reason is that the intent to create the enforceable homeowner obligation was not the only intent operating. Since the securitizations cheme — and the homeowner’s vital role in it — was not disclosed (actually actively concealed), the homeowner did not, could not and never did bargain away rights to compensation or consideration for his role and risks in this dangerous risky transaction.
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Thus we enter the realm of quasi contract and quantum meruit. 
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So now the question is how much consideration  did the homeowner actually receive for issuance of the note and mortgage? Since it wasn’t a loan, even though that was what was intended by the homeowner, the receipt of money must be categorized as payment of consideration. And that is a lot of consideration by any standard.
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But now the issuance of the note and mortgage becomes a service rather than the result of an underlying obligation to repay.
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So the consideration of the receipt of benefit from the funding of the homeowner transaction is entirely offset by a promise to pay more than the consideration received in the form of money paid to the homeowner. That might still result in a court finding some consideration, since the money on the front end might not be found by a court to exactly equal the money promised on the back end.
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On the other hand there is good reason to find that the consideration for issuance of the documents required to start securitization claims, securities, selling trading and hedging was entirely negated by the concurrent promise to pay more than the money received. But assuming there was a finding of consideration, was it enough?
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In a court of equity wherein rescission is no longer an option the court must determine what a reasonable homeowner would have bargained for or received through the process of free market forces if disclosure had actually been made regarding the securitizations scheme and the vast profits and revenue generated under the scheme.
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The court would hear testimony from a variety of experts and reach a conclusion as to whether the homeowner had received enough consideration or if the homeowner should have received more as per the quasi contract and not just what was presented as a loan agreement.
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The range of possibilities is nearly infinite. From zero to a majority of the pot because the investment bank secretly tricked the homeowner into a dangerous transaction, the risks of which were unknown to the homeowner. Using the shadow banking marketplace (i.e., where all derivatives are traded for nominal value) as the external reference point for heuristic projection, it may be fairly assumed that the average revenue generated from each securitization cycle was $12 for each $1 transacted with homeowners. Additional securities analysis reveals that the figure could be much higher.
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In a free marketplace where there was no asymmetry of information the fair question could be posed as follows: from the investment bank’s perspective they would be saying that they are going to make $12 on each $1 during the securitization cycle, perhaps more.
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The homeowner and investor sitting at the same fictional but still legal table would inevitably concede that for inventing and managing such an ingenious scheme the investment bank might be entitled to the lion’s share of the profit.
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The investors would say their role as investors is critical to the existence and success of the securitization cycle. And since capital is valued more highly than labor they would claim a greater share than that awarded to homeowners. Homeowners would make the same argument as investors — without them there is no securitization and there are no revenues and there are no transactions claimed as “loans.”
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So looking at the customs and practices of the financial industry the investors would probably initially claim 40% as angels and the homeowners could justify a claim of around half that amount for their indispensable role.
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Or one could look at the money actually spent (commissions, bonuses etc) on getting homeowners to execute the required note and mortgage while concealing the truth about the transaction as a measure of what the homeowners should get. Or a license or royalty arrangement might be adopted.
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All of them in my opinion average around 15%-20% of the total revenue generated by the scheme. this would leave the investment bank with 40% or more of the securitization cycle revenue which is around 1000% of normal revenues for underwriting and sale of debt securities.
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So the court would offset the obligation with whatever it decided was reasonable consideration for the homeowner. It would either order payment to the homeowner of any excess consideration due or order the homeowner to pay the balance of the obligation after offset for the consideration due. And if the homeowner still owed money both the note and mortgage would be enforceable.
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But here is the rub. None of this is possible without creating a contract by decree in which it is possible to designate a party who is not a creditor to act as a creditor — in a transaction to which the homeowner agrees that for all purposes the designee will be a creditor. And that creditor is subject to lending and servicing laws. This is essential because under current law only the owner of the debt can enforce the mortgage and only someone representing the owner of the debt can enforce the note unless they are a holder of the note in due course — which means they purchased it for value in good faith and without knowledge of the  maker’s defenses. 
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So it becomes necessary to plead for this attribute to be made part of the newly minted agreement because without it, you don’t have an enforceable agreement  Without an enforceable agreement you’re left pleading for damages under RICO, wrongful foreclosure, etc. And while the note and mortgage might not be subject to enforcement, they still exist. No lender or buyer will complete a transaction with that hanging over the deal.
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Neil F Garfield, MBA, JD, 73, is a Florida licensed trial attorney since 1977. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business and law. He is a former investment banker, securities broker, securities analyst, and financial analyst.
*

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If you want to submit your registration form click on the following link and give us as much information as you can. CLICK HERE FOR REGISTRATION FORM. It is free, with no obligation and we keep all information private. The information you provide is not used for any purpose except for providing services you order or request from us.
In the meanwhile you can order any of the following:
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*
FORECLOSURE DEFENSE IS NOT SIMPLE. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE OF A FAVORABLE RESULT. THE FORECLOSURE MILLS WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO WEAR YOU DOWN AND UNDERMINE YOUR CONFIDENCE. ALL EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT NO MEANINGFUL SETTLEMENT OCCURS UNTIL THE 11TH HOUR OF LITIGATION.
*
Please visit www.lendinglies.com for more information.

Are Lawyers Missing the Boat Again on Foreclosure Defense?

The problem is that while most people think everyone has been bought off, and to a certain extent that is true, the real problem is that the clever plan of securitization is so counter-intuitive that nobody believes the truth that is in plain sight. The reason for fabricated documents is that there were no transactions, so the documents had to be fabricated to fit facially with the requirements of law for administration, collection and enforcement.
To anyone who is not conversant in the language of finance, that seems impossible, unlikely, or just plain wrong. So rather than keeping an open mind about it, they react to such assertions with aggression and incredulity.

I recently received a question from a fairly knowledgeable reader. Why are lawyers dropping the ball on foreclosure defense? His specific question, along with similar questions from other readers is where are the trust lawyers, the securities lawyers, the property lawyers, the civil litigations lawyers, the personal injury lawyers (emotional distress etc), etc.?

Here was my answer with some edits for typos which all of you know I am prone to make and miss on edits.

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The question you posed is the million-dollar question. I think you are correct in your analysis. I have attempted to enlist attorneys who specialize in those areas but I have failed.
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The only explanation that I can give you that has any truth to it is that lawyers, despite their reputation, are easily intimidated, lazy and greedy. I surveyed hundreds of lawyers over a two-year period In 2008–2009.
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The proposition was simple. assuming a client with sufficient financial resources to pay any reasonable fee, were they willing to represent homeowners in distress?
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The fact that the answer was in the negative was frustrating enough. But the reason most often cited was that they would rather represent “the bank.” And when I pointed out that they did not represent any banks nor did they have any prospects for doing so, that’s when they said that it didn’t matter.
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Some did express reservation about the assumption that the client could pay. I pointed it out that if they were not making a monthly payment for housing, they could easily pay. That made no difference. They saw the entire endeavor as futile and unprofitable — but in reality I could tell, like any trial lawyer could detect, that I was dealing with raw unbridled fear.
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So I attacked it with seminars on foreclosure defense that highlighted business strategies in which the lawyer could become rich, and some of the attendees did. Others made a good living.
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But it was based on lowering of expectations. By adopting a hub-and-spoke strategy some lawyers, adopting the business plan that I proposed, began servicing hundreds of homeowners at a time. But like all such practices, their business success depended upon settlement of the cases, which meant modifications. This resulted in adding to the illusion that the servicer had any right to be in the picture.
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My latest plan is that I am working on potential pleadings for a case in Reformation in which the investment banks are literally drafted into the litigation. The Court decides whether the homeowner received consideration for issuing the documents (note and mortgage) that enabled the securitization plan, and whether the homeowner received or should receive adequate or additional consideration that could offset the claim. (There is a lot more to this but for purposes of this article I simply state in brief form).
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I have no doubt that there is an opportunity to achieve immense wealth simply by pursuing the obvious. But it appears that the General Public, law enforcement, the Judiciary, and most lawyers have succumbed to the party line that enables the Investment Bank to sit in the shadows and designate names of irrelevant parties with no stake and the outcome to administer, collect and enforce obligations that were long ago retired through securitization, proof of which is easy to obtain, to wit: is there any company showing the existence of the debt as an asset on their balance sheet and a loss from nonpayment? 
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I definitely know the answer to that question. Current law therefore does not allow the current scheme of securitization to exist nor should it. It depends entirely upon concealment of the most relevant data in any transaction — the terms and conditions under which each party intends to serve the other and the terms and conditions under which each party might profit from the transaction.
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Most of all under the federal and state lending and securities laws (and general laws requiring fair dealing) the identity of the counterparty must be included in order to make the agreement an enforceable contract.
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This concealment allows investment banks to act illegally and against the idea of free markets or capitalism. It prevents both investors and homeowners from bargaining for adequate consideration based upon the true nature of the transaction. 
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The problem is that while most people think everyone has been bought off, and to a certain extent that is true, the real problem is that the clever plan of securitization is so counter-intuitive that nobody believes the truth that is in plain sight. The reason for fabricated documents is that there were no transactions, so the documents had to be fabricated to fit facially with the requirements of law for administration, collection and enforcement.
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To anyone who is not conversant in the language of finance, that seems impossible, unlikely, or just plain wrong. So rather than keeping an open mind about it, they react to such assertions with aggression and incredulity.
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Some lawyers do get it and they win their cases most of the time. Everyone else seems to argue for their own weaknesses (See Steven Covey’s Book) without looking to actual information or data. They insist that the foreclosure cases are both unwinnable and are morally unconscionable if they give the homeowner a free house.
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I insist that there is no debt because the investment bank was never depending upon the economics of a loan to make money. Foreclosures are gravy. They made all their money creating, selling, issuing, trading, and hedging securities. The labelling of the homeowner transaction as a loan was a false representation. The investment bank, who never appeared on any of the paperwork, was the real party in interest and at the end of the day there was no person or company who owned the so-called debt from the homeowner. 
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If that plan had been disclosed — as it was required to be disclosed under both “lending” laws and “securities” laws — both investors and homeowners would have had the opportunity to bargain for more more compensation and better terms — because they would have known they were taking a much larger risk than the one that was actually presented.
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Indeed, investors that were pension or other types of “stable managed funds” would not have been able to invest at all had they known the true nature of the certificate scheme into which they they were investing the futures of workers and companies that had contributed to the fund.
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Such funds, as investors, were critical to the success of the securitization scheme. Investment banks would have been legally required to present additional safeguards to the fund managers such as participation in the trading profits, hedge contracts and insurance contracts in order to make the sale of certificates to stable managed fund investors. 
The same logic holds true for homeowners.
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They were making the largest investments of their lives based upon their reasonable belief that the apprasial was real and the loan was viable — all resposnibilities imposed on the “lender” by law (see TILA).
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Had they known the true incentives and motives and existence of the investment bank they would have understood that this was no loan. It was a service they were performing and an investment — for which they were being paid to issue documents that required them to pay money over time in order to enable the securitization scheme.
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If the true profits of the securitization scheme were disclosed as as required by law, homeowners and originators would have been able to compete for a greater share of the securitization pie or they would have had the opportunity to choose not to do business in such a hazy scheme. 
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Neil F Garfield, MBA, JD, 73, is a Florida licensed trial attorney since 1977. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business and law. He is a former investment banker, securities broker, securities analyst, and financial analyst.
*

FREE REVIEW:

If you want to submit your registration form click on the following link and give us as much information as you can. CLICK HERE FOR REGISTRATION FORM. It is free, with no obligation and we keep all information private. The information you provide is not used for any purpose except for providing services you order or request from us.
In the meanwhile you can order any of the following:
*
*
CLICK HERE TO ORDER CONSULT (not necessary if you order PDR)
*
*
CLICK HERE TO ORDER PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT REVIEW (PDR PLUS or BASIC includes 30 minute recorded CONSULT)
*
FORECLOSURE DEFENSE IS NOT SIMPLE. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE OF A FAVORABLE RESULT. THE FORECLOSURE MILLS WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO WEAR YOU DOWN AND UNDERMINE YOUR CONFIDENCE. ALL EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT NO MEANINGFUL SETTLEMENT OCCURS UNTIL THE 11TH HOUR OF LITIGATION.
*
Please visit www.lendinglies.com for more information.

The Best Article Yet on Illegal and Immoral Practices by Investment Banks Making False Claims About “Securitization of Debt” by Francesca Mari on Aaron Glantz Book “Homewreckers”

Francesca Mari in the JUNE 11, 2020 ISSUE of The New York Review of Books, has written a truly excellent piece on a book called “Homewreckers” by Aaron Glantz. 

If you ever had any doubt about whether homeowners have the moral high ground and whether the investment bankers have no moral or legal grounds for what they did, you should read the article and buy the book. ( I get nothing from sales of the book and I have not met either author — although I will contact them for interviews on my show).

The only point that I think both Mari and Glantz miss is that the loans were never securitized. Securitization is the process of selling assets in pieces to multiple investors. No residential loan to my knowledge has ever been sold to investors even on paper much less in reality.

Let me put it this way: there has never been a transaction in which investors buying certificates, investment banks or anyone else paid value in exchange for ownership of any debt, note or mortgage. They paid value but not for the loan. And they received the benefit of their bargain.

At the end of the day there is nobody who has paid value in exchange for a conveyance of ownership of the debt, note or mortgage. Claims of ownership of the debt, note or mortgage are all false even though they are documented. Documents are not transactions. They are evidence of transactions. And if there was no such transaction then the documents are false.

And that is why all of the documents in foreclosures are false, fabricated, forged, backdated and robosigned. The documents are false but they are presumptively valid if they conform to statutory requirements. The point missed by most homeowners, lawyers and judges is that just because they are presumed valid doesn’t mean they cannot be tested and rebutted.

Could IRS Enforcement of REMICs Bring Wall Street Into Line? Yes but they won’t do it. Investors and homeowners continue to suffer as victims of fraud.

The most obvious places to look for correction in the illegal conspiracies masquerading as securitization of residential debt were the IRS , the SEC, the FDIC and the FTC and probably later the CFPB. Qui tam (whistleblower) actions were regularly dismissed because the agency that lost money due to false claims rejected the notion that it was a false claim or that anything bad had occurred. Sheila Bair lost her job as head of the FDIC for protesting policy set by Presidents Bush and Obama that failed to hold the line.

So here is a 2014 article that talks about how we could have regulated the investment banks through IRS examination of the REMICs.

Corruption is the answer. Too many people were making too much money and were “donating” too much money to people in public office. Enforcement was impossible. The real answer is extremely simple — stop all private money in elections. All elections should be publicly funded. No exceptions.

see.. PA Journal of Business Law – REMIC Tax Enforcement

The problem remains that US government agencies refuse to police schemes that are labelled as securitization of debt. If they are securitization of debt then market forces apply and everything COULD even out in the end. The problem is that the debt was never sold into a securitized scheme and nobody cares even though that has eliminated even the possibility of the existence of any creditor.

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REMIC policing by the IRS would be ideal to reveal the fatal deficiencies and fraudulent character of these securitizations schemes. It is why the first 9 lawyers tasked with drafting the documents for securitization all quit with one declaring that she would not be party to or an accessory to a criminal enterprise. There is no entity that qualifies as REMIC in residential loans. AND the reason is very simple:  neither investors nor the trust is buying the loans.
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So all the tests and premises about having an ownership interest, and about the quality of the loans are all false tests designed to cover up the fact that there has never been securitization of any residential loan except is very specific rare circumstances where individual mortgage brokers have sold loans to small groups of investors with repurchase agreements. In most instances those turned out to be scams.
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The way they got away with it is that there was a securitization process — i.e., one in which new securities were issued, even if they were unregulated. But only those schooled in Wall Street finance grasp the fact that they were securitizing bets on data — something that is very ornate and complex.
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Once you DO grasp the idea of what they really were doing and are still doing then you see why all the documents in all the foreclosures had to be fabricated, forged, backdated and robosigned. 
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You can also see why they have robowitnesses come to court and why they show only the business records of a servicer who has no contact with the so-called principal named in the claim or lawsuit. You can see why there is never a proffer of the business records of a creditor because there is no creditor.

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There cannot be contact between foreclosure mill and trustee of REMIC trust, there cannot be contact between “servicer” and Trustee of REMIC trust, there cannot be direct contact between investment bank and any of the players because any such contact would undermine the essential ingredient of the entire plan — plausible deniability of intent or knowledge of the scope of the illegal plan.

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The job of the litigator is to assume that that the entire thing is fraudulent and to ask for what they cannot give — answers to simple questions about the ownership and authority and status of the “obligation” that in reality is nothing more than a return of the consideration paid for a license to sue the homeowner’s private data and homeownership as mere points of reference for the issuance and trading of complex securities.
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But you must make it look like all of those companies are in actual contact and that payments from consumers or from the forced sale of their property are going to a creditor. You need to do that in order to give a judge cover for ruling in favor of the investment bank who is not even in the courtroom.
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The answer is as simple as simple can be: they are making everything up.
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Documents are not real unless they memorialize something that happened in the real world. But Wall Street banks put together a plan that made it appear that a sale of the debt occured where there had been no such sale. Or to be even more specific, they made it appear that there had been a purchase by or on behalf of the investors or trusts. Nothing could have been further from the truth. The truth is that investment bankers never looked at homeowner transactions as loans. They saw the money they paid to homeowners as a cost and condition precedent to creating and selling new securities. 
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Why no creditor? Because that is how you escape liability for lending law violations. 
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Why call it a loan? Because that is how you keep consumers from bargaining for their share of the very rich pie created by investment banks in the sale and trading of derivatives, insurance contracts, hedge products and just plain bets on fictitious “movement” of data that was completely controlled, in the sole discretion, of the investment banks. 
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They were printing money for themselves. The losers were and remain investors who buy “certificates” that are nothing more than a cover for underwriting the sale of securities for a company that doesn’t exist. the losers are the homeowners whose issuance of a note and mortgage triggers a vast undisclosed profit scheme in which the wealth of America shifted from the many to the few.

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BUYING RMBS CERTIFICATES IS LIKE BUYING TULIPS JUST BECAUSE THERE IS A MOB OF PEOPLE WHO FOR COMPLETELY IRRATIONAL AND TEMPORARY REASONS THINK THEY ARE VALUABLE.
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The Curious Distraction of Applying “Adverse Possession” Rules to Foreclosures that are Time Barred by Statutes of Limitation.

The reference to “adverse possession” in any of these cases is not about legally changing title due to the statute of limitations enabling adverse possession. I know what that looks like. Possession that is adverse is not the legal definition of the statute governing “adverse possession”. Not even close. In this case the court was using the words “adverse possession” loosely. An adverse possession claim is procedural and substantive.
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For adverse possession to even be an issue that a court could adjudicate one would need to file a complaint alleging that the Plaintiff did NOT have legal title but had possessed the property is an open, adverse way directly against the interests of the title owner. No such complaint has been filed or even referenced in your case or this opinion from the court.
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In the absence of a claim in which a Plaintiff seeks specific relief, the court has no authority or jurisdiction to even consider, much less decide a case. Any ruling predicated on the existence of such a claim  is ultra vires (beyond the authority of the court).
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The only possible procedural exception would be that evidence was admitted without objection into the court record supporting proof that the Plaintiff was occupying land owned by the defendant and that such possession was open, notorious, continuous, hostile, adverse, exclusive and all the other elements of adverse possession. Then a motion to amend the pleading to conform to the evidence could be heard and granted. No such motion was brought in your case or any of these case you are showing me.
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So none of the cases are or even could be adverse possession cases. Opposing counsel is standing adverse possession on its head. She is saying that you are the owner and you are the possessor but that your ownership and possession are adverse to their interest in a process called foreclosure. Note that by definition they are not saying they own or possess the property already. And they are not even saying they have a right to possession. They are saying they have a right to foreclose. The issue of possession could not even be before the court until the court grants foreclosure and there is a sale of the property.
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The right to foreclose is based upon procedural and substantive law. The right to foreclose comes from contract. The contract is the mortgage. The mortgage, contrary to what everyone usually says, has many provisions in it that state that the mortgagor/owner of the property has agreed to undertake certain obligations of maintenance, insurance, and otherwise prevent the value from declining in value except for ordinary wear and tear and passage of time.
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In addition to those covenants the mortgage provides a right to the mortgagee to foreclose if the mortgagor is in breach of the mortgage covenants, one of which is the payment of money in accordance with the terms and conditions of a promissory note. The payment of money is usually referred to as the note which sets forth how much money and the terms of payment. Thus the owner of the property is a mortgagor under the mortgage and an obligor under the note. Those are two separate instruments. 
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If the note is evidence of an underlying debt like a loan from the Payee to the Payor, then the underlying debt is merged into the note by judicial doctrine to prevent the appearance of two liabilities for the same debt. If the named payee on the note is not actually the party who loaned the money then the merger doctrine does not apply and you have two legal liabilities — one because the debtor received money and the other because the same person executed a negotiable instrument that creates a separate liability regardless of the facts and circumstances of the “loan.”
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In such circumstances the Payor could complain and defend that it received no consideration from the payee and avoid liability at trial, but that would not result in dismissal of the lawsuit. That would be a question of fact for the trier of fact to decide.
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And if the negotiable instrument (note) was purchased for value in good faith and without knowledge of the Payor’s defense of lack of consideration, it is quite possible for a judgment to be entered against the Payor, which could include foreclosure of the mortgage which provides for foreclosure in the event that the obligor/mortgagor breaches the terms of the note. And all of that would be in addition to claims that could be made by the real owner of the debt to get paid. The recourse for the homeowner in such a situation is solely against the party who lured him into a signing a note without ever providing the consideration and without any intent to do so.
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As you can see from this exposition, it is entirely possible for the homeowner to theoretically lose twice and be left with a remedy against a now bankrupt originator.
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All of the above is necessary context to see where these courts are going wrong about the existence of the mortgage lien and its enforceability. They are entirely correct in seeing the note as distinguishable from the mortgage and even distinguishable from the debt. They could and often are three separate legal issues, each with its own set of rules. And those rules can vary depending upon the type of proceedings in which they are considered.
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This is why in bankruptcy the lien survives discharge of the obligation for the debt. That isn’t logic. It is just law. The obvious theory would be how can they foreclose on a debt that no longer exists? And the answer is a legal fiction in which the debt is somehow owed by the land, which I know is absurd but that is the law. However that has nothing to do whatsoever with the statute of limitations and the rules of procedure in a state court. And there is zero support in statutes or case law that it does. That is also the law. It’s not matter of persuasive logic.
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Your case is not a bankruptcy case nor does the defense rely upon discharge from bankruptcy which is the only proceeding in which the debt is eliminated as personal liability of the debtor but is retained as a liability against the land. No such doctrine applies in any other proceeding in federal or state courts. Nor has any case even considered the proposition. Nobody has ever suggested that the bankruptcy rule could be applied as doctrine to somehow change other statutory laws passed by the legislature that might bar collection, administration or enforcement of a debt, note or mortgage. It doesn’t exist and your opposition is not saying it does exist. So the issue does not exist.
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What your opposition is tapping into is the idea that the mortgage and the note are separate contracts each susceptible to independent enforcement. For example even if a homeowner is up to date on payments due on a legal debt owed to a real lender the lender could still foreclose if the homeowner failed to comply with local laws and ordinances such that the value of the collateral was threatened and the government agency was threatening fines, liens and foreclosure. The mortgage contract, is, as your opposition suggests, independent up to a point.
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The obvious logical argument in the absence of an enforceable underlying legal debt, is whether the covenants under the mortgage survive even if the note is not enforceable. I would point out here that your opposition is not advancing any such argument and that therefore even if the court were aware of this analysis it would still be wrong to consider it because the court is supposed to be deciding issues brought before it by the parties — not advocating for one side or the other.
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If a Judge, as former trial lawyer, sees something that might advance the cause of one side or the other, the judge is required to be silent unless there are grounds for the court to sua sponte decide on an issue not raised by either side — like jurisdiction.
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There are several logical and legal reasons why the mortgage continues to exist even though the underlying debt is unenforceable, which is most certainly and indisputably the case in your situation. One is simply that the statute of limitations can be waived or renewed by conduct of the debtor. While this has not happened YET, the fact that it is unlikely is speculative and no reason to cancel the mortgage lien.  And because of that possibility — along with the fact that no statute cancels the mortgage when the action is barred on the underlying debt — the mortgage lien continues to survive as a lien.
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The mortgagee, assuming the assignments of mortgage were valid and legal and supported by consideration (very problematic in your situation), has potential or inchoate rights that cannot be extinguished. But that does not give any right to the mortgagee to foreclose the mortgage for the sole reason that the mortgagor, as payor/obligor on the note breached the note — at least not where such a claim is time barred by an unambiguous express statute addressing that claim.
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The enforcement of the obligation is barred by the statute of limitations even though the breach is self-evident. This is a matter of public policy that the legislature of each state decides. Your state may have decided that if you don’t file the claim with six years of the breach you can’t bring the claim later. That is the law.
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Only a law that that specifically expressly supersedes another law can be used to avoid the legal requirements and restrictions of the other law. No such law has been invoked in any of these cases (because none exists) and there is no pronouncement from any court that the law of adverse possession supersedes the statute of limitations on debt because only the legislature can do that.
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The current statute of limitations is clear, unambiguous and expressly articulated.  If the legislature had meant to make an exception for mortgage loans, lawmakers would have declared the exception in the current statute rather than some vague presumed intent to allow for a conflict of laws where none exists.
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The conflict only exists if it is invented. Opposing counsel has invented the conflict and convinced the court to follow her proposed “logic.” But like all arguments, if you start with the wrong premise, you end up with the wrong result. There is no conflict of laws and therefore there is no basis for the court to presume one exists.
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Whether the debt exists or not is a separate question. The fact that a claim is time barred on a debt does not extinguish the debt unless there is a law that says that is the case. Some states have passed such laws.
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Assuming the debt exists for purposes of this argument, there must be a creditor who has paid value for the debt in exchange for ownership or conveyance of that debt. It is pure speculation as to the reason why no claim was filed for within the express statutory period of six years after what opposing counsel claims was a default and acceleration of the debt. And it doesn’t matter what the reason was.
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The claim is barred as matter of statute and public policy. The court receives no argument, assertion or basis for tolling the statute of limitations. That issue does not exist before the court.
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Hence the only possible conclusion is that the statute of limitations applies and the current claim is time-barred; the mortgage agreement cannot be enforced in the future unless and until, during the express term of the mortgage contract, the mortgagor renews the debt or otherwise breaches the terms and conditions of the mortgage agreement — and a legally recognized mortgagee seeks such enforcement.
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This will probably get me in plenty of hot water with lawyers. Homeowners should be winning foreclosures most of the time. The reason they don’t? — Ineffective Counsel.

The problem is not the judges. The problem is the lawyers who walk into court believing that the loan is real, claimant is real, the claim is real and that they are only looking for technical ways to get their client out of a valid deal.
The problem is exacerbated by magical thinking — that by pointing out bad acts by the foreclosure mill or servicer they will automatically cancel the mortgage, get quiet title and somehow the “debt” will disappear. Is it any wonder that judges are responding negatively to such assertions?
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Well I am rapidly coming to the conclusion that the primary basis for appeal in capital murder cases — ineffective counsel — is the real reason why homeowners think that the courts are ignoring the obvious. This is most manifest in a phenomenon I refer to as hallway trial lawyers. When they are speaking to their clients in the hallway outside the courtroom they sound great; but once inside the courtroom they are either mute or should be mute.
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Hallway lawyers can be great trial lawyers — if they would only prepare and obsessively roll the issues over in their mind as they approach a hearing or filing of a motion, pleading, or brief. And they would win far more often than they would lose if they did the work. That takes two things that most people lack — other than trial lawyers — commitment and courage. Like any performer you must give it your best and accept a pie in the face occasionally.
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In 45 years of litigation I have won and lost cases. Most of them I won. In hindsight I would say that virtually every loss is attributable to one factor —- lack of adequate planning, preparation and execution.
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My own experience is that when I have done my job as a litigator I have consistently successfully defended foreclosure cases because there is no case. That knowledge propels to me to object, challenge and refute basic assumptions in an orderly, timely and effective way. I am clear as to the basis of my objections and challenges and how it it lacks foundation, relevance or relies upon inadmissible statements or documents. And I am relentless. 
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While there are judges who simply refuse to consider any possibility of a homeowner victory, many of such judges can be turned when approached correctly. They are merely starting from assumptions they are required to make. They are not against the homeowner. They are for the rule of law.
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The problem is not the judges. The problem is the lawyers who walk into court believing that the loan is real, the claim is real and that they are only looking for technical ways to get their client out of a valid deal. The problem is exacerbated by magical thinking — that by pointing out bad acts by the foreclosure mill or servicer they will automatically cancel the mortgage, get quiet title and somehow the “debt” will disappear. Is it any wonder that judges are responding negatively to such assertions? 
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Why should any judge relieve a debtor of an obligation because of bad acts by a creditor? The answer is that they should not because if they did they would be destroying the foundation of a nation of laws. If you were owed the money then you would not think that is such a good idea either.
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That is why I strive to show the truth of the transaction between the homeowner and whoever sold the transactional documents for the homeowner to sign or the truth behind the acquisition of what had been a valid loan agreement.
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For the homeowner it was a loan and as soon as you admit that it was a loan, you are already in deep trouble. By admitting the loan you admit the existence of a conventional creditor and a conventional debtor. You also admit the existence of a conventional debt and you can’t contest  the non payment by the homeowner and therefore you are conceding that the homeowner is in breach of a loan agreement without excuse. Fabricating paperwork is no excuse to get out of paying a loan you received. You still owe the money.
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The lawyers and homeowners who complain that this gives them no place to go are missing the essential truth of Wall Street securitization: in nearly all cases the debt was never sold. If you start with the wrong premise you will always end up with the wrong result. 
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The entire enterprise was about selling and reselling private financial data of homeowners who for their part were tricked into thinking they were entering a loan agreement while the other side spared no effort in avoiding the title and liability of a lender under lending laws. That is not a loan and the agreement was not a loan agreement. 
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More importantly, the agreement might not be enforceable at all since (a) there was no meeting of the minds and (b) there was an absence of consideration caused by the payment of consideration together with an obligation to pay it back.
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For the investment banks this was solely about getting consent to sell private data and issuing sand trading securities based on the data not any debt. Anyone who does not understand the significance of that should probably not be litigating these cases. They will lose and thus contribute to the growing body of evidence that most people lose defending actions titled or labelled as foreclosures even though most people could win.
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Mass joinder and mass petitions to change the mandatory requirements for filing foreclosure actions can be done with direction from licensed people who actually understand that there is neither an actual claimant nor a claim in the creation, administration, servicing or enforcement of any transactional documents in which a homeowner is one of the parties.
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My opinion is that without central direction, preparation, investigation, and strategic and tactical planning by experienced trial lawyers, homeowners will continue to be food for a profitable scheme created and advanced by Wall Street.
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My opinion is that this is a massive social issue as well. By finally denying Wall Street banks of profit from foreclosures and all the profitable events leading up to foreclosure, the vast inequality of power and wealth can be addressed, at least in part.
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Neil F Garfield, MBA, JD, 73, is a Florida licensed attorney since 1977. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business and law. He is a former investment banker, securities broker, securities analyst, and financial analyst.
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The Problem With those Powers of Attorney

Just because a power of attorney appears to be facially valid doesn’t  mean that it IS facially valid, nor that it is substantively valid.

Sign Petition to Change the rules to Protect Homeowners from Fraudclosure.

Powers of Attorney are part of the strategy engineered by investment banks on Wall Street. Here is the problem with the POA or LPOA strategy.

In summary it is merely part of a larger strategy that seeks to create the illusion of real claims by real parties when in fact no such claim exists and no claimant exists. the claimant never gets the proceeds of foreclosure sale.

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The reason they do it is to insert an intermediary who can claim plausible deniability and that they were just following orders. It also serves the purpose of creating the illusion of a representative capacity between principal and agent.
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And that serves to create the illusion that the “principal” is somehow relevant to the transactional documents with the homeowner — although they never come right out and say that (because it is untrue).
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So the introduction of a Power of Attorney or Limited Power of Attorney is merely sleight of hand maneuvering to get a judge to believe that nobody would have gone to the trouble of creating and executing these documents unless there was something real going on. Unfortunately most lawyers, including those who represent homeowners in foreclosure, believe that to be true. As a result they completely miss the strategy that works in defeating such actions that are falsely labelled as foreclosures.
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Here is the truth.
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No POA ever gives anyone the right to claim ownership, control, administrative rights or the right to enforce any obligation of any homeowner. Instead it says it gives rights to speak for a label which may or may not be a legal entity — i.e., a “trust” which in fact is either nonexistent or “inchoate” under law.
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No trust, no matter how well written, creates a valid legal trust unless and until something of value is entrusted to the named trustee to hold for the benefit of defined beneficiaries upon certain terms expressly set forth in the trust. If the trustee does not own the alleged obligation, then the trust is irrelevant to any claim or proceeding.
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No named “trustee” has ever been party to a transaction in which the named trustee has ever received something of value from a seller or settlor who conveyed anything to the named trustee much less ownership of any obligation, note or mortgage from any homeowner.
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The existence of a note and mortgage is generally construed to be prima facie evidence of the existence of a loan agreement. But the absence of any “lender” conduct of the counterparties to those transactional documents demonstrates conclusively that there was no meeting of the minds. This leads to the counterintuitive conclusion that the investment banks wanted the transaction to look like a loan but but were completely unwilling to be considered “lenders” for purposes of compliance with lending statutes.
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The homeowner had every reasonable basis to think he/she was getting a loan — which means that there was a lender with a risk of loss and who therefore would not underwrite a transaction that was doomed to fail. Instead the real parties in interest, operating through dummy entities, were intentionally creating agreements that were extremely likely to fail. This enabled them to bet against the viability of those agreements. Therefore the less the quality of the appraisal, the loan terms, the household income etc., the more certain the investment bank could be of making money though failure of the DATA (not the debt) to perform. But since the investment banks and the homeowners had entirely different transactions in mind, there could be no meeting of the minds and there never was.
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None of the counterparties or their representatives ever considered themselves to be lenders. None of them ever purchased any obligation from a homeowner and registered such purchase as an asset receivable from a homeowner nor did they make an entry on the liability side of their balance sheet as a reserve for bad debt. Clearly nobody on the other side wanted to be liable as a lender for violations of lending statutes. None of them wanted to be “lenders.” Hence the transactional documents do not represent  meeting of the minds.
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Therefore, every such Power of Attorney grants nothing. It might be facially valid but it is not substantively valid because the purported grantor owned nothing and therefore could grant no powers over assets that were not owned.
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Note that I no longer refer to “loan documents.” Instead I refer to transactional documents. That is because I no longer believe that the transaction involving the homeowner should be referred to as a loan, even though that was what was intended by the homeowner. It wasn’t intended as a loan by anyone else who was directly or indirectly a counterparty to the transaction with the homeowner.
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In nearly all cases, the original transactional documents referred to the purchase of the homeowner’s consent and rights to resell personal data. The part of the transaction requiring payments from the homeowner was merely a vehicle for reducing the consideration paid for that consent. And the only place it is obliquely albeit not directly referenced as a loan is in actions that are falsely labelled as foreclosures. In all other transactions and documents the subject is clearly the sale and trading on data, not ownership of any debt owed by anyone.
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In a court of equity (i.e., foreclosure) the payment of consideration concurrent with an obligation to return that consideration should be treated as no consideration.
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Hence the apparent contract is rendered unenforceable for lack of consideration. This construction does not produce any financial loss to any party who paid consideration to the homeowner. All such parties are richly rewarded for procuring the signature of the homeowner far in excess of any claim for repayment of the consideration paid for the homeowner’s consent. This construction merely restricts the profits of the players in “securitization” to a level that is fair and proper after full disclosure.
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Further, in a court of equity, the payment of consideration for the consent of the homeowner to allow sale and resale of his personal  financial data should have been disclosed, was legally required to be disclosed and failure of which disclosure is a basis for the court to use its inherent authority to determine the amount of the compensation to be fairly paid to homeowners.
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That amount would be equal to what homeowners would have demanded in general and what investment banks would have offered as incentives in a free market with full disclosure.

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Neil F Garfield, MBA, JD, 73, is a Florida licensed attorney since 1977. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business and law. He is a former investment banker, securities broker, securities analyst, and financial analyst.

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FORECLOSURE DEFENSE IS NOT SIMPLE. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE OF A FAVORABLE RESULT. THE FORECLOSURE MILLS WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO WEAR YOU DOWN AND UNDERMINE YOUR CONFIDENCE. ALL EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT NO MEANINGFUL SETTLEMENT OCCURS UNTIL THE 11TH HOUR OF LITIGATION.
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Why Homeowners Lose Their Homes to Crooked Banks

The first and foremost thing about this is that where any loan is subject to claims of securitization, that claim is false. So no investor ever  bought any loan, debt, note or mortgage. Not ever. All documents claiming to memorialize such transactions are false. So the designated claimant has no claim.

To win these cases you must be realistic about what you are up against. The justice system doesn’t care about the merits of any claim, defense or denial unless it is properly and timely presented in accordance with the established rules of procedure and laws of evidence. It is not really an oversimplification to say that noncompliance with the rules means you lose even if you are right.

I can file a lawsuit against you, the reader, for anything right now even though I have no claim and I can win — and maybe claim your property to satisfy the judgement. The fact that I never had a claim is irrelevant to the system. Once the judgment or order is entered that is the law of the case. This is what crooked banks are using as their means to gain more profit through foreclosures.

[Practice Note: there is a very real privacy issue that has not been adequately explored in connection with homeowner transactions. If the true nature of the homeowner transaction was to obtain consent to sell private data then the consideration might be zero — because the money given to homeowners was offset entirely by a duty to pay it back with interest. So in addition to a lack of informed consent, the failure of consideration might negate all consent. This might augment a claim for quantum meruit for the real plan: the issuance and trading of securities.] 

The presence of questions does not mean that there is an absence of evidence. While the burden of proof is on the claimant to establish the necessary elements for a prima facie case, procedural law favors the claimant, especially in foreclosure cases. Homeowners can and should win, but they often lose because they think that being right is enough.

The apparent facial validity of the documents presented means that even if the documents were fabricated and the plaintiff was misrepresented as having legal existence, for purposes of the case, the judge is required to presume that the claim is true and that the claimant is real. the perpetrators of such a fraud get to enjoy the fruits of their labor. the property is sold and the proceeds are distributed as revenue without any accountability.

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Merely denying those facts is insufficient. You must be able to produce evidence to the contrary, to wit: either facts that show that the presumption is untrue or, more likely, the fact that the Foreclosure Mill was unable to or unwilling to answer basic questions about the ownership and authority over the debt.

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Many lawyers and pro se litigants make a common error. They think that by denying the existence of the plaintiff or the claim that they have shifted the burden back to the claimant or at least the Foreclosure Mill.  This assumption is misplaced particularly in foreclosure litigation. theoretically the denial of a fact that has been alleged is sufficient to force the claimant to prove the allegation of fact. But in foreclosures, thanks to form pleading, very few facts actually need to be alleged in order for a Judicial or non-judicial foreclosure to proceed.
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The denial from the homeowner is therefore a denial of facts that have not been alleged. It gets worse. The presumption arising from documents that appear to have facial validity ends the matter unless the court is faced with credible and persuasive evidence to the contrary.
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And the Foreclosure mill is never going to admit that it doesn’t have a client who is a claimant, and it is never going to admit that the claim doesn’t exist.
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The only avenue open to the homeowner is the exhaustion of all procedures and remedies under the rules of discovery. At the conclusion of that process, the homeowner will be in a position to argue that the failure of the opposition to answer the most basic questions about the claim that they have submitted, combined with their refusal to even follow court orders, should result in sanctions and further, should result in an inference that the claimant doesn’t exist and that the claim is without merit.
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This would not automatically mean that the homeowner wins the case. While sanctions under these circumstances could include striking the pleadings or the claim or the proof of claim in bankruptcy court, the judge is probably going to be more inclined to grant a motion in limine by the homeowner that prevent the Foreclosure Mill from introducing any evidence of ownership or authority over the debt, note or mortgage.
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That SHOULD end it but often doesn’t. Even then many courts will leave open the possibility of producing actual proof of ownership or authority over the debt. Appellate courts have been inconsistent in reversing or affirming such orders.

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The fact that they did not prove the claim independently of the legal presumptions merely means that the judge was satisfied that the prima facie case had been established.

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So the way homeowners are often presenting their position is basically that the judge should not have assumed that the elements of a prima facie case had in fact been established. But that means that you had introduced sufficient evidence to cast doubt on the validity of the documents relied upon in the foreclosure. By that point, the judge has already decided that you didn’t. You raised questions and denied things but you proved nothing.
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So you are now so far down the road in the Foreclosure action that it is probably impossible to reopen any form of discovery. This is why I recommend in such cases that you file an independent lawsuit that could survive a motion to dismiss. By filing lawsuit you raise issues that can be subject of inquiry in discovery, depositions, and subpoenas duces tecum.

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I think pro se litigants in particular also might be confusing the difference between a void judgment and an erroneous judgment. Arguments often appear to be directed to an erroneous judgment, although they contain good arguments against jurisdiction, which could be directed to characterizing the judgment as void. You need to be more specific that the judgment is void and why and not confuse your arguments of error with your argument of lack of jurisdiction.
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This is not something you’re going to be able to do on your own. You need to hire an attorney.
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SECURITIZATION NOTES: All securitizations I have reviewed have one thing in common: the sale of certificates that do not convey any right, title or interest to any debt, note or mortgage. No other financial transaction takes place after that point — except payment of some of the investor money to homeowners. Tax court cases make this abundantly clear: holders of certificates have no secured interest in anything and no interest at all in the performance or enforcement of any obligation.
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The transaction with homeowners was simply acquiring consent from the homeowner to sell private data multiple times to multiple buyers.
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No payments from homeowners — either voluntary or involuntary — are ever forwarded to anyone who has paid money. No proceeds from foreclosure are ever paid to reduce any debt because there is no asset receivable on any balance sheet in which the debt is claimed.
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Thus the presentation of a payment history in court is a distraction from the fact that there is no evidence of any records of any company that claims a loss from nonpayment on a debt.
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A proper objection to the introduction of such a document could be lack of foundation and lack of relevance — unless there is testimony or other evidence linking the payment history with the books of account of the claimant, there is no claim. But like all objections, if not timely raised it is waived. 
Neil F Garfield, MBA, JD, 73, is a Florida licensed attorney since 1977. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business and law. He is a former investment banker, securities broker, securities analyst, and financial analyst.

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FORECLOSURE DEFENSE IS NOT SIMPLE. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE OF A FAVORABLE RESULT. IN FACT, STATISTICS SHOW THAT MOST HOMEOWNERS FAIL TO PRESENT THEIR DEFENSE PROPERLY. THE FORECLOSURE MILLS WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO WEAR YOU DOWN AND UNDERMINE YOUR CONFIDENCE. ALL EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT NO MEANINGFUL SETTLEMENT OCCURS UNTIL THE 11TH HOUR OF LITIGATION.
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Magic Bullet? Maybe this: the foreclosure “team” are all witnesses, not claimants

The fact that the foreclosure players know — or even witnessed — the fact that you refused to make any further payments makes them a witness, not a claimant. 
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The investment banks say they are not liable as lenders for noncompliance with lending laws. OK. A good lawyer can make a powerful argument for estoppel — the investment banks cannot take one position — that it wasn’t a loan in terms of regulation of lenders   — and then that it is a loan so they can foreclose without a creditor.
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Two wrongs don’t make something right. The fact that they used a shill as the originator doesn’t mean they are allowed or should be allowed to use another shill to falsely invoke foreclosure laws and procedures. You can’t foreclose on a debt that does not exist.
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Most homeowners take out their frustration by attacking the judge or the opposing lawyer. This is a mistake on many levels.
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My concern here is that you are far too interested in two subjects that have the least probability of you achieving anything. The object of your ire is understandable. But you may be playing into the hand of the banks if you continue.
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The Judge, even if he or she is the most reprehensible person on Earth, is simply untouchable without very specific evidence that links the Judge to a corrupt scheme in which the decision of the Judge is directly tied to the scheme and where the Judge receives a  specifically identified reward for a corrupt decision. This does not exist in your case and it rarely exists in any case. So attacks on the Judge’s integrity or intelligence will provoke what they would when you attack anyone for anything. They get defensive and antagonistic — just the opposite of what you need.

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The foreclosure mill, even if they too consist of the most reprehensible human beings on the planet, is considered immune from liability for misrepresenting things in court. You don’t need to agree with this for it to be true. And railing against that fact will get you nowhere. I have tried to go after the lawyers and the result has been consistently negative — claim dismissed because of “litigation immunity.”
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So going after the Judge and the lawyers is a waste of valuable time, money and energy — something that the banks need you to do because they are sitting on a plan that claims money due when there is no money due to them, if at all. That is foreclosure.
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So if you are addressing the Judge for example, you first do what you must do whenever you are attempting to establish rapport with anyone — find common ground. You talk about obvious things about which you all agree so you are perceived as reasonable.
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THEN you move on to your argument about how this situation does not lead to the same result as the conventional case of foreclosure where an actual creditor is actually claiming a right to payment of an actual debt that is actually carried on its books as an asset receivable, which means that nonpayment did in fact cause it financial injury.
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Under our laws and just plain common sense, if you see someone rob a bank for example, then you, as a witness, have no right to sue the robber for the money they stole; true simply because they didn’t steal it from you. Why should you get any money that was stolen from the bank? And that is your point. The fact that the foreclosure players know — or even witnessed — the fact that you refused to make any further payments makes them a witness, not a claimant. 
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And yet…. if you do make the claim against the robber and the bank failed to press its own claim, you could get a judgement especially if the robber failed to raise any defenses. After all he knows he stole the money. [I am not equating homeowners with robbers. I am equitating banks with a unscrupulous version of you, making a claim to which you and  they are not entitled to receive any redress under law or common sense.]
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The question is not whether you owed the money or had any reason to pay or not to pay. The question is why are they appearing as claimants instead of witnesses in a claim by someone who actually did suffer some financial loss caused by your alleged nonpayment.
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And the question is why isn’t such a person (creditor) present in the foreclosure? Where are they? Who are they? Do they exist? If they don’t exist, was the transaction with the homeowner actually a loan transaction or was it something else entirely that was disguised as a loan transaction? 
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So you START with the premise that all legal debts should be paid to the obligee — the person to whom the debt is owed. Everyone agrees with that. And you follow with the premise, under the U.S. Constitution, that only people who have been injured can seek redress in court. You get the judge to agree that everyone agrees that if someone fails to pay a mortgage debt to someone who owns it, they should be subject to foreclosure, forced sale of their home, no matter how long it has been in the family, and evicted if they try to stay anyway.
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You talk about it as though you are in favor of foreclosure because that is where every judge starts. You don’t talk about foreclosure as though it is a new scheme that doesn’t have any support in logic or law because foreclosure has existed for centuries. It must exist because if someone parts with their money to give you a loan, they must be able to force repayment if you are unable or unwilling to make repayment. But that does not mean that a witness to nonpayment can make a claim.
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And you must take the time to study and understand the true nature of what has been really been going on. Securitization is by definition the issuance of securities. While it can be a source of financing it is just as often a means to distribute risk. The reason why thinly capitalized companies like DiTech and Quicken Loans were given hundreds of millions of dollars to sell trillions of dollars of low interest loans was not because the investment banks had come up with a new formula to squeeze profit out of low interest payments.
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It was because the return of principal and interest payments was irrelevant to their plan. The “failure” of such repayment plans was a centerpoint of the plan and they bet on it, making more and more money as each “loan” “failed.” Their plan was to sell securities. And the more securities they sold the more money they made because unlike all other securitization plans, they were not selling securities from an independent legal entity (client) that was going into business and using the proceeds to conduct or grow its business.
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Instead they were selling securities for themselves, taking the money and using as little of it as possible to cover the scheme. The money used to create the illusion of loans was a cover for the real scheme.
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The money, if any, that was sent to closing agents to close a transaction that was inaccurately described as a loan transaction was not delivered by the banks with the intent of creating a conventional loan product subject to lending laws. That would have made the investment bank a lender and they would have been named as such on the note and mortgage.
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Quite the contrary. It was designed to evade lending laws in a scheme that had has its hallmark claims by the investment banks, who were running the show, that the scheme did not subject them to lending laws and was not a loan. 
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By designating a false flag “originator” who was contractually unrelated to the investment bank and who received fees and bonuses from acting as though it was a lender, the banks now claim that they are not regulated by lending laws.
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My position is take them at their word and stop fighting them.
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OK, you are right but the only reason you are not subject to lending laws is that you did not engage in lending. So the money that arrived at the closing table was disguised conditional payment in exchange for a the homeowner’s signature on documents that could be used to fill in data on a spreadsheet.
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It was that data (not the loans) that was sold dozens of times thus relieving the investment bank from any risk of loss. The money was a fee paid to homeowners who were lured into transactions that were fraudulently disguised as loans but were in fact part of a plan to steal money and homes.
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Foreclosure is sought because it represents still more revenue and because by not foreclosing the banks would be admitting this wasn’t a loan in the first place. The money that went to homeowners or which was paid on their behalf was not a loan — it was only part of payment of a fee to which the homeowner was entitled (under quantum meruit) but knew nothing about and never had any opportunity to engage in free market negotiation.
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The reason why (a) there is no creditor and the reason why (b) all the documents are fabricated and (c) all this testimony is pre-scripted for perjury is simply that it wasn’t a loan to begin with — and nobody now is carrying the loan as an asset receivable on their books. NOBODY! The loan does not and never did exist. And that is because the money received was not a loan, it was payment for signature and implied consent to use private data for resale.
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The most basic law of contract is that there must be, at the outset, a meeting of the minds. The homeowner went into the transaction believing the false assertions that the money was a loan — instead of consideration for use of his or her private financial information and his or her signature.
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The investment bank went into the transaction through a myriad of sham conduits posing as “lenders” for exorbitant fees. The investment banks were not lending money. They were paying money so they could issue and profit from the sale of securities in “securitization.” Without that there would have been transaction at all. Refer to the “Step Transaction Doctrine” and “Single Transaction Doctrine” for support in case decisions and statutes. You’ll find multiple references on this blog from the early days (2007–2008) of this blog.
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The investment banks say they are not liable as lenders for noncompliance with lending laws. OK. A good lawyer can make a powerful argument for estoppel — the investment banks cannot take one position — that it wasn’t a loan in terms of regulation of lenders   — and then that it is a loan so they can foreclose without a creditor.
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But to get the judge to even consider such an apparently ridiculous assertion you need to demonstrate, step by step, relentlessly, that the foreclosure team has nothing. That doesn’t happen in one pleading or one hearing. It ONLY happens if you know and consistently use and apply the rules and laws relating to court procedure, discovery and trial objections.
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PRACTICE NOTES:
This argument can be made directly where the transaction was originated by the investment banks. Don’t get lost in the “warehouse lender” thickets — they were just one of many steps in a the circuitous process by which investment banks gave money to homeowners.
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But where a real loan was actually made by a real lender and then acquired by investment banks through what they called “securitization” then the argument shifts to the idea that the debt was extinguished at acquisition. this is because when all was said and done there was no creditor who was holding the debt as an asset receivable on its books.
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The fundamental point here, which can be corroborated with any knowledgeable person in the world of finance, is that neither the delivery of money to homeowners nor the acquisition of the debt after a real loan was originated was related to securitization as it had ever been done in the past.
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Securitization is simply the process of dividing up an asset into shares and selling them. This was never done in connection with these transactions. Nobody ever received a share of any loan. Securitization in this context consisted solely of the issuance of securities by the securities brokerage firm (investment bank) posing as an underwriter for a “trust name” that was merely a fictitious name of the the underwriter itself. That is not securitization. The job of the litigator is to gently and relentlessly lead the judge to conclude that this might indeed be the case and thus deny the foreclosure.
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Neil F Garfield, 73, is a Florida licensed attorney. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business and law. He is a former investment banker. securities analyst, and financial analyst.

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FORECLOSURE DEFENSE IS NOT SIMPLE. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE OF A FAVORABLE RESULT. IN FACT, STATISTICS SHOW THAT MOST HOMEOWNERS FAIL TO PRESENT THEIR DEFENSE PROPERLY. EVEN THOSE THAT PRESENT THE DEFENSES PROPERLY LOSE, AT LEAST AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL, AT LEAST 1/3 OF THE TIME. IN ADDITION IT IS NOT A SHORT PROCESS IF YOU PREVAIL. THE FORECLOSURE MILLS WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO WEAR YOU DOWN AND UNDERMINE YOUR CONFIDENCE. ALL EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT NO MEANINGFUL SETTLEMENT OCCURS UNTIL THE 11TH HOUR OF LITIGATION.
*
Please visit www.lendinglies.com for more information.

Answering the Shell Game

Most of the questions I get come from lawyers and homeowners who are totally confused by the array of names of companies that appear, disappeared and replaced by lawyers operating under instructions from command central — a group of lawyers who oversee the foreclosures of loans claimed to be securitized. They are the ones who give the orders to “servicers” and “foreclosure mills.”

The goal is to force the sale of homes and obtain the proceeds of sale for the benefit and account of a stockbroker who initiated a scheme of “securitization.”

Everything that happens in correspondence, statements and enforcement actions is specifically designed to make lawyers, homeowners and judges think that is not the case. Everything is designed to create the false impression that the parties involved have every legal right to originate, process and enforce residential loans when in fact no such authority exists.

The foreclosure process is just one step in many that results in unconscionable profits, fees and commissions distributed to a multitude of players whose livelihood depends upon successfully duping the courts into allowing foreclosure despite the fact that the money from the forced sale will never be paid to the investors who paid for the debt.

One such question came in from a reader regarding BONY Mellon as trustee of a supposedly REMIC trust. As with all things in the era of securitization fail (see Adam Levitin) even that is false. An entity that does not serve as a pass through vehicle for payment of principal and interest on residential loans is not a Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit — so it isn’t a REMIC. A name that includes the word “trust” in it without a trust agreement in which something is entrusted to the “trustee” is not a trust.

So BONY Mellon is simply renting its name out for use by stockbrokers who call themselves “investment banks” in order to create the illusion of an institutional loan when nothing could be further from the truth. With only a few exceptions the same statement applies to all entities named as “trustees” of “REMIC” “trusts”.

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Here is my reply to the reader:

They are playing a shell game and that is  what you should say:

  • None of the BONY Mellon entities ever owned or paid for the debt, note or mortgage.
  • None of the BONY Mellon entities ever served as trustee for the benefit of certificate holders
  • None of the certificate holders ever received a conveyance of ownership in the debt, note or mortgage. The assignment is always void (see below).
  • None of the certificate holders hold any equitable interest in the debt, note or mortgage because they expressly waived any such interest.
  • None of the BONY Mellon entities ever received your loan to hold in trust for anyone.
  • The assignment of bare naked title without the debt is a legal nullity. The trust agreement says that BONY holds bare naked legal title for the investment bank, but it does not have legal title because the debt was not also transferred.
  • The appearance and disappearance of technical legal entities occurs for the sole purpose of creating the illusion of business transactions that never occurred.
  • None of the BONY Mellon entities will ever receive the proceeds of a forced sale of property in this case.
  • None of the BONY Mellon entities have ever received the proceeds of forced sale of any property related to the subject “trust” or trust name.
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