Banks Fighting Subpoenas From FHFA Over Access to Loan Files

Whilst researching something else I ran across the following article first published in 2010. Upon reading it, it bears repeating.

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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WHAT IF THE LOANS WERE NOT ACTUALLY SECURITIZED?

In a nutshell this is it. The Banks are fighting the subpoenas because if there is actually an audit of the “content” of the pools, they are screwed across the board.

My analysis of dozens of pools has led me to several counter-intuitive but unavoidable factual conclusions. I am certain the following is correct as to all residential securitized loans with very few (2-4%) exceptions:

  1. Most of the pools no longer exist.
  2. The MBS sold to investors and insured by AIG and the purchase and sale of credit default swaps were all premised on a general description of the content of the pool rather than a detailed description with the individual loans attached on a list.
  3. Each Prospectus if it carried any spreadsheet listing loans, contained a caveat that the attached list was by example only and not the real loans.
  4. Each distribution report contained a caveat that the parties who created it and the parties who delivered it did not guarantee either authenticity or reliability of the report. They even had specific admonitions regarding the content of the distribution report.
  5. NO LOAN ACTUALLY MADE IT INTO ANY POOL. The evidence is clear: nothing was done to assign, indorse or deliver the note to the investors directly or indirectly until a case went into litigation AND a hearing was scheduled. By that time the cutoff date had been breached and the loan was non-performing by their own allegation and therefore was not acceptable into the pool.
  6. AT ALL TIMES LEGAL TITLE TO THE PROPERTY WAS MAINTAINED BY THE HOMEOWNER EVEN AFTER FORECLOSURE AND SALE. The actual creditor who submitted a credit bid was not the creditor. The sale is either void or voidable.
  7. AT ALL TIMES LEGAL TITLE TO THE LOAN WAS MAINTAINED BY THE ORIGINATING “LENDER”. Since there was no assignment, indorsement or delivery that could be recognized at law or in fact, the originating lender still owns the loan legally BUT….
  8. AT ALL TIMES THE OBLIGATION WAS BOTH CREATED AND EXTINGUISHED AT, OR CONTEMPORANEOUSLY WITH THE CLOSING OF THE LOAN. Since the originating lender was in fact not the source of funds, and did not book the transaction as a loan on their balance sheet (in most cases), the naming of the originating lender as the Lender and payee on the note, both created a LEGAL obligation from the borrower to the Lender and at the same time, the LEGAL obligation was extinguished because the LEGAL Lender of record was paid in full plus exorbitant fees for pretending to be an actual lender.
  9. Since the Legal obligation was both created and extinguished contemporaneously with each other, any remaining obligation to any OTHER party became unsecured since the security instrument (mortgage or deed of trust) refers only to the promissory note executed by the borrower.
  10. At the time of closing, the investor-lenders were the real parties in interest as lenders, but they were not disclosed nor were the fees of the various intermediaries who brought the investor-lender money and the borrower’s loan together.
  11. ALL INVESTOR-LENDERS RECEIVED THE EQUIVALENT OF A BOND — A PROMISE TO PAY ISSUED BY A PARTY OTHER THAN THE BORROWER, PREMISED UPON THE PAYMENT OR RECEIVABLES GENERATED FROM BORROWER PAYMENTS, CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS, CREDIT ENHANCEMENTS, AND THIRD PARTY INSURANCE.
  12. Nearly ALL investor-lenders have been paid sums of money to satisfy the promise to pay contained in the bond. These payments always exceeded the borrowers payments and in many cases paid the obligation in full WITHOUT SUBROGATION.
  13. NO LOAN IS IN ACTUAL DEFAULT OR DELINQUENCY. Since payments must first be applied to outstanding payments due, payments received by investor-lenders or their agents from third party sources are allocable to each individual loan and therefore cure the alleged default. A Borrower’s Non-payment is not a default since no payment is due.
  14. ALL NOTICES OF DEFAULT ARE DEFECTIVE: The amount stated, the creditor, and other material misstatements invalidate the effectiveness of such a notice.
  15. NO CREDIT BID AT AUCTION WAS MADE BY A CREDITOR. Hence the sale is void or voidable.
  16. ANY BALANCE DUE FROM THE BORROWER IS SUBJECT TO DEDUCTIONS FOR THIRD PARTY PAYMENTS.
  17. ANY BALANCE DUE FROM THE BORROWER IS SUBJECT TO AN EQUITABLE CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT THAT IS UNSECURED.
  18. ANY BALANCE DUE FROM THE BORROWER IS SUBJECT TO AN EQUITABLE CLAIM FOR A LIEN TO REFLECT THE INTENTION OF THE INVESTOR-LENDER AND THE INTENTION OF THE BORROWER.  Both the investor-lender and the borrower intended to complete a loan transaction wherein the home was used to collateralize the amount due. The legal satisfaction of the originating lender is not a deduction from the equitable satisfaction of the investor-lender. THUS THE PARTIES SEEKING TO FORECLOSE ARE SUBJECT TO THE LEGAL DEFENSE OF PAYMENT AT CLOSING BUT THE INVESTOR-LENDERS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THAT DEFENSE.
  19. The investor-lenders ALSO have a claim for damages against the investment banks and the string of intermediaries that caused loans to be originated that did not meet the description contained in the prospectus.
  20. Any claim by investor-lenders may be subject to legal and equitable defenses, offsets and counterclaims from the borrower.
  21. The current modification context in which the securitization intermediaries are involved in settlement of outstanding mortgages is allowing those intermediaries to make even more money at the expense of the investor-lenders.
  22. The failure of courts to recognize that they must apply the rule of law results not only in the foreclosure of the property, but the foreclosure of the borrower’s ability to negotiate a settlement with an undisclosed equitable creditor, or with the legal owner of the loan in the property records.

Loan File Issue Brought to Forefront By FHFA Subpoena
Posted on July 14, 2010 by Foreclosureblues
Wednesday, July 14, 2010

foreclosureblues.wordpress.com

Editor’s Note….Even  U.S. Government Agencies have difficulty getting
discovery, lol…This is another excellent post from attorney Isaac
Gradman, who has the blog here…http://subprimeshakeout.blogspot.com.
He has a real perspective on the legal aspect of the big picture, and
is willing to post publicly about it.  Although one may wonder how
these matters may effect them individually, my point is that every day
that goes by is another day working in favor of those who stick it out
and fight for what is right.

Loan File Issue Brought to Forefront By FHFA Subpoena

The battle being waged by bondholders over access to the loan files
underlying their investments was brought into the national spotlight
earlier this week, when the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the
regulator in charge of overseeing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, issued
64 subpoenas seeking documents related to the mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) in which Freddie and Fannie had invested.
The FHFA
has been in charge of overseeing Freddie and Fannie since they were
placed into conservatorship in 2008.

Freddie and Fannie are two of the largest investors in privately
issued bonds–those secured by subprime and Alt-A loans that were often
originated by the mortgage arms of Wall St. firms and then packaged
and sold by those same firms to investors–and held nearly $255 billion
of these securities as of the end of May. The FHFA said Monday that it
is seeking to determine whether issuers of these so-called “private
label” MBS misled Freddie and Fannie into making the investments,
which have performed abysmally so far, and are expected to result in
another $46 billion in unrealized losses to the Government Sponsored
Entities (GSE).

Though the FHFA has not disclosed the targets of its subpoenas, the
top issuers of private label MBS include familiar names such as
Countrywide and Merrill Lynch (now part of BofA), Bear Stearns and
Washington Mutual (now part of JP Morgan Chase), Deutsche Bank and
Morgan Stanley. David Reilly of the Wall Street Journal has written an
article urging banks to come forward and disclose whether they have
received subpoenas from the FHFA, but I’m not holding my breath.

The FHFA issued a press release on Monday regarding the subpoenas
(available here). The statement I found most interesting in the
release discusses that, before and after conservatorship, the GSEs had
been attempting to acquire loan files to assess their rights and
determine whether there were misrepresentations and/or breaches of
representations and warranties by the issuers of the private label
MBS, but that, “difficulty in obtaining the loan documents has
presented a challenge to the [GSEs’] efforts. FHFA has therefore
issued these subpoenas for various loan files and transaction
documents pertaining to loans securing the [private label MBS] to
trustees and servicers controlling or holding that documentation.”

The FHFA’s Acting Director, Edward DeMarco, is then quoted as saying
““FHFA is taking this action consistent with our responsibilities as
Conservator of each Enterprise. By obtaining these documents we can
assess whether contractual violations or other breaches have taken
place leading to losses for the Enterprises and thus taxpayers. If so,
we will then make decisions regarding appropriate actions.” Sounds
like these subpoenas are just the precursor to additional legal
action.

The fact that servicers and trustees have been stonewalling even these

powerful agencies on loan files should come as no surprise based on

the legal battles private investors have had to wage thus far to force

banks to produce these documents. And yet, I’m still amazed by the

bald intransigence displayed by these financial institutions. After

all, they generally have clear contractual obligations requiring them

to give investors access to the files (which describe the very assets

backing the securities), not to mention the implicit discovery rights

these private institutions would have should the dispute wind up in

court, as it has in MBIA v. Countrywide and scores of other investor

suits.

At this point, it should be clear to everyone–servicers and investors
alike–that the loan files will have to be produced eventually, so the
only purpose I can fathom for the banks’ obduracy is delay. The loan
files should, as I’ve said in the past, reveal the depths of mortgage
originator depravity, demonstrating convincingly that the loans never
should have been issued in the first place. This, in turn, will force
banks to immediately reserve for potential losses associated with
buying back these defective mortgages. Perhaps banks are hoping that
they can ward off this inevitability long enough to spread their
losses out over several years, thereby weathering the storm caused (in
part) by their irresponsible lending practices. But certainly the
FHFA’s announcement will make that more difficult, as the FHFA’s
inherent authority to subpoena these documents (stemming from the
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008) should compel disclosure
without the need for litigation, and potentially provide sufficient
evidence of repurchase obligations to compel the banks to reserve
right away. For more on this issue, see the fascinating recent guest
post by Manal Mehta on The Subprime Shakeout regarding the SEC’s
investigation into banks’ processes for allocating loss reserves.

Meanwhile, the investor lawsuits continue to rain down on banks, with
suits by the Charles Schwab Corp. against Merrill Lynch and UBS, by
the Oregon Public Employee Retirement Fund against Countrywide, and by
Cambridge Place Investment Management against Goldman Sachs, Citigroup
and dozens of other banks and brokerages being announced this week. If
the congealing investor syndicate was looking for political cover
before staging a full frontal attack on banks, this should provide
ample protection. Much more to follow on these and other developments
in the coming days…
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Posted by Isaac Gradman at 3:46 PM

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AUTHORITY AND AGENCY

In “Fair Game” Gretchen Morgenson continues to unravel the failing process of “saving homes” while the world ignores the simple truth that legally the homes are in no jeopardy but for the pranks and illusions created by the pretender lenders.

  • There is no valid foreclosure, auction, mediation, modification, short-sale, satisfaction of mortgage, release and re-conveyance, or even settlement with a party to whom the money is not owed and a party owning no rights under the security instrument (the mortgage or deed of trust).

It is all an illusion given reality by repetition not by truth. It is fraud ignored by courts who naturally find it far more likely that a deadbeat homeowner is trying to trick the court than a world class bank or someone pretending to be an agent of a world class bank. But in the end, whether title moves by foreclosure or any of the procedures mentioned above, there is no clear title. There is clouded, fatally defective title and a settlement with a party lacking any power to even be in the room.

This is why I have maintained that lawyers err when they do not aggressively (on the front end despite the rules requiring mediation etc.) insist on proof of authority to represent and proof of agency and proof that a decision-maker is in the room. If those elements are not satisfied, there can be deal — only the appearance of a deal.It is entirely possible that not even the lawyer has authority to represent and that the lawyer has conflicts of interest when you make the challenge. If a lawyer asserts he represents a party you have a right to demand proof of that. I’ve seen dozens of cases unravel at just that point.

The foreclosure mills play musical chairs but they are forgetting that this fraud on the court may come back and haunt them with liability, discipline and even criminal charges. They keep their options open until they absolutely are forced to name a pretender lender. That lawyer standing in the room has generally spoken to nobody other than a secretary in his own firm. he doesn’t know the client, or any representative of the client. He or she presumed to be authorized to represent the client because the file was given to him or her.

Think I am kidding. Try it out on Deutsch Bank or U.S. Bank or BONY-Mellon. Demand that the lawyer produce incontrovertible proof that their client knows the case even exists and that this lawyer represents them.

From what I am seeing, this interrupts the flow of plausible deniability. Nobody high up in the food chain wants to come in and say they have personal knowledge or that they have anything to do with these foreclosures. They just want their monthly fee for pretending to be Trustee over a pool that was never created, much less funded. They will try to use affidavits from people who know nothing and who are probably not even employed by the “client.” Even if they are employed a quick inquiry will reveal that the signatory lacks authority to hire legal counsel and has no personal knowledge of the case.

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September 18, 2010

When Mortgage Mediation Is a Gamble

By GRETCHEN MORGENSON

NEVADA — one of the states where home prices went stratospheric during the housing mania — is now reporting some of the nation’s most horrifying foreclosure figures. Last week, RealtyTrac said that 1 in every 84 households in the state had received a foreclosure notice in August, 4.5 times the national average.

To mitigate this continuing disaster, the Nevada Assembly created a foreclosure mediation program last year. Intended to help keep families in their homes, the program brings together troubled borrowers and their lenders to negotiate resolutions.

The program began on July 1, 2009, and in its first year, 8,738 requests for mediation were received and 4,212 completed, according to the state’s Administrative Office of the Courts. Some 668 borrowers gave up their homes and 445 were foreclosed upon in the period.

“We are the only state that requires the bank to do something — they must come to the table if the homeowner elects mediation,” said Verise V. Campbell, who administers the program. “We are now touted as the No. 1 foreclosure mediation program around the country. The program is working.”

During its first year, 2,590 cases — more than 60 percent of completed mediations — resulted in agreements between borrower and lender, Ms. Campbell said. But when asked how many actually wound up assisting homeowners through permanent loan modifications, she said her office did not track that figure.

Most of these agreements, say lawyers who have worked in Nevada’s program, were probably for temporary modifications like those that have frustrated borrowers elsewhere — you know, the kind of plan that lasts only three months until the bank decides that the borrower does not qualify for a permanent modification.

Clearly, the Nevada program is superior to the White House’s Home Affordable Modification Program, where borrowers have trouble even reaching lenders by phone. Forcing banks to meet with borrowers is definitely a good step.

But some mediators who have participated in the Nevada program and some lawyers who represent borrowers in it say it has flaws that may give the banks an advantage over borrowers.

Patrick James Martin, a lawyer in Reno who is a certified public accountant and an arbitrator for the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, was an early mediator in the program. In a recent letter to Nevada’s state court administrator, Mr. Martin expressed concern that the program favored lenders.

“I really felt the lenders didn’t have too much interest in having the program work,” Mr. Martin said in an interview. “A lawyer would show up for the lender with none of the documents required by the program. When they got into the mediation, they would call somebody in a bullpen someplace who had a computer handy and the borrower might or might not qualify for modification. No discussion, no negotiation.”

Mr. Martin said he no longer received cases to mediate.

Another experienced mediator, who declined to be identified because he feared reprisals, was removed from the system after he recommended sanctions for banks that did not meet their obligations under the program. These duties include showing up, bringing pertinent documents and having authority to negotiate with the borrower.

After this mediator made a petition for sanctions in a case this year, Ms. Campbell sent him and the other parties in the matter a letter saying that the recommendation was not a “valid Foreclosure Mediation Program document.” The letter, on Supreme Court of Nevada stationery, also stated that nothing in the law that established the mediation program “requires or permits a mediator to recommend specific sanctions.”

But the statute governing mediations in Nevada clearly specifies that if a lender does not participate in the mediation in good faith, by failing to appear, for example, “the mediator shall prepare and submit to the mediation administrator a petition and recommendation concerning the imposition of sanctions” against the lender. The court then has the power to issue sanctions, which can include forcing a loan modification.

Keith Tierney is a veteran real estate lawyer who was until recently a mediator in the program. He, too, stopped receiving mediation assignments after recommending sanctions against lenders in a number of cases. He said that a program official told him last week that he was no longer eligible because he issued a petition and recommendation for sanctions, even though that is what the law allows.

When asked why she believed that such recommendations were not allowed, Ms. Campbell said mediators who issued them were not following the program rules as interpreted by Nevada’s Supreme Court.

But Mr. Tierney said: “The statute trumps rules. Every attorney in the world knows that if a rule is in contradiction to a statute, the rule is null and void.”

Administering the program gives Ms. Campbell great power. She issues certificates allowing foreclosures to take place after mediations occur. And while she said such certificates were submitted only when mediators’ statements showed they should be, mistakes have happened.

ONE woman went through a mediation in which the lender didn’t provide necessary documents and the mediator noted it, according to legal documents. Under the rules, no certificate is supposed to be issued in such a circumstance, but shortly afterward, the borrower received notice of a trustee sale. Ms. Campbell’s office had issued a certificate allowing foreclosure; only by filing for bankruptcy could the borrower stop it.

Ms. Campbell said such problems were rare. The state doesn’t produce data that would allow her assertion to be verified.

Ms. Campbell is not a lawyer and is not a veteran of the housing or banking industries. Before overseeing the mediation program, she worked in the casino industry. She worked for a Chinese company developing a gambling property in Macau and was director of administration for the Cosmopolitan Resort and Casino in Las Vegas.

Ms. Campbell said that her position involved administrative duties, not legal insight, and that her experience overseeing large projects amply prepared her to manage the Nevada mediation program.

But David M. Crosby, the lawyer who represented the borrower whose case resulted in an erroneous foreclosure action, said significant questions remained about the program. Among them, he said, was the role that Ms. Campbell played in the process.

“Does she just do administrative stuff or does she make decisions?” he asked. “That doesn’t seem well decided.”


GMAC HALTS FORECLOSURES ADMITTING FALSE AFFIDAVITS

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From testimony in a Chase case, same as dozens of others I have seen —-

Q. So if you didn’t review any books, records, and documents or computerized records, how is it that you had personal knowledge of all the matters contained therein?

A. Well, I have personal knowledge that my staff has personal knowledge. That is our process.

KEEP IN MIND that these admitted facts now are the same facts treated with incredulity and derision from the bench and opposing counsel. The Judges were wrong. The foreclosures were wrong. Now what? How will homeowners and counsel be treated in court now? Will the Judge still think the homeowner is trying to get out of a legitimate debt or will the Courts start to allow these cases to heard on their MERITS instead of improper PRESUMPTIONS? Will the courts start following rules of evidence or will they continue to give the “benefit of the doubt” (i.e., and improper presumption) to the foreclosure mill that fabricated documents with false affidavits?

The tide is turning from defending borrowers to prosecuting damage claims for slander of title, fraud, appraisal fraud, and criminal prosecutions by state, local and federal law enforcement. GMAC is only the first of the pretender lenders to admit the false representations contained in pleadings and affidavits. The methods used to to obtain foreclosure sales were common throughout the industry. The law firms and fabrication mills will provide precious little cover for the culprits whose interests they served. AND now that millions of homes were foreclosed, their position is set and fixed — they can no longer “fix” the problem by manipulating the documents.

The bottom line is that GMAC mortgagors who “lost” their homes still own them, as I have repeatedly opined on these pages. The damages are obvious and the punitive damages available are virtually inevitable. Maybe Judges will change their minds about applying TILA and RESPA, both of which amply cover this situation. Maybe those teeth in those statutes do NOT lead to windfall gains for homeowners but only set things right.

These people can move back into their homes in my opinion and even taken possession from those who allegedly purchased them, since the title was based upon a fatal defect in the chain. Whether these people will end up owing any money and whether they might still be subject to foreclosure from SOMEBODY is not yet known, but we know that GMAC-sponsored foreclosures are now admitted to be defective. There is no reason to suppose that GMAC was any different from any of the other pretender lenders who initiated foreclosure sales either on false pleading or false instructions using the power of sale in non-judicial states.

Those hundreds of millions of dollars earned by the foreclosure mills, those tens of billions of wealth stolen from homeowner are all up for grabs as lawyers start to circle the kill, having discovered that there is more money here than any personal injury or malpractice suit and that anyone can do it with the right information on title and securitization.

With subpoenas coming in from law enforcement agencies around the country, GMAC is the first to crumble, aware that the choice was to either take a massive commercial hit for damages or face criminal charges. Finger pointing will start in earnest as the big boys claim plausible deniability in a scheme they hatched and directed. The little guys will flip on them like pancakes as they testify under oath about the instructions they received which they knew were contrary to law and the rules governing their licenses and charters. Real Estate Brokers, licensed appraisers, licensed mortgage mortgage brokers, notaries, witnesses, title agents and their collective title and liability insurance carriers will soon discover that their licenses, livelihood and reputations are not only at risk but almost certainly headed for a major hit.

There can be no doubt that all GMAC cases will be affected by this action although GMAC has thus far limited the instruction to judicial states. In non-judicial states, most of the foreclosures were done without affidavits because they were uncontested. GMAC will now find small comfort that they didn’t use affidavits but merely false instructions to “Trustees” whose status was acquired through the filing of “Substitution of Trustee” documents executed by the same folks who falsified the affidavits in the judicial states. But the fact is that GMAC was not the creditor and obtained title through a “credit bid.” THEY CAN’T FIX THIS! Thus the transfer of title was void, in my opinion, or certainly voidable.

The denial that the affidavit contained false information is patently false — and, as usual, not under oath (see below). GMAC takes the position that the affidavits were “inadvertently” signed (tens of thousands of them) by persons without knowledge of their truth or falsity and that the action is taken only to assure that the mortgage holder is actually known. So the fight isn’t over and don’t kid yourself. They are not all going to roll over and play dead. Just take this as another large step toward the ultimate remedy — reinstatement of people in their homes, damage awards to people who were defrauded, and thus restoration of hundreds of billions of dollars of wealth back into the economic sector where money is spent and the economy actually works for people who don’t trade false papers at the expense of pensioners and homeowners around the world.

September 20, 2010

GMAC Halts Foreclosures in 23 States for Review

By DAVID STREITFELD

GMAC Mortgage, one of the country’s largest and most troubled home lenders, said on Monday that it was imposing a moratorium on many of its foreclosures as it tried to ensure they were done correctly.

The lender, which specialized in subprime loans during the boom, when it was owned by General Motors, declined in an e-mail to specify how many loans would be affected or the “potential issue” it had identified with them.

GMAC said the suspension might be a few weeks or might last until the end of the year.

States where the moratorium is being carried out include New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Illinois, Florida and 18 others, mostly on the East Coast and in the Midwest. All of the affected states are so-called judicial foreclosure states, where courts control the interactions of defaulting homeowners and their lenders.

Since the real estate collapse began, lawyers for homeowners have sparred with lenders in those states. The lawyers say that in many cases, the lenders are not in possession of the original promissory note, which is necessary for a foreclosure.

GMAC, which has been the recipient of billions of dollars of government aid, declined to provide any details or answer questions, but its actions suggest that it is concerned about potential liability in evicting families and selling houses to which it does not have clear title.

The lender said it was also reviewing completed foreclosures where the same unnamed procedure might have been used.

Matthew Weidner, a real estate lawyer in St. Petersburg, Fla., said he interpreted the lender’s actions as saying, “We have real liability here.”

Mr. Weidner said he recently received notices from the opposing counsel in two GMAC foreclosure cases that it was withdrawing an affidavit. In both cases, the document was signed by a GMAC executive who said in a deposition last year that he had routinely signed thousands of affidavits without verifying the mortgage holder.

“The Florida rules of civil procedure are explicit,” Mr. Weidner said. “If you enter an affidavit, it must be based on personal knowledge.”

The law firm seeking to withdraw the affidavits is Florida Default Law Group, which is based in Tampa. Ronald R. Wolfe, a vice president at the firm, did not return calls. The firm is under investigation by the State of Florida, according to the attorney general’s Web site.

Real estate agents who work with GMAC to sell foreclosed properties were told to halt their activities late last week. The moratorium was first reported by Bloomberg News on Monday. Bloomberg said it had obtained a company memorandum dated Friday in which GMAC Mortgage instructed brokers to immediately stop evictions, cash-for-key transactions and sales.

Nerissa Spannos, a Fort Lauderdale agent, said GMAC represents about half of her business — 15 houses at the moment in various stages of foreclosure.

“It’s all coming to a halt,” she said. “I have so many nice listings and now I can’t sell them.”

The lender’s action, she said, was unprecedented in her experience. “Every once in a while you get a message saying, ‘Take this house off the market. We have to re-foreclose.’ But this is so much bigger,” she said.

Ally Says GMAC Mortgage Mishandled Affidavits on Foreclosures

By Dakin Campbell and Lorraine Woellert – Sep 21, 2010

Ally Financial Inc., whose GMAC Mortgage unit halted evictions in 23 states amid allegations of mishandled affidavits, said its filings contained no false claims about home loans.

The “defect” in affidavits used to support evictions was “technical” and was discovered by the company, Gina Proia, an Ally spokeswoman, said in an e-mailed statement. Employees submitted affidavits containing information they didn’t personally know was true and sometimes signed without a notary present, according to the statement. Most cases will be resolved in the next few weeks and those that can’t be fixed will “require court intervention,” Proia said.

“The entire situation is unfortunate and regrettable and GMAC Mortgage is diligently working to resolve the situation,” Proia said. “There was never any intent on the part of GMAC Mortgage to bypass court rules or procedures. Nor do these failures reflect any disrespect for our courts or the judicial processes.”

State officials are investigating allegations of fraudulent foreclosures at the nation’s largest home lenders and loan servicers. Lawyers defending mortgage borrowers have accused GMAC and other lenders of foreclosing on homeowners without verifying that they own the loans. In foreclosure cases, companies commonly file affidavits to start court proceedings.

“All the banks are the same, GMAC is the only one who’s gotten caught,” said Patricia Parker, an attorney at Jacksonville, Florida-based law firm, Parker & DuFresne. “This could be huge.”

No Misstatements

Aside from signing the affidavits without knowledge or a notary, “the sum and substance of the affidavits and all content were factually accurate,” Proia wrote in the e-mail. “Our internal review has revealed no evidence of any factual misstatements or inaccuracies concerning the details typically contained in these affidavits such as the loan balance, its delinquency, and the accuracy of the note and mortgage on the underlying transaction.”

Affidavits are statements written and sworn to in the presence of someone authorized to administer an oath, such as a notary public.

GMAC told brokers and agents to halt evictions tied to foreclosures on homeowners in 23 states including Florida, Connecticut and New York and said it may have to take “corrective action” on other foreclosures, according to a Sept. 17 memo. Foreclosures won’t be suspended and will continue with “no interruption,” Proia said in a statement yesterday.

10,000 a Week

In December 2009, a GMAC Mortgage employee said in a deposition that his team of 13 people signed “a round number of 10,000” affidavits and other foreclosure documents a month without verifying their accuracy. The employee said he relied on law firms sending him the affidavits to verify their accuracy instead of checking them with GMAC’s records as required. The affidavits were then used to complete the process of repossessing homes and evicting residents.

Florida Attorney General William McCollum is investigating three law firms that represent loan servicers in foreclosures, and are alleged to have submitted fraudulent documents to the courts, according to an Aug. 10 statement. The firms handled about 80 percent of foreclosure cases in the state, according to a letter from Representative Alan Grayson, a Florida Democrat.

“It appears that the actions we have taken and the attention we’ve paid to this issue could have had some impact on the actions that GMAC took today, but we can’t take full credit,” Ryan Wiggins, a spokeswoman for McCollum, said yesterday in a telephone interview.

‘Committed Fraud’

In August, Florida Circuit Court Judge Jean Johnson blocked a Jacksonville foreclosure brought by Washington Mutual Bank N.A. and JPMorgan Chase Bank, which had purchased the failed bank’s assets, and Shapiro & Fishman, the companies’ law firm. Documents eventually showed that the mortgage on the house was in fact owned by Washington-based Fannie Mae.

WaMu and the law firm “committed fraud on this court,” Johnson wrote. JPMorgan had presented a document prepared by Shapiro showing the mortgage was sold directly to WaMu in April 2008.

Tom Ice, founding partner of Ice Legal PA in Royal Palm Beach, Florida, said a fourth law firm representing GMAC in recent weeks has begun withdrawing affidavits signed by the GMAC employee.

“The banks are sitting up and taking notice that they can’t use falsified documents in the courtroom,” Ice said. “There may be others doing the same thing. They’re going to come back and say, ‘We’d better withdraw these,’” Ice said in a telephone interview.

Alejandra Arroyave, a lawyer with Lapin & Leichtling, a law firm in Coral Gables, Florida, who represented the employee at his December 2009 deposition, didn’t respond to a request for comment. A phone call to the employee wasn’t returned.

Mortgage Market

GMAC ranked fourth among U.S. home-loan originators in the first six months of this year, with $26 billion of mortgages, according to Inside Mortgage Finance, an industry newsletter. Wells Fargo & Co. ranked first, with $160 billion, and Citigroup Inc. was fifth, with $25 billion.

Iowa Assistant Attorney General Patrick Madigan said the implications of Ally’s internal review and the GMAC employee’s deposition could be “enormous.”

“It would call into question whether other servicers have engaged in similar practices,” Madigan said in a telephone interview. “It would be a major disruption to the foreclosure pipeline.”

To contact the reporters on this story: Dakin Campbell in San Francisco at dcampbell27@bloomberg.net; Lorraine Woellert in Washington at lwoellert@bloomberg.net.

3 CASES THAT SHOW WE ARE ON THE RIGHT TRACK

SUBMITTED BY BRIAN

Three cases that show we are on the right track.
Indymac is a bad group that is going down further.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/37596878/Paul-Nygen-Judgement-Against-Lenders-09-15-10

http://www.scribd.com/doc/37617034/FDIC-Indymac-V-Van-Dellen-Complaint-Officers-of-Indymac-sued-by-FDIC-Onewest-Bank-states-106-of-the-108-loans-are-non-performing-Must-be-to-the

http://www.scribd.com/doc/37618538/Indymac-Certificate-ShareHolder-Class-Action-9th-Circuit-Interlocutory-Order-certifying-the-6th-Amended-Complaint

44 Million in Poverty and Climbing

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RECOVERY HELD HOSTAGE BY WALL STREET AND POLITICIANS

THIS IS WHAT I WANTED AVOID. WE ARE FAST APPROACHING THIRD WORLD STATUS, FORMER WORLD LEADER. AND THE REASON IS SIMPLE, WALL STREET OWNS THE GOVERNMENT PROCESS. THE RESULT IS THAT THE ONLY RIGHTFUL STIMULUS PACKAGE THAT WOULDN’T COST THE TAXPAYERS A DIME IS BEING BLOCKED. WAKE UP, AMERICA! IT DOESN’T HAVE TO BE THIS WAY!

THE RIGHTFUL RETURN OF EQUITY TO HOMEOWNERS AMOUNTING TO TRILLIONS OF DOLLARS (WITHOUT A DIME MORE FROM TAXPAYERS) WOULD PRODUCE ALL THE STIMULUS NECESSARY TO JUMP START OUR ECONOMY FROM REVERSE GEAR TO FORWARD. IT WOULDN’T CURE EVERYTHING BUT IT WOULD ALLOW EVERYTHING TO GO RIGHT OVER TIME.

In the article below the gruesome details are shown and we all know that when it comes to bad news, the government tends to understate it and when it comes to good news, the government tends to overstate it. 4 million people have been officially added to those living below the poverty level. The total is now 44 million people, many of them children, and the government concedes this number is going to rise.

So let’s just put politics aside for a moment and focus on practicality. Just how close do the flood waters have to come to your front door before you stop caring how they got there and who else would benefit if you drained the swamp?

About 15% of our population, the highest in decades, is officially below the poverty line and the real figure is nearly twice that because of families that have had to move in together or because they couldn’t be located to be counted. In the same period of time it took us to get there, Wall Street grew from 15% of our our economy to 44%. Those kinds of result are impossible without government complicity and intentionally channeling the money from 98% of Americans to the top 2%.

It’s not that our people are stupid. The reason we have to wait for everyone to get mad enough is that everyone is trying so hard to stay afloat for themselves and their families that they don’t have luxury of reading, analysis and staying informed. Their news comes in tiny sound bites that say nothing but inflame the passions, because that is about all we have time for. But just like you don’t have to worry about crime until there is a home invasion in YOUR home, suddenly the pendulum swings the other way as we go into defensive and offensive mode to put down this takeover of the government and economy.

It’s happening. You can see it in politics as incumbents get hammered, as well they should, in new groups forming just to get heard or just to get the the existing person in office out and somebody, anybody else in. Voter anger is only part of this. Civil incidents are rising and will continue to rise until the vast majority of people start believing that the government is keeping the peace and the government is returning the piece of the American pie to its people.

What I think is the only legally, ethically and morally right thing to do is the only practical thing to do to drain the swamp before everyone ends up below the poverty line regardless of their current apparent economic condition. The economy needs the injection of trillions of dollars in individual wealth to start a REAL RECOVERY and the government doesn’t have it and can’t print it without causing even worse conditions than we now have.

Those trillions of dollars are locked up in the bondage of bogus claims by bogus intermediaries who are holding REO property from fraudulent foreclosures and who are adding to that pile of wealth every day because the judicial system is letting them. It is true that a complete change of policy that gives the middle class and poor the benefit of the bargain they thought there were getting when they accepted the “loan product” that they were sold, along with a fraudulent appraisal and fraudulent claims that the appraisal had been verified in the underwriting process that had been fraudulently claimed to have taken place.

The trick of this scheme was to make absolutely certain that the loans pools failed. That is what they did. And to make it fail-safe they put conditions in the pools that even if they were largely performing they could still be declared in default and collect money on insurance, counter-party risk obligations (credit default swaps) etc. But they knew that virtually all the loans would fail because regardless of the borrower’s ability to pay, which they sought to recruit at as a low a standard as they could find, they knew the borrower would not WANT to pay because the  deal turned out to be like one of those car deals where you drive off the lot and you already lost 20%, drive another 100 miles and you lost 25% and so on.

Practically every borrower thought when they accepted these deals that they had equity in the deal. Practically none of them did actually have equity. They had a loss and it got worse with each passing month and every dollar they put into the home. That loss was Wall Street’s gain. By any legal standard that I know that gain was illicitly obtained and should be re turned to the borrowers. If the borrowers were offered a deal where they ended up with at least part of the equity they were sold, the foreclosures would end, the housing market would rebound, the consumers would have money, the economy would start recovering and Wall Street would shrink back to where it belongs — a small portion of a vibrant economy that actually makes things of value that people want and actually performs services that people want and will pay for.

Free house? Maybe, if that is what it takes put the deal right after they robbed the homeowner blind. In most cases, no it won’t take that much. And in all cases the free houses are being given to intermediaries who never invested a dime in the deal would stop. The free houses that are being greedily split up by disinterested parties who have been paid multiple times on a transaction that never should have happened in the first place would also stop. Wall Street would groan and scream and call it socialism, as though ANY system of government or economics would allow the institutionalization of theft and the socialization (payment with citizens money) of losses.

We already paid for those losses by socializing the ridiculous machinations of Wall Street. Shouldn’t we get something for our investment? Shouldn’t there be some sort of exit strategy that leaves the economy right side up? And shouldn’t there be a day of reckoning for those caused this catastrophe?

  • What would be so bad if that day of reckoning also was the day we put things right with homeowners?

  • What would be so bad if some homeowners made out a little better than the Wall Street thieves who caused this mess, especially if it produced a healthy economy?

  • Do we really WANT our neighbors home to go down in flames when we know it will cause fire damage to our own home, just because he was smoking in bed, drunk, passed out?

  • When do we get practical about this and simply say, we want the economy right-side up, we want our society free and controlled by the people and for the people and if that ends up offending some souls out there, they’ll get over it or they won’t. Who cares?

September 16, 2010

Recession Raises Poverty Rate to a 15-Year High

By ERIK ECKHOLM

The percentage of Americans struggling below the poverty line in 2009 was the highest it has been in 15 years, the Census Bureau reported Thursday, and interviews with poverty experts and aid groups said the increase appeared to be continuing this year.

With the country in its worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, four million additional Americans found themselves in poverty in 2009, with the total reaching 44 million, or one in seven residents. Millions more were surviving only because of expanded unemployment insurance and other assistance.

And the numbers could have climbed higher: One way embattled Americans have gotten by is sharing homes with siblings, parents or even nonrelatives, sometimes resulting in overused couches and frayed nerves but holding down the rise in the national poverty rate, according to the report.

The share of residents in poverty climbed to 14.3 percent in 2009, the highest level recorded since 1994. The rise was steepest for children, with one in five affected, the bureau said.

The report provides the most detailed picture yet of the impact of the recession and unemployment on incomes, especially at the bottom of the scale. It also indicated that the temporary increases in aid provided in last year’s stimulus bill eased the burdens on millions of families.

For a single adult in 2009, the poverty line was $10,830 in pretax cash income; for a family of four, $22,050.

Given the depth of the recession, some economists had expected an even larger jump in the poor.

“A lot of people would have been worse off if they didn’t have someone to move in with,” said Timothy M. Smeeding, director of the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin.

Dr. Smeeding said that in a typical case, a struggling family, like a mother and children who would be in poverty on their own, stays with more prosperous parents or other relatives.

The Census study found an 11.6 percent increase in the number of such multifamily households over the last two years. Included in that number was James Davis, 22, of Chicago, who lost his job as a package handler for Fed Ex in February 2009. As he ran out of money, he and his 2-year-old daughter moved in with his mother about a year ago, avoiding destitution while he searched for work.

“I couldn’t afford rent,” he said.

Danise Sanders, 31, and her three children have been sleeping in the living room of her mother and sister’s one-bedroom apartment in San Pablo, Calif., for the last month, with no end in sight. They doubled up after the bank foreclosed on her landlord, forcing her to move.

“It’s getting harder,” said Ms. Sanders, who makes a low income as a mail clerk. “We’re all pitching in for rent and bills.”

There are strong signs that the high poverty numbers have continued into 2010 and are probably still rising, some experts said, as the recovery sputters and unemployment remains near 10 percent.

“Historically, it takes time for poverty to recover after unemployment starts to go down,” said LaDonna Pavetti, a welfare expert at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, a liberal-leaning research group in Washington.

Dr. Smeeding said it seemed almost certain that poverty would further rise this year. He noted that the increase in unemployment and poverty had been concentrated among young adults without college educations and their children, and that these people remained at the end of the line in their search for work.

One indirect sign of continuing hardship is the rise in food stamp recipients, who now include nearly one in seven adults and an even greater share of the nation’s children. While other factors as well as declining incomes have driven the rise, by mid-2010 the number of recipients had reached 41.3 million, compared with 39 million at the beginning of the year.

Food banks, too, report swelling demand.

“We’re seeing more younger people coming in that not only don’t have any food, but nowhere to stay,” said Marla Goodwin, director of Jeremiah’s Food Pantry in East St. Louis, Ill. The pantry was open one day a month when it opened in 2008 but expanded this year to five days a month.

And Texas food banks said they distributed 14 percent more food in the second quarter of 2010 than in the same period last year.

The Census report showed increases in poverty for whites, blacks and Hispanic Americans, with historic disparities continuing. The poverty rate for non-Hispanic whites was 9.4 percent, for blacks 25.8 percent and for Hispanics 25.3 percent. The rate for Asians was unchanged at 12.5 percent.

The median income of all households stayed roughly the same from 2008 to 2009. It had fallen sharply the year before, as the recession gained steam and remains well below the levels of the late 1990s — a sign of the stagnating prospects for the middle class.

The decline in incomes in 2008 had been greater than expected, and when the two recession years are considered together, the decline since 2007 was 4.2 percent, said Lawrence Katz, an economist at Harvard. Gains achieved earlier in the decade were wiped out, and median family incomes in 2009 were 5 percent lower than in 1999.

“This is the first time in memory that an entire decade has produced essentially no economic growth for the typical American household,” Mr. Katz said.

The number of United States residents without health insurance climbed to 51 million in 2009, from 46 million in 2008, the Census said. Their ranks are expected to shrink in coming years as the health care overhaul adopted by Congress in March begins to take effect.

Government benefits like food stamps and tax credits, which can provide hundreds or even thousands of dollars in extra income, are not included in calculating whether a family’s income falls above or below the poverty line.

But rises in the cost of housing, medical care or energy and the large regional differences in the cost of living are not taken into account either.

If food-stamp benefits and low-income tax credits were included as income, close to 8 million of those labeled as poor in the report would instead be just above the poverty line, the Census report estimated. At the same time, a person who starts a job and receives the earned income tax credit could have new work-related expenses like transportation and child care. Unemployment benefits, which are considered cash income and included in the calculations, helped keep 3 million families above the line last year, the report said, with temporary extensions and higher payments helping all the more.

The poverty line is a flawed measure, experts agree, but it remains the best consistent long-term gauge of need available, and its ups and downs reflect genuine trends.

The federal government will issue an alternate calculation next year that will include important noncash and after-tax income and also account for regional differences in the cost of living.

But it will continue to calculate the rate in the old way as well, in part because eligibility for many programs, from Medicaid to free school lunches, is linked to the longstanding poverty line.

Reporting was contributed by Rebecca Cathcart in Los Angeles, Emma Graves Fitzsimmons in Chicago, Malcolm Gay in St. Louis, Robert Gebeloff in New York and Malia Wollan in San Francisco.


UNDISCLOSED MIDDLE: Repurchase Obligation in the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement

FROM ANONYMOUS, MY FAVORITE CONTRIBUTOR 🙂

EDITOR’S NOTE: I would be better off and so would our readers if I could be as succinct in my writing as Anonymous. Somehow it always takes me longer to say what he does in a few sentences. Use HIS version instead of mine whenever possible. My version is more academic and runs the risk of putting the Judge to sleep.

  • This piece written by Anonymous underscores the BASIC point that needs to be made from the start: the TOTAL agreement between lender and borrower consists of far more than the loan closing documents.
  • The fact that the rest of the documents were withheld doesn’t mean they weren’t involved, signed, executed and delivered. It means they were not disclosed when the applicable federal and state statutes as well as common law required them to be disclosed.
  • The old school Judges and lawyers are confused ONLY because they fail to recognize this basic truth.
  • Once they accept the fact that the borrower signed a note but the lender received a bond from a party not involved in the borrower’s closing, it all falls into place.
  • There is no nexus between borrower and lender without recognizing the obvious — there were parties, documents, agreements and corresponding duties and obligations existing in the UNDISCLOSED MIDDLE.
  • The single transaction rule once applied, clears up all confusion. No money from investor – NO DEAL. No borrower to accept loan — NO DEAL. SINGLE TRANSACTION if there ever was one.
  • But perhaps the single most important point Anonymous makes is that the alleged assignment, transfer, endorsement etc of the note never took actually place which means that the title (encumbrance — mortgage or deed of trust) is and remains in the name of the originating “lender” to whom no money is owed. A classical case of an unperfected security interest.

From Anonymous: “Repurchase and stipulations is contained within the same Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement – it is not a separate contract – it is the same document and contract under the stated Trust and SEC filings. Thus, none of the note endorsements were actually “without recourse.”

However, many of the repurchase demands were not executed because the banks often looked the other way – until they became massive – and the originators were shut down.

Most of the endorsements were in blank – only when they knew there was no longer any recourse, are the notes actually endorsed to the trustee. But, they did not know this at the time of the trust set-up.

And, the notes are executed before foreclosure – they are sold at steep discounts to the servicer and removed from the trust – at this point there is no recourse..

It is at the inception of the trust – that the notes were not actually negotiable. Thus, the trust never actually owned the notes – they did not have to – because only the receivables are passed-through.

If there was a separate contract for Repurchases – it would have had to have been filed with the SEC – along with other documents. There was no separate contract – the Repurchase agreement was part of the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement – they were one and the same.

Taxation of Securitized Trusts

TAXATION OF SECURITIZED TRUSTS(2)

For those litigators advanced enough in their knowledge of accounting and taxation, you will uncover here and upon closer search of this blog and other resources that a rich store of materials can be used to great effect in attacking the pretender lenders, but you really must know what you are talking about and you must pick your choice of strategy very carefully. Since our friends are not the only ones reading this blog, I will reserve further comment for those who retain expert services.

FROM JOSE

Pinnacle, Indymac, Wells, Cendant through PHH, with head quarters in PA, First Magnus Financial, J.P. Morgan Chase, all used this detour to make trillions of dollars and then come back to us the TAX payers through or Corrupt Congress people for a bail out. Come on.

Yes there is gold, but most lawyer I have talked to, are for some reason freaked at the idea of going into Federal Court.
That is where TILA has teeth

MOVING INTO FIRST POSITION: PRIORITY OF LIENS

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IF YOU HAVE A SECOND MORTGAGE, HELOC OR OTHER JUNIOR LIEN ON YOUR PROPERTY (LIKE AN ASSOCIATION LIEN FOR NON-PAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE), THAT MIGHT JUST BE YOUR TICKET OUT OF THIS MESS.

I would add that if you are the holder or the attorney for the holder of junior liens, you should pay careful attention, because it is possible if not likely that you will have an opportunity to improve the value of that lien and at the same time clear the title with the homeowner such that the predatory loan defenses and title defenses disappear forever.

While the judiciary has been slow to apply the normal requirements of law, procedure and prioritization of real estate interests, that has only been apparent where the homeowner is contesting a foreclosure and the presumption in the Judge’s mind is that you’re a deadbeat who is trying to use technical gimmicks to delay or get out of a jam. In several cases we have reported here the rules were easily applied when the party seeking relief was an institution seeking to perfect its lien and establish its priority in the chain of title.

What I am suggesting here is that a deal between a junior lien holder with no equity covering their current position and the homeowner with an uphill fight on their hands could result in a favorable outcome for everyone except the first lien-holder. The following is a hypothetical scenario executing this strategy:

  • John Jones owns a house worth $75,000. The first mortgage is $200,000 and the second mortgage is $50,000. The original appraisal was $270,000. Jones also has a lien on his property for non payment of assessments to his condominium association. Each lien under law is subject to the procedure of foreclosure.
  • Scenario 1: The association sues to foreclose claiming the other lien holders have not perfected their liens and citing the deficiencies we all know from this blog. Homeowner settles or redeems property after Association has obtained a judgment placing it in first position. Homeowner is defendant is foreclosure of Association lien. If the Judgment states that the first lienholder failed to perfect their security interest, then the association has done your work for you.
  • Scenario 2: The holder of the second mortgage or HELOC which now views the loan as virtually worthless, or at least without any security covering the the loss, brings a quiet title action with you jointly establishing them is first position. In exchange for funding the litigation, the second place holder gets into first place, establishes that the first holder did not perfect their security interest and gets paid in full with or without a bonus.
  • Scenario 3: Homeowner is more creative and gets third party to purchase the holder of the junior lien and uses the same tactics as above. But without it appearing as bank vs. bank, the likelihood is that the court will see it as a homeowner maneuver and resort back to the wrongly conceived presumptions that makes all this necessary in the first place. A smart credit union or small community bank would do very well with this and could pilot it one house at a time.

    More details in next newsletter to LIVINGLIES MEMBER SUBSCRIPTION NEWSLETTER

ORDER LOAN SPECIFIC TITLE REPORT, COPIES OF DOCUMENTATION AND ANALYSIS HERE

ORDER SECURITIZATION REPORT COPIES OF DOCUMENTATION AND ANALYSIS HERE

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MERS-Deutsch Slammed on Quiet Title

9.09.10 NY MERS NO AUTHORIY DISMISSED

MERS tried to Quiet Title. In so doing they paved the way for millions of homeowners to sue MERS to quiet title. The net result is that the encumbrance is invalid. That means the debt, the obligation, MIGHT exist, but it is NOT secured by the home. I’d say I told you so, but that would be immature. 🙂

All of that is important but Judge Jeffrey Arlen Spinner went a lot further and made his mark on the issue of bogus affidavits that say nothing but which are used by foreclosure mill attorneys who spout off about what the affidavit says or what it proves. Judge Spinner flatly says the affidavit would be insufficient even if MERS had an interest, which it does not. He clearly states the law which is valid not only in New York, but EVERY state and federal jurisidiction, but which has been ignored by a majority of judges until now:

To establish a claim of lien by a lost mortgage there must be certain evidence (e.s.) demonstrating that the mortgage was properly executed with all the formalities required by law and proof of the contents (e.s.) of such instrument. … Here Burnett’s affidavit simply states that the original mortgage is not in Deutsch Bank’s files, and that he is advised (e.s.) that the title company is out of business. Burnett gives no specifics as to what efforts were made to locate the lost mortgage…. More importantly, there is no affidavit from MLN by an individual with personal knowledge of the facts that the complete file concerning this mortgage was transferred to Deutsch Bank and that the copy of the mortgage submitted to the court is an authentic copy of Torr’s Mortgage.” (e.s.)

EDITOR’S NOTE: The importance of this decision and its citations cannot be over-stated. Now we are getting down to the nub of it. It isn’t enough for the  foreclosure lawyer to make empty allegations contained nowhere in pleadings, affidavit or proof. The foreclosure lawyer is seeking affirmative relief — enforcement of the note and sale of the property. If he can’t plead the case in good faith then he doesn’t belong in court. And if he does plead the case he must prove it within the boundaries of ordinary rules of evidence. A competent witness must exist who is wiling to testify under oath and who actually appears to do so. They musts possess PERSONAL knowledge (not what someone told them) of the facts about which they are going to testify. Business records exceptions are very restrictive as they prevent the other side from cross examining a live witness (a basic constitutional right of due process).

  • “Trust me” is not a substitute for real evidence.
  • If they want to prove the obligation, they need evidence.
  • If they want to prove a default, they need evidence,
  • if they want to prove the note is evidence of the obligation, they must prove that assertion with evidence that the note is the whole deal (which is NEVER the case in a securitized loan).
  • If they want to prove a lost note they need evidence that the note was in existence, when it was in existence, how it came into existence, and what happened to it — not just say we had it, but now we don’t.
  • And watch out for those “original notes.” Many of them are fabricated using simple software and a color printer. If there are no impressions on the back of the page, even the note they present is probably NOT the original and is probably a fabrication printed off a laser or dot matrix printer. Close examination will show even a novice the truth of this statement.

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Wire Fraud, Mail Fraud? Possible Cause of Action Against Pretenders and Attorneys

Editor’s Comment: This reminds me of the end of Grisholm’s Book “The firm”. It’s not sexy but it has lots of teeth. The quote below is from Wikipedia. I was talking to an old friend of mine about the securitization scam which continues as an on-going process, first in the form of “closing” alleged loans and now in the form of foreclosures. It seems that the use of electronic media sent through the internet, like spreadsheets with misinformation on it, and which is part of a scheme wherein money is wired and illicit profits are earned, may be a crime and a cause of action for private individuals.

My friend, who shall remain anonymous, basically puts it this way. This is an oversimplification of the way he analyzed it. Money is wired into a “pool account.” That came from “investors. Then money is wired into an escrow account which in turn is wired into the accounts of third parties to close the transaction. Sometimes some of the wire proceeds are converted to checks. The procedure is perfectly legal unless the purpose of the or goal of the transaction was illegal, and more specifically fraudulent. The diversion of funds that were wired into undisclosed accounts for undisclosed parties in transactions that were misrepresented on the facts (appraisal fraud on the property and ratings fraud on the securities) makes the deal susceptible to wire fraud allegations.

Since we have now determined that at the time of “sale”of the “loan product” to the “borrower” the actual transaction papers were rarely if ever transmitted to anyone, and since we have now determined that the general practice was to send electronic spreadsheets with loan data on it which substantially misrepresented the content of the actual transactions, and since we we have determined that the ratings were at least wrong and probably fraudulent, the scheme fits neatly into the wire fraud and mail fraud infrastructure. If that is the case, there is a rather mundane cause of action with a lot of teeth in it which could bring the investment bankers and all their affiliates to task. You see, says my friend, they not only did it to each other, the borrowers and the investors, but they employed the same means with the Federal government when they took TARP money, went to the Fed window and participated in other Federal programs. In his opinion, this is a far simpler case to make than securities fraud or predatory lending.

Mail fraud is an offense under United States federal law, which refers to any scheme which attempts to unlawfully obtain money or valuables in which the postal system is used at any point in the commission of a criminal offense. Mail fraud is covered by Title 18 of the United States Code, Chapter 63. As in the case of wire fraud, this statute is often used as a basis for a separate federal prosecution of what would otherwise have been only a violation of a state law. “Mail fraud” is a term of art referring to a specific statutory crime in the United States of America. In countries with nonfederal legal systems the concept of mail fraud is irrelevant: the activities listed below are likely to be crimes there, but the fact that they are carried out by mail makes no difference as to which authority may prosecute or as to the penalties which may be imposed. In the 1960s and ’70s, inspectors under regional chief postal inspectors such as Martin McGee, known as “Mr. Mail Fraud,” exposed and prosecuted numerous swindles involving land sales, phony advertising practices, insurance ripoffs and fraudulent charitable organizations using mail fraud charges[1][2]

Wire fraud, in the United States Code, is any criminally fraudulent activity that has been determined to have involved electronic communications of any kind, at any phase of the event. The involvement of electronic communications adds to the severity of the penalty, so that it is greater than the penalty for fraud that is otherwise identical except for the non-involvement of electronic communications. As in the case of mail fraud, the federal statute is often used as a basis for a separate, federal prosecution of what would otherwise have been a violation only of a state law.

The crime of wire fraud is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and reads as follows:

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the violation affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.

In the case of United States v. LaMacchia (1994; text of opinion), a student of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology was charged with wire fraud when, because he had not profitted personally from online distribution of millions of dollars’ worth of illegally copied software, he could not be charged with criminal copyright infringement. The United States District Court, District of Massachusetts, dismissed the charges, noting they were an attempt to find a broad federal crime where the more narrowly defined one had not occurred. Congress then amended the copyright law to limit further use of this loophole.

According to Neder v. United States (527 U.S. 1, 23, decided in 1999), the alleged misrepresentation to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 must be a material misrepresentation; a misrepresentation that is capable of influencing, or has a “natural tendency” of influencing, a decision is material.

To commit wire fraud, one must (1) devise, or intend to devise, a scheme or artifice to defraud another person on the basis of a material representation, and (2) do it with the intent to defraud, and (3) do it through the use of interstate wire facilities (i.e. telecommunications of any kind).

See 8th Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, 242 & 250.

If a fourth element—that the alleged victim is a financial institution—also is present, the penalty is enhanced as provided in the statute.

LABOR DAY ABYSS

EDITOR’s comment: Everyone seems to agree that nobody really knows the identity of the creditor in the millions of mortgage transactions that were created from 2001 to 2008. Yet the general consensus from the administration and the media is that these transactions should be enforced anyway. The idea of enforcing a transaction in which only one of the parties is known is enough to  make the authors of any of the major legal treatises turn over in their graves. It is so obviously ridiculous that one need not consult the United States Constitution on due process, nor any statute or case in common law. Nevertheless this elephant continues to sit in our living rooms claiming ownership of our home. Thus a fictional character is prevailing over the rights of real people owning real homes who were tricked into fraudulent loan products based inflated appraisals that created the reasonable assumption on the part of the borrower that the “experts” had verified the fair market value and validated the viability of the loan product.


Most people understand that these homeowners were victims of fraud more than they were borrowers of money for a legitimate transaction. These title twisting transactions continue to become increasingly convoluted as the “ownership” of the “loans” becomes increasingly blurred by a continuing process of transfers,  “sales,” auctions without creditors or bona fide bidders, and the continuation of the strategy of moving the goal post every time anyone wants to examine it.


In the article below the Obama administration is described as having exhausted all possible remedies and is now faced with the untenable choice of future homeowners versus current homeowners. This is delusional thinking based on business dogma. The “experts” are now all raising their voices in a growing chorus of “let the market collapse.” It is only natural for these so-called experts to suggest such a dark scenario.

Under the business dogma currently driving the limp choices being made by the administration and by Congress, a crash in home housing prices from current levels would produce the foundation for a bull market in housing prices that would be reduced to oversold levels. This so-called bull market could only be fueled by speculators who are sitting on piles of money. It certainly won’t be fueled by the average consumer whose median income is dropping, whose wealth has been drained through Wall Street speculation, whose savings do not exist, and whose credit has been exhausted. In short, this brilliant strategy of giving up on the housing market can only result in a further widening between those who have money and wealth and those who do not and now have no prospects.


I know that most people do not have the time to be students of history. But a little time spent on Google or Wikipedia will show you that no society in human history has ever been sustained on a status quo that excluded  an expanding and vibrant middle class, with abundant opportunities for improvement in the financial condition of anyone in any class of that society. There is an answer to this problem but it is being ignored for political reasons. We cannot instantly raise median income for tens of millions of people. We can and we should lay the foundation for abundant opportunities for improvement in their economic and social condition, but this will not solve the current situation.


The current situation is that we are sitting on the abyss. And it seems that the general consensus is to see no evil, hear no evil and therefore ignore the only realities that must be addressed. We cannot escape the fact that in our current situation our economy is driven by consumer spending. We cannot escape the fact that consumer spending cannot rise in the short term by an increase in median income. We cannot escape the fact that consumer spending can only rise by presenting the consumer with a proposition that is acceptable––one in which both real and apparent consumer wealth is increased. Unless the deal is real, the current lack of confidence in the economy, our society and our government will prevent any increase in consumer spending and therefore prevent any improvement in our current economic decline.


Consumers have made it clear that they do not trust the housing market, they will not accept a continuation of credit driven spending, and that they are alone in fending for themselves and future generations. Therefore the savings rates on what little money consumers are receiving as income are increasing at unprecedented rates. This money is not going to come out of savings and into the marketplace and a general rush towards spending that will revive the old consumer driven economy unless the basic and real concerns of consumers are directly addressed with reality and conviction. The perception (delusion) is that consumers are a bottomless well from which  infinite sums of money can be withdrawn by way of taxes, insurance, subsidies to big business, and a government that is primarily concerned with the appearance of stability on Wall Street rather than the reality of amends that need to be offered.


I am not a pundit. I am only seeking to apply common sense to a situation that seems to be wallowing in dogma, and political maneuvering. In my view they are arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. In my view the worst is yet to come. In my view under the worst-case scenarios our way of life, our society, our economy and our government will be destabilized unless we open our eyes. It’s true that we don’t have a lot of tools left in the box. But then again we never did have a lot of tools in the box.

A great fraud has been committed on American and foreign taxpayers and investors as well as American and foreign buyers of real estate, commercial and residential. The perpetrators of this great fraud were intermediaries between the people who had money and the people who didn’t. If an honest attempt was made to do the right thing, we would do more to improve the confidence of our own consumers as well as foreign investors than any of these of exotic and creative plans to shore up an economy based on illusion and delusion.


If we already know that the identity of the creditor is in doubt, then we already have a perfectly legitimate legal reason to stop foreclosures. If we already know that the prices that were used in many fraudulent loan transactions were not equal to any sustainable measure of fair market value and that neither the borrower nor the actual lender (investor) was aware of this misrepresentation, then we already have a perfectly legitimate and legal reason to restructure all the affected loans, especially since most of them are controlled through guarantees of federal agencies if not outright ownership by those federal agencies. If we already know that somebody probably exists who has actually lost money on these transactions, or some of them, then it shouldn’t be hard for them to come forward, provide the necessary accounting and proof of ownership, and be included in the restructuring of these mortgage loans.


What is stopping the use of common sense is that we are relying on the very intermediaries who caused the problem in the first place and who have everything to gain by a continuation of the foreclosures, by a continuation of the free fall in housing prices, by a continuation of the charade of modifications, and by the speculative bull market that is currently being constructed right under the nose of this administration. That bull market may have a temporary effect on the economy (or at least the indexes that  measure economic results) and of course the stock market, but in reality it is easy to see that such a bull market will only be another bubble which will cause more devastation and further undermine confidence in the American economy and the American government.

HERE IS WHAT A FAIR RESOLUTION WOULD LOOK LIKE:

  1. ALL HOMES ELIGIBLE (INCLUDING REO). Forget the blame game
  2. ALL MORTGAGE BONDS ELIGIBLE. Forget the blame game
  3. REGULATE SERVICING COMPANIES LIKE UTILITIES OR REPLACE THEM WITH COMPANIES THAT WILL DO THE JOB
  4. SUSPEND ALL FORECLOSURES, SALES, JUDICIAL AND NON-JUDICIAL. SUSPEND MORTGAGE PAYMENTS, ALL MORTGAGES 90 DAYS.
  5. OFFER INTEREST RATE ONLY RE-STRUCTURE TO HOMEOWNERS THAT REDUCES FIXED INTEREST RATE TO 2%
  6. OFFER PRINCIPAL REDUCTION TO 110% OF FAIR MARKET VALUE WITH 5% FIXED INTEREST RATE, TOGETHER WITH AN EQUITY APPRECIATION CLAUSE OF 20% FROM REDUCED PRINCIPAL.
  7. OFFER CERTIFICATION OF OWNERSHIP FROM FEDERAL AGENCY TO THE HOMEOWNER.
  8. CREATE FAST TRACK QUIET TITLE ACTIONS TO RESOLVE ALL TWISTED TITLE ISSUES RESULTING FROM SECURITIZED LOANS
  9. OFFER TO SERVICE THE NEW LOANS FOR INVESTORS WHO PROVE OWNERSHIP.
  10. CREATE CUT-OFF DATE: HOMEOWNERS WHO DON’T TAKE THE DEAL  EITHER STAY WITH EXISTING TITLE AND MORTGAGE SITUATION OR GO THROUGH FORECLOSURE. INVESTORS WHO DON’T TAKE THE DEAL EITHER STAY WITH EXISTING TITLE AND RECEIVABLE SITUATION OR SUE THEIR INVESTMENT BANKERS.

I KNOW. WHO HAS THE POWER TO DO THIS? OBAMA, THAT’S WHO. NO NEW REGULATIONS ARE REQUIRED. STATE AND FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO PUT A “CAP”ON THIS IS UNNECESSARY, BUT IF THEY WANT TO DO IT THEY COULD DO IT AFTERWARD. The immediate result is that the downward pressure on housing would vanish. The upward mobility of consumers would instantly appear. The confidence by consumers that the government cares more about them than the oligopoly of banks who appear to be running the country would soar, as would their spending. World-wide confidence in the American financial system would soar because they would see the end of illusion and delusion.

And let’s not forget that the American moral high-ground would be restored, which is the only real basis for the consent of the governed here and around the world.
—————–

Housing Woes Bring New Cry: Let Market Fall

By DAVID STREITFELD

The unexpectedly deep plunge in home sales this summer is likely to force the Obama administration to choose between future homeowners and current ones, a predicament officials had been eager to avoid.

Over the last 18 months, the administration has rolled out just about every program it could think of to prop up the ailing housing market, using tax credits, mortgage modification programs, low interest rates, government-backed loans and other assistance intended to keep values up and delinquent borrowers out of foreclosure. The goal was to stabilize the market until a resurgent economy created new households that demanded places to live.

As the economy again sputters and potential buyers flee — July housing sales sank 26 percent from July 2009 — there is a growing sense of exhaustion with government intervention. Some economists and analysts are now urging a dose of shock therapy that would greatly shift the benefits to future homeowners: Let the housing market crash.

When prices are lower, these experts argue, buyers will pour in, creating the elusive stability the government has spent billions upon billions trying to achieve.

“Housing needs to go back to reasonable levels,” said Anthony B. Sanders, a professor of real estate finance at George Mason University. “If we keep trying to stimulate the market, that’s the definition of insanity.”

The further the market descends, however, the more miserable one group — important both politically and economically — will be: the tens of millions of homeowners who have already seen their home values drop an average of 30 percent.

The poorer these owners feel, the less likely they will indulge in the sort of consumer spending the economy needs to recover. If they see an identical house down the street going for half what they owe, the temptation to default might be irresistible. That could make the market’s current malaise seem minor.

Caught in the middle is an administration that gambled on a recovery that is not happening.

“The administration made a bet that a rising economy would solve the housing problem and now they are out of chips,” said Howard Glaser, a former Clinton administration housing official with close ties to policy makers in the administration. “They are deeply worried and don’t really know what to do.”

That was clear last week, when the secretary of housing and urban development, Shaun Donovan, appeared to side with current homeowners, telling CNN the administration would “go everywhere we can” to make sure the slumping market recovers.

Mr. Donovan even opened the door to another housing tax credit like the one that expired last spring, which paid first-time buyers as much as $8,000 and buyers who were moving up $6,500. The cost to taxpayers was in the neighborhood of $30 billion, much of which went to people who would have bought anyway.

Administration press officers quickly backpedaled from Mr. Donovan’s comment, saying a revived credit was either highly unlikely or flat-out impossible. Mr. Donovan declined to be interviewed for this article. In a statement, a White House spokeswoman responded to questions about possible new stimulus measures by pointing to those already in the works.

“In the weeks ahead, we will focus on successfully getting off the ground programs we have recently announced,” the spokeswoman, Amy Brundage, said.

Among those initiatives are $3 billion to keep the unemployed from losing their homes and a refinancing program that will try to cut the mortgage balances of owners who owe more than their property is worth. A previous program with similar goals had limited success.

If last year’s tax credit was supposed to be a bridge over a rough patch, it ended with a glimpse of the abyss. The average home now takes more than a year to sell. Add in the homes that are foreclosed but not yet for sale and the total is greater still.

Builders are in even worse shape. Sales of new homes are lower than in the depths of the recession of the early 1980s, when mortgage rates were double what they are now, unemployment was pervasive and the gloom was at least as thick.

The deteriorating circumstances have given a new voice to the “do nothing” chorus, whose members think the era of trying to buy stability while hoping the market will catch fire — called “extend and pretend” or “delay and pray” — has run its course.

“We have had enough artificial support and need to let the free market do its thing,” said the housing analyst Ivy Zelman.

Michael L. Moskowitz, president of Equity Now, a direct mortgage lender that operates in New York and seven other states, also advocates letting the market fall. “Prices are still artificially high,” he said. “The government is discriminating against the renters who are able to buy at $200,000 but can’t at $250,000.”

A small decline in home prices might not make too much of a difference to a slack economy. But an unchecked drop of 10 percent or more might prove entirely discouraging to the millions of owners just hanging on, especially those who bought in the last few years under the impression that a turnaround had already begun.

The government is on the hook for many of these mortgages, another reason policy makers have been aggressively seeking stability. What helped support the market last year could now cause it to crumble.

Since 2006, the Federal Housing Administration has insured millions of low down payment loans. During the first two years, officials concede, the credit quality of the borrowers was too low.

With little at stake and a queasy economy, buyers bailed: nearly 12 percent were delinquent after a year. Last fall, F.H.A. cash reserves fell below the Congressionally mandated minimum, and the agency had to shore up its finances.

Government-backed loans in 2009 went to buyers with higher credit scores. Yet the percentage of first-year defaults was still 5 percent, according to data from the research firm CoreLogic.

“These are at-risk buyers,” said Sam Khater, a CoreLogic economist. “They have very little equity, and that’s the largest predictor of default.”

This is the risk policy makers face. “If home prices begin to fall again with any serious velocity, borrowers may stay away in such numbers that the market never recovers,” said Mr. Glaser, a consultant whose clients include the National Association of Realtors.

Those sorts of worries have a few people from the world of finance suggesting that the administration should do much more, not less.

William H. Gross, managing director at Pimco, a giant manager of bond funds, has proposed the government refinance at lower rates millions of mortgages it owns or insures. Such a bold action, Mr. Gross said in a recent speech, would “provide a crucial stimulus of $50 to $60 billion in consumption,” as well as increase housing prices.

The idea has gained little traction. Instead, there is a sense that, even with much more modest notions, government intervention is not the answer. The National Association of Realtors, the driving force behind the credit last year, is not calling for a new round of stimulus.

Some members of the National Association of Home Builders say a new credit of $25,000 would raise demand but their chances of getting this through Congress are nonexistent.

“Our members are saying that if we can’t get a very large tax credit — one that really brings people off the bench — why use our political capital at all?” said David Crowe, the chief economist for the home builders.

That might give the Obama administration permission to take the risk of doing nothing.

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The Myth of the Credit Bid – Red-Handed

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Credit Charles Koppa (Poppa Koppa) with putting me onto this. He does GREAT work. poppakoppa@hotmail.com. He’s not lawyer but I trust him more than I do most lawyers to get to the bottom of things. He’s kind like one of those dogs that gets a bite of something and then NEVER lets go as the teeth go in deeper and deeper. I like that approach. The pretenders deserve it.

Credit Dan Edstrom with compiling everyone’s work including my own into securitization commentaries that work the material they way it should be done. Besides doing the Subscriber Members COMBO TITLE and Securitization Analysis, and the component parts, he also does a magnificent job of drilling down even further proving two points: (1) that while the borrower is dealing with a “Notice of Default” the Trust and investors are getting reports specifically stating that the same loan is performing — and they a re getting paid! and (2) that the distribution reports at the pool level are either on-going (Meaning the pool still exists) or they are no longer being sent (meaning the pool has been dissolved).

There are so many chairs and shells moving around I know it is difficult to keep them straight. That is exactly the point. The pretender lenders are going to keep them moving as long as they can because they are getting thousands of free houses every week through intimidation, fraud and deception of borrowers, court clerks, and Judges. But there are a few points in time at which the the chairs and shells stop moving or at least slow down. One of them is at the sale on the courthouse steps.

Charles Koppa pointed out the chicanery when he shared an ongoing study with me that showed changes in the bid price just hours before the sale and the resulting windfall to the new “buyer.” With pretenders swarming like flies around you-know-what it is no wonder that they find it easy to slip different entities in and out of the foreclosure process. But here is a simple proposition with far reaching implications regarding tracking the money, tracking the title and tracking the real obligation and the real creditor. ONLY THE CREDITOR CAN MAKE THE CREDIT BID. Anyone else must actually pay money.

Oops. It turns out that virtually no money is exchanging hands at these sales. And the Trustee is accepting a credit bid from an entity that wasn’t even named in the Notice of Default or the Trustee is issuing the deed to an entity that never made the credit bid or any bid at all. THAT TRANSACTION IS VOID ACCORDING TO MY READING OF THE STATUTES, WHETHER YOU ARE IN A JUDICIAL OR NON-JUDICIAL STATE. Maybe in some states it would be considered voidable but either way there is no “clear title” transferred and there is no successor in interest, which means that the homeowner still owns the home after the sale and can file a quiet title action against the originating lender and the party who received the title from the Trustee or Clerk, depending upon the procedure used. There is no defense as far as I can see and there might not even be an attempt at defending. Easier to let one slip by than risk a ruling that says these sales are all void.

But there is the rub. You can kick the can down the road for only so long. It doesn’t change the facts. NONE of the creditors filed foreclosure actions or sales in any of the securitized loan transactions. NONE of the creditors even knew the loan was not performing because they were being told quite the contrary by the very same group that declared the loan in default. ALL of the loans had co-obligors who in fact did pay but were not disclosed to either the borrower or the actual lender (investor). NONE of the notes were assigned at or near the time of the closing of the loans. NONE of the security interests were assigned at or near the time of the loan closing. NONE of the notes or security interests were endorsed or even transmitted to anyone after the loan closed unless the case went into litigation in which case they either “found” or re-created the documentation without admitting what they had done.

NONE OF THE OBLIGATIONS WERE COMPLETELY DESCRIBED IN THE NOTE, MORTGAGE OR DEED OF TRUST. AS PAUL  HARVEY LIKED TO SAY, THE “REST OF THE STORY” WAS IN THE MORTGAGE BOND, PROSPECTUS, PSA, ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION, INSURANCE CONTRACTS, CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS, TRANCHE STRUCTURING THAT THE LENDER RECEIVED. As I said at the beginning of this blog, this is all going to come down to two doctrines that are inescapably in favor of the homeowners and borrowers, including the ones who THINK they lost their homes: the single transaction doctrine and the step transaction doctrine. NONE of the actions of the securitization intermediaries would have any business reason to occur without the investment by the lender (investor) and the acceptance of the obligation by the borrower. That makes it ONE transaction between the the investor and the borrower no matter how complicated you WANT to describe it.

THE ONLY THING THAT WAS ACTUALLY MOVED WAS MONEY UNDER QUESTIONABLE CIRCUMSTANCES. A SPREADSHEET WAS USED AND SENT ELECTRONICALLY UPSTREAM TO TRANSMIT THE ALLEGED RECEIVABLES THAT WOULD BE CLAIMED AS PART OF POOLS THAT WERE NEVER OFFICIALLY FORMED. THE TERMS OF THAT TRANSACTION INCLUDED CO-OBLIGORS WITHOUT WHICH THE LENDERS WOULD NOT HAVE ADVANCED THE FUNDS FOR WORTHLESS (AND IN MANY CASES NON-EXISTENT) MORTGAGE BONDS.

THE WAY THEY DID IT WAS SIMPLE: GIVE THE BORROWER MONEY, HAVE THE BORROWER SIGN A NOTE TO A SHAM ENTITY AND GIVE THE LENDER EVIDENCE OF A BOND WHICH HAS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT TERMS FROM THE NOTE. THAT WAY THEY COULD USE PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY AND PLAUSIBLE EXCUSES FOR NOT SHARING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION WITH THE THE ONLY TWO REAL PARTIES TO THE TRANSACTION — THE BORROWER AND THE LENDER.

So they wait until nobody is looking, for that moment that appears clerical (ministerial) in nature and then they slip in new entities again, thus cheating the lender (again), but leaving the homeowner with legal title. The homeowner walks from the deal thinking it is over. But in truth, it is only just beginning. Now we enter the NEXT chapter of the mortgage meltdown.

If You Have a MERS Mortgage – Here is Their Deposition

36521121-Full-Deposition-of-William-Hultman-Secretary-and-Treasurer-of-MERSCORP[1]

THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT YOU WON’T FIND ANY MONEY, YOU WON’T FIND ANY DOCUMENTS, AND YOU WON’T FIND ANYTHING OF VALUE, TANGIBLE OR INTANGIBLE AT MERS. THERE IS NOTHING — AT THE BEGINNING, IN THE MIDDLE AND NOW AT THE END. THE WHOLE THING WAS A SHAM, THE CHILD OF SOME FLEETING THOUGHT AT THE RATING AGENCIES THAT HAD NO MERIT, THAT WAS NOT LEGAL AND COMMITTED THE PLAYERS TO FRAUDULENT ACTS AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES FROM START TO FINISH. IN THE PROCESS THEY NOT ONLY ROBBED INVESTORS AND PENSIONERS, BORROWERS AND HOMEOWNERS, BUT EVERY PURPORTED SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST WHO THOUGHT THEY WERE GETTING CLEAR TITLE. WE CAN’T FIX SOMETHING WE WON’T ADMIT IS BROKEN. DAWN WILL BREAK, BUT WHEN?

First I commend the attorney for an outstanding job of examining the “secretary” of MERS 1, MERS 2 and MERS 3. Yes, that’s in there too. Second, note that the creation, function and structure of the MERS entities was dictated by the rating agencies who were requiring that a “bankruptcy remote” entity hold title, meaning an entity that couldn’t go bankrupt and was separate and apart from any entity that could go bankrupt. Why couldn’t they go bankrupt? Because they had no assets, liabilities, income or expenses. Specifically at no time did ANY MERS entity claim any loan as an asset.

One of the many bottom lines in this deposition is that if it’s MERS it’s securitized. But if it’s securitized it doesn’t mean that there ever was any transfer of the loan. Sound paradoxical? It’s the difference between the documentation and the actual money. The only thing anyone was actually interested in was the money. THAT is what was securitized. The investors’ own money was securitized and the receivables from borrowers were bounced around like the ball in an exhibition of the Harlem Globe-trotters. The “securitization” of mortgage backed assets was a grand illusion. It never actually happened.

The shell game here is exposed in the full light of day as well as anyone could ever hope. If MERS is in your deal, then you have irreconcilable contradictions of fact and law. That doesn’t mean you don’t owe the money to ANYONE, it means that the holder of your mortgage or the beneficiary under your deed of trust, is an impenetrable cloud that is not subject to any authority or documentation that would satisfy any rule of evidence. The obligation that arose when you borrowed the money advanced by investors was NOT reflected in your closing documents. Thus the presumption that the note is evidence of the obligation and that the mortgage or deed of trust is incident to the note is false. Therefore the right of sale or foreclosure is not enforceable upon a declaration of default by an entity that was NOT a party to the loan transaction between the investor and the borrower.

In a nutshell, the obligation is legally unsecured in every MERS-related transaction. The note was a remote instrument that did NOT reflect the terms of the transaction with the Lender (investor) who received an entirely different set of documents. The loan is not only bankruptcy remote, it is also security remote. The rating agencies, the investment bankers and other intermediaries in the securitization chain were too cute by half. The attempt to foreclose based upon documentation that on its face misrepresented the real parties in interest is a fraud. The REAL parties are those who at this moment are sitting with money out of pocket. Once any entity attempts to invoke the power of sale or files a foreclosure action the game of musical chairs stops — and the chairs need to be filled with entities that are equitable and legal owners of the loan and the property.

Those real parties have thus far elected NOT to file actions for equitable liens and thus establish a perfected security interest. That failure has created a void. The problem is that most courts are filling the void with presumptions that are improper and invalid. A borrower should not be presumed to owe nothing — just as an alleged “holder” should not be presumed to be owed anything. Anyone seeking to claim a right of sale on a residence that involved MERS should be dismissed out of court or stopped by the Court unless and until they can plead and prove a credible story about how they were injured in the transaction. The way the Courts are handling this now, is the equivalent of letting an “eye witness” claim damages from a car crash he heard about from a friend.

When this story unfolds a little further, a prediction I made three years ago will come to pass. There will be a head-slapping moment when suddenly title carriers, attorneys, judges and administrative agencies and clerks suddenly realize that the monster created on Wall Street has its equivalent in the public records of counties across the nation. I doubt if more than 6-7% of all the foreclosures in the past 10 years have resulted in clear title delivered to anyone. And the only corrective instrument can come from the original owner. That homeowner is sitting in the catbird seat and doesn’t know it. Millions of people who THINK they have lost their homes still own them and if anyone wants a signature from those people to clear title, they are going to be required to pay dearly, which is at it should be.

Eventually the purse gets returned to the victim from whom it was snatched.

REad This: Now We are Getting Down to Business

My only comment is that this is an excellent piece of reporting by Bernstein and Eisinger at ProPublica that should be read and used as the basis for understanding what is going into your legal memorandums across the country. GREAT JOB!!

The Wall Street Money Machine
Banks’ Self-Dealing Super-Charged Financial Crisis

by Jake Bernstein and Jesse Eisinger
ProPublica, Aug. 26, 10:09 p.m.

Over the last two years of the housing bubble, Wall Street bankers perpetrated one of the greatest episodes of self-dealing in financial history.

Faced with increasing difficulty in selling the mortgage-backed securities that had been among their most lucrative products, the banks hit on a solution that preserved their quarterly earnings and huge bonuses:

They created fake demand.

A ProPublica analysis shows for the first time the extent to which banks — primarily Merrill Lynch, but also Citigroup, UBS and others — bought their own products and cranked up an assembly line that otherwise should have flagged.

The products they were buying and selling were at the heart of the 2008 meltdown — collections of mortgage bonds known as collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs.

As the housing boom began to slow in mid-2006, investors became skittish about the riskier parts of those investments. So the banks created — and ultimately provided most of the money for — new CDOs. Those new CDOs bought the hard-to-sell pieces of the original CDOs. The result was a daisy chain that solved one problem but created another: Each new CDO had its own risky pieces. Banks created yet other CDOs to buy those.

Individual instances of these questionable trades have been reported before, but ProPublica’s investigation, done in partnership with NPR’s Planet Money, shows that by late 2006 they became a common industry practice.

Click to see how frequently the banks turned to their best customers — their own CDOs.
An analysis by research firm Thetica Systems, commissioned by ProPublica, shows that in the last years of the boom, CDOs had become the dominant purchaser of key, risky parts of other CDOs, largely replacing real investors like pension funds. By 2007, 67 percent of those slices were bought by other CDOs, up from 36 percent just three years earlier. The banks often orchestrated these purchases. In the last two years of the boom, nearly half of all CDOs sponsored by market leader Merrill Lynch bought significant portions of other Merrill CDOs.

ProPublica also found 85 instances during 2006 and 2007 in which two CDOs bought pieces of each other’s unsold inventory. These trades, which involved $107 billion worth of CDOs, underscore the extent to which the market lacked real buyers. Often the CDOs that swapped purchases closed within days of each other, the analysis shows.

There were supposed to be protections against this sort of abuse. While banks provided the blueprint for the CDOs and marketed them, they typically selected independent managers who chose the specific bonds to go inside them. The managers had a legal obligation to do what was best for the CDO. They were paid by the CDO, not the bank, and were supposed to serve as a bulwark against self-dealing by the banks, which had the fullest understanding of the complex and lightly regulated mortgage bonds.

It rarely worked out that way. The managers were beholden to the banks that sent them the business. On a billion-dollar deal, managers could earn a million dollars in fees, with little risk. Some small firms did several billion dollars of CDOs in a matter of months.

“All these banks for years were spawning trading partners,” says a former executive from Financial Guaranty Insurance Company, a major insurer of the CDO market. “You don’t have a trading partner? Create one.”

Get ProPublica’s latest headlines and major investigations delivered to your inbox.The executive, like most of the dozens of people ProPublica spoke with about the inner workings of the market at the time, asked not to be named out of fear of being sucked into ongoing investigations or because they are involved in civil litigation.

Keeping the assembly line going had a wealth of short-term advantages for the banks. Fees rolled in. A typical CDO could net the bank that created it between $5 million and $10 million — about half of which usually ended up as employee bonuses. Indeed, Wall Street awarded record bonuses in 2006, a hefty chunk of which came from the CDO business.

The self-dealing super-charged the market for CDOs, enticing some less-savvy investors to try their luck. Crucially, such deals maintained the value of mortgage bonds at a time when the lack of buyers should have driven their prices down.

But the strategy of speeding up the assembly line had devastating consequences for homeowners, the banks themselves and, ultimately, the global economy. Because of Wall Street’s machinations, more mortgages had been granted to ever-shakier borrowers. The results can now be seen in foreclosed houses across America.

The incestuous trading also made the CDOs more intertwined and thus fragile, accelerating their decline in value that began in the fall of 2007 and deepened over the next year. Most are now worth pennies on the dollar. Nearly half of the nearly trillion dollars in losses to the global banking system came from CDOs, losses ultimately absorbed by taxpayers and investors around the world. The banks’ troubles sent the world’s economies into a tailspin from which they have yet to recover.

It remains unclear whether any of this violated laws. The SEC has said that it is actively looking at as many as 50 CDO managers as part of its broad examination of the CDO business’ role in the financial crisis. In particular, the agency is focusing on the relationship between the banks and the managers. The SEC is exploring how deals were structured, if any quid pro quo arrangements existed, and whether banks pressured managers to take bad assets.

The banks declined to directly address ProPublica’s questions. Asked about its relationship with managers and the cross-ownership among its CDOs, Citibank responded with a one-sentence statement:

“It has been widely reported that there are ongoing industry-wide investigations into CDO-related matters and we do not comment on pending investigations.”

None of ProPublica’s questions had mentioned the SEC or pending investigations.

Posed a similar list of questions, Bank of America, which now owns Merrill Lynch, said:

“These are very specific questions regarding individuals who left Merrill Lynch several years ago and a CDO origination business that, due to market conditions, was discontinued by Merrill before Bank of America acquired the company.”

This is the second installment of a ProPublica series about the largely hidden history of the CDO boom and bust. Our first story looked at how one hedge fund helped create at least $40 billion in CDOs as part of a strategy to bet against the market. This story turns the focus on the banks.

Merrill Lynch Pioneers Pervert the Market

By 2004, the housing market was in full swing, and Wall Street bankers flocked to the CDO frenzy. It seemed to be the perfect money machine, and for a time everyone was happy.

Homeowners got easy mortgages. Banks and mortgage companies felt secure lending the money because they could sell the mortgages almost immediately to Wall Street and get back all their cash plus a little extra for their trouble. The investment banks charged massive fees for repackaging the mortgages into fancy financial products. Investors all around the world got to play in the then-phenomenal American housing market.

Click to see how the CDO daisy chain worked.
The mortgages were bundled into bonds, which were in turn combined into CDOs offering varying interest rates and levels of risk.

Investors holding the top tier of a CDO were first in line to get money coming from mortgages. By 2006, some banks often kept this layer, which credit agencies blessed with their highest rating of Triple A.

Buyers of the lower tiers took on more risk and got higher returns. They would be the first to take the hit if homeowners funding the CDO stopped paying their mortgages. (Here’s a video explaining how CDOs worked.)

Over time, these risky slices became increasingly hard to sell, posing a problem for the banks. If they remained unsold, the sketchy assets stayed on their books, like rotting inventory. That would require the banks to set aside money to cover any losses. Banks hate doing that because it means the money can’t be loaned out or put to other uses.

Being stuck with the risky portions of CDOs would ultimately lower profits and endanger the whole assembly line.

The banks, notably Merrill and Citibank, solved this problem by greatly expanding what had been a common and accepted practice: CDOs buying small pieces of other CDOs.

Architects of CDOs typically included what they called a “bucket” — which held bits of other CDOs paying higher rates of interest. The idea was to boost overall returns of deals primarily composed of safer assets. In the early days, the bucket was a small portion of an overall CDO.

One pioneer of pushing CDOs to buy CDOs was Merrill Lynch’s Chris Ricciardi, who had been brought to the firm in 2003 to take Merrill to the top of the CDO business. According to former colleagues, Ricciardi’s team cultivated managers, especially smaller firms.

Merrill exercised its leverage over the managers. A strong relationship with Merrill could be the difference between a business that thrived and one that didn’t. The more deals the banks gave a manager, the more money the manager got paid.

As the head of Merrill’s CDO business, Ricciardi also wooed managers with golf outings and dinners. One Merrill executive summed up the overall arrangement: “I’m going to make you rich. You just have to be my bitch.”

But not all managers went for it.

An executive from Trainer Wortham, a CDO manager, recalls a 2005 conversation with Ricciardi. “I wasn’t going to buy other CDOs. Chris said: ‘You don’t get it. You have got to buy other guys’ CDOs to get your deal done. That’s how it works.’” When the manager refused, Ricciardi told him, “‘That’s it. You are not going to get another deal done.’” Trainer Wortham largely withdrew from the market, concerned about the practice and the overheated prices for CDOs.

Ricciardi declined multiple requests to comment.

Merrill CDOs often bought slices of other Merrill deals. This seems to have happened more in the second half of any given year, according to ProPublica’s analysis, though the purchases were still a small portion compared to what would come later. Annual bonuses are based on the deals bankers completed by yearend.

Ricciardi left Merrill Lynch in February 2006. But the machine he put into place not only survived his departure, it became a model for competitors.

As Housing Market Wanes, Self-Dealing Takes Off

By mid-2006, the housing market was on the wane. This was particularly true for subprime mortgages, which were given to borrowers with spotty credit at higher interest rates. Subprime lenders began to fold, in what would become a mass extinction. In the first half of the year, the percentage of subprime borrowers who didn’t even make the first month’s mortgage payment tripled from the previous year.

That made CDO investors like pension funds and insurance companies increasingly nervous. If homeowners couldn’t make their mortgage payments, then the stream of cash to CDOs would dry up. Real “buyers began to shrivel and shrivel,” says Fiachra O’Driscoll, who co-ran Credit Suisse’s CDO business from 2003 to 2008.

Faced with disappearing investor demand, bankers could have wound down the lucrative business and moved on. That’s the way a market is supposed to work. Demand disappears; supply follows. But bankers were making lots of money. And they had amassed warehouses full of CDOs and other mortgage-based assets whose value was going down.

Rather than stop, bankers at Merrill, Citi, UBS and elsewhere kept making CDOs.

The question was: Who would buy them?

The top 80 percent, the less risky layers or so-called “super senior,” were held by the banks themselves. The beauty of owning that supposedly safe top portion was that it required hardly any money be held in reserve.

That left 20 percent, which the banks did not want to keep because it was riskier and required them to set aside reserves to cover any losses. Banks often sold the bottom, riskiest part to hedge funds. That left the middle layer, known on Wall Street as the “mezzanine,” which was sold to new CDOs whose top 80 percent was ultimately owned by … the banks.

“As we got further into 2006, the mezzanine was going into other CDOs,” says Credit Suisse’s O’Driscoll.

Get ProPublica’s latest headlines and major investigations delivered to your inbox.This was the daisy chain. On paper, the risky stuff was gone, held by new independent CDOs. In reality, however, the banks were buying their own otherwise unsellable assets.

How could something so seemingly short-sighted have happened?

It’s one of the great mysteries of the crash. Banks have fleets of risk managers to defend against just such reckless behavior. Top executives have maintained that while they suspected that the housing market was cooling, they never imagined the crash. For those doing the deals, the payoff was immediate. The dangers seemed abstract and remote.

The CDO managers played a crucial role. CDOs were so complex that even buyers had a hard time seeing exactly what was in them — making a neutral third party that much more essential.

“When you’re investing in a CDO you are very much putting your faith in the manager,” says Peter Nowell, a former London-based investor for the Royal Bank of Scotland. “The manager is choosing all the bonds that go into the CDO.” (RBS suffered mightily in the global financial meltdown, posting the largest loss in United Kingdom history, and was de facto nationalized by the British government.)

Source: Asset-Backed Alert
By persuading managers to pick the unsold slices of CDOs, the banks helped keep the market going. “It guaranteed distribution when, quite frankly, there was not a huge market for them,” says Nowell.

The counterintuitive result was that even as investors began to vanish, the mortgage CDO market more than doubled from 2005 to 2006, reaching $226 billion, according to the trade publication Asset-Backed Alert.

Citi and Merrill Hand Out Sweetheart Deals

As the CDO market grew, so did the number of CDO management firms, including many small shops that relied on a single bank for most of their business. According to Fitch, the number of CDO managers it rated rose from 89 in July 2006 to 140 in September 2007.

One CDO manager epitomized the devolution of the business, according to numerous industry insiders: a Wall Street veteran named Wing Chau.

Earlier in the decade, Chau had run the CDO department for Maxim Group, a boutique investment firm in New York. Chau had built a profitable business for Maxim based largely on his relationship with Merrill Lynch. In just a few years, Maxim had corralled more than $4 billion worth of assets under management just from Merrill CDOs.

In August 2006, Chau bolted from Maxim to start his own CDO management business, taking several colleagues with him. Chau’s departure gave Merrill, the biggest CDO producer, one more avenue for unsold inventory.

Chau named the firm Harding, after the town in New Jersey where he lived. The CDO market was starting its most profitable stretch ever, and Harding would play a big part. In an eleven-month period, ending in August 2007, Harding managed $13 billion of CDOs, including more than $5 billion from Merrill, and another nearly $5 billion from Citigroup. (Chau would later earn a measure of notoriety for a cameo appearance in Michael Lewis’ bestseller “The Big Short,” where he is depicted as a cheerfully feckless “go-to buyer” for Merrill Lynch’s CDO machine.)

Chau had a long-standing friendship with Ken Margolis, who was Merrill’s top CDO salesman under Ricciardi. When Ricciardi left Merrill in 2006, Margolis became a co-head of Merrill’s CDO group. He carried a genial, let’s-just-get-the-deal-done demeanor into his new position. An avid poker player, Margolis told a friend that in a previous job he had stood down a casino owner during a foreclosure negotiation after the owner had threatened to put a fork through his eye.

Chau’s close relationship with Merrill continued. In late 2006, Merrill sublet office space to Chau’s startup in the Merrill tower in Lower Manhattan’s financial district. A Merrill banker, David Moffitt, scheduled visits to Harding for prospective investors in the bank’s CDOs. “It was a nice office,” overlooking New York Harbor, recalls a CDO buyer. “But it did feel a little weird that it was Merrill’s building,” he said.

Moffitt did not respond to requests for comment.

Under Margolis, other small managers with meager track records were also suddenly handling CDOs valued at as much as $2 billion. Margolis declined to answer any questions about his own involvement in these matters.

A Wall Street Journal article ($) from late 2007, one of the first of its kind, described how Margolis worked with one inexperienced CDO manager called NIR on a CDO named Norma, in the spring of that year. The Long Island-based NIR made about $1.5 million a year for managing Norma, a CDO that imploded.

“NIR’s collateral management business had arisen from efforts by Merrill Lynch to assemble a stable of captive small firms to manage its CDOs that would be beholden to Merrill Lynch on account of the business it funneled to them,” alleged a lawsuit filed in New York state court against Merrill over Norma that was settled quietly after the plaintiffs received internal Merrill documents.

NIR declined to comment.

Banks had a variety of ways to influence managers’ behavior.

Some of the few outside investors remaining in the market believed that the manager would do a better job if he owned a small slice of the CDO he was managing. That way, the manager would have more incentive to manage the investment well, since he, too, was an investor. But small management firms rarely had money to invest. Some banks solved this problem by advancing money to managers such as Harding.

Chau’s group managed two Citigroup CDOs — 888 Tactical Fund and Jupiter High-Grade VII — in which the bank loaned Harding money to buy risky pieces of the deal. The loans would be paid back out of the fees the managers took from the CDO and its investors. The loans were disclosed to investors in a few sentences among the hundreds of pages of legalese accompanying the deals.

In response to ProPublica’s questions, Chau’s lawyer said, “Harding Advisory’s dealings with investment banks were proper and fully disclosed.”

Citigroup made similar deals with other managers. The bank lent money to a manager called Vanderbilt Capital Advisors for its Armitage CDO, completed in March 2007.

Vanderbilt declined to comment. It couldn’t be learned how much money Citigroup loaned or whether it was ever repaid.

Yet again banks had masked their true stakes in CDO. Banks were lending money to CDO managers so they could buy the banks’ dodgy assets. If the managers couldn’t pay the loans back — and most were thinly capitalized — the banks were on the hook for even more losses when the CDO business collapsed.

Goldman, Merrill and Others Get Tough

When the housing market deteriorated, banks took advantage of a little-used power they had over managers.

Source: Thetica Systems
The way CDOs are put together, there is a brief period when the bonds picked by managers sit on the banks’ balance sheets. Because the value of such assets can fall, banks reserved the right to overrule managers’ selections.

According to numerous bankers, managers and investors, banks rarely wielded that veto until late 2006, after which it became common. Merrill was in the lead.

“I would go to Merrill and tell them that I wanted to buy, say, a Citi bond,” recalls a CDO manager. “They would say ‘no.’ I would suggest a UBS bond, they would say ‘no.’ Eventually, you got the joke.” Managers could choose assets to put into their CDOs but they had to come from Merrill CDOs. One rival investment banker says Merrill treated CDO managers the way Henry Ford treated his Model T customers: You can have any color you want, as long as it’s black.

Once, Merrill’s Ken Margolis pushed a manager to buy a CDO slice for a Merrill-produced CDO called Port Jackson that was completed in the beginning of 2007: “‘You don’t have to buy the deal but you are crazy if you don’t because of your business,’” an executive at the management firm recalls Margolis telling him. “‘We have a big pipeline and only so many more mandates to give you.’ You got the message.” In other words: Take our stuff and we’ll send you more business. If not, forget it.

Margolis declined to comment on the incident.

“All the managers complained about it,” recalls O’Driscoll, the former Credit Suisse banker who competed with other investment banks to put deals together and market them. But “they were indentured slaves.” O’Driscoll recalls managers grumbling that Merrill in particular told them “what to buy and when to buy it.”

Other big CDO-producing banks quickly adopted the practice.

A little-noticed document released this year during a congressional investigation into Goldman Sachs’ CDO business reveals that bank’s thinking. The firm wrote a November 2006 internal memorandum about a CDO called Timberwolf, managed by Greywolf, a small manager headed by ex-Goldman bankers. In a section headed “Reasons To Pursue,” the authors touted that “Goldman is approving every asset” that will end up in the CDO. What the bank intended to do with that approval power is clear from the memo: “We expect that a significant portion of the portfolio by closing will come from Goldman’s offerings.”

When asked to comment whether Goldman’s memo demonstrates that it had effective control over the asset selection process and that Greywolf was not in fact an independent manager, the bank responded: “Greywolf was an experienced, independent manager and made its own decisions about what reference assets to include. The securities included in Timberwolf were fully disclosed to the professional investors who invested in the transaction.”

Greywolf declined to comment. One of the investors, Basis Capital of Australia, filed a civil lawsuit in federal court in Manhattan against Goldman over the deal. The bank maintains the lawsuit is without merit.

By March 2007, the housing market’s signals were flashing red. Existing home sales plunged at the fastest rate in almost 20 years. Foreclosures were on the rise. And yet, to CDO buyer Peter Nowell’s surprise, banks continued to churn out CDOs.

“We were pulling back. We couldn’t find anything safe enough,” says Nowell. “We were amazed that April through June they were still printing deals. We thought things were over.”

Instead, the CDO machine was in overdrive. Wall Street produced $70 billion in mortgage CDOs in the first quarter of the year.

Many shareholder lawsuits battling their way through the court system today focus on this period of the CDO market. They allege that the banks were using the sales of CDOs to other CDOs to prop up prices and hide their losses.

“Citi’s CDO operations during late 2006 and 2007 functioned largely to sell CDOs to yet newer CDOs created by Citi to house them,” charges a pending shareholder lawsuit against the bank that was filed in federal court in Manhattan in February 2009. “Citigroup concocted a scheme whereby it repackaged many of these investments into other freshly-baked vehicles to avoid incurring a loss.”

Citigroup described the allegations as “irrational,” saying the bank’s executives would never knowingly take actions that would lead to “catastrophic losses.”

In the Hall of Mirrors, Myopic Rating Agencies

The portion of CDOs owned by other CDOs grew right alongside the market. What had been 5 percent of CDOs (remember the “bucket”) now came to constitute as much as 30 or 40 percent of new CDOs. (Wall Street also rolled out CDOs that were almost entirely made up of CDOs, called CDO squareds.)

The ever-expanding bucket provided new opportunities for incestuous trades.

It worked like this: A CDO would buy a piece of another CDO, which then returned the favor. The transactions moved both CDOs closer to completion, when bankers and managers would receive their fees.

Source: Thetica Systems
ProPublica’s analysis shows that in the final two years of the business, CDOs with cross-ownership amounted to about one-fifth of the market, about $107 billion.

Here’s an example from early May 2007:

•A CDO called Jupiter VI bought a piece of a CDO called Tazlina II.
•Tazlina II bought a piece of Jupiter VI.
Both Jupiter VI and Tazlina II were created by Merrill and were completed within a week of each other. Both were managed by small firms that did significant business with Merrill: Jupiter by Wing Chau’s Harding, and Tazlina by Terwin Advisors. Chau did not respond to questions about this deal. Terwin Advisors could not reached.

Just a few weeks earlier, CDO managers completed a comparable swap between Jupiter VI and another Merrill CDO called Forge 1.

Forge has its own intriguing history. It was the only deal done by a tiny manager of the same name based in Tampa, Fla. The firm was started less than a year earlier by several former Wall Street executives with mortgage experience. It received seed money from Bryan Zwan, who in 2001 settled an SEC civil lawsuit over his company’s accounting problems in a federal court in Florida. Zwan and Forge executives didn’t respond to requests for comment.

After seemingly coming out of nowhere, Forge won the right to manage a $1.5 billion Merrill CDO. That earned Forge a visit from the rating agency Moody’s.

“We just wanted to make sure that they actually existed,” says a former Moody’s executive. The rating agency saw that the group had an office near the airport and expertise to do the job.

Rating agencies regularly did such research on managers, but failed to ask more fundamental questions. The credit ratings agencies “did heavy, heavy due diligence on managers but they were looking for the wrong things: how you processed a ticket or how your surveillance systems worked,” says an executive at a CDO manager. “They didn’t check whether you were buying good bonds.”

One Forge employee recalled in a recent interview that he was amazed Merrill had been able to find buyers so quickly. “They were able to sell all the tranches” — slices of the CDO — “in a fairly rapid period of time,” said Rod Jensen, a former research analyst for Forge.

Forge achieved this feat because Merrill sold the slices to other CDOs, many linked to Merrill.

The ProPublica analysis shows that two Merrill CDOs, Maxim II and West Trade III, each bought pieces of Forge. Small managers oversaw both deals.

Forge, in turn, was filled with detritus from Merrill. Eighty-two percent of the CDO bonds owned by Forge came from other Merrill deals.

Citigroup did its own version of the shuffle, as these three CDOs demonstrate:

•A CDO called Octonion bought some of Adams Square Funding II.
•Adams Square II bought a piece of Octonion.
•A third CDO, Class V Funding III, also bought some of Octonion.
•Octonion, in turn, bought a piece of Class V Funding III.
All of these Citi deals were completed within days of each other. Wing Chau was once again a central player. His firm managed Octonion. The other two were managed by a unit of Credit Suisse. Credit Suisse declined to comment.

Not all cross-ownership deals were consummated.

In spring 2007, Deutsche Bank was creating a CDO and found a manager that wanted to take a piece of it. The manager was overseeing a CDO that Merrill was assembling. Merrill blocked the manager from putting the Deutsche bonds into the Merrill CDO. A former Deutsche Bank banker says that when Deutsche Bank complained to Andy Phelps, a Merrill CDO executive, Phelps offered a quid pro quo: If Deutsche was willing to have the manager of its CDO buy some Merrill bonds, Merrill would stop blocking the purchase. Phelps declined to comment.

The Deutsche banker, who says its managers were independent, recalls being shocked: “We said we don’t control what people buy in their deals.” The swap didn’t happen.

The Missing Regulators and the Aftermath

In September 2007, as the market finally started to catch up with Merrill Lynch, Ken Margolis left the firm to join Wing Chau at Harding.

Chau and Margolis circulated a marketing plan for a new hedge fund to prospective investors touting their expertise in how CDOs were made and what was in them. The fund proposed to buy failed CDOs — at bargain basement prices. In the end, Margolis and Chau couldn’t make the business work and dropped the idea.

Why didn’t regulators intervene during the boom to stop the self-dealing that had permeated the CDO market?

No one agency had authority over the whole business. Since the business came and went in just a few years, it may have been too much to expect even assertive regulators to comprehend what was happening in time to stop it.

While the financial regulatory bill passed by Congress in July creates more oversight powers, it’s unclear whether regulators have sufficient tools to prevent a replay of the debacle.

In just two years, the CDO market had cut a swath of destruction. Partly because CDOs had bought so many pieces of each other, they collapsed in unison. Merrill Lynch and Citigroup, the biggest perpetrators of the self-dealing, were among the biggest losers. Merrill lost about $26 billion on mortgage CDOs and Citigroup about $34 billion.

Additional reporting by Kitty Bennett, Krista Kjellman Schmidt, Lisa Schwartz and Karen Weise.

NY J Shack Does it Again

In my June 3, 2008 decision and order in this matter, I granted leave to plaintiff, THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS CWALT, INC. ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2006-OC1 MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, [*2]SERIES 2006-OC1 (BNY), to renew its application for an order of reference within forty-five (45) days, until July 18, 2008, if it complied with three conditions. However, plaintiff did not make the instant motion until May 4, 2009, 335 days after June 3, 2008, and failed to offer any excuse for its lateness. Therefore, the instant motion is 290 days, almost ten months, late. Further, the instant renewed motion failed to present the three affidavits that this Court ordered plaintiff BNY to present with its renewed motion for an order of reference: (1) an affidavit of facts either by an officer of plaintiff BNY or someone with a valid power of attorney from plaintiff BNY and personal knowledge of the facts; (2) an affidavit from Ely Harless describing his employment history for the past three years, because Mr. Harless assigned the instant mortgage as Vice President of MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. (MERS) and then executed an affidavit of merit for assignee BNY as Vice President of BNY’s alleged attorney-in-fact without any power of attorney; and, (3) an affidavit from an officer of plaintiff BNY explaining why it purchased the instant nonperforming loan from MERS, as nominee for DECISION ONE MORTGAGE COMPANY, LLC (DECISION ONE).

Moreover, after I reviewed the papers filed with this renewed motion for an order of reference and searched the Automated City Register Information System (ACRIS) website of the Office of the City Register, New York City Department of Finance, I discovered that plaintiff BNY lacked standing to pursue the instant action for numerous reasons. Therefore, the instant action is dismissed with prejudice.

Supreme Court, Kings County

The Bank of New York, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS CWALT, INC. ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2006-OC1 MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-OC1, Plaintiff,

against

Denise Mulligan, BEVERLY BRANCHE, et. al., Defendants.

29399/07

Plaintiff:

McCabe Weisberg Conway PC

Jason E. Brooks, Esq.

New Rochelle NY

Defendant:

No Appearances.

Arthur M. Schack, J.

Plaintiff’s renewed application, upon the default of all defendants, for an order of reference for the premises located at 1591 East 48th Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 7846, Lot 14, County of Kings) is denied with prejudice. The complaint is dismissed. The notice of pendency filed against the above-named real property is cancelled.

In my June 3, 2008 decision and order in this matter, I granted leave to plaintiff, THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS CWALT, INC. ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2006-OC1 MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, [*2]SERIES 2006-OC1 (BNY), to renew its application for an order of reference within forty-five (45) days, until July 18, 2008, if it complied with three conditions. However, plaintiff did not make the instant motion until May 4, 2009, 335 days after June 3, 2008, and failed to offer any excuse for its lateness. Therefore, the instant motion is 290 days, almost ten months, late. Further, the instant renewed motion failed to present the three affidavits that this Court ordered plaintiff BNY to present with its renewed motion for an order of reference: (1) an affidavit of facts either by an officer of plaintiff BNY or someone with a valid power of attorney from plaintiff BNY and personal knowledge of the facts; (2) an affidavit from Ely Harless describing his employment history for the past three years, because Mr. Harless assigned the instant mortgage as Vice President of MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. (MERS) and then executed an affidavit of merit for assignee BNY as Vice President of BNY’s alleged attorney-in-fact without any power of attorney; and, (3) an affidavit from an officer of plaintiff BNY explaining why it purchased the instant nonperforming loan from MERS, as nominee for DECISION ONE MORTGAGE COMPANY, LLC (DECISION ONE).

Moreover, after I reviewed the papers filed with this renewed motion for an order of reference and searched the Automated City Register Information System (ACRIS) website of the Office of the City Register, New York City Department of Finance, I discovered that plaintiff BNY lacked standing to pursue the instant action for numerous reasons. Therefore, the instant action is dismissed with prejudice.

Background
Defendant DENISE MULLIGAN (MULLIGAN) borrowed $392,000.00 from

DECISION ONE on October 28, 2005. The mortgage to secure the note was recorded by MERS, “acting solely as a nominee for Lender [DECISION ONE]” and “FOR PURPOSES OF RECORDING THIS MORTGAGE, MERS IS THE MORTGAGEE OF RECORD,” in the Office of the City Register of the City of New York, New York City Department of Finance, on February 6, 2006, at City Register File Number (CRFN) 2006000069253.

Defendant MULLIGAN allegedly defaulted in her mortgage loan payments with her May 1, 2007 payment. Subsequently, plaintiff BNY commenced the instant action, on August 9, 2007, alleging in ¶ 8 of the complaint, and again in ¶ 8 of the August 16, 2007 amended complaint, that “Plaintiff [BNY] is the holder of said note and mortgage. said mortgage was assigned to Plaintiff, by Assignment of Mortgage to be recorded in the Office of the County Clerk of Kings County [sic].” As an aside, plaintiff’s counsel needs to learn that mortgages in New York City are not recorded in the Office of the County Clerk, but in the Office of the City Register of the City of New York. However, the instant mortgage and note were not assigned to plaintiff BNY until October 9, 2007, 61 days subsequent to the commencement of the instant action, by MERS, “as nominee for Decision One,” and executed by Ely Harless, Vice President of MERS. This assignment was recorded on October 24, 2007, in the Office of the City Register of the City of New York, at CRFN 2007000537531.

I denied the original application for an order of reference, on June 3, 2008, with leave to renew, because assignor Ely Harless also executed the March 20, 2008-affidavit of merit as Vice President and “an employee of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., attorney-in-fact for Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.” The original application for an order of reference did not present any power of attorney from plaintiff BNY to Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. Also, the Court pondered how [*3]Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. could be its own an attorney-fact?

In my June 3, 2008 decision and order I noted that Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) § 1321 allows the Court in a foreclosure action, upon the default of defendant or defendant’s admission of mortgage payment arrears, to appoint a referee “to compute the amount due to the plaintiff” and plaintiff BNY’s application for an order of reference was a preliminary step to obtaining a default judgment of foreclosure and sale. (Home Sav. Of Am., F.A. v Gkanios, 230 AD2d 770 [2d Dept 1996]). However, plaintiff BNY failed to meet the clear requirements of CPLR § 3215 (f) for a default judgment, which states:

On any application for judgment by default, the applicant

shall file proof of service of the summons and the complaint, or

a summons and notice served pursuant to subdivision (b) of rule

305 or subdivision (a) of rule 316 of this chapter, and proof of

the facts constituting the claim, the default and the amount due

by affidavit made by the party . . . Where a verified complaint has

been served, it may be used as the affidavit of the facts constituting

the claim and the amount due; in such case, an affidavit as to the

default shall be made by the party or the party’s attorney. [Emphasis

added].

Plaintiff BNY failed to submit “proof of the facts” in “an affidavit made by the

party.” (Blam v Netcher, 17 AD3d 495, 496 [2d Dept 2005]; Goodman v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. 2 AD3d 581[2d Dept 2003]; Drake v Drake, 296 AD2d 566 [2d Dept 2002]; Parratta v McAllister, 283 AD2d 625 [2d Dept 2001]; Finnegan v Sheahan, 269 AD2d 491 [2d Dept 2000]; Hazim v Winter, 234 AD2d 422 [2d Dept 1996]). Instead, plaintiff BNY submitted an affidavit of merit and amount due by Ely Harless, “an employee of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.” and failed to submit a valid power of attorney for that express purpose. Also, I required that if plaintiff renewed its application for an order of reference and provided to the Court a valid power of attorney, that if the power of attorney refers to a servicing agreement, the Court needs a properly offered copy of the servicing agreement to determine if the servicing agent may proceed on behalf of plaintiff. (EMC Mortg. Corp. v Batista, 15 Misc 3d 1143 (A), [Sup Ct, Kings County 2007]; Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v Lewis, 14 Misc 3d 1201 (A) [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2006]).

I granted plaintiff BNY leave to renew its application for an order of reference within forty-five (45) days of June 3, 2008, which would be July 18, 2008. For reasons unknown to the Court, plaintiff BNY made the instant motion to renew its application for an order of reference on May 4, 2009, 290 days late. Plaintiff’s counsel, in his affirmation in support of the renewed motion, offers no explanation for his lateness and totally ignores this issue.

Further, despite the assignment by MERS, as nominee for DECISION ONE, to plaintiff BNY occurring 61 days subsequent to the commencement of the instant action, plaintiff’s counsel claims, in ¶ 17 of his affirmation in support, that “[s]aid assignment of mortgage [by MERS, as nominee for DECISION ONE to BNT] was drafted for the convenience of the court in establishing the chain of ownership, but the actual assignment and transfer had previously occurred by delivery.” The alleged proof presented of physical delivery of the subject MULLIGAN mortgage is a computer printout [exhibit G of motion], dated April 30, 2009, from [*4]Countrywide Financial, which plaintiff’s counsel calls a “Closing Loan Schedule,” and claims, in ¶ 21 of his affirmation in support, that this “closing loan schedule is the mortgage loan schedule displaying every loan held by such trust at the close date for said trust at the end of January 2006. The closing loan schedule is of public record and demonstrates that the Plaintiff was in possession of the note and mortgage about nineteen (19) months prior to the commencement of this action.” There is an entry on line 2591 of the second to last page of the printout showing account number 1232268089, which plaintiff’s counsel, in ¶ 22 of his affirmation in support, alleges is the subject mortgage. Plaintiff’s counsel asserts, in ¶ 23 of his affirmation in support, that “[t]he annexed closing loan schedule suffices to proceed in granting Plaintiff’s Order of Reference in this matter proving possession prior to any default.” This claim is ludicrous. The computer printout, printed on April 30, 2009, just prior to the making of the instant motion, has no probative value with respect to whether physical delivery of the subject mortgage was made to plaintiff BNY prior to the August 9, 2007 commencement of the instant action.

Further, even if the mortgage was delivered to BNY prior to the August 9, 2007 commencement of the instant action, this claim is in direct contradiction to plaintiff’s claim previously mentioned in ¶ 8 of both the complaint and the amended complaint, that “Plaintiff [BNY] is the holder of said note and mortgage. said mortgage was assigned to Plaintiff, by Assignment of Mortgage to be recorded in the Office of the County Clerk of Kings County [sic].” Both ¶’s 8 allege that the assignment of the subject mortgage took place prior to August 9, 2007 and the recording would subsequently take place. The only reality for the Court is that the assignment of the subject mortgage took place 61 days subsequent to the commencement of the action on October 9, 2007 and the assignment was recorded on October 24, 2007.

Moreover, plaintiff’s counsel alleges, in ¶ 18 of his affirmation in support, that “[p]ursuant to a charter between Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems, Inc. ( MERS’) and Decision One Mortgage Company, LLC, all officers of Decision One Mortgage Company, LLC, a member of MERS, are appointed as assistant secretaries and vice presidents of MERS, and as such are authorized” to assign mortgage loans registered on the MERS System and execute documents related to foreclosures. ¶ 18 concludes with “See Exhibit F.” None of this appears in exhibit F. Exhibit F is a one page power of attorney from “THE BANK OF NEW YORK, as Trustee” pursuant to unknown pooling and servicing agreements appointing “Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP and its authorized officers (collectively CHL Servicing’)” as its “attorneys-in-fact and authorized agents” for foreclosures “in connection with the transactions contemplated in those certain Pooling and Servicing Agreements.” The so-called “charter” between MERS and DECISION ONE was not presented to the Court in any exhibits attached to the instant motion.

Further, attached to the instant renewed motion [exhibit D] is an affidavit of merit

by Keri Selman, dated August 23, 2007 [47 days before the assignment to BNY], in which Ms. Selman claims to be “a foreclosure specialist of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. Servicing agent for BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS CWALT, INC. ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2006-OC1 MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-OC1 . . . I make this afidavit upon personal knowledge based on books and records of Bank of New York in my possession or subject to my control [sic]” Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. is not Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, referred to in the power of attorney attached to the renewed motion [exhibit F]. Moreover, plaintiff failed to [*5]present to the Court any power of attorney authorizing Ms. Selman to execute for Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. her affidavit on behalf of plaintiff BNY. Also, Ms. Selman has a history of executing documents presented to this Court while wearing different corporate hats. In Bank of New York as Trustee for Certificateholders CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-22 v Myers (22 Misc 3d 1117 [A] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2009], in which I issued a decision and order on February 3, 2009, Ms. Selman assigned the subject mortgage on June 28, 2008 as Assistant Vice President of MERS, nominee for Homebridge Mortgage Bankers Corp., and then five days later executed an affidavit of merit as Assistant Vice President of plaintiff BNY. I observed, in this decision and order, at 1-2, that:

Ms. Selman is a milliner’s delight by virtue of the number of hats

she wears. In my November 19, 2007 decision and order (BANK OF

NEW YORK A TRUSTEE FOR THE NOTEHOLDERS OF CWABS, INC.

ASSET-BACKED NOTES, SERIES 2006-SD2 v SANDRA OROSCO

NUNEZ, et. al. [Index No., 32052/07]), I observed that:

Plaintiff’s application is the third application for an

order of reference received by me in the past several days that

contain an affidavit from Keri Selman. In the instant action,

she alleges to be an Assistant Vice President of the Bank of

New York. On November 16, 2007, I denied an application for

an order of reference (BANK OF NEW YORK A TRUSTEE FOR

THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF CWABS, INC. ASSET-

BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-8 v JOSE NUNEZ,

et. al., Index No. 10457/07), in which Keri Selman, in her

affidavit of merit claims to be “Vice President of COUNTRYWIDE

HOME LOANS, Attorney in fact for BANK OF NEW YORK.”

The Court is concerned that Ms. Selman might be engaged in a

subterfuge, wearing various corporate hats. Before granting an

application for an order of reference, the Court requires an

affidavit from Ms. Selman describing her employment history

for the past three years.

This Court has not yet received any affidavit from Ms. Selman describing

her employment history, whether it is with MERS, BNY, COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, or any other entity. [*6]

Further, the Court needs to address the conflict of interest in the

June 20, 2008 assignment by Ms. Selman to her alleged employer, BNY.

I am still waiting for Ms. Selman’s affidavit to explain her tangled employment relationships. Interestingly, Ms. Selman, as “Assistant Vice President of MERS,” nominee for “America’s Wholesale Lender,” is the assignor of another mortgage to plaintiff BNY in Bank of New York v Alderazi (28 Misc 3d 376 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2010]), which I further cite below.

It is clear that plaintiff BNY failed to provide the Court with: an affidavit of merit by an officer of plaintiff BNY or someone with a valid power of attorney from BNY; an affidavit from Ely Harless, explaining his employment history; and, an explanation from BNY of why it purchased a nonperforming loan from MERS, as nominee of DECISION ONE. Moreover, plaintiff BNY did not own the subject mortgage and note when the instant case commenced. Even if plaintiff BNY owned the subject mortgage and note when the case commenced, MERS lacked the authority to assign the subject MULLIGAN mortgage to BNY, as will be explained further. Plaintiff’s counsel offers a lame and feeble excuse for not complying with my June 3, 2008 decision and order, in ¶ 23 of his affirmation in support, claiming that “[t]he affidavits requested in Honorable Arthur M. Schack’s Decision and Order should not be required, given the annexed closing loan schedule.”

Plaintiff BNY lacked standing
The instant action must be dismissed because plaintiff BNY lacked standing to bring this action on August 9, 2007, the day the action commenced. “Standing to sue is critical to the proper functioning of the judicial system. It is a threshold issue. If standing is denied, the pathway to the courthouse is blocked. The plaintiff who has standing, however, may cross the threshold and seek judicial redress.” (Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v Pataki, 100 NY2d 801 812 [2003], cert denied 540 US 1017 [2003]). Professor Siegel (NY Prac, § 136, at 232 [4d ed]), instructs that:

[i]t is the law’s policy to allow only an aggrieved person to bring a

lawsuit . . . A want of “standing to sue,” in other words, is just another

way of saying that this particular plaintiff is not involved in a genuine

controversy, and a simple syllogism takes us from there to a “jurisdictional”

dismissal: (1) the courts have jurisdiction only over controversies; (2) a

plaintiff found to lack “standing”is not involved in a controversy; and

(3) the courts therefore have no jurisdiction of the case when such a

plaintiff purports to bring it.

“Standing to sue requires an interest in the claim at issue in the lawsuit that the law will recognize as a sufficient predicate for determining the issue at the litigant’s request.” (Caprer v Nussbaum (36 AD3d 176, 181 [2d Dept 2006]). If a plaintiff lacks standing to sue, the plaintiff may not proceed in the action. (Stark v Goldberg, 297 AD2d 203 [1st Dept 2002]). [*7]

Plaintiff BNY lacked standing to foreclose on the instant mortgage and note when this action commenced on August 7, 2007, the day that BNY filed the summons, complaint and notice of pendency with the Kings County Clerk, because it did not own the mortgage and note that day. The instant mortgage and note were assigned to BNY, 61 days later, on October 7, 2007. The Court, in Campaign v Barba (23 AD3d 327 [2d Dept 2005]), instructed that “[t]o establish a prima facie case in an action to foreclose a mortgage, the plaintiff must establish the existence of the mortgage and the mortgage note, ownership of the mortgage, and the defendant’s default in payment [Emphasis added].” (See Witelson v Jamaica Estates Holding Corp. I, 40 AD3d 284 [1st Dept 2007]; Household Finance Realty Corp. of New York v Wynn, 19 AD3d 545 [2d Dept 2005]; Sears Mortgage Corp. v Yahhobi, 19 AD3d 402 [2d Dept 2005]; Ocwen Federal Bank FSB v Miller, 18 AD3d 527 [2d Dept 2005]; U.S. Bank Trust Nat. Ass’n Trustee v Butti, 16 AD3d 408 [2d Dept 2005]; First Union Mortgage Corp. v Fern, 298 AD2d 490 [2d Dept 2002]; Village Bank v Wild Oaks, Holding, Inc., 196 AD2d 812 [2d Dept 1993]).

Assignments of mortgages and notes are made by either written instrument or the

assignor physically delivering the mortgage and note to the assignee. “Our courts have repeatedly held that a bond and mortgage may be transferred by delivery without a written instrument of assignment.” (Flyer v Sullivan, 284 AD 697, 699 [1d Dept 1954]). The written October 7, 2007 assignment by MERS, as nominee for DECISION ONE, to BNY is clearly 61 days after the commencement of the action. Plaintiff’s BNY’s claim that the gobblygook computer printout it offered in exhibit G is evidence of physical delivery of the mortgage and note prior to commencement of the action is not only nonsensical, but flies in the face of the complaint and amended complaint, which both clearly state in ¶ 8 that “Plaintiff [BNY] is the holder of said note and mortgage. said mortgage was assigned to Plaintiff, by Assignment of Mortgage to be recorded in the Office of the County Clerk of Kings County [sic].” Plaintiff BNY did not own the mortgage and note when the instant action commenced on August 7, 2007. “[A] retroactive assignment cannot be used to confer standing upon the assignee in a foreclosure action commenced prior to the execution of an assignment.” (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Marchione, 69 AD3d 204, 210 [2d Dept 2009]). The Marchione Court relied upon LaSalle Bank Natl. Assoc. v Ahearn (59 AD3d 911 [3d Dept 2009], which instructed, at 912, “[n]otably, foreclosure of a mortgage may not be brought by one who has no title to it’ (Kluge v Fugazy, 145 AD2d 537 [2d Dept 1988]) and an assignee of such a mortgage does not have standing unless the assignment is complete at the time the action is commenced).” (See U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, 68 AD3d 752 [2d Dept 2009]; Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v Gress, 68 AD3d 709 [2d Dept 2009]; Citgroup Global Mkts. Realty Corp. v Randolph Bowling, 25 Misc 3d 1244 [A] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2009]; Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Company v Abbate, 25 Misc 3d 1216 [A] [Sup Ct, Richmond County 2009]; Indymac Bank FSB v Boyd, 22 Misc 3d 1119 [A] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2009]; Credit-Based Asset Management and Securitization, LLC v Akitoye,22 Misc 3d 1110 [A] [Sup Ct, Kings County Jan. 20, 2009]; Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v Peabody, 20 Misc 3d 1108 [A][Sup Ct, Saratoga County 2008]).

The Appellate Division, First Department, citing Kluge v Fugazy, in Katz v East-Ville Realty Co., (249 AD2d 243 [1d Dept 1998]), instructed that “[p]laintiff’s attempt to foreclose upon a mortgage in which he had no legal or equitable interest was without foundation in law or [*8]fact.” Therefore, with plaintiff BNY not having standing, the Court lacks jurisdiction in this foreclosure action and the instant action is dismissed with prejudice.

MERS had no authority to assign the subject mortgage and note
Moreover, MERS lacked authority to assign the subject mortgage. The subject DECISION ONE mortgage, executed on October 28, 2005 by defendant MULLIGAN, clearly states on page 1 that “MERS is a separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for Lender [DECISION ONE] and LENDER’s successors and assigns . . . FOR PURPOSES OF RECORDING THIS MORTGAGE, MERS IS THE MORTGAGEE OF RECORD.” The word “nominee” is defined as “[a] person designated to act in place of another, usu. in a very limited way” or “[a] party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others.” (Black’s Law Dictionary 1076 [8th ed 2004]). “This definition suggests that a nominee possesses few or no legally enforceable rights beyond those of a principal whom the nominee serves.” (Landmark National Bank v Kesler, 289 Kan 528, 538 [2009]). The Supreme Court of Kansas, in Landmark National Bank, 289 Kan at 539, observed that:

The legal status of a nominee, then, depends on the context of

the relationship of the nominee to its principal. Various courts have

interpreted the relationship of MERS and the lender as an agency

relationship. See In re Sheridan, 2009 WL631355, at *4 (Bankr. D.

Idaho, March 12, 2009) (MERS “acts not on its own account. Its

capacity is representative.”); Mortgage Elec. Registrations Systems,

Inc. v Southwest, 2009 Ark. 152 ___, ___SW3d___, 2009 WL 723182

(March 19, 2009) (“MERS, by the terms of the deed of trust, and its

own stated purposes, was the lender’s agent”); La Salle Nat. Bank v

Lamy, 12 Misc 3d 1191 [A], at *2 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2006]) . . .

(“A nominee of the owner of a note and mortgage may not effectively

assign the note and mortgage to another for want of an ownership interest

in said note and mortgage by the nominee.”)

The New York Court of Appeals in MERSCORP, Inc. v Romaine (8 NY3d 90 [2006]), explained how MERS acts as the agent of mortgagees, holding at 96:

In 1993, the MERS system was created by several large

participants in the real estate mortgage industry to track ownership

interests in residential mortgages. Mortgage lenders and other entities,

known as MERS members, subscribe to the MERS system and pay

annual fees for the electronic processing and tracking of ownership

and transfers of mortgages. Members contractually agree to appoint [*9]

MERS to act as their common agent on all mortgages they register

in the MERS system. [Emphasis added]

Thus, it is clear that MERS’s relationship with its member lenders is that of agent with the lender-principal. This is a fiduciary relationship, resulting from the manifestation of consent by one person to another, allowing the other to act on his behalf, subject to his control and consent. The principal is the one for whom action is to be taken, and the agent is the one who acts.It has been held that the agent, who has a fiduciary relationship with the principal, “is a party who acts on behalf of the principal with the latter’s express, implied, or apparent authority.” (Maurillo v Park Slope U-Haul, 194 AD2d 142, 146 [2d Dept 1992]). “Agents are bound at all times to exercise the utmost good faith toward their principals. They must act in accordance with the highest and truest principles of morality.” (Elco Shoe Mfrs. v Sisk, 260 NY 100, 103 [1932]). (See Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Development Corp., 96 NY 409 [2001]); Wechsler v Bowman, 285 NY 284 [1941]; Lamdin v Broadway Surface Advertising Corp., 272 NY 133 [1936]). An agent “is prohibited from acting in any manner inconsistent with his agency or trust and is at all times bound to exercise the utmost good faith and loyalty in the performance of his duties.” (Lamdin, at 136).

Thus, in the instant action, MERS, as nominee for DECISION ONE, is an agent of DECISION ONE for limited purposes. It only has those powers given to it and authorized by its principal, DECISION ONE. Plaintiff BNY failed to submit documents authorizing MERS, as nominee for DECISION ONE, to assign the subject mortgage to plaintiff BNY. Therefore, even if the assignment by MERS, as nominee for DECISION ONE, to BNY was timely, and it was not, MERS lacked authority to assign the MULLIGAN mortgage, making the assignment defective. Recently, in Bank of New York v Alderazi, 28 Misc 3d at 379-380, my learned Kings County Supreme Court colleague, Justice Wayne Saitta explained that:

A party who claims to be the agent of another bears the burden

of proving the agency relationship by a preponderance of the evidence

(Lippincott v East River Mill & Lumber Co., 79 Misc 559 [1913])

and “[t]he declarations of an alleged agent may not be shown for

the purpose of proving the fact of agency.” (Lexow & Jenkins, P.C. v

Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp., 122 AD2d 25 [2d Dept 1986]; see

also Siegel v Kentucky Fried Chicken of Long Is. 108 AD2d 218 [2d

Dept 1985]; Moore v Leaseway Transp/ Corp., 65 AD2d 697 [1st Dept

1978].) “[T]he acts of a person assuming to be the representative of

another are not competent to prove the agency in the absence of evidence

tending to show the principal’s knowledge of such acts or assent to them.”

(Lexow & Jenkins, P.C. v Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp., 122 AD2d

at 26, quoting 2 NY Jur 2d, Agency and Independent Contractors § 26). [*10]

Plaintiff has submitted no evidence to demonstrate that the

original lender, the mortgagee America’s Wholesale Lender, authorized

MERS to assign the secured debt to plaintiff [the assignment, as noted

above, executed by the multi-hatted Keri Selman].

In the instant action, MERS, as nominee for DECISION ONE, not only had no authority to assign the MULLIGAN mortgage, but no evidence was presented to the Court to demonstrate DECISION ONE’s knowledge or assent to the assignment by MERS to plaintiff BNY.

Cancellation of subject notice of pendency
The dismissal with prejudice of the instant foreclosure action requires the

cancellation of the notice of pendency. CPLR § 6501 provides that the filing of a notice of pendency against a property is to give constructive notice to any purchaser of real property or encumbrancer against real property of an action that “would affect the title to, or the possession, use or enjoyment of real property, except in a summary proceeding brought to recover the possession of real property.” The Court of Appeals, in 5308 Realty Corp. v O & Y Equity Corp. (64 NY2d 313, 319 [1984]), commented that “[t]he purpose of the doctrine was to assure that a court retained its ability to effect justice by preserving its power over the property, regardless of whether a purchaser had any notice of the pending suit,” and, at 320, that “the statutory scheme permits a party to effectively retard the alienability of real property without any prior judicial review.”

CPLR § 6514 (a) provides for the mandatory cancellation of a notice of pendency by:

The Court, upon motion of any person aggrieved and upon such

notice as it may require, shall direct any county clerk to cancel

a notice of pendency, if service of a summons has not been completed

within the time limited by section 6512; or if the action has been

settled, discontinued or abated; or if the time to appeal from a final

judgment against the plaintiff has expired; or if enforcement of a

final judgment against the plaintiff has not been stayed pursuant

to section 551. [emphasis added]

The plain meaning of the word “abated,” as used in CPLR § 6514 (a) is the ending of an action. “Abatement” is defined as “the act of eliminating or nullifying.” (Black’s Law Dictionary 3 [7th ed 1999]). “An action which has been abated is dead, and any further enforcement of the cause of action requires the bringing of a new action, provided that a cause of action remains (2A Carmody-Wait 2d § 11.1).” (Nastasi v Natassi, 26 AD3d 32, 40 [2d Dept 2005]). Further, Nastasi at 36, held that the “[c]ancellation of a notice of pendency can be granted in the exercise of the inherent power of the court where its filing fails to comply with CPLR § 6501 (see 5303 Realty Corp. v O & Y Equity Corp., supra at 320-321; Rose v Montt Assets, 250 AD2d 451, 451-452 [1d Dept 1998]; Siegel, NY Prac § 336 [4th ed]).” Thus, the [*11]dismissal of the instant complaint must result in the mandatory cancellation of plaintiff BNY’s notice of pendency against the property “in the exercise of the inherent power of the court.”

Conclusion
Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, that the renewed motion of plaintiff, THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS CWALT, INC. ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2006-OC1 MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-OC1, for an order of reference, for the premises located at 1591 East 48th Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 7846, Lot 14, County of Kings), is denied with prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED, that the instant action, Index Number 29399/07, is dismissed with

prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that the Notice of Pendency in this action, filed with the Kings

County Clerk on August 9, 2007, by plaintiff, THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS CWALT, INC. ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2006-OC1 MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-OC1, to foreclose a mortgage for real property located at 1591 East 48th Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 7846, Lot 14, County of Kings), is cancelled.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

ENTER

________________________________HON. ARTHUR M. SCHACK

J. S. C.

Judges Rising to the Rules

Editor’s Comment: Without inventing anything, an increasing number of Judges are coming to the same conclusion. If they apply the rules and deny the pretender lender the benefit of presumptions to which they were not entitled in the first place, the case can be heard on the merits. They don’t need to decide who is right or who is wrong. They need to call balls and strikes.

In this submission from 4closurefraud.com the Judge simply states the obvious — an affidavit from some stranger who says that he looked at some papers and arrived at some conclusions in his or her own mind is not evidence or even a proffer of evidence. It is nonsense. Summary Judgment denied. Motion to lift stay should similarly be denied. Any motion based upon such an affidavit from EITHER side should be denied. AND NOW THEY ARE…..

I SHOULD ADD THAT THE NAME “ICE” ESQ. IS COMING UP MORE FREQUENTLY. I’D LIKE TO SEE MORE FROM THIS LAWYER. He seems to be talking the same tack as Gator Bradshaw in Central Florida (Ocala et al) , Jon Lindemen (S. Fla and Orlando), George Gingo (Northern Florida) and others, to wit: we are out to win these cases not just “mix it up” to justify the fees. Very gratifying to me. 3 years ago, nobody would listen. Now they are taking the ideas developed here, by Max Gardner and April Charney and taking it to the next level. I hope they leave us in the dust.

Full Hearing Transcript attached . Courtesy of T. Ice Esq. Palm Beach Florida

Florida – June 2010 – MSJ denied. Affidavits Hearsay Insufficient

What we are starting to see here is a pattern of Judges not excepting these affidavits from these robo-signers.

I can tell you that, if properly challenged, they will pull the affidavits across the board.

Don,t let that stop you from deposing these people, because once you do it will clearly show that they DO NOT have the authority to produce them. It will also show you they know absolutely nothing about the documents that they are signing even though they state it is of their personal knowledge.

Below is a transcript of how one Judge, in Palm Beach County, DENIED a motion for summary judgment on pending issues, including the insufficient affidavit.

Another key issue was an affidavit presented by the defense from Expert Witness Lynn Szymoniak regarding the fraudulent assignment presented in the case.

Lynn’s expert testimony has stopped many foreclosures in its tracks.

If you are interested in talking to Lynn about her services she can be reached at szymoniak@mac.com and just tell her 4closureFraud sent ya…

Some excerpts from the transcript…

THE BANK OF NEW YORK TRUST
COMPANY, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR
CHASEFLEX TRUST SERIES 2007-3,
Plaintiff,
-vs-
DAVID J. MOSQUERA; ELIZABETH

~

THE COURT: Okay. Without going into
anything else, I’m not about to enter a motion –
granting a motion for summary judgement based onan affidavit of Mr. Reardon.
~
MR. CHANE: Your Honor, there is simply no — there’s no basis to –
~
THE COURT: I’m sorry. It’s just — it
basically just says he looked at some records. I
don’t know what he looked at and he plugged some
numbers in.
~
MR. CHANE: Your Honor, it’s based on his
personal knowledge. That’s all he needs to do
according to the Rule.
~
THE COURT: Well, motion denied.
~
MR CHANE: On what basis, Judge?
~
THE COURT: On the basis that the Court
fears that there are many issues of fact to be
determined. This is not a matter in which
everything is undisputed.
~
MR. CHANE: What issues of fact?
~
THE DEPUTY: Sir, the Judge ruled. The
hearing is over.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/36551048/Full-Transcript-M-S-J-denied-Hearsay-Affidavit-not-Valid

4closureFraud.org

THE BANK OF NEW YORK TRUST COMPANY, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR CHASEFLEX TRUST SERIES 2007-13 PLAINTIF VS. DAVID MOSQUERA

CASE NUMBER 50 2008 CA 04969 XXXX MB PALM BEACH COUNTY FLORIDA

New strategy attacks validity of affidavits

Foreclosure Crisis
New strategy attacks validity of affidavits
August 26, 2010
hen it comes to fighting foreclosures, homeowners and their lawyers may have found a new strategy to score courtroom victories.
Defense lawyers across the state are increasingly attacking the validity of affidavits that owners of notes must file with the courts as part of the foreclosure process. Attorneys like Dustin Zacks, of the firm Ice Legal in West Palm Beach, are successfully arguing that plaintiffs — usually a trust that owns the note or the servicer of the note — are violating court rules by filing affidavits with no records attached to support their foreclosure suits. The records include details of the loan, borrower fees and payment history.
The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 1.510) states that “sworn or certified copies” of all records referred to in the affidavit must be attached as evidence in the foreclosure case.
The rule helps ensure that homeowners’s due process rights aren’t violated — namely that the lender has to prove it is entitled to press its claim.
By: Paola Iuspa-Abbott
Dustin Zacks
In a foreclosure suit, the plaintiff’s affidavit outlines how much the homeowner owes, asserts that there are no unresolved disputes between the lender and borrower and that the home is legally ready to be sold.
Judges rely on the affidavits as critical evidence when they hand down a summary judgment in favor of the lenders, which paves the way for the sale of a property at a foreclosure auction. Since most foreclosure cases are unopposed, the validity of the affidavits and compliance to the rules have rarely been questioned.
When a summary judgment is denied — because an affidavit is flawed, among other reasons — the homeowner can face the lender at trial.
A deficient affidavit can be the difference between homeowners losing their properties through a summary judgment or going to trial, Zacks said.
“These affidavits are the linchpin of cases when they are trying to win a house at summary judgment,” he said. “A summary judgment cuts short [a homeowner’s] right to a full trial.”
Several judges and lawyers say deficient affidavits are rare in most other civil cases, but are rampant in foreclosure cases.
“Our entire judicial system is under attack as a result of this foreclosure process,” said St. Petersburg lawyer Matthew Weidner, who blogs about foreclosures. “Judges, just like us, have just sort of overlooked this in the midst of this crisis.”
AG’s Investigation
Foreclosure firms are increasingly under scrutiny for questionable practices, including the alleged falsification of documents. Earlier this month, Florida Attorney General Bill McCollum launched a probe into the Law Offices of David J. Stern in Plantation; the Law Offices of Marshall C. Watson in Fort Lauderdale; and Shapiro & Fishman, with offices in Boca Raton and Tampa.
McCollum’s office is investigating whether the three law firms submitted false affidavits or fabricated court documents to obtain final judgments against homeowners.
The Law Offices of David J. Stern and Shapiro & Fishman deny wrongdoing and have filed motions to quash or modify the subpoenas issued by the AG office.
Defense lawyers, who have been filing civil lawsuits against the foreclosure law firms, welcomed the investigation. They claim some plaintiff lawyers are rushing through large volumes of foreclosures on behalf of lenders, often improperly serving notice on homeowners or filing false pleadings.
Some judges say they don’t have the resources nor it is their job to make sure every affidavit is proper, but at least two said they are interested in hearing the argument.
“It is a genuine question that should be raised,” said Miami-Dade Circuit Judge Jennifer Bailey. “The question is, where should each judge draw the line about the degree of investigation they are going to do on these affidavits? There is no clear answer.”
In June, Zacks persuaded Palm Beach Circuit Judge Howard Harrison Jr. to deny a motion for summary judgment because of a flawed affidavit.
Page 1 of 3
http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/news.html?news_id=64829&stripTemplate=1    8/26/2010
Harrison told a representative of the Bank of New York, the loan’s trustee, that it needed to produce the loan records rather than having an employee of the plaintiff attorney or the loan servicer attest that documents are in order before signing the affidavits.
“It basically just says he looked at and plugged some numbers in,” Harrison said, according to a transcript of a June 29 hearing. “If they are not contested, that’s fine. But where somebody just basically says, ‘I looked at the records,’ this is it. That’s not enough for me to agree.”
Harrison’s ruling gave Elizabeth and David Mosquera a temporary break. The couple owes $1 million on a six-bedroom Wellington home they bought for $1.4 million in 2007, according to Palm Beach County property records. The couple fell behind on their mortgage payments last year.
In May, Zacks got Palm Beach Circuit Judge Jack Cook to strike an affidavit that did not include records. Now it will be up to Wells Fargo Bank, as trustee, to file a new affidavit.
Challenging Rule
In addition to requiring a copy of the records, Rule 1.510 also says that the person signing the affidavit must have personal knowledge of the facts of the case. That can be a challenge since most loans have been sold several times since they were originated and have been processed by different servicers. Many notes and mortgages are not available for review.
Since the foreclosure crisis started in 2008, it has become common for plaintiff lawyers and servicers to assign an employee to sign hundreds of affidavits, even though they usually are not familiar with the cases.
“I’d like to see in one of these cases where a defense lawyer cross examines, takes a deposition of these people [so] we can see whether they ought to be charged with perjury for all of these affidavits,” Pinellas Circuit Judge Anthony Rondolino said during an April 7 hearing.
At that hearing, he vacated a summary judgment he granted in January in favor of GMAC Mortgage.
Rondolino reconsidered his decision after defense lawyer Michael Wasylik of Dade City asked for a rehearing to challenge GMAC’s affidavit, which did not include any sworn or certified documents.
Rondolino said he hasn’t seen many defense lawyers use flawed-affidavit arguments as a defense, “but when they do raise these issues, I listen to the argument carefully.”
Wasylik said summary judgements that were granted based on insufficient affidavits can be appealed and set aside. “If courts are fooled into granting judgments … it could be disastrous for Florida’s real estate,” he said.
Attorney Mark Romance, with Richman Greer in Miami, said people who lost their homes to foreclosure can appeal a judgment that was the result of an insufficient affidavit or on a mistake.
“That doesn’t help necessarily the person whose home has been foreclosed upon and sold … but they can still get some relieve from the court,” he said.
Nonjudicial process?
The Florida Bankers Association is pushing state lawmakers to make the foreclosure process nonjudicial so lenders can repossess properties faster.
It can take more than a year for uncontested cases to move through the overworked court system and several years if a homeowner defends the case.
A bill proposed by the FBA to make foreclosures nonjudicial failed earlier this year during the legislative session in Tallahassee. The industry group is considering re-introducing the bill in the 2011 session, said Anthony DiMarco, the FBA’s executive vice president and director of government affairs.
“Everybody has the right to a defense, but if they do it just to slow down the process, they are just going to slow down the [recovery of the housing market,]” DiMarco said. “And the faster we get through all this, the faster we are going to get to the end of the crisis and we can move on.”
Paola Iuspa-Abbott can be reached at (305) 347-6657.

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