Freddie Mac Changes Its Language from “Loan Portfolio” to “Reference Pool”

see https://www.streetinsider.com/Globe+Newswire/Freddie+Mac+Credit+Protects+%24167.3+Billion+of+Single-Family+Mortgages+in+Third+Quarter/17554183.html

People still don’t believe it. Loans were not securitized but are being treated as though they were securitized. “Securitization” means selling off an asset in pro rata shares to investors who get a piece of paper telling them that they own X% of the asset.

Ask anyone who knows (or read it yourself) — all of the securitization documents are “forward statements” meaning they are referencing a future event. And none of the securitization documents convey any ownership, equitable or legal interest in any debt, note, or mortgage. And the future event never occurs. That’s the point for the Wall Street bankers.

Since they never retain any interest in any debt, note or mortgage they face no exposure to any risk of loss, and no liability for violations of federal and state statutes as issuers or lenders even though they are both. When they foreclose through various intermediaries (usually a bank appearing solely as trustee of a nonexistent trust) they still receive the net money proceeds but they have no loan account receivable to credit when they receive those sales proceeds.

ACCOUNTING NOTE: There is a difference between a loan account and a loan account receivable. A “loan account” can mean anything or nothing at all. But a loan account receivable is ane try on a general ledger that is reported on the issued balance sheet of a business entity showing that the company paid value (debt cash, credit assets) in exchange for a conveyance of ownership of the underlying debt (from one who legally owns it) — all as required by Article 9 §203 UCC which has been one existence, in one form or another, for centuries.

Without such a transaction there is nothing to report.

And without a conveyance of ownership of the asset receivable, there is no legally allowable entry on the general ledger claiming ownership of the debt, note or mortgage.

The securitization of loans never happened. This means that all claims of rights or authority to administer, collect, or enforce any debt, note or mortgage are completely and utterly false if they are based upon securitization of the subject loan.

But the Wall Street PR machine has convinced virtually everyone including “borrowers” that the loans were securitized. And there are hundreds of appellate decisions referring to loan portfolios that do not exist but are treated as real nonetheless.

So watch for how bulletins and announcements are phrased. In order to avoid indictments and civil liability for outright lying, they are now referring to loan portfolios as “reference pools,” which is exactly what I have been saying for years.

Yes, there were securities created, issued, sold, and traded. And in fact, the indenture did indeed have references to groups of data derived from announcements by investment banks referring to the performance of those loans. But that is not securitization of loans. It is the securitization of proprietary data relating to the performance of the loans — not the ownership of loans (which is what is required to speak of securitization of loans).

SO WHERE DID THE LOAN GO? This could be a reasonable basis fr dispute — i.e., whether the loan was extinguished or simply became inchoate (sleeping) pending a reformation of the transaction such that a designated virtual creditor was replaced with a real one — as required by law.

DOESN’T THAT GIVE AN UNFAIR WINDFALL TO HOMEOWNERS WHO RENEGED ON A PROMISE TO PAY? Again subject to dispute, but my answer is absolutely not.

In fact, it reveals exactly the opposite.

The “lender” (securities brokerage firm doing business as an “investment bank”) is actually an issuer of securities that cannot be sold without the cooperative signature of the homeowner together with detailed personal information of the homeowner.

The resulting sale of securities produces a windfall to the investment bank equal on average to 12 times the principal paid, thus far, to the homeowner.

The homeowner is required under the disclosed part of the deal to repay the principal paid to him — which means that the homeowner did not receive any consideration for the concealed part of the securitization deal.

In addition, the homeowner has unknowingly taken on the risk that the investment bank has dumped. As a putative “lender” (not really) its sole business reason for the transaction is the issuance of securities without which it would not near lending to individual homeowners.

The more securities the merrier and the larger the windfall to the investment bank— all without giving any conveyance of any debt, note or mortgage. (You never see the investment bank as the grantee on any recorded conveyance).

Since the investment bank has no risk of loss, it does not care about the future performance of the alleged “loan transaction.” This one fact removes the basic balance between any person who is characterized as a borrower and any person who is characterized as a lender.

According to federal and state lending laws and basic common sense, the lender, as a sophisticated financial enterprise, is charged legally with determining the viability of the loan because it has a risk of loss.

Without that risk of loss, the only interest remaining is getting the “borrower” to submit personal data and to have the homeowner sign documentation promising to pay back the consideration (plus interest!) received for the concealed, involuntary participation in the securitization scheme.

In contract law, this is a classic example of a failure of an element of enforceable contract — no meeting of the minds. Borrower intent + NO lending intent = no contract. 

The homeowner is deprived of the opportunity to receive the benefit of bargaining for a share of the securitization scheme or not to participate at all.

Therefore my conclusion is that (a) the homeowner owes nothing because of contract failure and (b)is entitled to quantum meruit under quasi-contract law to reasonable compensation for the concealed securitization scheme that could never have existed but for the homeowner’s signature and personal data.

What does this mean? It means that NONE of the investors who bought or traded swaps, certificates, or other securities ever acquired any interest in any loan. None of them acquired the ownership of any debt, note, or mortgage. None of them ever acquired the legal right to administer, collect, or enforce any debt, note, or mortgage. And it means that all documents suggesting the contrary are fabricated and false.

Thus under such circumstances no servicer, trustee, trust or investor Including Fannie and Freddie) possesses any right, title or interest in administration, collection or enforcement of any loan.

DUMP THE RISK: The theory behind securitization is perfectly sound, legal, moral, and politically expedient. It is intended to attract investment by reducing risk. But Wall Street took this one step further. They completely eliminated the risk. In order to do that they had to completely eliminate the loan account from the general ledger of any company that was involved in the securitization process. The loan account was a cover for fraud. It doesn’t exist.

Nobody loses money when a homeowner stops paying. And when a homeowner does pay they are contributing to bonuses and largely untaxed profit of investment banks — and that is an apt description of what happens to the money when a homestead is forced into sale. NO entry is ever made decreasing the amount of a receivable because there is no receivable.

And that is the part that is completely “counterintuitive” to nearly everyone. It is also the reason that Foreclosure Mills consistently Stonewall any attempts to get discovery of information that would obviously lead to admissible evidence in court.

There are thousands of Foreclosure cases that have been pushed to the back burner for 10 years or more (I have one that is 12 years old) as a result of lawyers and pro se litigants experimenting with this concept.

The concept is simple. The claim brought against the homeowner either directly or indirectly asserts that the designated claimant exists in the real world and possesses a claim against the Homeowner. The homeowner says OK, tell me how you exist and how you acquired a claim against me. The Foreclosure Mail refuses to answer because it knows that the truth will kill the claim. 

BUT by sheer force of will and perseverance and infinitely deep pockets, the investment bank continues litigating a claim that has absolutely no merit. And in most cases, because our government regulators are sleeping the cost of defending the baseless claims falls onto the homeowner who lacks the resources of time, money and energy to preserve the largest asset he/she owns.

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Neil F Garfield, MBA, JD, 73, is a Florida licensed trial and appellate attorney since 1977. He has received multiple academic and achievement awards in business and law. He is a former investment banker, securities broker, securities analyst, and financial analyst.
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Bank of New York Mellon faces a reckoning from residential foreclosure cases in New York that date back to the subprime mortgage crisis.

The sooner everyone realizes that these foreclosures are merely schemes to generate revenue the closer we will come to justice. The fact that is that anyone who has paid value for the debt is getting paid pursuant to a third party agreement that has very little relationship with the performance or non performance of the borrower. Investors either get paid even if the borrower is not performing or they don’t get paid even if the borrower is performing.

In their efforts to assure the sanctity of contract, judges are routinely delivering revenue — not payment of a debt — to the perpetrators of an illegal scheme labeled by  lawyers as a foreclosure but which is not a foreclosure because foreclosures ONLY serve as remedies for restitution of an unpaid debt. It is not the fault of borrowers that this anomaly as appeared, which incidentally is the mask for multiple sources of revenue greatly exceeding the loan itself.

As usual investment banks having the greatest access to the microphones have convinced most people that this is a question of whether or not homeowners should get a free house. This distracts attention from the fact that they are getting free money based on claims for debts they don’t own.

see https://therealdeal.com/2020/01/16/bny-mellon-faces-suit-over-foreclosures-from-the-housing-crash/

From the article

The bank — along with its debt-collector partners Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing and law firm McCabe, Weisberg & Conway — are accused by a class-action lawsuit of systematically trying to foreclose on mortgages after the state’s six-year statute of limitations had passed.

Mark Anderson, an attorney at the Queens-based law firm Shiryak, Bowman, Anderson, Gill and Kadochnikov, which filed the case, said his firm noticed an uptick in foreclosure cases initially filed in the wake of the subprime crisis more than a decade ago and now being revived, despite the statute of limitations expiring.

“I have over 500 cases that are dealing with this issue — and that’s just my firm,” said Anderson. He believes thousands of homeowners could qualify to be part of the suit if it gets class-action status.

The complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in November. The defendants are accused of resurrecting foreclosure actions that have expired and, in doing so, violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, which prevents debt collectors from using false and deceptive representations.

Anderson said his firm filed the suit now because of recent federal court rulings that he believes are favorable to holding to foreclosure firms, servicers and banks liable for violations of the act.

The law awards consumers statutory damages of $1,000 per violation, attorneys’ fees and — in some cases — damages for proven emotional or physical harm.

If you think foreclosures are a thing of the past, think again

In order to maintain the illusion of legality and an orderly marketplace the banks and their servicers must continue to push foreclosures even if it means going after people who are not actually withholding payments. The legacy of the mortgage meltdown and the brainless government policies that let the banks get away with what they had done, is that the crime not only continues but is being repeated with each new claimed securitization or “resecuritization” of residential loans.

As I predicted in 2006, the  tidal wave of foreclosures was in fact unprecedented, underestimated and continues to this day. With a starting point of around 2002, foreclosures attributed to the mortgage meltdown have continued unabated for 17 years. I said it would 20-30 years and I am sticking with that, although new evidence suggests it will go on much longer. So far more than 40 million people have been displaced from their homes and their lives.

Google Buffalo and New Jersey, for example and see whether they think foreclosures are a thing of the past. They don’t. And the people in Buffalo are echoing sentiments across the nation where the economy seems better, unemployment is down, wages are supposedly increasing but foreclosures are also increasing.

And let’s not forget that back in the early and mid 2000’s foreclosures did not mention trustees or trusts. In fact when the subject was raised by homeowners it was vehemently denied in courts cross the country. The denials were that the trusts even existed. This was not from some homeowner or local lawyer. This was from the banks and their attorneys. It turns out they were telling the truth then.

The trusts didn’t exist and there were no trustees. But in the upside down world of foreclosure here we are with most foreclosures filed in the name of a nonexistent implied trust on behalf of a “trustee” with no trustee powers, obligations or duties to administer any assets much less loans in foreclosure.

In order to understand this you must throw out any ideas of a rational market driven by fundamental economics and accept the fact that the banks  and their servicers continue to be engaged in the largest economic crime in human history. Their objective is foreclosure because that accomplishes two goals: first, it rubber stamps prior illegal practices and theft of borrowers’ identities for purposes of trading profits and second, it gives them a free house and free money.

If they lose a foreclosure case nobody suffers a financial loss. If they win, which they do most of the time (except where homeowners aggressively defend) they get a free house and the proceeds of sale are distributed to the players who are laughing, pardon the pun, all the way to the bank. Investors get ZERO.

As for modifications, look closely. The creditor is being changed along with the principal interest and payments. It might just be a new loan, except for the fact the new “lender” is a servicer like Ocwen who has not advanced any money for the purchase or acquisition the loan. But that’s OK because neither did the lender or the claimant. Modification is a PR stunt to make it look like the banks are doing something for borrowers when in fact they are stealing or reassigning the loan to a totally different party from anyone who previously appeared in the chain of title.

Modification allows the banks to claim that the loan is performing — thus maintaining the false foundation supporting trades and profits amounting to dozens of times the amount of the loan. Watch what happens when you ask for acknowledgement from the named Plaintiff in judicial states or the named beneficiary in nonjudicial states. You won’t get it. If US Bank was really a trustee then acknowledging a settlement on its behalf would not be a problem. As it stands, that is off the table.

The mega banks, with unlimited deep pockets derived from their massive economic crimes, began a campaign of whack-a-mole to create the impression that foreclosures were on the decline and the crisis is over. Their complex plan involves decreasing the number of filed foreclosures where the numbers are climbing and increasing the filed foreclosures where they have allowed the numbers to sink. Add that to their planted articles in Newspapers and Magazines around the country and it all adds up to the impression that foreclosures derived from claimed securitized loans are declining.

Not so fast. There were over 600,000 reported foreclosures last year and the numbers are rising this year. Most of them involve false claims of securitization where the named claimant is simply appointed to pretend to be the injured party. It isn’t and in many cases a close look at the “name” of the claimant reveals that no legal person or entity is actually named.

US Bank is often named but not really present. It says it is not appearing on its own behalf but as Trustee. The trust is not specifically named but is implied without the custom and practice of naming the jurisdiction in which the trust was organized or the jurisdiction in which it maintains a business. That’s because there is no trust and there is no business and US Bank owns no debt, note or mortgage in any capacity. The certificates are held by investors who acknowledge that they have no right, title or interest in the debt, note or mortgage. So who is the claimant? Close inspection reveals that nobody is named.

In fact, those foreclosures proceed often without contest because homeowners mistakenly believe they are in default. In equity, if the facts were allowed in as evidence, the homeowner would be entitled to a share of the bounty that was a windfall to the investment bank and its affiliates by trading on the borrower’s signature. A “free house” only partially compensates the homeowner for the illegal noncensual trading on his name with the intent of screwing him/her later.

Upon liquidation of the property the proceeds of sale are deposited not by an owner of the debt, but by one of the players who just added insult to injury to both the borrower and the original investors who paid real money but failed to get an interest in the fabricated closing documents — i.e., the note and mortgage.

The Banks have succeeded in getting everyone to think about how unfair it is that homeowners would even think of pursuing a “free house”. By doing that they distract from the fact that the homeowners and the investors who put up the origination or acquisition money are both excluded from the huge profits generated by trading on the signature of borrowers and the money of investors who do not get to share in the bounty, which is often 20-40 times the amount of the loan.

The courts don’t want to hear about esoteric arguments about the securitization process. Judges assume that somewhere in the complex moving parts of the securitization scheme there is an owner of the debt who will get compensated as a result of the homeowner’s refusal or failure to make monthly payments of interest and principal. That assumption is untrue.

This is revealed when the money from the sale of property is traced. If you trace the check you will be mislead. Regardless of where the check is mailed, the check is actually cashed by a servicer who deposits it to the account of an investment bank who has already received many times the amount of the loan principal. That money is neither credited to the account of the borrower nor reported, much less distributed to investors who bought certificates (wrongly named “mortgage bonds”).

Neither the investors who bought the original uncertificated certificates nor the investors who purchased contracts based upon the apparent value of the certificates ever see a penny of the proceeds of a foreclosure sale.

In order to maintain the illusion of legality and an orderly marketplace the banks and their servicers must continue to push foreclosures even if it means going after people who are not actually withholding payments. The legacy of the mortgage meltdown and the brainless government policies that let the banks get away with what they had done, is that the crime not only continues but is being repeated with each new claimed securitization or “resecuritization” of residential loans.

When the economy contracts, as it always does, the number of foreclosures will shoot up like a thermometer held over a steam radiator. And instead of actually looking for facts people will presume them. And that will lead to more tragedy and more inequality of income, wealth and opportunity in a country that should be all about a level playing field. This is not the marketplace doing its work. It is the perversion of the marketplace caused by outsized and unchecked power of the banks.

My solution is predicated on the idea that everyone is to blame for this. Everyone involved should share in losses and gains from this illicit scheme. Foreclosures should come to a virtual halt. Current servicers should be barred from any connection with these loan accounts. Risk and loss should be shared based upon an equitable formula. And securitization should be allowed to continue as long as securitization is actually happening — so long as the investors and borrowers are aware that they are the only two principals on opposite sides of a complex transaction in which trading profits are likely as part of the disclosed compensation of the intermediaries in the loans originated or acquired.

Disclosure allows the borrowers and the investors to bargain for better deals — to share in the bounty. And if there is no such bounty with full disclosure it will then be because market forces have decided that there should not be any such rewards.

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