If you think foreclosures are a thing of the past, think again

In order to maintain the illusion of legality and an orderly marketplace the banks and their servicers must continue to push foreclosures even if it means going after people who are not actually withholding payments. The legacy of the mortgage meltdown and the brainless government policies that let the banks get away with what they had done, is that the crime not only continues but is being repeated with each new claimed securitization or “resecuritization” of residential loans.

As I predicted in 2006, the  tidal wave of foreclosures was in fact unprecedented, underestimated and continues to this day. With a starting point of around 2002, foreclosures attributed to the mortgage meltdown have continued unabated for 17 years. I said it would 20-30 years and I am sticking with that, although new evidence suggests it will go on much longer. So far more than 40 million people have been displaced from their homes and their lives.

Google Buffalo and New Jersey, for example and see whether they think foreclosures are a thing of the past. They don’t. And the people in Buffalo are echoing sentiments across the nation where the economy seems better, unemployment is down, wages are supposedly increasing but foreclosures are also increasing.

And let’s not forget that back in the early and mid 2000’s foreclosures did not mention trustees or trusts. In fact when the subject was raised by homeowners it was vehemently denied in courts cross the country. The denials were that the trusts even existed. This was not from some homeowner or local lawyer. This was from the banks and their attorneys. It turns out they were telling the truth then.

The trusts didn’t exist and there were no trustees. But in the upside down world of foreclosure here we are with most foreclosures filed in the name of a nonexistent implied trust on behalf of a “trustee” with no trustee powers, obligations or duties to administer any assets much less loans in foreclosure.

In order to understand this you must throw out any ideas of a rational market driven by fundamental economics and accept the fact that the banks  and their servicers continue to be engaged in the largest economic crime in human history. Their objective is foreclosure because that accomplishes two goals: first, it rubber stamps prior illegal practices and theft of borrowers’ identities for purposes of trading profits and second, it gives them a free house and free money.

If they lose a foreclosure case nobody suffers a financial loss. If they win, which they do most of the time (except where homeowners aggressively defend) they get a free house and the proceeds of sale are distributed to the players who are laughing, pardon the pun, all the way to the bank. Investors get ZERO.

As for modifications, look closely. The creditor is being changed along with the principal interest and payments. It might just be a new loan, except for the fact the new “lender” is a servicer like Ocwen who has not advanced any money for the purchase or acquisition the loan. But that’s OK because neither did the lender or the claimant. Modification is a PR stunt to make it look like the banks are doing something for borrowers when in fact they are stealing or reassigning the loan to a totally different party from anyone who previously appeared in the chain of title.

Modification allows the banks to claim that the loan is performing — thus maintaining the false foundation supporting trades and profits amounting to dozens of times the amount of the loan. Watch what happens when you ask for acknowledgement from the named Plaintiff in judicial states or the named beneficiary in nonjudicial states. You won’t get it. If US Bank was really a trustee then acknowledging a settlement on its behalf would not be a problem. As it stands, that is off the table.

The mega banks, with unlimited deep pockets derived from their massive economic crimes, began a campaign of whack-a-mole to create the impression that foreclosures were on the decline and the crisis is over. Their complex plan involves decreasing the number of filed foreclosures where the numbers are climbing and increasing the filed foreclosures where they have allowed the numbers to sink. Add that to their planted articles in Newspapers and Magazines around the country and it all adds up to the impression that foreclosures derived from claimed securitized loans are declining.

Not so fast. There were over 600,000 reported foreclosures last year and the numbers are rising this year. Most of them involve false claims of securitization where the named claimant is simply appointed to pretend to be the injured party. It isn’t and in many cases a close look at the “name” of the claimant reveals that no legal person or entity is actually named.

US Bank is often named but not really present. It says it is not appearing on its own behalf but as Trustee. The trust is not specifically named but is implied without the custom and practice of naming the jurisdiction in which the trust was organized or the jurisdiction in which it maintains a business. That’s because there is no trust and there is no business and US Bank owns no debt, note or mortgage in any capacity. The certificates are held by investors who acknowledge that they have no right, title or interest in the debt, note or mortgage. So who is the claimant? Close inspection reveals that nobody is named.

In fact, those foreclosures proceed often without contest because homeowners mistakenly believe they are in default. In equity, if the facts were allowed in as evidence, the homeowner would be entitled to a share of the bounty that was a windfall to the investment bank and its affiliates by trading on the borrower’s signature. A “free house” only partially compensates the homeowner for the illegal noncensual trading on his name with the intent of screwing him/her later.

Upon liquidation of the property the proceeds of sale are deposited not by an owner of the debt, but by one of the players who just added insult to injury to both the borrower and the original investors who paid real money but failed to get an interest in the fabricated closing documents — i.e., the note and mortgage.

The Banks have succeeded in getting everyone to think about how unfair it is that homeowners would even think of pursuing a “free house”. By doing that they distract from the fact that the homeowners and the investors who put up the origination or acquisition money are both excluded from the huge profits generated by trading on the signature of borrowers and the money of investors who do not get to share in the bounty, which is often 20-40 times the amount of the loan.

The courts don’t want to hear about esoteric arguments about the securitization process. Judges assume that somewhere in the complex moving parts of the securitization scheme there is an owner of the debt who will get compensated as a result of the homeowner’s refusal or failure to make monthly payments of interest and principal. That assumption is untrue.

This is revealed when the money from the sale of property is traced. If you trace the check you will be mislead. Regardless of where the check is mailed, the check is actually cashed by a servicer who deposits it to the account of an investment bank who has already received many times the amount of the loan principal. That money is neither credited to the account of the borrower nor reported, much less distributed to investors who bought certificates (wrongly named “mortgage bonds”).

Neither the investors who bought the original uncertificated certificates nor the investors who purchased contracts based upon the apparent value of the certificates ever see a penny of the proceeds of a foreclosure sale.

In order to maintain the illusion of legality and an orderly marketplace the banks and their servicers must continue to push foreclosures even if it means going after people who are not actually withholding payments. The legacy of the mortgage meltdown and the brainless government policies that let the banks get away with what they had done, is that the crime not only continues but is being repeated with each new claimed securitization or “resecuritization” of residential loans.

When the economy contracts, as it always does, the number of foreclosures will shoot up like a thermometer held over a steam radiator. And instead of actually looking for facts people will presume them. And that will lead to more tragedy and more inequality of income, wealth and opportunity in a country that should be all about a level playing field. This is not the marketplace doing its work. It is the perversion of the marketplace caused by outsized and unchecked power of the banks.

My solution is predicated on the idea that everyone is to blame for this. Everyone involved should share in losses and gains from this illicit scheme. Foreclosures should come to a virtual halt. Current servicers should be barred from any connection with these loan accounts. Risk and loss should be shared based upon an equitable formula. And securitization should be allowed to continue as long as securitization is actually happening — so long as the investors and borrowers are aware that they are the only two principals on opposite sides of a complex transaction in which trading profits are likely as part of the disclosed compensation of the intermediaries in the loans originated or acquired.

Disclosure allows the borrowers and the investors to bargain for better deals — to share in the bounty. And if there is no such bounty with full disclosure it will then be because market forces have decided that there should not be any such rewards.

PTSD: A Breakdown of Securitization in the Real World

By using the methods of magicians who distract the viewer from what is really happening the banks have managed to hoodwink even the victims and their lawyers into thinking that collection and foreclosure on “securitized” loans are real and proper. Nobody actually stops to ask whether the named claimant is actually going to receive the benefit of the remedy (foreclosure) they are seeking.

When you break it down you can see that in many cases the investment banks, posing as Master Servicers are the parties getting the monetary proceeds of sale of foreclosed property. None of the parties in the chain have lost any money but each of them is participating in a scheme to foreclose on the property for fun and profit.

Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult or check us out on www.lendinglies.com. Order a PDR BASIC to have us review and comment on your notice of TILA Rescission or similar document.
I provide advice and consultation to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key required elements of a scam — in and out of court. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM.
A few hundred dollars well spent is worth a lifetime of financial ruin.
PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORM WITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION. OUR PRIVACY POLICY IS THAT WE DON’T USE THE FORM EXCEPT TO SPEAK WITH YOU OR PERFORM WORK FOR YOU. THE INFORMATION ON THE FORMS ARE NOT SOLD NOR LICENSED IN ANY MANNER, SHAPE OR FORM. NO EXCEPTIONS.
Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345 or 954-451-1230. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
========================

It is worth distinguishing between four sets of investors which I will call P, T, S and D.

The P group of investors were Pension funds and other stable managed funds. They purchased the first round of derivative contracts sometimes known as asset backed securities or mortgage backed securities. Managers of hedge funds that performed due diligence quickly saw that that the investment was backed only by the good faith and credit of the issuing investment bank and not by collateral, debts or mortgages or even notes from borrowers. Other fund managers, for reasons of their own, chose to overlook the process of due diligence and relied upon the appearance of high ratings from Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch combined with the appearance of insurance on the investment. The P group were part of the reason that the Federal reserve and the US Treasury department decided to prop up what was obviously a wrongful and fraudulent scheme. Pulling the plug, in the view of the top regulators, would have destroyed the investment portfolio of many if not most stable managed funds.

The T group of investors were traders. Traders provide market liquidity which is so highly prized and necessary for a capitalist economy to maintain prosperity. The T group, consisting of hedge funds and others with an appetitive for risk purchased derivatives on derivatives, including credit default swaps that were disguised sales of loan portfolios that once sold, no longer existed. Yet the same portfolio was sold multiple time turning a hefty profit but resulted in a huge liability when the loans soured during the process of securitization of the paper (not the debt). The market froze when the loans soured; nobody would buy more certificates. The Ponzi scheme was over. Another example that Lehman pioneered was “minibonds” which were not bonds and they were not small. These were resales of the credit default swaps aggregated into a false portfolio. The traders in this group included the major investment banks. As an example, Goldman Sachs purchased insurance on portfolios of certificates (MBS) that it did not own but under contract law the contract was perfectly legal, even if it was simply a bet. When the market froze and AIG could not pay off the bet, Hank Paulson, former CEO of Goldman Sachs literally begged George W Bush to bail out AIG and “save the banks.” What was saved was Goldman’s profit on the insurance contract in which it reaped tens of billions of dollars in payments for nonexistent losses that could have been attributed to people who actually had money at risk in loans to borrowers, except that no such person existed.

The S group of investors were scavengers who were well connected with the world of finance or part of the world of finance. It was the S group that created OneWest over a weekend, and later members of the S group would be fictitious buyers of “re-securitized” interests in prior loans that were subject to false claims of securitization of the paper. This was an effort to correct obvious irregularities that were thought to expose a vulnerability of the investment banks.

The D group of investors are dummies who purchased securitization certificates entitling them to income indexed on recovery of servicer advances and other dubious claims. The interesting thing about this is that the Master Servicer does appear to have a claim for money that is labeled as a “servicer advance,” even if there was no advance or the servicer did not advance any funds. The claim is contingent upon there being a foreclosure and eventual sale of the property to a third party. Money paid to investors from a fund of investor money to satisfy the promise to pay contained in the “certificate” or “MBS” or “Mortgage Bond,” is labeled, at the discretion of the Master Servicer as a Servicer Advance even though the servicer did not advance any money.

This is important because the timing of foreclosures is often based entirely on when the “Servicer Advances” are equal to or exceed the equity in the property. Hence the only actual recipient of money from the foreclosure is not the P investors, not any investors and not the trust or purported trustee but rather the Master Servicer. In short, the Master servicer is leveraging an unsecured claim and riding on the back of an apparently secured claim in which the named claimant will receive no benefits from the remedy demanded in court or in a non-judicial foreclosure.

NOTE that securitization took place in four parts and in three different directions:

  1. The debt to the T group of investors.
  2. The notes to the T and S group of traders
  3. The mortgage (without the debt) to a nominee — usually a fictitious trust serving as the fictitious name of the investment bank (Lehman in this case).
  4. Securitization of spillover money that guaranteed receipt of money that was probably never due or payable.

Note that the P group of investors is not included because they do not ever collect money from borrowers and their certificates grant no right, title or interest in the debt, note or mortgage. When you read references to “securitization fail” (see Adam Levitin) this is part of what the writers are talking about. The securitization that everyone is talking about never happened. The P investors are not owners or beneficiaries entitled to income, interest or principal from loans to borrowers. They are entitled to an income stream as loans the investment bank chooses to pay it. Bailouts or even borrower payoffs are not credited to the the P group nor any trust. Their income remains the same regardless of whether the borrower is paying or not.

Why Fabrications? Why Forgeries?

In an increasing number of foreclosure cases, homeowners are going head to head with the lawyers who file claims on behalf of entities on the basis of fabricated and/or forged instruments that in many cases were also recorded in county records. Lawyers like Dan Khwaja in Illinois are getting clearer and clearer about it. They hire experts who understand exactly how the notes are mechanically created and the endorsements are not real signatures.

The key question is why would the notes have been fabricated and forged when there actually was a closing and a note was actually signed? We’re talking about the financial industry whose reputation depends upon safeguarding all signed documents. If they didn’t safeguard the documents and instead destroyed them or “lost” them, why was that allowed to happen?

==============================
Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult or check us out on www.lendinglies.com. Order a PDR BASIC to have us review and comment on your notice of TILA Rescission or similar document.
I provide advice and consultation to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key required elements of a scam — in and out of court. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM.
A few hundred dollars well spent is worth a lifetime of financial ruin.
PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORM WITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION. OUR PRIVACY POLICY IS THAT WE DON’T USE THE FORM EXCEPT TO SPEAK WITH YOU OR PERFORM WORK FOR YOU. THE INFORMATION ON THE FORMS ARE NOT SOLD NOR LICENSED IN ANY MANNER, SHAPE OR FORM. NO EXCEPTIONS.
Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345 or 954-451-1230. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
==========================

So we have a case in Illinois where lawyers filed a judicial foreclosure on behalf of Bank of New York/Mellon (BONY) as trustee (i.e. representative of) “holders” of certificates. The lawyers attach a copy of a note and indorsements. Khwaja hired an expert who found quite definitively that the note and the endorsements were all fabricated (forged). Khwaja has filed a motion for summary judgment.

Here is my analysis:

*
The lawyers who filed the claim have a serious problem. If they cannot convince the judge that they have no need to respond they are dead in the water. They must either pay someone to commit perjury or seek to amend with an actual original note. In view of prior studies that show that most (or at least half) of all notes were “lost or destroyed” immediately following the “closing” combined with your expert on hand, coming up with the original note is not an option.
*
And that brings us to the question of “why?” If there really was a closing at which the borrower signed documents, why do they need fabricated documents? To me, the answer is simple. In order to sell the same loan multiple times they needed to convert from actual to imaged documents. The actual one had to disappear. And the handful of megabanks who had a virtual monopoly on tens of millions of mortgage transactions made it “custom and practice” to use images rather than actual documents. [This practice has spilled over to property sale contracts where neither party gets an original].
*
And we have the additional issue which is presented by the foreclosure complaint. It says that BONY appears on behalf of the holders of certificates. The simple question is “so what?”
*
Being holders of certificates means nothing. It leaves out any assertion that the holders of the certificates are owners of the certificates, or anything that might identify those “holders”. So the proceeds of foreclosure could then go to whoever was chosen by the parties actually pulling the strings.
*
They are asking the court to fill in the blanks. They want the court to draw an inference without ever stating the fact to be inferred, to wit: the holders of the certificates are owners of the certificates who are therefore owners of the debt, note and mortgage. There simply is no such allegation nor any exhibit indicating that is true. The reason is that it is not true.
*
So who is really the Plaintiff? Supposedly not BONY who is appearing in a representative capacity.
*
If “sanctions” were applied against the “Plaintiff” BONY would claim it is not the actual party and that the unidentified “holders” of certificates are the proper party or perhaps an implied trust.
*
So then is it the certificate holders, represented by BONY? But they don’t have any right, title or interest to the subject debt, note or mortgage. The prospectus and certificate indentures make that abundantly clear in most cases.
*
Examining what happens after a foreclosure is “successful” provides clues. Neither BONY nor any certificate holder ever receives the actual money from the proceeds of the purported sale of the property.
*
So who does?
*
As the one party with actual control over the loan receivable, the investment bank that created the “securitization” scheme is the only party that comes close to being an actual creditor. But here is their problem: that loan receivable has been sold multiple times. This not only leaves them with no claim to the debt, but a surplus of funds over and above the amount due on what was the loan receivable. It’s basic accounting and bookkeeping. And if that were not true the banks would not be doing it.
*
So in the real world it is the investment bank that gets the proceeds of a foreclosure sale. But they do it as the “Master Servicer” of an implied (and nonexistent) trust. The money simply disappears.
*
In order to get away with selling the debt multiple times they had to make each sale a non recourse sale. And they did that. So the buyers of the debt, note and mortgage had no actual legal title to the debt, note and mortgage and no recourse to the borrower to collect on the unpaid debt.
*
THAT leaves NOBODY as owner of a debt that has probably been extinguished and reveals the paper issued to buyers/investors as essentially the issuance of cash equivalent instruments (also known as currency). And THAT is the reason the banks, after  two decades of this nonsense, have yet to come to court and simply say “here is proof of our funding of the origination or purchase of the debt, note and mortgage.”
*
If they did, they would be admitting to lying in millions of foreclosure cases over at least a 15 year period of time. Their scheme effectively concentrated the risk of loss on investors and borrowers while literally retaining all the benefits of supposed loan transactions for the sole benefit of the intermediaries, who then leveraged loans multiple times.
*
This translates as follows: the money taken from investors is an unsecured liability of the investment bank. To be sure that has a value — but not a value derived from loans to homeowners. THAT value was taken by the investment bank who cashed in on it already.
*
Note: For certain second tier investment bankers there were transition periods in which they were at actual risk. Examples include Lehman and Bear Stearns. But the top tier was able to sell forward on the certificates and never commit a single dime of their own money into the securitization scheme even in transition. But by pointing to Lehman and Bear Stearns they were able to convince policy makers that they were in the same position. This produced the “bailout” which was essentially the payment of even more money for losses that did not exist.
*
In an odd twist of irony, Wells Fargo was the only party (2009) that admitted to no loss but was forced to take bailout money so that other “less fortunate” parties would not be singled out as weak institutions.
*
In truth the AIG bailout and similar bailouts were merely payments of extra profits to Goldman Sachs and some other players, leaving investors and borrowers stranded with nearly worthless investments and collapsed markets for both homes, whose prices had been inflated by over 100% over value, and a nonexistent market for the bogus certificates that the Fed chose to revive by its purchasing program of “mortgage bonds” that were neither bonds nor backed by mortgages.
*
Despite the complexity of all this, on a certain level most people understand that the banks caused the misery of the meltdown and profited from it.  They also understand that it is still happening. The failure of government to deal appropriately with the existential threat posed by the megabanks clearly played into and perhaps caused the social unrest around the world in the form of “populist” movements. And until governments deal with this issue head-on, people will be looking for political candidates who show that they are willing to take a wrecking ball to the banks and anyone who is protecting them.
*
In the meanwhile, an increasing number of homeowners (again) are walking away from homes in the mistaken belief that they have an unpaid debt to the party named as the claimant against them.

FLA S Ct Reverses Course on Homeowner’s Award of Attorney Fees and Raises Other Issues for Defense of Foreclosures

For those of us that have access to the data, we know that homeowners are winning foreclosure cases all the time. Nobody else knows because as soon as a homeowner wins or gets into a winning position they are offered money for their silence. The situation worsened when Florida and courts in other states turned down the homeowner’s demand for attorney fees after the homeowner had flat out won the case — especially where the case was dismissed for lack of standing.

Here the homeowner once again wins, having advanced several defense narratives. The homeowner applies for recovery of attorney fees and the demand is rejected because the loan contract no longer exists or because the party seeking to use it was shown not to be party to it, at least when suit was commenced. The Florida Supreme Court reversed that decision and rejected others like it.

Recognizing the danger of the erroneous rulings from the trial court and the district courts of appeal, the Court rejected arguments that a dismissal, voluntary or otherwise, based upon lack of standing meant that the loan contract no longer existed. While not completely abandoning the lower courts the Florida Supreme Court has narrowed the issues such that it is again almost always arguable and even inevitable that if the homeowner wins the foreclosure case an award of fees will follow.

fla s ct attny fees 1-4-19 sc17-1387 Glass v Nationwide

see also Follow Up Article to this Article

==============================
Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult or check us out on www.lendinglies.com.
I provide advice and consultation to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key required elements of a scam — in and out of court. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM.
A few hundred dollars well spent is worth a lifetime of financial ruin.
PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORM WITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION. OUR PRIVACY POLICY IS THAT WE DON’T USE THE FORM EXCEPT TO SPEAK WITH YOU OR PERFORM WORK FOR YOU. THE INFORMATION ON THE FORMS ARE NOT SOLD NOR LICENSED IN ANY MANNER, SHAPE OR FORM. NO EXCEPTIONS.
Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345 or 954-451-1230. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
==========================

This case opens a can of worms for the banks and servicers and corroborates much of what I have been writing for 12 years.

At issue was the homeowner’s right to prevail on an attorney fees award after winning the case in the trial court. This has previously been denied on the basis that cases dismissed for lack of standing meant that there was not contract. But the Florida Supreme Court says that the fact that just because the party involved had no right to enforce the contract doesn’t mean there was no contract.

The clear implication here is that the court did not want the erroneous rulings of trial courts and appellate district courts to be construed as completely canceling the loan contract. Any other ruling would be inherently ruling on the rights of unidentified third parties who DID have a right to collection of payment from the borrower’s debt and who did have a right to enforcement — without any notice to them because they are undisclosed and unknown.

The Supreme Court ruled that failure to allege or prove standing does not negate the fact that the homeowner is the prevailing party and entitled to fees under F.S. 57.105(7).

Citing its own decision in 1989, Katz v Van Der Noord 546 So 2d 1047, the Supreme Court held that even if the contract is rescinded or held to be unenforceable the prevailing party is still entitled to fees under the reciprocity provisions of F.S. 57.105(7).

This upends a basic strategy of the banks and servicers. Up until this decision they were virtually guaranteed an award of fees and costs if they won and immunity to fees if they lost. This reopens the fees issue and may give attorneys a reason to accept foreclosure defense cases — even on contingency or partial contingency.

But the court, perhaps in dicta, also mentions whether the note is negotiable, quoting from the homeowner’s arguments and pleadings.

Up until now the mere existence of the original note and in many cases a copy of the note, was sufficient to regard the note as a negotiable instrument. But the Florida Supreme Court is hinting at something here that the banks and servicers really don’t want to hear, to wit: it takes more that announcing the existence of a note to make it negotiable. This is not so.

Which brings me to my final point: read carefully the day the claimant is introduced and you will probably find that the note and assignment are not facially valid because they require reference to parole or extrinsic evidence. This bars legal presumptions, at least in the absence of a specific reference to the documents supporting the execution of the instrument as a substitution of trustee, an assignment or an endorsement.

The court was more than hinting at the idea that subsequent treatment of the note, which may have been a negotiable instrument at the time of execution (if the “lender” was in fact the lender). The question is whether the note is facially valid, to wit: whether the note specifically names a maker, payee and an unconditional promise to pay. If the originator was not the lender then extrinsic evidence would be required to prove the loan and the debt and the party who would have been appropriately named as payee on the note.

If subsequent indorsements or assignments for a note that WAS negotiable remove certainty from one or more of the elements of a facially valid instruments, then it is no longer a negotiable instrument. And THAT means that the all “reasonable” assumptions and legal preemptions are taken off the table.

The reason is simple. In order to be a negotiable instrument the assignee or successor must have certainty as to the parties and terms of the note. If extrinsic or parole evidence is required to provide that certainty the instrument is not negotiable and thus not entitled to any assumptions or presumptions.

So for example (taken from another case) when a Substitution of Trustee occurs in a nonjudicial state and it is executed by “U.S. Bank National Association, as trustee, in trust for registered Holders of First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-FF I, by Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., as attorney-in-fact” then there are several points that require extrinsic or parole evidence, making the note non negotiable or at least arguably so.

In this scenario for an assignee to take a note from a party claiming rights to enforce in this instance one must know

  1. The name of the Trust, and the jurisdiction in which it was organized and is now existing.
  2. The instrument by which US Bank claims to be trustee
  3. Identification of “registered holders”
  4. The identification and content of the certificates
  5. The instrument by which SPS claims to be “attorney in fact”
  6. If you look closely you will also see that there is a question as to whom it is claimed that SPS is representing as attorney in fact. In any event “attorney in fact” means that a power of attorney exists but without specific reference to that power of attorney by date and parties, extrinsic or parole evidence is required meaning that no assumptions or legal presumptions may be made.

In other words the note cannot be accepted by anyone without extrinsic evidence. The fact that documents are apparently accepted by the assignees doesn’t change anything as to the facial validity of the document. Without facial validity there can be no negotiability under Article 3 of the UCC. Without negotiability there can be no assumptions or legal presumptions and thus the claimant must prove every element of its claim without presumptions.

And of course when the homeowner wins an award of attorney fees is now once again probable in addition to court costs.

Remember always: the point is not who can get away with enforcement. The point of the law is assuring that the owner of the debt is the one enforcing the debt and collecting the proceeds of enforcement. Before false claims of securitization this premise was almost universally true. Now it is rarely true that the true owner of the debt is represented.

And the apparent absence of such a party due to manipulation of the debt by intermediaries, does not legally create a vacuum into which anyone with knowledge and access to data may step in and claim rights of enforcement. As stated in California Ivanova decision the law does not allow the borrower’s debt to be owed to anyone whose premise is simply that they claim it.

Older Forensic Title Analyses Need Updating — Even Ours

 A recent request from an old client brought to mind the changes that have occurred, as in her case, since 2011 — more than 7 years ago.
A quick review indicates that the facts were correct but the conclusions need tweaking. And the title record should be updated. Many new laws and case decisions have occurred since that report was finished and many new facts have been revealed about these older transactions.

For example it now appears that our assumption about the flow of payments was incorrect.
  1. Your payments were being made to a subservicer who was forwarding money on a separate contract to a Master Servicer.
  2. The Master Servicer then authorized, in its sole discretion, third parties to make certain payments to investors who had purchased certificates issued in the name of a trust, which turns out to not exist.
  3. The trust name was being used as a fictitious name for the named underwriter of the certificate offering. But the actual transaction was not an underwriting; it was simply a sale by the party posing as underwriter (implying it was working for a third party, presumably the nonexistent trust).
  4. By contract, the investors purchased their right to receive money arising out of a promise to pay issued by the named underwriter (i.e., seller) that was unrelated to the terms of repayment on any note.
  5. And most importantly the investors waived any right, title or interest to the loans, debts, notes or mortgages.
  6. Thus you can see that actions undertaken in the name of the holders of certificates or a REMIC Trust or the Trustee of a REMIC trust are all fabricated, to hide the fact that the obligation of the borrower has been transformed into an unsecured obligation to pay intermediaries who converted the investors’ money and thus claim to be principals entitled to enforce a debt in which they had no investment.
  7. Most of the documents uploaded to SEC.gov, if at all, are either unsigned or incomplete (or both) lacking a mortgage loan schedule or any reference to a particular loan. Such documents are ONLY uploaded to SEC.GOV which has no power to charter or approve any entities nor their filings, as long as they have been granted access to upload documents. Their existence on SEC.GOV means nothing.
  8. An assignment without actual transfer of the debt is without effect. In virtually all cases involving false claims of securitization no payment of any kind was ever made by any party in the chain for the origination or purchase of the loan. Our Case Analysis examines the issues arising from transfer of a promissory note which can cause legal presumptions to arise concerning ownership of the debt and transfers thereof.
  9. Analysis of the fictitious “trust” documents reveals the absence of essential elements of a trust hence leading to the conclusion that no actual trust was intended notwithstanding the illusions and implications contained in the documents themselves and the representations of attorneys and representatives of “servicers” to the contrary. Upon case analysis (apart from title analysis contained in our TERA report) the following basic elements of a trust are usually absent.
    1. Complete signed trust instrument
    2. Trustee with powers to administer the affairs of the trust and the trust assets
    3. Trustor/settlor creating the trust.
    4. Beneficiaries of the trust
    5. RES: anything that has been entrusted to the named trustee to manage on behalf of the beneficiaries
My suggestion, if the issues are still pending, is that you order the current TERA and the PDR PLUS, which includes a recorded CONSULT.
CLICK HERE TO ORDER CONSULT (not if you order PDR)
CLICK HERE TO ORDER PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT REVIEW (PDR BASIC or more probably the PDR PLUS, in your case — includes CONSULT)

Foreclosure Defense Discovery Timeline

In answer to a number of very similar questions about the paid services we provide on www.lendinglies.com regarding the subject of Discovery, I submit the following:

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The TERA will definitely give you narrative from which you can cut and paste questions or at least ideas on what questions you could ask in discovery. But it is far from a complete analysis for discovery. It is a part of the analysis required to come up with a complete defense narrative that you can use to guide you through litigation and educate the judge on what is wrong with the false case against you and your property (if that is the case).
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The Case Analysis goes much deeper and completes the defense narrative as well as providing you with more in depth insight that can be used for cut and paste into discovery and the narrative for defending your discovery requests which most certainly come under attack.
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Discovery is a multi faceted approach.
  • First you have the QWR and DVL.
  • Then you have the complaints to the State AG and the CFPB.
  • Response to statutory letters often provide the basis for the next step, because your opposition will evade, lie, and provide inconsistent answers. 
  • It is not uncommon to see them back off of a sale or dismiss a foreclosure case entirely when confronted with questions and accusations from the homeowner. 
  • The next step in the discovery process is the filing in court and service of discovery requests (usually limited to a specified number — i.e., you might need to submit more than one set) in the form of one or more of the following:
    • Interrogatories
    • Request to Produce (only aimed at party who is named in litigation)
    • Subpoena for documents
    • Subpoena for deposition duces decum
    • Request for Admissions
    • Request to enter or inspect
  • Following the filing and service of any discovery request you will almost definitely be met with objections and motions to strike and so forth. You must use the defense narrative to justify your questions and to answer how your request might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. This part requires an aggressive stance — one that is often missed by pro se litigants and foreclosure defense lawyers.
  • Once you have received an order commanding compliance with your discovery request you will probably need to consider filing a motion for sanctions for non compliance. (We know that they will never admit that there is no trust or that the claimant has no interest in the loan or that the claimant won’t receive the proceeds of liquidation of the property.)
  • And lastly you will need to preserve objections before trial and possibly file a motion in limine to restrict the evidence your opposition can introduce at trial to the extent that includes discovery items they refused to give you.
While the questions will generally follow the same theme from case to case your discovery will be shot down if it is not specific according to your  defense narrative for this case alone.
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We provide all these services either through www.lendinglies.com or by direct retainer of Neil Garfield (neilfgarfield@hotmail.com) as an expert consultant or for legal consulting and analysis that can be used in conjunction with and in support of a local attorney.
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In order to put all these elements into an actual plan for your case alone, you must submit the REGISTRATION FORM to us before even beginning. Put as much information on then form as you can do. The less information you give the more work we must do and must charge you for us to do the work.
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Finally that leads to the Consult. Usually a thirty minute CONSULT is sufficient. In that conversation we decide on the path that you wish us to take in preparing pre litigation and litigation documents. Later Consults are for strategic assistance in confronting the efforts of the lawyers for often nonexistent clients to obfuscate, wear you down and thus defeat you.
*
Generally speaking we require consults to be ordered with the PDR (Preliminary Document Review). This pays us to review some of your documents and the most recent reports and correspondence in preparation for the Consult with me, Neil Garfield.
*
But all of this work is virtually identical to the background work needed to defend against a motion for summary judgment. However, if you want us to write the opposing motion and brief you need to hire us to do that by direct retainer of Neil Garfield (neilfgarfield@hotmail.com) as an expert consultant or for legal consulting and analysis that can be used in conjunction with and in support of a local attorney.

How to Choose a Forensic Report

If you stick to an objective statement of facts without presumptions, anyone can report and testify with credibility if they have backup. Once you cross the line into opinions the report is undermined as to bias, credibility and lack of foundation. Even if it is admitted into evidence the report will be given zero weight in deciding the case.

You undermine your defense if you are relying upon presumptions instead of actual facts or the absence of actual facts. Most presumptions used by homeowners are not persuasive.

TO GET OUR FORENSIC REPORT, CLICK THE LINK

FREE RESEARCH: Go to our home page and enter subject in search bar.

Let us help you plan and draft your answers, affirmative defenses, discovery requests and defense narrative: Contact us now at info@lendinglies.com

954-451-1230 or 202-838-6345. Ask for a CONSULT.

REGISTRATION FORM: You will make things a lot easier on us and yourself if you fill out the registration form. It’s free without any obligation. No advertisements, no restrictions.

Purchase an audio seminar now, together with seminar materials

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

About Neil F Garfield, M.B.A., J.D.

=====================

Starting with the tidal wave of foreclosures that hit our shores in 2007-present, a cottage industry emerged to help homeowners contest or negotiate with the pretender lender. Some were better than others. Many were at best a good faith failed attempt at understanding the claimed process of securitization, whose hallmark is complexity and obscurity.  In the words of an executive VP at Deutsch Bank, “it is all very counterintuitive.”

The job of the forensic reporter is to break down the facts so that the defense narrative is understandable and believable. Note that in most cases the defense narrative is going to rely on the absence of facts that should be present if the claims for foreclosure were based in fact. The object should be the production of a report that actually provides traction to the defense and not merely justification for the fee received.

  • RULE #1: If the report sticks to the facts and has an adequate presentation it can serve two purposes, to wit: (a) it provides a checklist of issues for an attorney or pro se litigant to know “what is on the menu” of potential defenses and (b) it might serve as evidence or corroboration of narratives pursued in court in creating and compelling discovery, filing and arguing motions and raising well timed objections at trial. If the preparer did fact checking and investigation, it is permissible to describe inconsistencies in the available evidence that need to be reconciled.
  • RULE #2: Anyone can write a report but few people can satisfy the burden of persuasion in court. Just because something is accepted into evidence or even admitted does not mean that it will be given any weight in the final decision. So if you are going to hire someone to review, investigate and report, that person should have a credible level of knowledge and access to data. Someone who has been through a foreclosure is neither credible nor lacking in credibility, but the other side will no doubt argue that the person had a bias against the banks. Certifications are not a substitute for experience. The greater the credentials the higher the credibility.
  • RULE #3: You are starting with bias against the homeowner. So you must focus on what will persuade the trier of fact (a judge in most cases) to rule in favor of the homeowner. To be persuasive means that the facts are presented without hypotheticals or conclusions that should be made by the judge. The presentation must gradually educate the judge as to how specifically in this case, the foreclosing party should not be allowed to continue. You don’t win by pointing out inconsistencies. You win by showing that the inconsistencies cannot be resolved even with the “help” of the robo-witness at trial.
  • RULE #4: “Everybody knows” is not a defense. If there is information available that might assist in showing that the documents are self-serving, then that might be the the jump-off point for undermining the credibility of the witness and the exhibit, but it needs to be much stronger to exclude the evidence altogether. If the foreclosing party has been the target of investigations, charges and settlement agreements based upon fabrication of documents, forgery and robosigning, that could be the jump-off point to argue that the foreclosing party must present its evidence without benefit of a legal presumption.
  • RULE #5: Wording is critically important. Describing the transaction as a loan or as an assignment basically admits that the description fits. At that point you might just as well pack up and go home. The forensic report should describe documents that have a title, and and then describe the contents and any inconsistencies or disparities. But calling the document an assignment or admitting that the loan was transferred, at least implies that there was a sale of the debt. If you check the documentation you will never see anything that refers to the sale of debt, because there was no sale of the debt.
  • RULE #6: Identify the salient points of the report in a memorandum in support of discovery or motions specifically citing to the page and position of the facts revealed in the report. If the report is for internal use only, attorney work-product etc., the use of bullet points in the report is preferable. Anything that takes less time of the attorney will save time and money. Thus if you want to assert forgery of a document the examiner would state that the signature on Document A appears to be inconsistent with the same person’s signature on Document B. THEN bring in a forensic document examiner who can give an opinion as to whether it is a forgery, back it up with demonstrative exhibits. AND remember, just because there isa  forged document doesn’t mean you win and they lose. You must persuasively argue that the forgery defeats their action.
  • RULE #7: CITATION TO CASE LAW IS LEGAL ARGUMENT — not a forensic report. But the presentation could report that as part of the instructions to the examiner, it has been assumed that X v Y case and Statute § ABC has been used as a reference point.

Here at livinglies and LENDINGLIES we are on our 12th iteration of a forensic report  for homeowners or their counsel. We call it the TERA for Title and Encumbrance Report and Analysis. It is the result of review and research by paralegals who are given instruction by me usually after I get together with the client in a short or long CONSULT.

I have long said that homeowners should stick with people who have or held licenses in professions that might affect the case. And while some people may have a professional license in a relevant field you should not make the mistake, based upon this article, of limiting the scope of work performed by them, just as you should not over-broaden the scope.

After many years of doing unrelenting research and investigation there are many people who have valuable insights that should be shared with the client. So if the forensic examiner says he notices a certain pattern of facts and that this same pattern was used in another case where the homeowner won, you should be listening even though the conclusion might be outside of his report and outside of his/her area of expertise. Note that the same fact pattern is often treated differently by different courts or even the same court.

In the TERA that we currently produce, our mission is to set forth the following elements:

  1. Sufficient information to assist the homeowner (or homeowner’s counsel) in deciding whether to fight, and if so, the toward what end.
  2. Identify the factual discrepancies.
  3. Identify areas for further investigation for discovery.
  4. Identify elements that support demands for discovery.
  5. Answer specifically worded questions posed by existing counsel or me.*
  6. Provide copies of all relevant documents as exhibits to the report.
  7. Identify subject for which a Case Analysis might be of assistance as in developing the specific narrative, strategies or tactics to pursue in the case and what to avoid.

In all cases we defer to local counsel. But with the right support and and guidance most attorneys develop specific knowledge and skills to win these cases. You don’t hear about all the cases won by homeowners because the banks pay for silence in the form of confidentiality agreements.

* EXAMPLE: It is wrong to phrase the question “Does US Bank have standing?” That calls for a legal conclusion that only the court can do. The question is better phrased “What factual evidence has been produced to support the assertion that US Bank has an interest in the subject loan?”

 

 

 

Tonight — Silent Roles of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac — Hiding Behind the Obtuse

How to Withhold Vital Information from Homeowners

Thursdays LIVE! Click in to the The Neil Garfield Show

Or call in at (347) 850-1260, 6pm Eastern Thursdays

Charles Marshall, Attorney and Bill Paatalo, licensed investigator discuss the moral hazard created by the Government Sponsored Entities (GSEs) banks, the courts and the regulators in allowing “presumptions” to be used even when the actual facts are different from the presumed facts.

Fannie and Freddie have long been a mystery wrapped in an enigma.

Before false claims of securitization, before fabrication and forgery of documents, the GSEs had fairly clear role in the origination, servicing and enforcement of mortgages. Now they are used as cover to hide lack of ownership where the banks and servicers make the homeowner travel and endless loop leading nowhere.

Now, as to any specific loan, we don’t know which of the following applies:

  1.  GSE is the guarantor of the loan (basically like a third party insurer with government backing)
  2. GSE is Master Trustee of a REMIC Trust in which there is a named Trustee who has the same powers, rights and obligations as the Master Trustee — i.e., no powers to actively administer the active affairs of the trust because there is no business or assets in the trust.
  3. GSE is or was a purchaser for cash.
  4. GSE is or was a purchaser using MBS issued by a named trust that either exists or doesn’t exist.
  5. GSE, using Trust A MBS paid Trust A for loans owned by the Trust or for loans not owned by the trust.
  6. GSE was a seller of the subject debt, note or mortgage.
  7. GSE claimed ownership when it didn’t own the subject debt, note or mortgage.
  8. GSE showed subject loan on its website but had no interest in the subject debt, note or mortgage (or foreclosure).
  9. Third parties claimed that GSE owned the subject debt, note and/or mortgage and it was true.
  10. Third parties claimed that GSE owned the subject debt, note and/or mortgage and it was false.

Wells Fargo “Lending” Securities It Didn’t Own

Translation: WFB was the “custodian” of alleged “mortgage-backed” certificates issued for the benefit of investors who paid billions of dollars for ownership of the certificates. WFB “Loaned” those alleged securities to brokers. The brokers in exchange provided “collateral” the proceeds of which were reinvested by WFB. In short, WFB was laundering the investors money for the sole benefit of WFB and not for the investors who owned the certificates and certainly to the detriment of the brokers and their buyers of derivative instruments based upon the loan of the securities.

This case reveals the flowering of multiple levels arising from false claims of securitization. First WFB issues certificates from a fictitious trust that owns nothing. Then it keeps both the money paid for those certificates and it keeps the certificates as well. On Wall Street this practice is called holding securities in “street name.” Then WFB engages in trading on securities it doesn’t own, but which are worthless anyway because the certificates only represent a promise from the REMIC trusts that exists only on paper.

It is all based upon outright lies. And that is why the banks get nervous when the issue of ownership of a debt, security or derivative becomes an issue in litigation. In this case the bank represented the trades as ownership or derivative ownership of “high grade money market instruments” such as “commercial paper or bank time deposits and CDs.”

None of it was true. WFB simply says that it thought that the “instruments” were safe. The lawsuit referred to in the linked article says they knew exactly what they were doing and didn’t care whether the instruments were safe or not. If the attorneys dig deeper they will find that the certificates’ promise to pay was not issued by an actual entity, that certificates were never mortgage-backed, and that WFB set it up so when there were losses it would not fall on WFB even though WFB was using the named trust basically as a fictitious name under which it operated.

So I continue to inquire: why does any court accept any document from WFB as presumptively valid? Why not require the actual proof?

Let us help you plan your defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.

Purchase now Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar including 3.5 hours of lecture, questions and answers, plus course materials that include PowerPoint Presentations. Presenters: Attorney and Expert Neil Garfield, Forensic Auditor Dan Edstrom, Attorney Charles Marshall and and Private Investigator Bill Paatalo. The webinar and materials are all downloadable.

Get a Consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

===========================

Hat Tip Bill Paatalo

see  WFB Securities Lending Scheme

The investments by WFB went into “mortgage backed assets.” Really? So let’s see how that works. First they create the certificates and sell them to investors even though neither the investors nor the trust have any interest in mortgage assets. Then they “loan” the same certificates to brokers, who provide collateral to WFB so that WFB can “reinvest” investor money using commingled investor money from a variety of sources.

Then derivatives on derivatives are sold as private contracts or insurance policies in which when the nonexistent trust assets are declared by WFB to have failed, in which WFB collects all the proceeds. The investors from all layers are screwed. And borrowers, as was originally planned, are screwed.

The lender to the borrower in the real world (where money is exchanged) are be the investors whose money was in the dynamic dark pool when the loan of money occurred. But the investors have no proof of ownership of the debt because of the false documents created by the “underwriter” bank.  The money from the second tier of investors is used to “purchase” the certificates WFB is “printing”. And then derivatives and hybrid derivatives and synthetic derivatives are sold multiplying the effect of every certificate issued. Such has the control over currency shifted from central banks who control around $8 trillion of fiat currency to the TBTF banks who boast a shadow banking market of $1 quadrillion ($1,000,000,000,000,000.00).

This every loan and every certificate is multiplied in the shadow banking market and converted into real money in the real world. Based upon prior securities analysis and review of disclosures from the publicly held banks it thus became possible for a “bank” to receive as much as $4.2 million on a $0.1 Million loan (i..e, $100,000). But in order to maintain the farce they must foreclose and not settle which will devalue the derivatives.

Then having done all that through control of a dynamic dark pool of investor money they must of course create the illusion of a robust lending market. True this particular case involves a business acquired when WFB acquired Wachovia. But WFB acquired Wachovia because it was the actual party in control of a false securitization scheme in which Wachovia acted primarily as originator and not lender.

WFB barely cares about the interest rate because they know the loans that are being approved won’t last anyway. But its trading desk secures extra profits by selling loans with a high interest rate, as though the loans had a low interest rate thereby guaranteeing two things: (1) guaranteed defaults that WFB can insure and (2) buying low (with investor money) and selling high (to investors).

All of which brings us back to the same point I raised when I first wrote (circa 2007) about the systemic fraud in securitization not as an idea, but in the way it had been put into practice. Using established doctrines in tax litigation there are two doctrines that easily clear up the intentional obfuscation by the banks: (1) The single transaction doctrine and (2) the step transaction doctrine. Yes it is that simple. If the investors didn’t part with their money then the loan of money would have never reached the desk of the closing agent. If the homeowners had not been similarly duped as to who and what was being done, they would never have signed on the dotted line.

To assume otherwise would be the same as assuming that borrowers were looking for a way to waste money on non-deductible down payments, improvements and furniture in exchange for a monthly payment that everyone knew they couldn’t afford.

 

Subpoena Compliance Officer at the time the loan was made

Last night on the Neil Garfield Show, Charles Marshall brought up the idea of the use of the subpoena power of the court. I agree that this is a way of lawfully penetrating into the inner recesses of the alleged loan process. People ask me to whom should they issue a subpoena? Opinions vary. But I would say the person who served as compliance officer at the time was being “underwritten.” You’ll probably find out that loan was not underwritten by the originator. But more than that you will find that there exists a witness who can say what really happened at the alleged “loan closing.”

See below for a short list of questions that might be posed at the deposition of such a witness.

Let us help you plan your discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.
Purchase now Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar including 3.5 hours of lecture, questions and answers, plus course materials that include PowerPoint Presentations. Presenters: Attorney and Expert Neil Garfield, Forensic Auditor Dan Edstrom, Attorney Charles Marshall and and Private Investigator Bill Paatalo. The webinar and materials are all downloadable.
Get a Consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

SeePAPER CHASE AND MONEY CHASE — THE CASE AGAINST CHASE

There are dozens of questions to ask. But I think the following list is a guide toward strategically posing the right questions:

  1. Do you review all prospective loans?
  2. What risks are you looking for? Define them.
  3. What are the primary risks of loss in closing a loan in today’s marketplace?
  4. Does the prospect of “sale” of the debt, note or mortgage affect your risk analysis?
  5. Is the bank using a warehouse lender?
  6. Is the bank making the loan or playing the role of originator?
  7. Is the bank the intended ultimate secured party on the mortgage?
  8. Is the bank the intended ultimate recipient of monthly payments as described in the note?
  9. What is the annual rate of mortgage originations in principal dollars for the bank.
  10. Does the bank have buy-back exposure on its loan originations?

Deloitte and Touche Pays $149.5 Million Settling Claims of Audit Failure of Taylor Bean and Whittaker

One of the first cases I ever handled involved TBW in 2008. As usual they filed a lost note count in their foreclosure complaint. And as is required, they offered to indemnify the homeowner if someone else showed up with the original note. With financial firms dropping left and right, my position was two fold: (1) that an indemnification from a firm that was clearly in trouble as reported in the news was of dubious value and (2) that even if that wasn’t the case neither their complaint  nor their affidavit recited any facts about when the loss occurred, who was in possession of the note, whether the possessor had rights to enforce when the note was “lost” etc. TBW folded, went into bankruptcy shortly thereafter and its principals went to prison.

But throwing TBW under the bus, as much as they deserved it, takes nothing away from the fact that everyone was doing what they did. The only difference was they got caught and could not effectively indemnify the homeowner in the event they were lying about the possession of the original note — something that as proven beyond a reasonable doubt in the criminal trial of the execs..

Let us help you plan your discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.
Purchase now Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar including 3.5 hours of lecture, questions and answers, plus course materials that include PowerPoint Presentations. Presenters: Attorney and Expert Neil Garfield, Forensic Auditor Dan Edstrom, Attorney Charles Marshall and and Private Investigator Bill Paatalo. The webinar and materials are all downloadable.
Get a Consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

Hat tip to Dan Edstrom

see  Multiple Sales of Same Loans Force Auditor to Cough Up $149.5 Million

PR shows like this one became one of the ways that the banks were able to throw a curtain over the real customs and practices of the industry — most of which were virtually identical to TBW. The impression from the collapse and prosecution of TBW and its executives implies that this was an unusual event — selling the same “loan” multiple times.

But close examination of the many claims of securitization of debt shows that exactly the same thing was happening in the rest of the industry. In fact, that is where the enormous “profits” came from as reported from their “trading desks.” The only difference is that TBW was blatant about it by using copies of notes that were repeatedly sold, not once, but multiple times.

The leverage of making multiple sales went to ridiculous heights — 42 times in the case of Bear Stearns mortgage related activities. Yes you read that right. That $200,000 loan produced around $8 million in “profit.” Of course none of this was disclosed to the borrower whose name and financial reputation would be used directly or indirectly to accomplish these “sales.” They did it by hiding behind “derivative” documents rather than the actual loan documents, but they also did what TBW did. But while TBW was exclusively faking sales, investment banks mixed up the process such that, if caught, they would be able to say that some of these things happened because of a failure of controls and that they will now correct it.

As the MBS marketplace slowed down and had some hiccups many of the contracts or derivatives came due and Bear Stearns simply didn’t have the money to honor them despite the enormous “profits” earned earlier. This also is a possible indicator that leverage was even higher than what has been reported. As the buying frenzy slowed down and investors suddenly became aware that they were holding certificates issued by entities that didn’t exist and were never active, the buying stopped — and like any Ponzi scheme, the entire infrastructure came crashing down.

Practice Note: So what all of this means is that questions should be posed to parties who file foreclosure actions. But you need to wade through the multiple servicers and multiple “assignees” and multiple “endorsees” and multiple “Underwriters of bogus RMBS to ask the simple question: how many contracts or securities have been issued with the respect to the subject loan? It’s relevant because it is asking whether the foreclosing party has sold its rights to an undisclosed third party. In 99% of all cases, the “REMIC Trust” was never used and the underwriter has already entered into various contracts, sales, and issued “derivatives” in which the PAPER was sold but the underlying debt, if it still exists, was never subject to any transfer, contract or derivative.

Vulture Firms: The Last Step in a Chain of Illegal Paper, with the Debt Long Gone

The key element of the paper strategy has been to create the illusion of transfers of assets, thus supporting the erroneous narrative that with all those parties purchasing the loans, a lot of due diligence MUST have been done and therefore the screaming defense of homeowners (attacking ownership) is nothing but a dilatory stall tactic.

What is consistently missed, even by people who are completely fed up with the banks and regulatory agencies that have given a wink and nod at plainly fraudulent practices, is that the only “asset” is the paper, and that the debt itself has never moved. In a true securitization the debt would indeed be transferred. But all claims of securitization of debt that are based upon CLAIMS of ownership rather than the ownership itself are groundless. Thus neither Vulture Firms nor any of their predecessors ever owned the debt.

This is why we have lawyers go to law schools. Such convoluted schemes are not easily deciphered without experts and lawyers. Lawyers understand the distinction between the debt, the note and the mortgage. But lawyers forget and lay people never knew about the distinction. It isn’t technical. It is all about keeping transactions on paper honest.

And right now nearly all of the hundreds of millions of documents are being used around the world to foreclose, or support the sale of the paper note and mortgage and derivatives based upon the value of those millions of documents containing false recitations and inferences of fact.

So borrowers, whether their payments (to the wrong party) are “current” or not, like the one in the story found in the link below are stuck in the very place that legislators and regulators have said could never happen in a legal mortgage lending situation: no knowledge about the identity of the obligee of the debt. Foreclosure defense lawyers who win cases punch holes in the foreclosure case simply by knowing they are not dealing with anyone who owns the debt nor anyone who is representing the obligee in the underlying debt (i.e., the real world).

Let us help you plan your discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.
Purchase now Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar including 3.5 hours of lecture, questions and answers, plus course materials that include PowerPoint Presentations. Presenters: Attorney and Expert Neil Garfield, Forensic Auditor Dan Edstrom, Attorney Charles Marshall and and Private Investigator Bill Paatalo. The webinar and materials are all downloadable.
Get a Consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

Hat tip Eric Mains and Bill Paatalo

see Vulture Firms Must Clean Up the Mess

So people ask me the obvious question, to wit: “If the paper didn’t transfer the debt because the seller, assignor or endorser never owned the debt, where is the debt now?”

The answer is simpler than you might imagine. The only two parties are the obligor (the person who took the money) and the obligee (the person who gave the money). The current obligee (owner of the debt) in most instances is a group of investors who are beneficiaries of multiple paper trusts that have never existed nor been active. THAT is why you never see any assertion that the debt has been purchased.

No money has exchanged hands in any of the transfers except in the case of vulture firms who pay fractions of a cent on the dollar for the paper. They don’t buy the debt because the seller of the paper doesn’t own the debt.

The one simple law school issue taught repeatedly in several classes — Contracts, Bills and Notes etc. — is that the debt arises no from paper but from action. There is no debt if there is no money exchanged between the parties claiming to be part of the transaction.

The debt arises by operation of law without  and even despite the existence or nonexistence of any written instruments — virtually all of which are subject to hearsay objections and lacking in factual foundation, to wit: an actual transaction in the real world in which reciprocal consideration was exchanged between the obligor and the obligee.

If the written instrument recites or assumes that the parties to the instrument are in fact identical to the parties to the real world transaction, then the parties to the debt would be identical to the parties on the written instrument. So keep this in your bonnet while you are planning defense strategy: at some point, usually at origination, a debt was created, separate and distinct from the recitals on the note and mortgage.

If the written instrument recites or assumes that the parties to the instrument are in fact identical to the parties to the debt, but the recital or assumption is untrue. Assumptions and presumptions are based upon one singular doctrine — they are used for judicial economy only where the the presumption clearly is true and where no contest to the presumption is introduced by the defense.

If the defense asserts and gives some argument or evidence that is inconsistent with the presumed “fact,” then the burden shifts back to the party who claimed the benefit of the presumption — i.e. they must prove the real world transaction that was being presumed. There is no prejudice to forcing such a party to prove the fact that they wished to be presumed — unless they were lying to begin with.

 

Evidence and Forensic Reports

Every once in a while it is helpful for the consumer to realize that a non lawyer giving advice or opinions about legal matters is like going to a nail salon for a medical opinion, or worse, treatment.
There is a simple test for hiring a  purported forensic investigator: Are they in close touch with attorneys who understand the law and how to apply the law, particularly the laws and rules of Evidence? If not, steer clear of them as they will lead you down a rabbit hole.
Let us help you plan your narrative and strategy: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.
Register now for Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar.
Get a Consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

At our upcoming webinar this Friday, 2/16 at 1PM, we explore not only discovery and the actual rules of evidence, but also what constitutes facts that could be admitted into evidence — and cross examination or trial objections that prevent or remove information from being considered as evidence proving the truth of the matter being asserted.

Some of those facts that could be used as evidence or “anti-evidence” (information that removes the foundation or credibility for evidence admitted) come from the court filings but many of them come from forensic investigators whose task is to report on facts that tend to prove gaps in the narrative of the foreclosing party. At the Webinar will be two forensic investigators whose work I support because they understand the difference between facts and the law.

It is challenging for forensic investigators to refrain from  giving opinions on legal matters. But in order for their report to be taken seriously and in order for the conclusions to be persuasive, forensic investigators need to refrain from expressing conclusions of law. If not, they will be ripped to shreds on the witness stand where their credibility will sink to zero. Keep in mind that the report is not evidence nor will it ever be admitted into evidence without authentication and foundation from a live witness (the author).

It is interesting that I frequently come under attack from non lawyers who are constantly trying to steer people to forensic investigative reports that apparently ignore the standards for issuing such reports — because they pretend to be knowledgeable about the law and they offer legal advice and commentary which is the unauthorized practice of law.

Their reports are inevitably half baked and favor the banks by discounting the best defenses and offensive plays for a homeowner in favor of strategies that will almost certainly fail. Which in turn leads to the question: Why are non lawyers polluting the discussion with pro-bank obfuscation?

Even more interesting is that bank lawyers who have published articles about rescission and foreclosure defenses assume that rescission and foreclosure defenses based upon standing and such are valid. Indeed even the most biased courts recognize that standing is the root of their jurisdiction. Without standing the court cannot do anything other than dismissing the vacating the foreclosure complaint or sale. And winning on standing is far from simply delaying the inevitable.

“Mortgage examinations” in lieu of getting advice from a licensed attorney is legal suicide. But there are some entrepreneurs selling exactly that. Slick talking is not replacement for 3 years of law school, internship, and experience in the practice of law. So when I get something like this it worries me that anyone might read or believe it:

What’s wrong with foreclosure pretense defense attorneys all over Florida?  Why to they hang their hats on standing issues that serve only to delay the inevitable, predictable, and proper loss of the borrower’s home to justified foreclosure?
If all those lawyers who “get it” (meaning get the scheme of bilking clients for the privilege of losing their house for them) were to get mortgage examinations done for their clients and thereby find numerous causes of action underlying the loan transaction, then they would have something worthwhile to bring to the court instead of dilatory standing issues.
*
The question is basically a cynical dud advanced by the banks. Foreclosure defense lawyers are not pretending anything. They are doing the best they can with what they are getting paid. Standing is not just important in terms defeating the current foreclosure action. It is also important in preventing future ones, and important for collateral damage cases based in wrongful foreclosure, interference in business relations, emotional distress and potentially punitive damages.
*
As thousands of homeowners can attest, when they won on standing and the servicer and so-called mortgagee or beneficiary has painted themselves into a corner, the scales have tipped very much in favor of the homeowner. The banks do not have a ready option to submit different paperwork and pursue the second foreclosure — although it has been done. The only reason why successor foreclosures are successful is default. Homeowners, exhausted by the first round simply give up and walk away or settle for cash for keys or modification.
Your money is much better spent on licensed attorneys rather than unlicensed, uneducated, untrained lay people whose only exposure consists of presenting false challenges to real lawyers — except where those investigators are working at the direction of or in support of some lawyer. Their reports are no substitute for a lawyer who understands and uses objections and the art of cross examination to bring the factual findings to life.
*
Many lay “entrepreneurs” have attempted to lure me into a “debate” so that they can raise themselves on the radar to put out more useless reports. Every once in a while it is helpful for the consumer to realize that a non lawyer giving advice or opinions about legal matters is like going to a nail salon for a medical opinion, or worse, treatment.

 

 

What and Who is a Creditor?

Practically everyone thinks they know what is a creditor even if they cannot identify who is the creditor. The reason that this is important is that the lawyers for the banks have created a divergence of the money trial and the paper trail. One is worth every cent claimed and the other is worth nothing, but for the repeated acceptance of a claim as proof in and of itself that a real transaction is referenced in the paper trail. In most cases, it isn’t.

Let us help you plan your narrative and strategy: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.
Register now for Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar.
Get a Consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

The problem is very real when you look at it through a semantic lens.

*

What is a creditor? In court it has come to mean anyone with a claim. What it does not automatically mean is that the so-called creditor owns the debt. In normal situations before claims of securitization, ownership of the debt was presumed to be underlying the claim for money and thus the term creditor and owner of the debt were used interchangeably. That is what the TBTF banks were counting on and that is what they got.

*

The “creditor” in foreclosures is just a party holding paper. If the paper is fabricated or otherwise does not represent an actual transaction in real life it should be struck since the paper doesn’t prove anything. A note is evidence of the debt. It is not the debt. That is why we have the merger doctrine to prevent double liability. But the merger doctrine only operates if the Payee on the note and the owner of the debt are the same.

*

If the party seeking the foreclosure cannot produce the proof that the Payee and debt owner are the same, then the note lacks foundation and would be disallowed as evidence. The mortgage being incident to the note would therefore secure nothing and would be equally invalid and subject to being removed from the country records. More than a decade of experience shows that you won’t get anywhere at trial with his knowledge UNLESS you have conducted proper discovery and pursued it through motions to compel.

*

But what we are left with is entirely counter-intuitive. You end up with a debt owner with no paperwork and the homeowner having two liabilities — one in the form of a debt that arises by operation of law when the debt owner advanced money and the homeowner received it — and one in the form of a potential liability in the form of a note that has no reference point in the real world, but if acquired by value in good faith and with no knowledge of the borrower’s defenses, can nonetheless be enforced leaving the maker (homeowner) to seek remedies from other parties who tricked him. {See Holder in Due Course}

*

This type of analysis is not well received by courts who come to each situation with a bias toward what they perceive to be “the bank” who wouldn’t be in court if they were not the owner of the debt. But as we have seen in most instances “the bank” is not appearing on its own behalf but merely as a representative of what is most often a nonexistent common law trust. If there is any bank involved at all it must be the underwriter of “securities” that were issued under the name of an alleged REMIC Trust.

Nonetheless we see the courts referring to the case at U.S. Bank adv the homeowner instead of saying XYZ Trust adv the homeowner for the simple reason that in practice styling the case refers to the first name that appears on the pleadings. So invariably the case is referred to as “U.S. Bank. adv John Smith.”

*

This continually reinforces the erroneous presumption that this is a case of a financial institution versus the homeowner; in fact, however, it is a case of an unlicensed unregistered private entity (the alleged REMIC Trust) outside the world of banking or finance whose existence as a trust entity is problematic at best, especially if the subject loan was never purchased by the Trust (acting  through the Trustee).

*

Without the debt being entrusted to the Trustee on behalf of the Trust there is no trust. The existence of an assignment, absent evidence of purchase, merely means that the alleged Trust has “ownership” of the paper, not the debt. But in practice owning the paper raises a presumption of ownership of the debt — which is why so much effort must be made toward preventing the application of the presumption through objections to foundation that are themselves founded on prior discovery showing the failure or refusal to provide proof of ownership and in fact, proof the paper chain being congruent with the money trial.

*

Hence the claim of creditor status may be true as to the paper but untrue as to the debt or any other monetary transaction in the real world.

Deutsch Bank National Trust Company Was Crushed in Texas in 2015. Why isn’t anyone listening?

When a judge looks carefully at the record, the bank loses. The use of Deutsch’s name in the style of the case still shows that Judges are considering the Plaintiff to be the named “Trustee” instead of the named (or named, which is frequently the case) Trust. In fact the Trustee has nothing to do with foreclosures. In this case the Judge wrote the following:

“Judgment (for the homeowner for declaratory relief) was based on findings and conclusions that Deutsche Bank had failed to prove chain of title back to the original lender, now defunct. The sole proof on which the bank relied — a purported assignment from “MERS as nominee for the lender, its successors and assigns” — was held void, because the assignor did not exist when the document was signed.

“Deutsche Bank’s first argument is based on a misrepresentation of the trial record. [i.e. the lawyers were lying to the court about what was in the trial record].

“The Burkes argued that the stamp block containing the Cathy Powers signature was not a part of the Note as originally executed, and instead offered a copy of the unindorsed Note as one of their own exhibits,

“This absence of documentary proof mirrors the lack of any testimonial evidence of holder status. Given its utter failure of proof, Deutsche Bank’s continuing assertion of a right to foreclose as holder of the Note is not just groundless, it is frivolous. On this trial record the current holder of the Burke Note remains a mystery.

“Deutsche Bank introduced no proof whatever of a prior transaction by which it acquired any rights in the Note. Absent such proof, L’Amoreaux is not controlling. Here MERS was acting on behalf of a defunct entity (IndyMac Bank), and its purported assignment was therefore void and invalid under the Texas common law of assignments, as explained below.

“There is simply no proof of an existing assignor with an existing right in the property capable of being assigned in 2011. It is undisputed that Indy-Mac Bank had been “dead” since 2008, several years prior to the 2011 assignment. (P. Ex. 6, at p. 1). Thus, any post-mortem transaction by that entity would be a nullity under Pool v. Sneed.

“In sum, L’Amoreaux does not undermine this court’s judgment in favor of the Burkes because (1) there is no record evidence of a prior assignment of the lender’s interest in the Note or Deed of Trust, (2) there is no record evidence that any purported assignor existed at the time of the 2011 assignment; and (3) there is no record evidence of a principal/agency relationship between MERS and any “successor or assign” of the lender when the assignment was executed.

“Deutsche Bank’s third argument is a red herring

“a homeowner is allowed “to challenge the chain of assignments by which a party claims a right to foreclose….” Id. at 224. It is true that in Texas an obligor cannot defend against an assignee’s efforts to enforce the obligation on a ground that merely renders the assignment “voidable at the election of the assignor,” such as a fraudulent signature by an unauthorized corporate agent. Id. at 225. The problem here is not a voidable defect that a defrauded assignor might choose to disregard — it is the absence of a valid assignor (i.e. a real entity owning the right to be assigned) in the first place. Cf. L’Amoreaux v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 755 F.3d 748, 750 (5th Cir.2014) (considering homeowner’s challenge to validity of MERS assignment on its merits, implicitly rejecting bank’s “voidable” argument).

“A court’s primary duty in construing a written contract is to ascertain the true intention of the parties as expressed in the language of the document itself. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex.1983). In this document, the name of the assignor, “Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.” appears three (3) times — in the body of the assignment, above the signature line, and in the corporate acknowledgement. Each time, MERS’s name is immediately followed by the phrase “as nominee for” the lender, IndyMac Bank, its successor and assigns. P. Ex. 2. Nowhere does this document hint that MERS intended to convey its own rights,[8] or that it was acting as principal rather than as agent for other entities.

Words matter, especially in real estate transactions. See Univ. Sav. Ass’n v. Springwoods Shopping Ctr., 644 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex.1982) (“the terms set out in a deed of trust must be strictly followed”); see also Mathis v. DCR Mortg. III Sub I, L.L.C., 389 S.W.3d 494, 507 (Tex.App. — El Paso, 2012) (“The rules of interpretation that apply to contracts also apply to notes and deeds of trust.”). Based on the words of the 2011 assignment, MERS was no more acting on its own behalf than was the bank’s own law firm.

“Deutsche Bank asks to reopen the trial record to provide “the wet ink original of the Note or testimony affirming Deutsche Bank’s status as holder of the Note.” (Dkt. 90, at 7). No authority or excuse is offered for this breathtakingly late request. Even assuming such evidence exists, Deutsche Bank does not pretend that it is “newly discovered”, nor that the bank was excusably ignorant about it until after trial despite using due diligence to discover it. See 11 WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2808 (2012). After four years of litigation, including court-ordered mediation and trial on the merits, the time for such a deus ex machina maneuver has long since passed. The Burkes are entitled to the finality of judgment that our judicial process is intended to provide. The bank’s request for a do-over is denied.

Let us help you prepare for trial: 202-838-6345
Get a consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

Hat tip Bill Paatalo

see Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Burke, 117 F. Supp. 3d 953 – Dist

 

Wells Fargo “Explains” Securitization

YOU NEED AN INFINITE NUMBER OF BASES AND PLAYERS TO PLAY BALL WITH THESE GUYS: The Trustee controls the trust as trustee. Oops, wait, it is the Master Servicer who has all the control. No, wait again, it is the subservicer who has the right to administer the loan. But actually if there is an alleged default it is the special servicer who has exclusive authority over decision making. Except that the “Controlling Class” has the last say in the matter. But actually it is the Controlling Class Representative who has the last word.

I have always felt that there must be some way to force the other side into approving a modification or at least providing access by the borrower to the “lender” to discuss or negotiate the matter. I still believe that. Maybe this article will help spur some ideas. Information is leverage, especially in the world of false claims of securitization.

 

Let us help you prepare your narrative (blue print) for litigation: 202-838-6345
Get a consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

Hat Tip Bill Paatalo

see Wells Fargo Document – No Lender in Remics

Essentially the banks would have us believe that by magic they created loans without owners or holders in due course. So it might as well be the banks who foreclose under any pretense they choose to offer. The political decision was to let them do it for fear that the banks would bring down the entire system. But if that were true, the bank’s capital would be worthless as would every world currency including the dollar. They bluffed Presidents Bush and Obama and the Presidents blinked. Millions of foreclosures followed because the ordinary guy is just not that important even if it involves a substantial portion of a population.

I will provide my comments and suggestions for discovery or cross examination along with each statement in the above cited article. Keep in mind that the entire article is an exercise in deceit: It is assuming that securitization actually happened. If that were true then they would be more than happy to show that the subject loan was purchased on a certain date by the payment of value to a specific seller by a trust. The trust would then be a holder in due course. But as we have seen numerous times nobody ever refers to the trust as a holder in due course which can only mean there was no such purchase.

The indented portions are direct quotes from the WFDb article cited above.

The thing most borrowers fail to realize about conduit loans is that once a loan has been securitized, they are not working with a “lender” anymore.

That’s the first sentence of the “explanation.” And the first thing that pops out is “conduit loans.” What is a conduit loan? Is the subject loan a conduit loan? In what way is the subject loan a conduit loan? [This also corroborates what I have been writing for years — that Matt Taibbi (Rolling Stone Magazine) got it right when he describes securitization as a monster with multiple tentacles.]

There is no legal definition for a conduit loan. The banks would have us believe that if they present any tentacle, that is sufficient for them to foreclose on a loan. But that isn’t legal standing — it is fraud on the court. A loan is a loan, but Wall Street banks don’t want you thinking about that. But by calling it something different it immediately plays into the bias of the court assuming that the big banks know what they are doing and that only they can explain what is going on.

Corroborating my description of the “Conduit”: remark, WFB explains that you are not dealing with a lender anymore. Is that supposed to make us feel better? There is no lender? Was there ever a lender? If, yes, then please identify the party who loaned their money to the borrower.

Now this on servicer advances:

If a loan becomes delinquent, the Master Servicer is usually obligated to make the first three or four payments to the certificate holders as well as pay trust expenses on delinquent assets…

The Master Servicer is reimbursed when the borrower makes up the payment or when the property goes into foreclosure and is later sold.

So we are being told that the Master Servicer is making payments to investors regardless of whether the borrower makes any payment. First, the payments to investors are made by the Master Servicer because they are the only one with access to a giant slush fund or dark pool created out of money that should have a gone to each trust and been maintained as a trust account, administered by the trustee.

But it is true that the Master Servicer gets paid for the “servicer advances” when the property is sold. So if the investors received 12 months of payments (of at least interest), even though it was taken out of a reserve pool (read the prospectus) consisting of their own money, the Master Servicer gets paid as though it was a reimbursement when in fact it is a windfall. Needless to say the incentive is to let the case languish for years before foreclosure and sale take place.

The longer the time period between the alleged default and the sale of the property, the more money is received by the Master Servicer as “reimbursement” for money it never advanced.

The Special Servicer makes all final decisions about dispositions of defaulted property and Real Estate Owned (REO). Often they are also the holders of the “first loss pieces” of the pool. Because they are taking the most risk, as part of their agreement to take that risk, they usually insist on being the Special Servicer as a requirement of their investment. There are only a handful of special servicers in the country.

Really? So the Master Servicer, the subservicer and the Trustee of the alleged REMIC trust have no say in whether to work out or modify a loan that is economically not feasible but which could be feasible if there was a workout or modification. What is a first loss piece of the pool? What is the account name of the pool supposedly held in a bank somewhere? Does the account name match the alleged REMIC trust in any way? Is there an account administered by the Trustee? Does the Trustee get performance reports or end of month statements?

Oops wait! There are other people with special powers —

The PSA also designates a “Controlling Class” who will provide input on recommendations for Special Serviced Loans and REO.

If the Special Servicer is willing to extend the loan, they have to get permission from the Controlling Class Representative (CCR), who is a fiduciary for all the certificate holders.

Anyone who has seen that famous but from Abbot and Costello in the 1950’s understands what is happening here. The Trustee controls the trust as trustee. Oops, wait, it is the Master Servicer who has all the control. No, wait again, it is the subservicer who has the right to administer the loan. But actually if there is an alleged default it is the special servicer who as exclusive authority over decision making. Except that the “Controlling Class” has the last say in the matter. But actually it is the Controlling Class Representative who has the last word.

So in discovery ask which of those entities was contacted about modification and why the borrower was instructed to send the application and documents to the subservicer when the subservicer had no authority?

And let’s not forget the fact that the certificate holders have no right, title or interest in the loans, the debt , the note or the mortgage. So their “Fiduciary” (who apparently is not the Trustee of the alleged Trust) does what?  How do we contact these intermediaries to whom powers and obligations of a trustee are passed around like free money? How do we know if the subservicer is telling the truth when it reports that the “investor” turned down the settlement or modification.

And by the way, why do we not have recording of the modification agreement? Why does not the Trustee of the REMIC Trust sign the modification agreement? Instead it is ALWAYS the signature of the servicer who, as we already know, has no power to accept or deny requests for modifications — and of course it is never recorded in county records. Why?

Remember, there are no “pockets of money” to use for refinance. Special Servicers, although legally allowed by the PSA to forgive any portion of the debt, rarely do so because often that would negatively affect one or more of the bondholders at the expense of the others. Instead, the Special Servicer, on behalf of the conduit, will almost always foreclose and sell the asset.

Hmmmm. So the Special Servicer (and the CCR?) ordinarily chooses to drive down the price of the collateral and take a larger loss on the subject loan because it “would negatively affect one or more of the bondholders at the expense of the others.” But the principal reduction would positively affect some bond holders more than others by saving the collateral. So exactly what are they saying as Wells Fargo Bank about the roles and rules of securitization?

And lastly, why did WFB task authors to write about this when their experience is limited to manufactured home communities? Probably the same reason why robo-witnesses know nothing.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ocwen Admission Confounds Judges and Experts

This is a blatant attempt at deception  — a deceit without which none of the Trusts would be recognized as legal entities much less the owner of loans. Ocwen is admitting that there is no single owner of the loan it is allegedly “servicing.” “There is no single owner of the account, but rather the account is one of many in a securitized investment trust.”

For the uninitiated, this statement might suffice or at least be threatening enough as a challenge to their experience and intelligence to direct them away from the central false assertion that the trusts own any loan. They don’t.

Let us help you prepare for deposition or trial: 202-838-6345
Get a consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

Hat Tip Bill Paatalo

see Ocwen Responsive Letter – CFPB – 11-03-2017

In this real live case, Ocwen is fulfilling its job that includes obfuscation as one of its paramount duties. After first “answering” the CFPB requests with obfuscation it then states “The ownership status of the account is based upon our review of our records as of the date of this letter.” It doesn’t say that the information is correct or even believed to be correct. It doesn’t say they performed due diligence to determine whether a true chain of ownership exists, combing the various records of “predecessors.”

Nor is there a statement that Ocwen is authorized to service the account. It simply says that it IS servicing the account. And of course then they do not assert the basis of their authority since they never asserted their authority. It is implied. It is assumed. In court, it might well be presumed by the court, the foreclosure mill attorney and even by the borrower and the borrower’s attorney. This is one of the errors that snatches defeat from the jaws of victory. An attack on what is missing instead of trying to dodge what is there would result in far more victories for homeowners.

The attorney’s client is Ocwen. Ocwen is impliedly asserting authority to service but can’t show it. In one recent case of mine, they came in with a Power of Attorney signed by someone who purportedly executed the instrument on behalf of Chase. The problem was that Chase was never mentioned before in any pleading, documents or testimony. The POA was false.

Back to ownership: “there is no single owner” implies that there are many owners. There are several problems with that assertion or implication that involve outright lying. Ocwen is saying that the loan is in a securitized investment trust which certainly would imply that the loan is not in transit nor is it owned by more than one trust.

Further if the reference (omitted) is to investors, that too is a lie in most cases. The certificate indenture usually contains the express statement that the holder of the certificate receives no right, title or interest to the debt, note or mortgage in “underlying” loans (which have never been acquired by the trust anyway).

So what are we left with? No single owner which means that the securitized investment trust doesn’t own it because that is one single entity. Multiple owners does not refer to investors because the express provisions on their certificates say they have no ownership of the debt, note or mortgage in the alleged loan.

The counterintuitive answer is that the bank’s are saying there is no owner. But there is an owner. It is a group of investors whose money was used to fund or acquire the loan. This was not done through any trust, as they intended and as was required by the “securitization” documents. If that was the case then the trust would have been named as lender or as holder in due course. That never happened.

But the holders of worthless securities can claim an equitable interest in the loan and perhaps even the collateral. In order to establish that interest the investors must go to a court of competent jurisdiction. But in order to do that the investors must know about the specific loan transaction(s), which they don’t. The fact that they don’t know about it and can’t exercise their rights does not mean that legally, anyone can intervene and assert ownership rights.

Ten years ago I said get rid of the current servicers and stick a government agency in as intermediary so that investors, as real parties in interest and borrowers as real parties in interest could do what the lending industry normally does best — work this out so that nobody loses everything and nobody gets a windfall. This could have all been over years ago and the impact on the economy would have been a powerful stimulus leaving no inherent weakness in our economy or our currency.

Unfortunately the courts strayed from making legal decisions and instead made a political decision to save the banking industry at the expense of homeowners.

 

 

 

Banks Fighting Subpoenas From FHFA Over Access to Loan Files

Whilst researching something else I ran across the following article first published in 2010. Upon reading it, it bears repeating.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

WHAT IF THE LOANS WERE NOT ACTUALLY SECURITIZED?

In a nutshell this is it. The Banks are fighting the subpoenas because if there is actually an audit of the “content” of the pools, they are screwed across the board.

My analysis of dozens of pools has led me to several counter-intuitive but unavoidable factual conclusions. I am certain the following is correct as to all residential securitized loans with very few (2-4%) exceptions:

  1. Most of the pools no longer exist.
  2. The MBS sold to investors and insured by AIG and the purchase and sale of credit default swaps were all premised on a general description of the content of the pool rather than a detailed description with the individual loans attached on a list.
  3. Each Prospectus if it carried any spreadsheet listing loans, contained a caveat that the attached list was by example only and not the real loans.
  4. Each distribution report contained a caveat that the parties who created it and the parties who delivered it did not guarantee either authenticity or reliability of the report. They even had specific admonitions regarding the content of the distribution report.
  5. NO LOAN ACTUALLY MADE IT INTO ANY POOL. The evidence is clear: nothing was done to assign, indorse or deliver the note to the investors directly or indirectly until a case went into litigation AND a hearing was scheduled. By that time the cutoff date had been breached and the loan was non-performing by their own allegation and therefore was not acceptable into the pool.
  6. AT ALL TIMES LEGAL TITLE TO THE PROPERTY WAS MAINTAINED BY THE HOMEOWNER EVEN AFTER FORECLOSURE AND SALE. The actual creditor who submitted a credit bid was not the creditor. The sale is either void or voidable.
  7. AT ALL TIMES LEGAL TITLE TO THE LOAN WAS MAINTAINED BY THE ORIGINATING “LENDER”. Since there was no assignment, indorsement or delivery that could be recognized at law or in fact, the originating lender still owns the loan legally BUT….
  8. AT ALL TIMES THE OBLIGATION WAS BOTH CREATED AND EXTINGUISHED AT, OR CONTEMPORANEOUSLY WITH THE CLOSING OF THE LOAN. Since the originating lender was in fact not the source of funds, and did not book the transaction as a loan on their balance sheet (in most cases), the naming of the originating lender as the Lender and payee on the note, both created a LEGAL obligation from the borrower to the Lender and at the same time, the LEGAL obligation was extinguished because the LEGAL Lender of record was paid in full plus exorbitant fees for pretending to be an actual lender.
  9. Since the Legal obligation was both created and extinguished contemporaneously with each other, any remaining obligation to any OTHER party became unsecured since the security instrument (mortgage or deed of trust) refers only to the promissory note executed by the borrower.
  10. At the time of closing, the investor-lenders were the real parties in interest as lenders, but they were not disclosed nor were the fees of the various intermediaries who brought the investor-lender money and the borrower’s loan together.
  11. ALL INVESTOR-LENDERS RECEIVED THE EQUIVALENT OF A BOND — A PROMISE TO PAY ISSUED BY A PARTY OTHER THAN THE BORROWER, PREMISED UPON THE PAYMENT OR RECEIVABLES GENERATED FROM BORROWER PAYMENTS, CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS, CREDIT ENHANCEMENTS, AND THIRD PARTY INSURANCE.
  12. Nearly ALL investor-lenders have been paid sums of money to satisfy the promise to pay contained in the bond. These payments always exceeded the borrowers payments and in many cases paid the obligation in full WITHOUT SUBROGATION.
  13. NO LOAN IS IN ACTUAL DEFAULT OR DELINQUENCY. Since payments must first be applied to outstanding payments due, payments received by investor-lenders or their agents from third party sources are allocable to each individual loan and therefore cure the alleged default. A Borrower’s Non-payment is not a default since no payment is due.
  14. ALL NOTICES OF DEFAULT ARE DEFECTIVE: The amount stated, the creditor, and other material misstatements invalidate the effectiveness of such a notice.
  15. NO CREDIT BID AT AUCTION WAS MADE BY A CREDITOR. Hence the sale is void or voidable.
  16. ANY BALANCE DUE FROM THE BORROWER IS SUBJECT TO DEDUCTIONS FOR THIRD PARTY PAYMENTS.
  17. ANY BALANCE DUE FROM THE BORROWER IS SUBJECT TO AN EQUITABLE CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT THAT IS UNSECURED.
  18. ANY BALANCE DUE FROM THE BORROWER IS SUBJECT TO AN EQUITABLE CLAIM FOR A LIEN TO REFLECT THE INTENTION OF THE INVESTOR-LENDER AND THE INTENTION OF THE BORROWER.  Both the investor-lender and the borrower intended to complete a loan transaction wherein the home was used to collateralize the amount due. The legal satisfaction of the originating lender is not a deduction from the equitable satisfaction of the investor-lender. THUS THE PARTIES SEEKING TO FORECLOSE ARE SUBJECT TO THE LEGAL DEFENSE OF PAYMENT AT CLOSING BUT THE INVESTOR-LENDERS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THAT DEFENSE.
  19. The investor-lenders ALSO have a claim for damages against the investment banks and the string of intermediaries that caused loans to be originated that did not meet the description contained in the prospectus.
  20. Any claim by investor-lenders may be subject to legal and equitable defenses, offsets and counterclaims from the borrower.
  21. The current modification context in which the securitization intermediaries are involved in settlement of outstanding mortgages is allowing those intermediaries to make even more money at the expense of the investor-lenders.
  22. The failure of courts to recognize that they must apply the rule of law results not only in the foreclosure of the property, but the foreclosure of the borrower’s ability to negotiate a settlement with an undisclosed equitable creditor, or with the legal owner of the loan in the property records.

Loan File Issue Brought to Forefront By FHFA Subpoena
Posted on July 14, 2010 by Foreclosureblues
Wednesday, July 14, 2010

foreclosureblues.wordpress.com

Editor’s Note….Even  U.S. Government Agencies have difficulty getting
discovery, lol…This is another excellent post from attorney Isaac
Gradman, who has the blog here…http://subprimeshakeout.blogspot.com.
He has a real perspective on the legal aspect of the big picture, and
is willing to post publicly about it.  Although one may wonder how
these matters may effect them individually, my point is that every day
that goes by is another day working in favor of those who stick it out
and fight for what is right.

Loan File Issue Brought to Forefront By FHFA Subpoena

The battle being waged by bondholders over access to the loan files
underlying their investments was brought into the national spotlight
earlier this week, when the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the
regulator in charge of overseeing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, issued
64 subpoenas seeking documents related to the mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) in which Freddie and Fannie had invested.
The FHFA
has been in charge of overseeing Freddie and Fannie since they were
placed into conservatorship in 2008.

Freddie and Fannie are two of the largest investors in privately
issued bonds–those secured by subprime and Alt-A loans that were often
originated by the mortgage arms of Wall St. firms and then packaged
and sold by those same firms to investors–and held nearly $255 billion
of these securities as of the end of May. The FHFA said Monday that it
is seeking to determine whether issuers of these so-called “private
label” MBS misled Freddie and Fannie into making the investments,
which have performed abysmally so far, and are expected to result in
another $46 billion in unrealized losses to the Government Sponsored
Entities (GSE).

Though the FHFA has not disclosed the targets of its subpoenas, the
top issuers of private label MBS include familiar names such as
Countrywide and Merrill Lynch (now part of BofA), Bear Stearns and
Washington Mutual (now part of JP Morgan Chase), Deutsche Bank and
Morgan Stanley. David Reilly of the Wall Street Journal has written an
article urging banks to come forward and disclose whether they have
received subpoenas from the FHFA, but I’m not holding my breath.

The FHFA issued a press release on Monday regarding the subpoenas
(available here). The statement I found most interesting in the
release discusses that, before and after conservatorship, the GSEs had
been attempting to acquire loan files to assess their rights and
determine whether there were misrepresentations and/or breaches of
representations and warranties by the issuers of the private label
MBS, but that, “difficulty in obtaining the loan documents has
presented a challenge to the [GSEs’] efforts. FHFA has therefore
issued these subpoenas for various loan files and transaction
documents pertaining to loans securing the [private label MBS] to
trustees and servicers controlling or holding that documentation.”

The FHFA’s Acting Director, Edward DeMarco, is then quoted as saying
““FHFA is taking this action consistent with our responsibilities as
Conservator of each Enterprise. By obtaining these documents we can
assess whether contractual violations or other breaches have taken
place leading to losses for the Enterprises and thus taxpayers. If so,
we will then make decisions regarding appropriate actions.” Sounds
like these subpoenas are just the precursor to additional legal
action.

The fact that servicers and trustees have been stonewalling even these

powerful agencies on loan files should come as no surprise based on

the legal battles private investors have had to wage thus far to force

banks to produce these documents. And yet, I’m still amazed by the

bald intransigence displayed by these financial institutions. After

all, they generally have clear contractual obligations requiring them

to give investors access to the files (which describe the very assets

backing the securities), not to mention the implicit discovery rights

these private institutions would have should the dispute wind up in

court, as it has in MBIA v. Countrywide and scores of other investor

suits.

At this point, it should be clear to everyone–servicers and investors
alike–that the loan files will have to be produced eventually, so the
only purpose I can fathom for the banks’ obduracy is delay. The loan
files should, as I’ve said in the past, reveal the depths of mortgage
originator depravity, demonstrating convincingly that the loans never
should have been issued in the first place. This, in turn, will force
banks to immediately reserve for potential losses associated with
buying back these defective mortgages. Perhaps banks are hoping that
they can ward off this inevitability long enough to spread their
losses out over several years, thereby weathering the storm caused (in
part) by their irresponsible lending practices. But certainly the
FHFA’s announcement will make that more difficult, as the FHFA’s
inherent authority to subpoena these documents (stemming from the
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008) should compel disclosure
without the need for litigation, and potentially provide sufficient
evidence of repurchase obligations to compel the banks to reserve
right away. For more on this issue, see the fascinating recent guest
post by Manal Mehta on The Subprime Shakeout regarding the SEC’s
investigation into banks’ processes for allocating loss reserves.

Meanwhile, the investor lawsuits continue to rain down on banks, with
suits by the Charles Schwab Corp. against Merrill Lynch and UBS, by
the Oregon Public Employee Retirement Fund against Countrywide, and by
Cambridge Place Investment Management against Goldman Sachs, Citigroup
and dozens of other banks and brokerages being announced this week. If
the congealing investor syndicate was looking for political cover
before staging a full frontal attack on banks, this should provide
ample protection. Much more to follow on these and other developments
in the coming days…
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Posted by Isaac Gradman at 3:46 PM

Foreclosure News in Review

For more information, services and products please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688.

CLICK ON LINKS FOR FULL STORY

PRETENDER MENDERS: GOVERNMENT IGNORES THE ELEPHANT IN THE LIVING ROOM — DOW HEADED FOR 8,000?

Starting with the Clinton and Bush administration and continued by the Obama administration (see below), the public, the media, the financial analysts, economists and regulators are uniformly ignoring the obvious pointed out originally by Roubini, myself and many others (Simon Johnson, Yves Smith et al). We are pretending the fix the economy, not actually doing it. The fundamental weakness of world economies is that the banks caused a drastic reduction in household wealth through credit cards and mortgages. Credit was used to replace a living wage. That is a going out of business strategy. The economies in Europe are stalling already and our own stock market has started down a slippery path. The prediction in the above-linked article seems more likely than the blitzkrieg of planted articles from pundits for Bank of America, and other banks pushing their common stock as a great investment. The purpose of that blitzkrieg of news is simple — the more people with a vested interest in those banks, the more pressure against real regulation, real enforcement and real correct.

As the facts emerge, there were no actual financial transactions within the chain of documents relied upon by foreclosing parties. That cannot change. So the foreclosures are simply part of a larger fraudulent scheme. If the government regulators and the Federal reserve would tell the truth that they definitely know is the truth, the the mortgages would all be recognized as completely void and the notes would not only be void but subject to civil and potentially criminal charges of fraud. Most importantly it would eliminate foreclosures, for the most part, and allow borrowers to get together with their real (even if reluctant) lenders and settle up with new mortgages., This would restore at least some of house hold wealth and end the policy of making the little guy bear the burden of this gross error in regulation and this gross fraudulent scheme of non-securitization of mortgage debt, student debt, auto loan debt, credit card debt and other consumer debt.

It is ONLY be restoration of a vibrant middle class that our economy and the world economic marketplace can avoid the coming and recurring disaster. This is a matter of justice, not relief. See also Complete absence of mortgage and foreclosures are the largest component of our problems

What happens to restitution and why is the government ignoring the obvious benefits from restitution? NY Times

So a trader no longer needs to be subject to a requirement of restitution because he has already entered into civil agreement to restore creditors who bought bogus mortgage bonds that were issued by REMIC Trusts that were never funded by any cash or any assets. Since the “securitization fail” originated as a fraudulent scheme by the world’s major banks, and restitution is the primary remedy to defrauded victims, it follows that restitution should be the principal focus of enforcement actions, civil suits and criminal prosecutions. Meanwhile some restitution is occurring, just like this case.

The question is, assuming the investors who were in fact the creditors, how are the proceeds of settlement posted in accounting for the recovery of potential losses? If, as is obviously the case, the payments reduce the losses of the investors, then why are those settlements not credited to the books of account of those creditors and why isn’t that a matter subject to discovery of what the “Trust” or “Trust beneficiaries” are showing as “balance due” and what effect does that have on the existence of a default — especially where servicer advances are involved, which appears to be most cases.

The courts are wrong. Those judges that rule that the accounting and posting on the actual creditors’ books and records are irrelevant are succumbing to political and economic pressure (Follow Tom Ice on this issue) instead of calling balls and strikes like they are supposed to do. If third party payments are at least includable in discovery and probably admissible at trial, then the amount that the creditor is allowed to expect would be reduced. In accounting there is nothing more black letter that a reduction in the debt affects both the debtor and the creditor. So a principal reduction would occur by simple application of justice and arithmetic — not some bleeding heart prayer for “relief.”

Why the economy can;t budge — consumers are not participating in greater productivity caused by consumers as workers

Simple facts: our economy is driven by, or was driven by 70% consumer spending. Like it or not that is the case and it is a resilient element of U.S. Economics. Since 1964 workers wages have been essentially stagnant — despite huge gains in productivity that was given ONLY to management and shareholders. I know this is an unpopular position and I have some misgivings about it myself. But the fact remains that when unions were strong EVERYONE was getting paid better and single income households were successful with even some padding in savings account.

By substituting credit for a proper wage commensurate with merit (productivity), the country has moved most of the population in the direction of poverty, burdened by debt that should have been wages and savings.

But the big shock that is not over is the sudden elimination of household wealth and the sudden dominance of the banks in the economy, world politics and our national politics. Proper and appropriate sharing of the losses imposed solely on borrowers in a mean spirited “rocket docket” is not the answer. (see above) The expediting of foreclosures is founded on a completely wrong premise — that the debts, notes and mortgages are, for the most part, valid. They are not valid as to the parties who seek to enforce them for their own benefit at the expense and detriment to both the creditors (investors) and borrowers.

GDP of the United States is now composed of a virtually dead heat between financial “services” and all the rest of real economic activity (making things and doing services). This means that trading paper based upon the other 50% of real economic activity has tripled from 16% to nearly 48%. That means our real economic activity is composed, comparing apples to apples, of about 1/3 false paper. A revision of GDP to 2/3 of current reports would cause a lot of trouble. But it is the truth and it opens the door to making real corrections.

The Basic Premise of the Bailout, TARP, Bond Purchases was Wrong

Now that Bernanke, Geithner, Paulson and others are being forced to testify, it is apparent that they had no idea what they were really doing because they were proceeding on false information (from the banks) and false premises (from the banks). Most revealing is that both Paulson and Bernanke were relying upon Geithner while he was President of the NY Fed. Everyone was essentially asleep at the wheel. Greenspan, former Federal Reserve chairman, admits he was mistaken in believing that while his staff of 100 PhD’s didn’t understand the securitization scheme, market forces would mysteriously cause a correction. Perhaps that would have been painfully true if market forces had been allowed to continue — resulting in the failure of most of the major banks.

The wrong premise was the TBTF assumption — the fall of AIG or the banks would have plunged into a worldwide depression. That would only have been true if government didn’t simply step in, seize bank assets around the world, and provide restitution to the victims — pension funds, homeowners, insurers, guarantors, et al. We already know that size is no guarantee of safety (Lehman, AIG, Bear Stearns et al). There are over 7,000 community banks and credit unions, some with more than $10 billion on deposit, that could easily pick up where bank of America left off before its own crash. Banking is marketing and electronic data processing. All  banks, right down to the smallest bank in America, have access to the exact same IT backbone for transfer of funds, deposits and loans. Iceland showed us the way and we ignored it. They sent the bad bankers to jail and reduced household debt by more than 25%. They quickly recovered from the “failed” banks and things are running quire smoothly.

JDSUPRA.COM: What good is the statute of limitations if it never ends?

A word of caution. In the context of a quiet title action my conclusion is that it should not be available just because the statute of limitations has run on enforcement of the note. But it remains on the public records as a lien. The idea proposed by me, initially, and others later that a quiet title action was the right path is probably wrong. documents in the public records may not be eliminated without showing that they never should have been recorded in the first place. Thus the mortgage or assignment of record remains unless we prove that those documents were void and therefore should not have been recorded.

That said, I hope the Supreme Court of Florida makes the distinction between the context of quiet title, where I agree that it should not easy to eliminate matters in the public record, and the statute of limitations, where parties should not be permitted to bring repeated actions on the same debt, note and mortgage after they have lost. Both positions cause uncertainty in the marketplace — if quiet title becomes easy to allege due to statute of limitations and statute of limitations becomes  harder to raise because despite choosing the acceleration option, and despite existing Florida law and precedent, the court decides that the the foreclosing party is estopped by res judicata, collateral estoppel and the statute of limitations.

JDSUPRA.COM: Association Lien Superior to 1st Mortgage

As I predicted years ago and have repeated from time to time, one strategy that is absent is collaboration between the homeowner and the association whose lien is superior to the 1st Mortgage which can be foreclosed out of existence. This was another area of concentration in my prior practice of law. We provide litigation support to attorneys. We will not make any attempt nor accept direct engagement of associations. But I can show you how to use this to advantage of our law firm, your client’s interests and avoid an empty abandoned dwelling unit.

What a surprise?!? Servicers are steering unsophisticated and emotionally challenged borrowers into foreclosure

by string them along in modifications. This is something many judges are upset about. They don’t like it. More motions to compel mediation (with a real decider) or to enforce a settlement that has already been approved (and then the NEXT servicer says they are not bound by the prior agreement.

Who Are the Creditors?

For litigation support (to attorneys only) and expert witness consultation, referrals to attorneys please call 954-495-9867 or 520 405-1688.

Since the distributions are made to the alleged trust beneficiaries by the alleged servicers, it is clear that both the conduct and the documents establish the investors as the creditors. The payments are not made into a trust account and the Trustee is neither the payor of the distributions nor is the Trustee in any way authorized or accountable for the distributions. The trust is merely a temporary conduit with no business purpose other than the purchase or origination of loans. In order to prevent the distributions of principal from being treated as ordinary income to the Trust, the REMIC statute allows the Trust to do its business for a period of 90 days after which business operations are effectively closed.

The business is supposed to be financed through the “IPO” sale of mortgage bonds that also convey an undivided interest in the “business” which is the trust. The business consists of purchasing or originating loans within the 90 day window. 90 days is not a lot of time to acquire $2 billion in loans. So it needs to be set up before the start date which is the filing of the required papers with the IRS and SEC and regulatory authorities. This business is not a licensed bank or lender. It has no source of funds other than the IPO issuance of the bonds. Thus the business consists simply of using the proceeds of the IPO for buying or originating loans. Since the Trust and the investors are protected from poor or illegal lending practices, the Trust never directly originates loans. Otherwise the Trust would appear on the original note and mortgage and disclosure documents.

Yet as I have discussed in recent weeks, the money from the “trust beneficiaries” (actually just investors) WAS used to originate loans despite documents and agreements to the contrary. In those documents the investor money was contractually intended to be used to buy mortgage bonds issued by the REMIC Trust. Since the Trusts are NOT claiming to be holders in due course or the owners of the debt, it may be presumed that the Trusts did NOT purchase the loans. And the only reason for them doing that would be that the Trusts did not have the money to buy loans which in turn means that the broker dealers who “sold” mortgage bonds misdirected the money from investors from the Trust to origination and acquisition of loans that ultimately ended up under the control of the broker dealer (investment bank) instead of the Trust.

The problem is that the banks that were originating or buying loans for the Trust didn’t want the risk of the loans and frankly didn’t have the money to fund the purchase or origination of what turned out to be more than 80 million loans. So they used the investor money directly instead of waiting for it to be processed through the trust.

The distribution payments came from the Servicer directly to the investors and not through the Trust, which is not allowed to conduct business after the 90 day cutoff. It was only a small leap to ignore the trust at the beginning — I.e. During the business period (90 days). On paper they pretended that the Trust was involved in the origination and acquisition of loans. But in fact the Trust entities were completely ignored. This is what Adam Levitin called “securitization fail.” Others call it fraud, pure and simple, and that any further action enforcing the documents that refer to fictitious transactions is an attempt at making the courts an instrument for furthering the fraud and protecting the perpetrator from liability, civil and criminal.

And that brings us to the subject of servicer advances. Several people  have commented that the “servicer” who advanced the funds has a right to recover the amounts advanced. If that is true, they ask, then isn’t the “recovery” of those advances a debit to the creditors (investors)? And doesn’t that mean that the claimed default exists? Why should the borrower get the benefit of those advances when the borrower stops paying?

These are great questions. Here is my explanation for why I keep insisting that the default does not exist.

First let’s look at the actual facts and logistics. The servicer is making distribution payments to the investors despite the fact that the borrower has stopped paying on the alleged loan. So on its face, the investors are not experiencing a default and they are not agreeing to pay back the servicer.

The servicer is empowered by vague wording in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement to stop paying the advances when in its sole discretion it determines that the amounts are not recoverable. But it doesn’t say recoverable from whom. It is clear they have no right of action against the creditor/investors. And they have no right to foreclosure proceeds unless there is a foreclosure sale and liquidation of the property to a third party purchaser for value. This means that in the absence of a foreclosure the creditors are happy because they have been paid and the borrower is happy because he isn’t making payments, but the servicer is “loaning” the payments to the borrower without any contracts, agreements or any documents bearing the signature of the borrower. The upshot is that the foreclosure is then in substance an action by the servicer against the borrower claiming to be secured by a mortgage but which in fact is SUPPOSEDLY owned by the Trust or Trust beneficiaries (depending upon which appellate decision or trial court decision you look at).

But these questions are academic because the investors are not the owners of the loan documents. They are the owners of the debt because their money was used directly, not through the Trust, to acquire the debt, without benefit of acquiring the note and mortgage. This can be seen in the stone wall we all hit when we ask for the documents in discovery that would show that the transaction occurred as stated on the note and mortgage or assignment or endorsement.

Thus the amount received by the investors from the “servicers” was in fact not received under contract, because the parties all ignored the existence of the trust entity. It was a voluntary payment received from an inter-meddler who lacked any power or authorization to service or process the loan, the loan payments, or the distributions to investors except by conduct. Ignoring the Trust entity has its consequences. You cannot pick up one end of the stick without picking up the other.

So the claim of the “servicer” is in actuality an action in equity or at law for recovery AGAINST THE BORROWER WITHOUT DOCUMENTATION OF ANY KIND BEARING THE BORROWER’S SIGNATURE. That is because the loans were originated as table funded loans which are “predatory per se” according to Reg Z. Speaking with any mortgage originator they will eventually either refuse to answer or tell you outright that the purpose of the table funded loan was to conceal from the borrower the parties with whom the borrower was actually doing business.

The only reason the “servicer” is claiming and getting the proceeds from foreclosure sales is that the real creditors and the Trust that issued Bonds (but didn’t get paid for them) is that the investors and the Trust are not informed. And according to the contract (PSA, Prospectus etc.) that they don’t know has been ignored, neither the investors nor the Trust or Trustee is allowed to make inquiry. They basically must take what they get and shut up. But they didn’t shut up when they got an inkling of what happened. They sued for FRAUD, not just breach of contract. And they received huge payoffs in settlements (at least some of them did) which were NOT allocated against the amount due to those investors and therefore did not reduce the amount due from the borrower.

Thus the argument about recovery is wrong because there really is no such claim against the investors. There is the possibility of a claim against the borrower for unjust enrichment or similar action, but that is a separate action that arose when the payment was made and was not subject to any agreement that was signed by the borrower. It is a different claim that is not secured by the mortgage or note, even if the  loan documents were valid.

Lastly I should state why I have put the “servicer”in quotes. They are not the servicer if they derive their “authority” from the PSA. They could only be the “servicer” if the Trust acquired the loans. In that case they PSA would affect the servicing of the actual loan. But if the money did not come from the Trust in any manner, shape or form, then the Trust entity has been ignored. Accordingly they are neither the servicer nor do they have any powers, rights, claims or obligations under the PSA.

But the other reason comes from my sources on Wall Street. The service did not and could not have made the “servicer advances.” Another bit of smoke and mirrors from this whole false securitization scheme. The “servicer advances” were advances made by the broker dealer who “sold” (in a false sale) mortgage bonds. The brokers advanced money to an account in which the servicer had access to make distributions along with a distribution report. The distribution reports clearly disclaim any authenticity of the figures used, the status of the loans, the trust or the portfolio of loans (non-existent) as a whole. More smoke and mirrors. So contrary to popular belief the servicer advances were not made by the servicers except as a conduit.

Think about it. Why would you offer to keep the books on a thousand loans and agree to make payments even if the borrowers didn’t pay? There is no reasonable fee for loan processing or payment processing that would compensate the servicer for making those advances. There is no rational business reason for the advance. The reason they agreed to issue the distribution report along with money that was actually under the control of the broker dealer is that they were being given an opportunity, like sharks in a feeding frenzy, to participate in the liquidation proceeds after foreclosure — but only if the loan actually went into foreclosure, which is why most loan modifications are ignored or fail.

Who had a reason to advance money to the creditors even if there was no payment by the borrower? The broker dealer, who wanted to pacify the investors who thought they owned bonds issued by a REMIC Trust that they thought had paid for and owned the loans as holder in due course on their behalf. But it wasn’t just pacification. It was marketing and sales. As long as investors thought the investments were paying off as expected, they would buy more bonds. In the end that is what all this was about — selling more and more bonds, skimming a chunk out of the money advanced by investors — and then setting up loans that had to fail, and if by some reason they didn’t they made sure that the tranche that reportedly owned the loan also was liable for defaults in toxic waste mortgages “approved” for consumers who had no idea what they were signing.

So how do you prove this happened in one particular loan and one particular trust and one particular servicer etc.? You don’t. You announce your theory of the case and demand discovery in which you have wide latitude in what questions you can ask and what documents you can demand — much wider than what will be allowed as areas of inquiry in trial. It is obvious and compelling that asked for proof of the underlying authority, underlying transaction or anything else that is real, your opposition can’t come up with it. Their case falls apart because they don’t own or control the debt, the loan or any of the loan documents.

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