It is easy to blame judges for corruption, but it is more accurate to blame them for ignorance and arrogance.

Homeowners (and my readers, in particular) are completely correct in asserting at least the appearance of corruption by judges. Virtually all of them have their retirement invested partially or even mostly in funds that rely heavily on purchasing “Mortgage-Backed Securities.” Hence, if judges were to rule against the lawyers asserting representation of banks like “U.S. Bank as trustee…” (Blah blah), they would be ruling against the interest of their retirement.
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Let’s remember the meaning of corruption. It means that people in public office are violating their charter or oath primarily to benefit themselves. If someone in public office takes some action that produces a benefit that includes them, it is not corruption unless that was the main reason or the only reason they did it.
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So if you are going to accuse a public official (like a judge) of corruption, you must base that accusation on known facts that you can prove, establishing that the only reason the judge did what he/she did was to preserve their retirement account. If you can’t do that, you must find another way to hate the judge.
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But the fact that the judge is literally invested in the outcome of litigation is a correct statement of the facts. That alone should be sufficient to force the judge’s recusal and substitution of a judge with no such conflict. My reason for this opinion is that lawyers and judges must avoid even the appearance of impropriety under the ethical rules governing professional conduct.
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And yet I use the strongest possible language to dissuade homeowners from using that as a foundation for a challenge to a judge, who seems unfriendly. My primary reason is that it never works and annoys the judge.
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And some people point to my inconsistent statements as evidence of a defect in my mental condition. But there is a method to my madness. And being 75 going on 76 does have the advantage of seeing and experiencing many improbable events.
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The first point is that it is highly unlikely to find a single judge anywhere who does not have a retirement package. It is also extremely unlikely that the retirement package would be devoid of investment in falsely labeled “mortgage-backed securities.”
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The certificates are not securities according to changes in the securities law long sought by Wall Street and successfully implemented in 1998. When President Clinton signed that into law, he was letting tigers out of their cages. The fact that they ate everyone should have come as no surprise.
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Also, just as a reminder, the certificates are never backed by any debt, note, or mortgage issued by any homeowner. Arguments in court to the contrary are lies protected b y the doctrine of litigation immunity that applies to both lawyers and their clients.
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So the problem is that if a judge recused himself or herself from the proceeding based upon the appearance of impropriety, there would be nobody to replace the judge. The simple political fact of life is that this is unacceptable in our society. And while you can argue the philosophical pros and cons, it will never happen.
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Then there is the other problem that has no answer at all. Exactly how much does the judge know about his/her investments? I have friends on the bench, and I can report that out of about a dozen, only one is well-versed in investments, particularly their own investments. The rest depend entirely on the manager of retirement funds. They have no idea whether their decisions are favorable or unfavorable to their own financial situation because they don’t know how their money has been invested.
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I have suggested that experienced lawyers who are fairly well-known to the judge could ask if they could conduct voir dire on the judge, himself or herself.
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This would include questions about their ability to render a fair verdict even though their retirement funds may be affected. While this is unlikely to produce a recusal, it is highly likely to focus the judge’s attention on the specific requirements of evidence and procedure that are often ignored by judges in foreclosure cases. It is, in my opinion, a possible first step in educating a judge and persuading them to rule in favor of the homeowner.
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I have several reasons for believing that judges can be convinced to rule in favor of the homeowner. The first and most major reason is that I have done it dozens of times. The second reason is that I have seen other lawyers do it hundreds of times. The third reason is that I have received reports of pro se homeowners doing it thousands of times.
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There is some truth to the matter asserted by homeowners who are given to conspiratorial thinking. Most judges are afraid of pulling the plug on the entire financial system. But I think both homeowners and lawyers give too much credit and weight to judges’ intelligence, knowledge, and experience. It is simply not true that judges know anything about the securitization of debt — in theory, in documents, or in practice. In fact, they don’t know there is a difference. The problem is that they think they know.
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So there you have it. Judges’ dismissive rulings are because they have convinced themselves they know what they are talking about. They don’t. Ego gets in the way of recognizing their ignorance even though they have no problem dealing with it if the subject matter is medicine or technology. This has happened before, and it will no doubt happen again. Judges are just as susceptible to memes or fads as anyone else.
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So I have suggested to lawyers, especially experienced trial lawyers, that if they want to win, they need to probe the judge and watch the judge’s reactions during the proceedings. They are looking for “tells” that show or reveal the things that the judge thinks are most obvious about the case, so the lawyer can reveal that the opposition cannot corroborate that “obvious fact.”
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Then when the judge rules for the homeowner, it isn’t about whether the debt is real or unreal. It is about the lawyer for the foreclosure mill having messed up, and the judge is issuing a punishment for having messed up the case. This is the primary reason I have won so many cases. It wasn’t that the judge was finally convinced that foreclosure was fraudulent.
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Judges like to do that because if they don’t enforce court rules, their courtroom becomes a circus. And a circus produces absurd rulings that get reversed. And reversed rulings lead to dead ends for ambitious judges — they will never be promoted to an appellate bench if they are constantly reversed.
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3 Responses

  1. Courts are enablers for Wall Street Banks extortion racket which became a racket on its own.
    My current judge Hala Jarbou has three brothers whose entire business is based on renting their names for Wall Street Banks in a massive money laundering and multi-million fraud scheme agaisnt investors and customers.
    No surprise she did not found any merits in my case – if she will it will destroy her brothers’ profits. So, its either my family of hers. and she is in position of power to steal my home and my money for her familiy patrons – Wall Street Banks and their servicers Foley and Bisignano

  2. Seems to me you’r trying to let the judges off a whole lot easier than they let people keep thier homes… soooo… here’s some pertinent definitions from Blacxk’s 9th… you know, that book that’s supposed to help all American’s understand the legal industy speak?
    CORRUPTION

    From Black’s 9th Edition

    corrupt, adj. 1. Having an unlawful or depraved motive;
    esp., influenced by bribery. 2. Archaic. (Of a person)
    subject to corruption of blood.
    “[There are divers offences made Treason by Act of Parliament, whereof, though a Man be Attaint, yet his Blood.
    by Provisoes therein, is not corrupt, nor shall he forfeit any thing ….” Thomas Blount, Noma-Lexicon: A Law·
    Dictionary (1670).

    corrupt, vb. 1. To change (a person’s morals or principles) from good to bad. 2. To destroy or
    diminish the quality and usefulness of an electronic or mechanical device or its components.
    3. Archaic. To impose corruption of blood on (a person).

    corrupting, n. See IMPAIRING THE MORALS OF A MINOR.

    corruption. (l4c) 1. Depravity, perversion, or taint; an impairment of integrity, virtue, or moral principle; esp.,
    the impairment of a public official’s duties by bribery.
    [Cases: Officers and Public Employees (;:::> 121.J
    “The word ‘corruption’ indicates impurity or debasement and when found in the criminal law it means depravity or
    gross impropriety.” Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 855 (3d ed. 1982).
    2. The act of doing something with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the
    rights of others; a fiduciary’s or official’s use of a station or office to procure some benefit either personally or for someone else, contrary to the rights of others.

    corruption in office. See official misconduct under MIS CONDUCT.

    corruption of a minor. See IMPAIRING THE MORALS OF A MINOR.

    corruption of blood. A defunct doctrine, now considered unconstitutional, under which a person loses the ability to inherit or pass property as a result of an attainder or of being declared civilly dead. – Also termed corruption of the blood.
    See ATTAINDER; civil death (1) under DEATH.
    “Corruption of blood is, when anyone is attainted of felony or treason, then his blood is said to be corrupt; by means
    whereof neither his children, nor any of his blood, can be heirs to him, or to any other ancestor, for that they ought to
    Claim by him. And if he were a noble or gentleman before, he and all his children are made thereby ignoble and
    ungentle ….” Termes de fa Ley 125 (1 st Am. ed. 1812).

    corruptly, adv. (16c) In a corrupt or depraved manner; by means of corruption or bribery.• As used in criminal law statutes, corruptly usu. indicates a wrongful desire for pecuniary gain or other advantage.

    corrupt-motive doctrine. (1962) Criminal law. The rule that conspiracy is punishable only if the agreement was entered into with an evil purpose, not merely with an intent to do the illegal act. • This doctrine – which originated in People v. Powell, 63 N.Y. 88 (1875) has been rejected by the Model Penal Code. – Also termed Powell doctrine. [Cases: Conspiracy (;:::>24.5.]

    IGNORANCE:

    ignorantia (ig-na-ran-shee-33.]
    “‘Ignorantia facti excusat,’ however, is obviously too sweeping even for a general statement of law, because it is clear (to mention only one point for the moment) that if a certain deed would constitute exactly the same crime
    under either of two factual situations, it will be no excuse that one was mistaken for the other.” Rollin M. Perkins &
    Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 1044 (3d ed. 1982).

    ignorantia juris non excusat (ig-n;)-ran-shee-~ joor-is non ek-skyoo-sat or -zat). [Latin] Lack of knowledge about a legal requirement or prohibition is never an excuse to a criminal charge. _ In English, the idea is commonly rendered ignorance ofthe law is no excuse.
    Often shortened to ignorantia juris.
    Also termed ignorantia juris neminem excusat (ignorance of the law
    excuses no one); ignorantia legis non excusat: ignorantia
    juris haud excusat. [Cases: Criminal Law C=:>32.]
    “Almost the only knowledge of law possessed by many people is that ignorance of it is no excuse (ignoYantiajuris
    non excusat), This maxim was originally formulated at a time when the list of crimes, broadly speaking, represented
    current morality (mala in se), but we now have many other crimes that are the result of administrative or social regulation (mala prohibita),which are equally governed by the maxim, The rule is, then, that whereas ignorance of fact can excuse, to the extent that it negatives mens rea or fault, ignorance of the law generally does not.” Glanville
    Williams, Textbook ofCriminal Law40S (1978),

    ignoratio elenchi (ig-n~-ray-shee-oh e-leng-kI or ig-n~
    rab-tee-oh i-Ieng-kee). [Law Latin “ignorance of the conclusion to be proved”] (l6c) An advocate’s misun
    derstanding of an opponent’s position, manifested by an argument that fails to address the opponent’s point;
    the overlooking of an opponent’s counterargument. •
    This fallacy of logic often involves an advocate’s trying to prove something that is immaterial to the point to
    be decided.

    My thought… Ie…. such as Plaintiff’s failure to even address defendant’s claim of Plaintiff’s lack of capacity to envoke the Court’ jurisdfiction.

    ignorantia jacti excusat (ig-na-ran-shee-a fak-tI ek
    skyoo-sat or -zat). [Latin] Ignorance of fact is an excuse; whatever is done under a mistaken impression
    of a material fact is excused or provides grounds for relief. • This maxim refers to the principle that acts
    done and contracts made under mistake or ignorance of a material fact are voidable. [Cases: Criminal Law
    C=>33.]
    “‘Ignorantia facti excusat,’ however, is obviously too sweeping even for a general statement of law, because it
    is clear (to mention only one point for the moment) that if a certain deed would constitute exactly the same crime
    under either of two factual situations, it will be no excuse that one was mistaken for the other.” Rollin M. Perkins &
    Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 1044 (3d ed. 1982).

    ignorantia juris non excusat (ig-na-ran-shee-joor-is
    non ek-skyoo-sat or -zat). [Latin] Lack of knowledge about a legal requirement or prohibition
    is never an excuse to a criminal charge. _ In English, the idea is commonly rendered
    ignorance ofthe law is no excuse.
    Often shortened to ignorantia juris.
    Also termed
    ignorantia juris neminem excusat (ignorance of the law excuses no one);
    ignorantia legis non excusat: ignorantia juris haud excusat.
    [Cases: Criminal Law C=:>32.]
    “Almost the only knowledge of law possessed by many people is that ignorance of it is no excuse (ignoYantiajuris
    non excusat), This maxim was originally formulated at a time when the list of crimes, broadly speaking, represented
    current morality (mala in se), but we now have many other crimes that are the result of administrative or social regulation (mala prohibita), which are equally governed by the maxim, The rule is, then, that whereas ignorance of fact can excuse, to the extent that it negatives mens rea or fault, ignorance of the law generally does not.” Glanville
    Williams, Textbook ofCriminal Law40S (1978),

    ignoratio elenchi (ig-n~-ray-shee-oh e-leng-kI or ig-n~ rab-tee-oh i-Ieng-kee).
    [Law Latin “ignorance of the conclusion to be proved”] (l6c) An advocate’s misunderstanding of an opponent’s position, manifested by an argument that fails to address the opponent’s point; the overlooking of an opponent’s counterargument. • This fallacy oflogic often involves an advocate’s trying to prove something that is immaterial to the point to be decided.

    ignore, vb. (lB01) 1. To refuse to notice, recognize, or consider, 2. (Of a grand jury) to reject (an indictment)
    as groundless; to no-bill (a charge).

    illegality, n. (l7c) l. An act that is not authorized by law.
    2. The state of not being legally authorized.
    “A contract made ultra vires is void; but not [strictly speaking] on the ground of illegality. Lord Cairns .. , takes
    exception to the use of the term ‘illegality,’ pointing out that it is not the object of the contracting parties, but the
    incapacity of one of them, that avoids the contract.” William R, Anson, Principles of the Law of Contract 190 (Arthur L Corbin ed., 3d Am. ed, 1919).
    “It must not be thought that illegality in the law of contract is co-terminous with illegality in the criminal law, for a contract may be illegal without involving any breach of the criminal law at all.” p.s. Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract 257 (3d ed, 1981).

    My thought… so the judge KNOWS he’s doing wrong… theres just been to much publication and public knowledge (common knowledge) for an illegal foreclosures not to be considered “Public Knowledge” so then isn’t his verdit in reality a….

    fraudulent misrepresentation. (18c) A false statement that is known to be false or is made recklessly
    without knowing or caring whether it is true or false and that is intended to induce a party to det
    rimentally rely on it. Also termed fraudulent representation; deceit. [Cases: Fraud ~8.j
    “A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker intends his assertion to induce a party to manifest his assent and
    the maker (a) knows or believes that the assertion is not in accord with the facts, or (b) does not have the confidence
    that he states or implies in the truth of the assertion, or (c) knows that he does not have the basis that he states or
    implies for the assertion.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 162(1) (1979).

    Note on ignorance… there’s another 20+ references to it in Black’s 9th that I’m not including here… for brevity.
    Also’s:

    Note on Arrogance… Black’s 9th has nothing on it! BUT…. Meriam Webster’s online has this to say: : an attitude of superiority manifested in an overbearing manner or in presumptuous claims or assumptions

    Yea… I’d say most judges have this quality(?).

    crimen (krI-man), n. [Latin]l. An accusation or charge
    Of a crime. 2. A crime. PI. crimina (krim-a-na).
    crimen expilatae hereditatis (kri-mm eks-p.:>-lay-tee
    ha-red-i-tay-tis). Roman law. A false claimant’s willful
    spoliation of an inheritance.

    crimen falsi (kri-man fal-51 or fawl-sI). [Latin “the
    crime of falsifying”) 1. A crime in the nature of
    perjury. – Also termed falsum. 2. Any other offense
    that involves some element of dishonesty or false
    statement. See Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2). [Cases: Wit
    nesses (;:J337(12).]
    “The starting point [for perjury] seems to have been the
    so-called crimen falSi, — crime of falsifying. In the begin
    ning, perhaps, one convicted of perjury was deemed too
    untrustworthy to be permitted to testify in any other case,
    and the idea grew until the term ‘crimen falsi’ included any
    crime involving an element of deceit. fraud or corruption.”
    Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 26 (3d
    ed.1982).

    ernbrace, vb. To atternpt to influence (a judge or juror)
    by corruption, or to behave in a way that might have a
    corrupting influence; to engage in embracery.
    embracee (em-bray-see). The bribe-taker in the offense
    of embracery.
    ernbracer (im-brays-i}r). [fro Old French embraseor “one
    who kindles or instigates,” fro embraser “to set fire to”]
    (15c) The bribe-giver in the offense of embracery; one
    who attempts to influence a judge or a juror by means
    of corruption. – Also spelled embraceor.
    embracery (im-brays-i}-ree), n. (15c) The attempt to corrupt or wrongfully
    influence a judge or juror, esp. by threats or bribery.
    Also spelled imbracery. – Also termed jury-tampering;
    laboring a jury. Cf. JURY-FIX-ING; JURY-PACKING.
    [Cases: Criminal Law C=:>45.35.]
    “The word ’embracery’ … has tended to disappear. It is
    included in some of the codes but the tendency has been
    to divide this common-law offense into two parts, placing
    that which is appropriate thereto in sections on bribery
    and the remainder in provisions dealing with obstruction
    of justice.” Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal
    Law 552 (3d ed. 1982).

    litem suam facere (li-tem s[y]oo-am fay-sa-ree). [Latin
    “to make a suit one’s own”] Roman law. (Of a judex)
    to fail in his official duty through imprudence, such as not adhering to
    the formula, or not following due procedure.• This failure amounted
    to misconduct in the judex’s duties, and a litigant was given a private
    action against him. The scope of actionable misconduct is not certain.
    It included not obeying the formula and not adjourning the trial properly,
    but it may also have included overt acts of corruption, such as accepting
    bribes.
    Imprudence: Adjective: not showing care for the consequences of an action; rash: “it would be imprudent to leave her winter coat behind”

    malversation (mal-var-say-shdn), n. [French “ill behavior”] Official corruption;
    misbehavior by an official in the exercise of the duties of the office. [Cases:
    Officers and Public Employees C–;) 121.) – malverse, vb.

    misconduct (mis-kon-d~kt). (l7c) 1. A dereliction of duty; unlawful or improper behavior.
    affirmative misconduct. (1897) 1. An affirmative act of misrepresentation
    or concealment of a material fact; intentional wrongful behavior. – Some courts hold
    that there must be an ongoing pattern of misrepresentation or false promises, as opposed
    to an isolated act of providing misinformation. 2. With respect to a claim of estoppel
    against the federal government, a misrepresentation or concealment of a material
    fact by a government employee – beyond a merely innocent or negligent misrepresentation. [Cases:
    Estoppel C-::;;:’62.2(3, 4).]

    juror misconduct. (1954) A juror’s violation of the court’s charge or the law, committed
    either during trial or in deliberations after trial, such as (1) communicating about the case with
    outsiders, witnesses, attorneys, bailiffs, or judges, (2) bringing into the jury room information
    relating to the case but not in evidence, and (3) conducting experiments regarding theories of
    the case outside the court’s presence.
    [Cases: Criminal Law (:::;)855; Federal Courts 1974; Trial (:::;::,304-311.]

    misconduct in office. See official misconduct.

    official misconduct. (1830) A public officer’s corrupt violation of assigned duties by malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance. Also termed misconduct in office; misbehavior in office: malconduct in office; misdemeanor in office: corruption in office: official corruption; political corruption. [Cases: Officers and Public Employees (;=, 121.]

    wanton misconduct. (1844) An act, or a failure to act when there is a duty to do so, in reckless disregard
    Of another’s rights, coupled with the knowledge that injury will probably result. – Also termed wanton
    and reckless misconduct. [Cases: Negligence 275.)

    willful and wanton misconduct. (1866) Conduct committed with an intentional or reckless disregard for the safety of others, as by failing to exercise ordinary care to prevent a known danger or to discover a
    danger. Also termed willful indifference to the safety ofothers. [Cases: Automobiles (::::::) 181(1): Negligence (;:::>275.]

    willful misconduct. (1804) Misconduct committed voluntarily and intentionally. (Cases: Carriers
    307(6.1); Negligence (:::;::,275; Unemployment Compensation (:::;::,65.]
    “This term of art [willful misconduct] has defied definition, but it is clear that it means something more than negligence. Two classic examples of misconduct which will defeat the seaman’s claim are intoxication and venereal disease.” Frank L. Maraist, Admiralty in a Nutshell 185-86 (3d ed. 1996).

    Question: Isn’t the Judge an employee of the public? Aren’t then litigants also considered legal members of “the Public”? Then would not the judge be considered “an employee of the employer’s interests”?

    willful misconduct of an employee. (1884) The deliberate disregard by an employee of the employer’s interests, including its work rules and standards of conduct, justifying a denial of unemployment
    compensation if the employee is terminated for the misconduct. [Cases: Unemployment Compensation
    65.]
    2. An attorney’s dishonesty or attempt to persuade a court or jury by using deceptive or reprehensible
    methods. (Cases: Criminal Law(:::;::,1980-2210; Federal Civil Procedure (:::;::, 1970; Trial (‘::::> 113.]

    vice (VIS), n. (14c) 1. A moral failing; an ethical fault. 2. Wickedness; corruption. 3. Broadly, any defect or
    failing.

  3. As of this date, the New York State Supreme court , county of Delaware, County Clerk, Court Clerk, have allowed the ILLEGAL foreclosure of over 100 homes in the county. Judge Richard D Northrup was elected as COUNTY judge, in 2015, “temporarily“ appointed as a supreme court justice in summer, 2018. While this is constitutionally legal under Article 6, Section 26, Section 21 (d) of the same article limits this appointment to 3 months. Judge Northrup was required by law to stand for ELECTION, he did not. Judge Northrup was eventually replaced by Judge Burns, who is simply rubber-stamping the otherwise illegal and VOID decisions of Judge Northrup. This situation means that any of Judge Northrup’s decisions as “acting” Supreme Court Justice in 2018 or after are null and void and have no legal merit. Judge Northrup stands in violation of his oath office as do the other elected officials.

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