How Those Refi’s Were Turned Into Gold by the Investment Banks

Most people cannot conceive of why they should have been paid more at the purported “Closing” of their transaction than what they received or what they think was paid on their behalf.

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But the bottom line is that in most cases, whether the transaction involved a resale of the home or “refinancing,” only a fraction of the money you thought was transacted was actually present. It’s not just that they should have been paid more — it is that the homeowner did not receive the money he or she promised to pay back. This fact is part of a pattern of active concealment directed by investment bankers that starts with the initial transaction and continues right up to and including the foreclosure sale and eviction.

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In short, you issued notes and mortgages for far more than any money paid to or on your behalf. You didn’t owe the money but they got you to promise to pay it anyway. This is a joke and a bonus for investment bankers — but it is a loss for the homeowner.

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Instead, each new transaction left the previous one intact and started a new securitization infrastructure. So a home that was subject to an initial securitization claim could end up with as many as 8 securitization infrastructures —- all with sales to investors for far more than anything paid to or on behalf of the homeowner. And each securitization infrastructure led to sales of around $12 in securities for $1 of apparent money that was asserted to have been transacted with the homeowner.

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Do the math. A single transaction falsely labeled as a mortgage loan can produce up to $96 for each dollar originally paid to or on behalf of the homeowner. Don’t you think you should have been told about that? It turns out that the question is fully answered in the Federal Truth in Lending Act.

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And the answer is yes, you should have been told that because the purpose of the Act was to prevent virtual “creditors” from being substituted for actual creditors who were responsible for compliance with lending laws, rules and regulations. Event table-funded loans were declared against public policy — but this is much worse. It takes an essential component out of the transaction falsely labeled as a loan.”

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If you believe the transaction consisted at least partly of “paying off” an old lien, then you DO want the outgoing wire transfer or other means of payment. If the prior and new lien were funded by direction from the same investment bank it would be unusual for that portion have to have been sent to the old “lender” because it is long out of the picture. But it is still common because the investment banks don’t want to alert the closing agent that the deal was a scam. So they direct a wire transfer to a certain depository account bearing the name “Ocwen Servicing” or some such thing that is actually controlled by the common underwriting investment bank.

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So if you ever get those wire transfer receipts, you want to trace down the ownership of the depository account. For example, Goldman Sachs (or any other investment bank) can open an account named “Ocwen”. It is still a Goldman Sachs account and they can go out and buy groceries with whatever is in the account.
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But to the outside world — the homeowner and the closing agent — they would swear that Ocwen was involved. And they would be 100% wrong. Ocwen for its part has no record of the transaction because it was not their money and they take no legal action against the use of their name because they are part of the game.
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So the bottom line is that there was no payoff of the old lien and no cancellation of the note or underlying obligation asserted by fake “representatives” of a nonexistent creditor owning a nonexistent loan account receivable. If there was an existing loan account receivable that would make one of those thinly capitalized nonentities the owner of the right, title, and interest to payments, balance, and interest — something the investment banks would never permit.

2 Responses

  1. This is correct Neil. I may approach differently, but bottom line — what you write is correct. You write – “Instead, each new transaction left the previous one intact and started a new securitization infrastructure.” I would just say that it is liquidated from prior transaction (noted as uncollectible) – with zero value reflected. Meaning that prior securitization cannot attempt to collect. The new securitization scheme “Reinstates” the claimed debt elsewhere — which is fraudulent. Borrowers PAID for a mortgage to pay off prior one by them — not reinstatement into a new securitization scheme. This is particularly troublesome when the investment banker is NOT the same, or when multiple investment banks are named to the old and new securitization scheme. Also, if transaction was over 7 years ago, it is very difficult to obtain wire transfer information to trace anything. Thanks.

  2. The fictitious loan documents create an AGENCY relationship with alleged beneficiary/lender to launch the undisclosed Securities Scheme. Where the lender* collection commission and fails to pass them the principle in the Agency Relationship. This is Fraud.

    Look into Agency Doctrines

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