Livinglies's Weblog

There are only two times the transaction with homeowners is characterized as a loan. First when the homeowner signed the documents, thinking it was a loan. Second when the players come back to the table with false claims for enforcement — in plain violation of the condition precedent set forth by statute in adopting Article 9 §203 of the Uniform Commercial Code.

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There is not one single company, entity, investment bank, trust, trust company, opr even “Master servicer” that ever reports holding a loan due from a homeowner. Not one. They cover this up by assigning a company to claim it is a servicer who produces reports of payments that are received and accounted for by third parties. this payment history masquerades as the loan account, but it isn’t. Reality check: if it was an actual loan account it would show disbursements to creditors. It doesn’t.

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The achilles heel of this strategy is starting to show: as more homeowners press the issue of exactly what the “servicer” does, the admissiblity of evidence from that servicer will fail — thus completely destroying even a hint of a prima facie case agasint the homeowner.

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With nothing else to demonstrate the existence of a loan account receivable, the assertion, assumption or even the presumption of a valid legal unapid debt also fails. That reveals the the absence of any substantive basis for the presentation of “securitization of debt”, which in turn undermines the ability of investmetn banks to generate pornographic profits and revenues without accountability or disclosure to anyone.

1. JPMorgan Chase & Co.
2. Bank of America Corp.
3. Wells Fargo & Co.
4. Citigroup Inc.
5. U.S. Bancorp
6. Truist Financial Corporation
7. PNC Financial Services Group Inc.
8. TD Group US Holdings LLC
9. Bank of New York Mellon Corp.
10. Capital One Financial Corp.

Without securitization, their assets would be a fraction of what is reported and a smaller fraction of what they actually have parked offshore. They would also have a small fraction of income that they currently report and even smaller fraction of income that they actually receive.

They are hooked on securitization because of fees, commissions, profits, and revenues generated from the successful pursuit of unlawful claims. Without securitization, many of them would collapse.

In varying degrees, all of them including U.S. Bank and Deutsch Bank National Trust Company, receive fees for posing as actors in a play that has no plot. And that is because securitization, as it is presently understood, never happened in relation to residential mortgage instruments. It’s all very profitable pretense. And it has become institutionalized into accepted practice not because the law allows it but because they continue doing it.

Let’s be clear. If securitization means breaking up an asset or group of assets into shares and selling them to investors, then securitization of “residential debt” never occurred. And that means that all claims from all players that rely on securitization are false. And that means that all fees paid to all actors involved in false claims for securitization are also false, fraudulent, and actionable under civil and criminal statutes. I cannot be plainer than that.

If you think I am some fringe conspiracy theorist, find me one single investment banker or lawyer who knows the inner working of what Wall Street calls securitization — and ask him or her if I am wrong. I have posted that challenge for 16 years. Crickets is the answer. Find one single article or case in which a court looked at securitization and came up with the conclusions that the investment bank or the investors own any right, title, or interest in any debt, note or mortgage.

The issuance and sale of securities do not mean that securitization of a referenced asset has occurred. It could be the securitization of something else. And that is exactly what happened when Wall Street entered the residential lending marketplace and destroyed all of the basic elements of a traditional loan transaction.

In doing so they arrogantly created a phantasm of economics: starting with getting a homeowner or prospective homeowner to sign documents that create the initial impression that a loan transaction was created or still exists, they sold multiple layers of securities that produced, in some cases, more than 50 times the total amount of the transaction with homeowners.

At no time during the process they are reporting as “Securitization” does anyone anywhere maintain an accounting ledger that simply shows entries that create an asset for that company or entity. In plain language, nobody is claiming ownership of any debt because (1) they never paid for it and (2) they don’t want to be “lenders” controlled by lending and servicing statutes. There is no intent to be seen as lenders until they seek enforcement — at a time when there is no legally recognized debt. 

If it was a loan transaction, then that revenue would need to be disclosed to homeowners before they signed. But it wasn’t. Why? Because the players made sure it wasn’t a loan. If it wasn’t a loan, then they were not lenders and if they were not lenders, they were not liable for apparent violations of lending and servicing laws.

There is no doubt and frankly no argument that most lending platforms would not exist but for the ability to sell securities. The sale of securities is as integral to the process of payment to homeowners as a bank account. Without the sale of securities, there would be no homeowner transactions.

There are only two times the transaction with homeowners is characterized as a loan. First when the homeowner signed the documents, thinking it was a loan. Second when the players come back to the table with false claims for enforcement — in plain violation of the condition precedent set forth by statute in adopting Article 9 §203 of the Uniform Commercial Code.

The courts are cynical about mistrust of our institutions because they have failed to see their role in this charade. And the Federal Reserve has been perplexed over their inability to control the marketplace the way they could before securitization. And as for politicians and law enforcement, taking their cue from administration officials and the money that comes pouring into campaign coffers from the bottomless pot of gold created by securitization, they enforce laws only against the little guy who is merely emulating the big lie of the Wall Street banks.

If the time comes, as I think it will, that there is an awakening in which we realize that we have bungled a major policy for the people and the nation, the securitization injections will end, and with it, withdrawal symptoms will flood the markets with information about the weaknesses of the largest banks in the country that were previously “unknown.” But were they really unknown?

PRACTICE NOTE: It might be possible to bring these issues to the forefront with an action in reformation — something that the investment banks would do if they were proceeding in good faith. They don’t like that because it would force them to share the huge profits with more people. The basic allegation is simple: the transaction consisted of two parts, only one of which was disclosed. the presence of the second part completely changes the dynamics of a loan transaction and the risks assumed by the supposed borrower. If there is money due back from the homeowner it should be limited to the amount of an overpayment to the homeowner as an incentive to sign the “loan” documents. The starting point would be that the banks already determined the amount of such payment — by funding the transaction. the burden would be on them to show it was more than what a homeowner should have received.

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• But challenging the “servicers” and other claimants before they seek enforcement can delay action by them for as much as 12 years or more.
• Yes you DO need a lawyer.
• If you wish to retain me as a legal consultant please write to me at neilfgarfield@hotmail.com.

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