Without the legal presumptions arising from fake documents, they have nothing.
Among the countries that refused to go along with the bullshit from Wall Street is Malaysia. Malaysia joins Iceland and others in fighting back and clawing back money received and retained by giant financial institutions who regarded the entire country as a feeding trough — just like they have done in the U.S. since 1995. Despite all the expected political corruption, it seems that law enforcement in Malaysia is mainly about law enforcement. So it is not a surprise to see them go after lawbreakers and collect billions of dollars.
That covers prosecution. It doesn’t cover the judiciary where the failure to prosecute should make no difference in civil court as to granting evidentiary presumptions to thieves and fraudsters. Nobody in Malaysia is taking the word of Goldman Sachs that it is entitled to keep the money nor that they were entitled to collect it in creating a “fund” that was an illusion and was used as a license to steal — just like they did through securitization here.
Following centuries of common law precedent and statutes on the subject, evidentiary presumptions arising from documents should only go to those who are credible sources of information. Every document from every witness in foreclosures in which securitization is forthrightly asserted or indirectly implied involves parties who have already been found to be untrustworthy and not credible, having committed fraud and remain non-compliant with the promises they made in settlements.
And yet the courts in the U.S. routinely overrule objections and arguments that challenge the validity and authenticity of documents presented in foreclosures, despite hundreds of billions of dollars of settlements in which the players promised to correct the wrongful practices, to wit: fabricating false documents that assert the existence, ownership, and authority over obligations asserted to have been created in “loan” transactions.
But I do find that even the most petulant judges will start to give way if the lawyers are fearless and relentless — holding the judge’s feet to the fire. And I think that it high time that we take our cue from the largest city in Malaysia, Kuala Lampur. In short, sue the investment banks, sue the individuals involved, and don’t stop.
Also start the clock by sending QWR and DVL letters and then sue when they fail to respond properly. They can’t respond because the truth is that they have intentionally destroyed any path by which anyone can assert the existence, ownership or authority over any underlying obligation, legal debt, note, or mortgage. Without the legal presumptions arising from fake documents, they have nothing.
And don’t forget that if you bring the same claims that might be barred by the statute of limitation as recoupment and affirmative defenses they are in most cases not barred by the statute of limitations. They are limited in recovery to the amount demanded by the plaintiff in foreclosure lawsuits.
And for the more adventurous, in non-judicial states, I believe it is time to aggressively pursue the realignment of parties such that the homeowner faced with a notice of substitution of trustee, or a notice of default, or a notice of sale, the foreclosure mill must be forced to file for judicial foreclosure, allowing the homeowner to seek recoupment on claims that would otherwise be barred. I think it is pretty clear that due process is denied and contested foreclosures that are carried out in non-judicial states. Failing to realign the parties is a direct denial of due process and equal protection.
Among other things the fund sued Goldman Sachs and others for
- breach of
- contractual,
- statutory,
- common law and
- fiduciary duties;
- breach of trust;
- fraud;
- conspiracy to defraud;
- fraudulent misrepresentation;
- fraudulent breach of duties and trust;
- fraudulent concealment;
- fraudulent misappropriation;
- dishonest assistance in misappropriation of funds;
- negligence,
- knowing receipt and
- unjust enrichment.
the writs filed by SRC are against a total of 15 individuals and eight entities for various wrongdoings including abuse of power, breach of fiduciary duties in public office, breach of trust, conspiracy, dishonest assistance, fraudulent breach of duties, knowing receipt, misfeasance and wrongful conversion.
“1MDB and SRC contend that these entities and/or individuals have been unjustly enriched by wrongfully receiving monies from 1MDB or SRC,” it added.
Filed under: foreclosure |
Poppy: Excellent work . . .. thanks!!!! Be nice to get a copy of the Malaysian government’s complaint in their case! Neil thanks too for digging this up and sharing – it gives new ‘ammo’ with applicable causes of action – figures we have to rely on a foreign country to take actions like this first.
Anyone get a copy of the complaint please share!!!
Anyone want to review this and do you think it matters? Rebuttals and comments appreciated….
It is a VIOLATION of the 11th Amendment for a FOREIGN CITIZEN to INVOKE the JUDICIAL POWER of the State
Article XI.
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
US citizens (FEDERAL CITIZENS) are FOREIGN to the several States and SUBJECTS of the FEDERAL UNITED STATES/STATE of NEW COLUMBIA/DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
Attorneys are considered FOREIGN AGENTS under the FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT (FARA) and are SUBJECTS of the BAR ASSOCIATION.
Government Is Foreclosed from Parity with Real People
Supreme Court of the United States 1795
“Inasmuch as every government is an artificial person, an abstraction, and a creature of the mind only, a government can interface only with other artificial persons. The imaginary, having neither actuality nor substance, is foreclosed from creating and attaining parity with the tangible. The legal manifestation of this is that no government, as well as any law, agency, aspect, court, etc. can concern itself with anything other than corporate, artificial persons and the contracts between them.”
S.C.R. 1795, Penhallow v. Doane’s Administraters (3 U.S. 54; 1 L.Ed. 57; 3 Dall. 54),
Supreme Court of the United States 1795
And,
“An attorney for the plaintiff cannot admit evidence into the court. He is either an attorney or a witness”.
(Trinsey v. Pagliaro D.C.Pa. 1964, 229 F. Supp. 647)
Subject: Trinsey v. Pagliaro, 229 F.Supp. 647: when you read it you will find that it is THE case cited for FRCP 12(b) (6).
Now, while what it says at 12(b) (6) is good, notice how I have highlighted some items from the actual decision, it goes MUCH further than 12(b) (6) does and we should also. Keep in mind the two Maxims in Law that are opposite sides of the same coin: Truth is Expressed in the Form of an Affidavit, & An Unrebutted Affidavit stands as Truth in the Matter.
Now, while keeping these in mind, think about when someone like an attorney for the IRS comes forward and “testifies” about how you did such-and-such. Are they a First-Hand-Witness, or simply a “Statement of Counsel in Brief or Argument?” Shut them down! Hit them with Trinsey and get the “Judge” to take official Judicial Notice of it. If the “Judge” does not sustain your object, you need to immediately file an oral “Affidavit of Prejudice” against the “Judge” as he has shown his prejudice and then file the same Affidavit in writing into the record with witnesses to the same. Once your Affidavits are filed, get a record of what has been filed and show that you are the only one who has actually introduced FACTS into the case and move for Summary Judgment upon the Facts… while reminding the “Judge” that the ONLY thing he is to consider is the FACTS of the case ON THE RECORD, that the opposing “counsel” has only been “enlightening” to the Court, but not sufficient to rise to the level of FACT.
This applies both with Federal Rules of Evidence and State Rules of Evidence…. there must be a competent first hand witness (a body). There has to be a real person making the complaint and bringing evidence before the court. Corporations are paper and can’t testify.
“Manifestly, [such statements] cannot be properly considered by us in the disposition of [a] case.” United States v. Lovasco (06/09/77) 431 U.S. 783, 97 S. Ct. 2044, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752,
“Under no possible view, however, of the findings we are considering can they be held to constitute a compliance with the statute, since they merely embody conflicting statements of counsel concerning the facts as they suppose them to be and their appreciation of the law which they deem applicable, there being, therefore, no attempt whatever to state the ultimate facts by a consideration of which we would be able to conclude whether or not the judgment was warranted.” Gonzales v. Buist. (04/01/12) 224 U.S. 126, 56 L. Ed. 693, 32 S. Ct. 463.
“No instruction was asked, but, as we have said, the judge told the jury that they were to regard only the evidence admitted by him, not statements of counsel”, Holt v. United States, (10/31/10) 218 U.S. 245, 54 L. Ed. 1021, 31 S. Ct. 2,
“The prosecutor is not a witness; and he should not be permitted to add to the record either by subtle or gross improprieties. Those who have experienced the full thrust of the power of government when leveled against them know that the only protection the citizen has is in the requirement for a fair trial.” Donnelly v. Dechristoforo, 1974.SCT.41709 ¶ 56; 416 U.S. 637 (1974) Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting.
“Care has been taken, however, in summoning witnesses to testify, to call no man whose character or whose word could be successfully impeached by any methods known to the law. And it is remarkable, we submit, that in a case of this magnitude, with every means and resource at their command, the complainants, after years of effort and search in near and in the most remote paths, and in every collateral by-way, now rest the charges of conspiracy and of gullibility against these witnesses, only upon the bare statements of counsel. The lives of all the witnesses are clean, their characters for truth and veracity un-assailed, and the evidence of any attempt to influence the memory or the impressions of any man called, cannot be successfully pointed out in this record.” Telephone Cases. Dolbear v. American Bell Telephone Company, Molecular Telephone Company v. American Bell Telephone Company. American Bell Telephone Company v.. Molecular Telephone Company, Clay Commercial Telephone Company v. American Bell Telephone Company, People’s Telephone Company v. American Bell Telephone Company, Overland Telephone Company v. American Bell Telephone Company,. (PART TWO OF THREE) (03/19/88) 126 U.S. 1, 31 L. Ed. 863, 8 S. Ct. 778.
“Statements of counsel in brief or in argument are not sufficient for motion to dismiss or for summary judgment,” Trinsey v. Pagliaro, D. C. Pa. 1964, 229 F. Supp. 647.
“Factual statements or documents appearing only in briefs shall not be deemed to be a part of the record in the case, unless specifically permitted by the Court” – Oklahoma Court Rules and Procedure, Federal local rule 7.1(h).
Trinsey v Pagliaro, D.C.Pa. 1964, 229 F.Supp. 647. “Statements of counsel in brief or in argument are not facts before the court and are therefore insufficient for a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.” Pro Per and pro se litigants should therefore always remember that the majority of the time, the motion to dismiss a case is only argued by the opposing attorney, who is not allowed to testify on the facts of the case, the motion to dismiss is never argued by the real party in interest.
“Where there are no depositions, admissions, or affidavits the court has no facts to rely on for a summary determination.” Trinsey v. Pagliaro, D.C. Pa. 1964, 229 F. Supp. 647.
Frunzar v. Allied Property and Casualty Ins. Co., (Iowa 1996)† 548 N.W.2d 880 Professional statements of litigants attorney are treated as affidavits, and attorney making statements may be cross-examined regarding substance of statement. [And, how many of those Ass-Holes have “first hand knowledge”? NONE!!!]
Porter v. Porter, (N.D. 1979 ) 274 N.W.2d 235 ñ The practice of an attorney filing an affidavit on behalf of his client asserting the status of that client is not approved, inasmuch as not only does the affidavit become hearsay, but it places the attorney in a position of witness thus compromising his role as advocate.
Deyo v. Detroit Creamery Co (Mich 1932) 241 N.W.2d 244 Statutes forbidding administering of oath by attorney’s in cases in which they may be engaged applies to affidavits as well