Long before the term “robosigning” was coined I had come to the conclusion that investment banks on Wall Street were (a) not the owners of loans and (b) were faking the transfer of loans. I later came to the conclusion that the loans were nonexistent either at origination or later upon “acquisition.” the “acquired” loans were inf act paid off through conduits created by Wall Street, using borrowed money; but they were not purchased nor accounted for as assets of any kind, much less accounts receivable as is customary for loans.
Specifically, I had stumbled into a survey that i had not meant to conduct. In assisting homeowners with foreclosures there was a clear difference between asking for the documents from a “loan” that was considered “current” and a “loan” that was considered to be in “default.” When I asked for documents on a “loan” that was considered “current” I received nothing. When I asked for documents on a loan that was considered to be in default or delinquency. I received assignments, allonges etc.
It took me a while to grasp what was happening but as I did hundreds of these, the difference was stark and always true. The documents were being sent to me only on loans declared to be delinquent or in default. So that meant that they were either withholding the documents (illegally) for “current” loans or they didn’t have the documents on “current” loans.
Eventually, I concluded that the documents were being created when the “loan” was being prepared for foreclosure. Those documents were signed by employees without any knowledge or authority to transfer any assets, much less a six-figure loan. And that led me to conclude that there was no consideration for the paper transfer, which legally means there is no legal transfer and that the ownership of the “loan,” even if it existed had never moved.
Tom Ice was one of the successful foreclosure defense lawyers in Florida and he was busier than I was in actually litigating these issues. He kept proving, time and again, that the documents were fake — i.e., that they contained false information about nonexistent business events and that they were signed by people who neither had the legally required knowledge of the transaction nor the authority to execute any paperwork about it.
This is a copy of part of a transcript of a 2012 deposition conducted by a member of Tom Ice’s law firm in Florida. The witness is Erika Lance. Besides the obvious conclusion that people were signing a document that memorialized events about which they knew nothing, it reveals the obvious conclusion that these people in NTC and other “document preparation” firms and in law firms and companies claiming to be servicers had no concept of the fact that what they were doing was both illegal and fraudulent.
see https://www.icelegal.com/files/06-02-10_Deposition_of_Erika_Lance.txt
Q Can you describe the list of names for me?
10 A The list of names are employees of Nationwide
11 Title Clearing that we give to them to — to have them
12 authorize them to be signers as vice presidents or assistant
13 secretaries. The list is generated to insure that depending
14 on the volume of loans that have to be executed we have
15 enough employees in Nationwide to execute all of those
16 documents. Included in there, are people who have other
17 capacities at NTC, but in the time of overload, could go
18 assist in that particular area.
19 Q So the people who are listed on Exhibit 3 are
20 people who could act as vice presidents or assistant
21 secretaries, but each of these persons are full-time
22 employees of Nationwide; is that correct?
23 A Correct.
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But challenging the “servicers” and other claimants before they seek enforcement can delay action by them for as much as 12 years or more.
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Filed under: foreclosure |
Debt Collector….Fair Debt Collection Practices Act immediately…if they proceed without answering…Fed Law supersedes State law if they do not agree..
The Court is bound by the legal precedence of The Rules of Decision Act (RDA), 28U.S.C. §§ 1652, based upon the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution is the main statute stating when the court should apply federal law, and when it should apply state law. According to the clear language of the RDA, the federal Constitution, treaties, and constitutional statutes enacted by Congress, always take precedence. (In fact, this rule applies not only to federal proceedings, but also to state court proceedings.)
In re: Pablo MARTINEZ 266 B.R. 523
[18] Upon acting upon a Validation Notice by disputing the debt, a consumer is under no obligation to respond to the complaint until, at the earliest, the debt collector responds with the requested information. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). It mischaracterizes the law to suggest that it is satisfactory for a least sophisticated consumer to be induced to respond to a complaint within the time set forth in the summons, when, as a matter of law, that time is statutorily extended if there is a request for the validation of his debt. Only a consumer at best uncertain as to his rights would come to this conclusion. See Bartlett, 128 F.3d at 500-01 (“A contradiction is just one means of inducing confusion.”).
The District Court decision is AFFIRMED.C.A.11 (Fla.),2002. In re: Martinez 311 F.3d 1272, 16 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 8, 16 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 54 The appeals court determined:
In re: Spears vs. Brennan 745N.E.2d.862.”Brennan (plaintiff collection attorney) violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) when he obtained a default judgment against Spears (defendant) after Spears had notified Brennan in writing that the debt was being disputed and before Brennan had mailed verification of the debt to Spears.”
Issue Four: Failure to Cease Debt Collection
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
SPEARS vs. BRENNAN No. 49A02-0003-CV-169
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Kenneth Johnson, Judge Cause No. 49D02-9802-CP-236
Finally, we address Spears’ claim that Brennan violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) when he failed to cease collection of the debt after receiving Spears’ written notification, within the thirty-day debt validation period, that Spears was disputing the debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) reads: If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period described in subsection (a) of this section that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original creditor, and a copy of such verification or judgment, or name and address of the original creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.
15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (emphasis added). On November 12, 1996, nineteen days after the date of Brennan’s debt collection letter, Spears’ counsel Shepard sent Brennan a letter declaring that Spears “disputes your debt collection-related allegations, denies the same, and demands strict proof and verification thereof.” Record at 21. As such, Brennan should have ceased his debt collection efforts immediately upon receiving that letter. Instead, Brennan proceeded to obtain a default judgment against Spears on the debt collection claim before he had mailed Spears the necessary verification and, thus, violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). Brennan maintains, however, that there was no violation of the FDCPA because he “sent adequate verification of the debt [to Spears] in the October 30, 1996 notice of claim.” Brief of Appellee at 13. Specifically, Brennan claims that a copy of the consumer credit contract between Spears and American General attached to the notice of claim provided sufficient verification of the debt within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). We cannot agree.
The contract in no way provides sufficient verification of the debt. A review of the document reveals that it identifies only the terms of Spears’ loan, including a 17.99% annual interest rate and the original loan amount of $2,561.59. The loan agreement contains no accounting of any payments made by Spears, the dates on which those payments were made, the interest which had accrued, or any late fees which had been assessed once Spears stopped making the required payments. Indeed, the existing unpaid contract balance at the time Brennan sent the debt collection notice was at least $350.00 more than the original loan amount. Therefore, Brennan violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) when he failed to cease collection of the debt by obtaining a default judgment against Spears after Spears had notified Brennan in writing that he was disputing the debt but before Brennan had mailed verification of the debt to Spears. See footnote We reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Brennan on this issue.
CONCLUSION
…We reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Brennan on Spears’ claim that Brennan violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) when he scheduled the November 27, 1996 hearing on the debt collection claim and obtained a default judgment against Spears on that date. Having found the existence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to this issue, we remand to the trial court with instructions to determine, in accordance with the principles set forth in this opinion, when Spears received Brennan’s debt collection notice and whether Brennan violated the FDCPA by scheduling the November 27, 1996 hearing and obtaining a default judgment against Spears within the thirty-day debt validation period. We reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Brennan with respect to the remainder of Spears’ claims as identified herein. Having found, as a matter of law, multiple violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(a) and (b), we further remand to the trial court for a determination of damages in accordance with the FDCPA. See footnote Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. SULLIVAN, J., and BROOK, J., concur.
Footnote: We observe additionally that, Spears did not waive his verification rights under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) by failing to appear at the November 27, 1996 hearing. Like 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(a) and 1692i, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) is in the nature of a statutory tort which is completed once the debt collector fails to cease his debt collection efforts after receiving written notification that a debtor is disputing the debt but before mailing verification of the debt to the debtor. See Blakemore, 895 F. Supp. at 984. As discussed previously, an FDCPA claim “has nothing to do with whether the underlying debt is valid. An FDCPA claim concerns the method of collecting the debt. It does not arise out of the transaction creating the debt[.]” Azar, 874 F. Supp. at 1318.
But the mortgage can only be discharged/satisfied/cancelled by the Lender/Mortgagee. If we only have a servicer (debt collector) who is the mortgagee? And, that is all we have – a debt collector. That is how the “Loan” started out – with debt collection. None of the crisis loans were valid. So, then what happened prior to the last transaction? Totally missed.
How do the attorneys and law firms of the fraudulent banks and fake financial institutions allowed to continue to have immunity, if they all know the foreclosure documents, that they file for their clients, are all fake, fraudulent, and void???
every servicer must notify the debtor that it has been assigned as the new servicer of the account within 30 days and must forgive any late payments because of the change.
And the note is what must be assigned and is a nullity with just the mortgage. Because the mortgage follows the note, I do not believe it can be just mentioned in the mortgage exchange. Once they are separated as in securitization, they are also a nullity.
Who answered my find?
Don,
That’s a good find, I’ve never read that before. If I understand this completely, an assignment can have two distinctly different reasons for being done;
The first reason is because the assignor is actually assigning the mortgage to a purchaser, for value, it the assignor has the legal standing to do so.
The second reason, is because the assignor is assigning the legal responsibilty of servicing the mortgage, paying taxes, monitoring insurance coverage etc.
The two reasons are distinct and should definitely be specified somehow by the assignor.
Everyone reading an assignment assumes that the ownership of the mortgage is being transferred because it has been sold.
Looks like I’ve been fooled again….
Any other takes on this?
Bank of America just passed Caliber Home Loans (Former Countrywide Financial) to New Residentical, for purportedly $1.6 Billion in CASH (means very hard to detect where money came from )
Look where New Residential CEO worked before he was assigned (by WHOM? ) as a CEO in 2016
Mr. Nierenberg was appointed as our Chairman of the Board in May 2016, and our Chief Executive Officer and President in November 2013. Prior to becoming Chief Executive Officer of New Residential, Mr. Nierenberg served as managing director and head of Global Mortgages and Securitized Products at Bank of America Merrill Lynch. Mr. Nierenberg joined Bank of America Merrill Lynch in November 2008 from J.P. Morgan, where he was head of Global Securitized Products and a member of the management committee of the investment bank. Prior to his tenure at J.P. Morgan, Mr. Nierenberg held a range of senior leadership positions during fourteen years with Bear Stearns, including head of interest rate and foreign exchange trading operations, co-head of structured products and co-head of mortgage-backed securities trading. From 2006 to 2008, he was a member of Bear Stearns’s Board of Directors. Mr. Nierenberg spent seven years at Lehman Brothers prior to joining Bear Stearns and was instrumental in building the company’s adjustable rate mortgage business.
SO, WITH ALL THE SERVICERS FORECLOSING, WHY IS THIS NOT APPLICABLE ?
Title 15, Chapter 41, § I, Part B › § 1641
(f)Treatment of servicer
(1) In general
A servicer of a consumer obligation arising from a consumer credit transaction shall not be treated as an assignee of such obligation for purposes of this section unless the servicer is or was the owner of the obligation.
(2)Servicer not treated as owner on basis of assignment for administrative convenience
A servicer of a consumer obligation arising from a consumer credit transaction shall not be treated as the owner of the obligation for purposes of this section on the basis of an assignment of the obligation from the creditor or another assignee to the servicer solely for the administrative convenience of the servicer in servicing the obligation. Upon written request by the obligor, the servicer shall provide the obligor, to the best knowledge of the servicer, with the name, address, and telephone number of the owner of the obligation or the master.