Deutsche Bank National Trust Company Legally Exists as a Company, But Not as Trustee for Borrower Loans

Several readers have sent me information regarding DBNTC and pointed out that I had misstated the status of DBNTC in past articles. I think they were at least partially right. Thanks to all the readers who sent in comments and information.

DBNTC is a name change from Banker’s Trust which was a real bank, organized and existing under national charter. So DBNTC exists under a national charter. But DBNTC is not a bank in the sense that it makes loans or collects deposits from customers. It is a trust management company. So bottom line, DBNTC does exist as a legal entity.

The conflict arises when the DBNTC name is used in conjunction with a REMIC Trust. This might appear as

  • “DBNTC as Trustee for the XYZ Trust” or
  • “DBNTC as Trustee on behalf of the holders of certificate series ABC-2008A” or
  • “DBNTC as Trustee for certificate series ABC-2008A” or
  • “DBNTC” as Trustee for the certificate holders of XYZ Trust series ABC-2008A”

Despite the variation in names it all adds up to the same thing.

First, since DBNTC has never entered into a transaction in which it paid value in exchange for any debt, it cannot be the owner of the debt.

Second, since no trustor or settlor has entrusted any debt to DBNTC, it can’t be the trustee with any right, title or interest in the debt’s ownership or management.

Third, since the certificates do not convey any right, title or interest to any debt, the certificates are irrelevant but are stated to create the misleading impression that a foreclosure is brought on behalf of investors who will receive the money proceeds from the forced sale of the home. They don’t receive any money from those sales and they are not entitled to receive such proceeds.

Fourth, certificates are not legal persons and therefore stating that the action is brought by DBNTC for a certificate series says nothing more than DBNTC is not appearing in its own behalf but rather in a representative capacity — all without stating what capacity other than calling it “trustee.”

Fifth, DBNTC does not have any contractual or other authority to represent certificates or owners of certificates. It is stated in vague terms to create the misleading impression that the Pooling and Servicing Agreement has some provision enabling DBNTC to represent the owners of certificates as though they are beneficiaries of the trust. Certificate owners are not beneficiaries of any trust. They are creditors. And there is no agreement in which DBNTC represents the interests of the certificate holders.

Sixth, the naming of a beneficiary under a deed of trust or a Plaintiff in a foreclosure action including the DBNTC name is entirely misleading.

  • DBTC is a legal entity.
  • The trust — whether expressly named or implied — either does not exist or does not exist in relation to the subject debt.
    • Trusts are generally held to exist only if the elements are present — trust agreement, settlor (trustor), beneficiaries and res — a thing of value entrusted to the trustee to keep for beneficiaries.
    • In all cases the REMIC trust is virtually the same as MERS — it is naked nominee for any documents executed in favor of the trustee or trust for its principal, the investment bank that was the named underwriter (but actually the issuer of the certificates doing business under the name of a fake trust).
    • But without conveyance of the debt (i.e., in a transaction in which value is paid) the paper conveyance of an interest in a mortgage or deed of trust is a legal nullity in all US jurisdictions.
    • Thus the trust holds nothing and does not, in most jurisdictions, have any status as a legal entity.
  • The certificate holders exist but they are irrelevant.
  • The certificates actually don’t exist except in virtual form and are also irrelevant.
  • Since the trust does not own the debt, there is no trustee with any power or right to administer the loan.
  • Hence naming DBNTC as trustee is merely a ploy intended to mislead you and the courts into thinking that a trust exists, in which the debt is owned and certificate owners are beneficiaries. None of those things are true. It is a lie.

Hence if the foreclosure mills just named DBNTC without saying “trustee” or naming certificates, or a trust or certificate holders, they would be naming a legal entity, albeit one without any claim. BUT by naming those other things and implied entities they are naming an entity that does not exist legally or even equitably.

Even if an entity was found to technically exist, it has no claim because it does not own the debt, note or mortgage —despite paper conveyances fabricated to create the false assertion that the mortgage or beneficial interest had somehow been conveyed — despite the absence of any real transfer of the debt.

In previous articles I said things to the effect that DBNTC did not exist. That was shorthand for saying that it did not exist in relation to any debt of any homeowner where the loan was subject to claims of securitization. I apologize for the confusion. I hope this article clears it up.

5 Responses

  1. Trying to post my wiring instructions, from Duetsche Bank with relevant numbers and accounts….blocked? Just thought you all might want to see it! Site will not let me download it.

  2. Deutsche Bank Trust Company of the Americas supplied the FUNDING DRAFT for my WELLS FARGO loan. Who get my house now?

  3. The lender appealed, the Bankruptcy Court upheld, but denied the homeowners’attorneys fees to fight the appeal.
    Now, tell me again that there is no bias in the Court system. A-holes, all of them.

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently rejected a loan servicer’s appeal from a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s ruling to remand to the lower bankruptcy court a punitive damages award for alleged discharge violations.

    In so ruling, the Court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction regarding the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s ruling as to the punitive damages award, but affirmed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s denial of the debtors’ motion for appellate attorney’s fees.

    A copy of the opinion in In re Marino is available at: Link to Opinion.

    Husband and wife homeowners defaulted on their mortgage loan, and abandoned their home to foreclosure. Then, they filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy and received a discharge injunction

    However, they continued “to receive letters and telephone calls from [the loan servicer] about their former home.”

    The bankruptcy court held an evidentiary hearing and “found [the loan servicer] in contempt of the discharge injunction and imposed a $119,000 civil contempt sanction.”

    The servicer appealed “from that order, as well as from the bankruptcy court’s order denying its motion for reconsideration.” The servicer also appealed “the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s (“BAP”) conclusion that it was ‘error for the bankruptcy court to preclude itself from considering an award of punitive damages’ under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).” The debtors appealed “the BAP’s denial of their motion for attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.”

    On appeal, the Ninth Circuit began by explaining that its “jurisdiction is limited to ‘decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees that are ‘final’ [and that it lacks] authority … to consider interlocutory orders and decrees.’ … Because bankruptcy cases are often complex and litigated in various discrete proceedings, BAP orders may be immediately appealed only if they ‘finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case.’ … An order in a bankruptcy proceeding is final and thus appealable if it ‘alters the status quo and fixes the rights and obligations of the parties … [or] alters the legal relationships among the parties.’”

    The Court went on to explain, however, that “an order from the BAP is not final if it ‘remands for factual determinations on a central issue[.]’ We have departed from this rule only when the BAP remands for ‘purely mechanical or computational task[s] such that the proceedings on remand are highly unlikely to generate a new appeal.’”

    The Ninth Circuit applied “a four-part test to determine if [it] has jurisdiction over an appeal from a BAP decision that remands to the bankruptcy court.” After considering “‘(1) the need to avoid piecemeal litigation; (2) judicial efficiency; (3) the systemic interest in preserving the bankruptcy court’s role as finder of fact; and (4) whether delaying review would cause either party irreparable harm[,]’” the Court concluded “that all four factors compel dismissal of [the servicer’s] appeals.”

    The Court reasoned that “dismissal serves judicial efficiency and avoids piecemeal litigation by allowing the bankruptcy court to make additional findings of fact and conclusions of law before we exercise jurisdiction.” This avoids multiple trips up and down the “appellate ladder,” which the Supreme Court of the United States has discouraged.

    Turning to the third factor, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that “[d]ismissal preserves the bankruptcy court’s fact-finding role where, as here, the BAP’s decision remands to the bankruptcy court to determine whether punitive damages are appropriate.”

    Regarding the fourth factor, the Court found that “other than protracted litigation costs, neither party would be irreparably harmed if we declined jurisdiction over [the servicer’s] appeals. Litigation costs generally do not qualify as irreparable harm.”

    Because “the BAP remanded to the bankruptcy court for more factual findings on punitive damages,” the Ninth Circuit reasoned that making that decision was not a “ministerial task.”

    Also, the bankruptcy court’s ruling on punitive damages “was part of the same ‘discreet proceeding’ in which the bankruptcy court imposed sanctions … for violating the discharge injunction.” The BAP’s decision did not end the contempt proceedings, “in which [the debtors] sought both monetary sanctions and punitive damages.”

    Because the “BAP remanded to the bankruptcy court to assess whether to award … punitive damages[,]” the Court concluded that “[t]his is therefore not a case in which BAP’s decision” left no further judicial labor to be done.

    Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the servicer’s “appeals for lack of appellate jurisdiction.”

    Turning to address the debtors’ appeal of “the BAP’s denial of their motion for attorney’s fees incurred defending against the appeal before the BAP[,] the Court found that it had jurisdiction because unlike the servicer’s appeal, the debtors’ appeal raised “an issue that is both final and discrete[;]” namely, “the frivolousness of [the servicer’s] appeal to the BAP….”

    The Ninth Circuit rejected the debtors’ argument that they were entitled to attorney’s fees either under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38, “the attorney’s fees provision in the deed trust with [the servicer], and … section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.”

    Addressing each in turn, the Court first concluded that “[t]he BAP did not clearly err in finding that the appeal was not frivolous and did not abuse its discretion by declining to sanction [the servicer] under Rule 38.”

    Next, the Ninth Circuit found that “[t]he BAP did not err in concluding that the deed of trust did not entitle the [debtors] to appellate attorney’s fees … [because they] seek to enforce the discharge injunction, not the deed of trust.”

    Finally, the Court determined that awarding the debtors attorney’s fees under Bankruptcy Code section 105(a) “would require us to overturn our decision, In re Del Mission Ltd., 98 F. 3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1996), in which we held that section 105(a) does not authorize an award of attorney’s fees. The Court declined to do so because only a panel sitting en banc can reverse Ninth Circuit precedent.

    The Ninth Circuit dismissed the loan servicer’s appeals for lack of jurisdiction, and affirmed the BAP’s holding that debtors “were not entitled to attorney’s fees for their appeal to the BAP.”
    Maurice Wutscher LLP

  4. All fraudulent and criminal since the beginning. All fraud on the court as well as perjury by the attorneys.

  5. It appears DBNTC is a WHOLLY owned subsidiary. I think that means that they cannot exist without the parent. Is not the parent responsible for their business conducting? Can DBNTC be sued without naming the parent? I don’t think so, but not an attorney.

    “DBNTC, a national association chartered under federal banking law, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Deutsche Bank Holdings, Inc., which is a wholly owned subsidiary of DBTC. Under its charter, DBNTC’s powers are limited to conducting the business of a trust company.”

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