The obvious import of these memos is that Deutsche wants to be able to claim plausible deniability. But secondarily it places responsibility on servicers to have knowledge that they often disclaim in court. Without that knowledge and the testimony about securitization, there is a lack of foundation that should be the subject of an objection in court and even in hearings.
Without evidence of securitization there is no way for the court to rule based upon the assumption that the proceeds of foreclosure will go to someone who paid value for the debt in exchange for ownership of the debt.
And that’s the rub. Those proceeds are received as revenue. In the chain relied upon by claimants in foreclosures, there is either nobody who paid or nobody who owns the debt.
The investors did not pay for the debt. they paid for certificates that exclude them from the debt and substitute a discretionary promise from an investment bank to make payments to them. Those payments are indexed on loan data but nowhere does anything actually state that the trustee or trust actually paid for the debt, owns the debt, or even received the debt from someone who paid value for the origination or acquisition of the debt. And that is because no such payment was made.
So the disclaimers and contortions of Deutsche ar easily explainable. They are merely renting out the use of their name to make it look like an institutional foreclosure when the case is neither institutional nor is it actually a foreclosure which can only be for restitution of an unpaid debt to a claimant who paid value for the debt in exchange for ownership of it.
See Deutsche memos and instructions david co db memo 10 pgs
Filed under: foreclosure |
ANON: excellent commentary! thank you
Thanks Neil – it is so true that certificate investors only invested in a pass-through of cash flows that excluded any ownership of any debt, mortgage, loan, or note.
All Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreements show only an “intent” to sell loans from the “Seller” to the Depositor. There is then an assignment of these rights to the “trustee” on behalf of certificate investors. Under all American law, the trustee is the legal holder of the “rights.” But there is no evidence any consideration was paid by the Depositor – who usually was a subsidiary and/or affiliate of the security underwriter. Thus, the only entity that could have paid consideration is the security underwriter. But they did not pay whole loan consideration because these loans were already classified as default debt to the GSEs – by which the security underwriters (big banks) previously acted as “servicer” to. The cash flows were only for “debt collection rights” as the “loans” themselves were fabrications of a real and actual refinance.
This memo is from 2010. Part of the problem was that the insurers (AIG and others) could not pay the insurance on these loans. So AIG, along with the security underwriters (banks) were bailed out. The “Debt” largely went to the government – who then sold off as distressed debt to debt buyers. These debt buyers continue to use the debt collection “servicer” to collect and foreclose. The “trustee” and “trust” have been torn apart along with the original (fictitious) role they originally claimed. But the debt collection servicers continue to present obsolete duties of the trustee to courts across the country. One of the problems I have seen is that attorneys do not believe that the FDCPA requires them to disclose the current creditor to whom the debt is claimed owed – so they use old, obsolete, and fictitious assignments to present to judges who don’t have a clue. The government will not fix because too much money is involved. As my “investment” friend tells me – the government is quite confident this fraud is behind them and that they have other issues to deal with. She has specifically said that the government acted to save the majority “investors” and the economy – and that they will not revisit the fraud. The government has kept the fraud from surfacing by continuing to conceal the real effect of the crisis by manipulating interest rates. Had the government not done this, the crisis would have naturally affected the economic cycles, and the fraud would have been exposed.
What we have is a bureaucracy that does not care. We have to be very original to break this wide and open. Keep in mind what would happen if we do. What would happen with all of the fraudulent foreclosures that would then be exposed? .This is what we are up against. . .