Pleading Civil Conspiracy and RICO

I am currently working on multiple cases in which lawsuits for civil conspiracy and RICO will shortly be filed. I thought I would share with the public some of my observations and research.


All of these discussions come down to a specific description of the scheme, when the tortious act (“crime”) occurred, who did it and why.
General rule: an act which constitutes no ground of action against one person cannot be made the basis of a civil action for conspiracy.” This is going to be the defense — divide and conquer. They will each defend s saying that their actions do not constitute a tort. Therefore they cannot be held liable for a tort. If I was them I would argue that the collection of non-tortious actions does not create a tort, collectively or individually.
But, the article goes on to say that “mere force of numbers acting in unison may comprise an actionable wrong.” This is exactly what we should be alleging. Servicing is not a crime. But acting as though you are servicing for the purpose of facilitating a false foreclosure is a crime, especially if you are servicing for a client that has no interest in the debt. Investment banking is not a crime. But selling certificates and using the proceeds to fund loans in the name of originators who can’t or won’t be liable for pending law violations is a crime (tort). And directing foreclosure for profit instead of seeking restitution or settlement of an unpaid debt is also a crime (tort). AND coming to court as a witness is not a crime. But coming to court with a scripted message about which you actually know nothing in order to mislead the court is also a crime. The same goes for affidavits and declarations.
The further discussion is also interesting. “If the Plaintiff can show some peculiar power of coercion possessed by the conspirators by virtue of their combination, which power an individual would not possess, the conspiracy itself becomes an independent tort…. The essential elements of the tort are a malicious motive and coercion through numbers or economic influence.” Bingo! That is it! The false flag foreclosure could not happen but for the integration of acts by multiple co-venturers including the trustee, trust, certificate holders, servicers, lawyers, etc. Each one of them played a vital role. The purpose was clear — revenue through false pretenses — the false pretense being that there were pursuing restitution for an unpaid debt when in fact they were only seeking revenue.
…ordinarily there can be no independent tort for conspiracy. However, if the plaintiff can show some peculiar power of coercion possessed by the conspirators by virtue of their combination, which power an individual would not possess, then conspiracy itself becomes an independent tort. See also Shaltupsky v. Brown Shoe Co.,350 Mo. 831168 S.W.2d 1083 (1943); DesLauries v. Shea,300 Mass. 3013 N.E.2d 932 (1938); Cummings v. Harrington,278 Mass. 527180 N.E. 519 (1932). The essential elements of this tort are a malicious motive and coercion through numbers or economic influence. See Hunter Lyon, Inc. v. Walker,152 Fla. 6111 So.2d 176 (1942); Regan v. Davis,97 So.2d 324 (Fla. 2d DCA 1957).
Churruca v. Miami Jai-Alai, Inc., 353 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1978)
Respondents next argue that the second amended complaint does not state a cause of action in tortious conspiracy. That argument is also unpersuasive. In order to sustain their cause of action, petitioners must demonstrate that the conspirators acted with evil motive. It is true that the respondent frontons are individually entitled to employ whomever they wish. They may even decide in combination to refuse employment to prospective employees if they believe those persons would be unsatisfactory. However, if the concerted effort of the fronton owners is designed maliciously for the purpose of beggaring petitioners by depriving them of their livelihood, the employers are guilty of tortious conspiracy.
Churruca v. Miami Jai-Alai, Inc., 353 So. 2d 547, 549 (Fla. 1978)
25. This aforesaid refusal was the result of defendant frontons knowingly, wilfully, wantonly, wickedly, maliciously, and malevolently, conspiring, combining, confederating and agreeing together to prevent the plaintiffs, and each of them, playing jai-alai at the defendant frontons.
26. The said jai-alai frontons, at a time unknown to the plaintiffs, maliciously, wantonly, and wilfully conspired and agreed together to punish the plaintiffs, and each of them, for their having joined the Union and supported the Union’s demands as aforesaid and for their refusal to play as aforesaid during the said 1968-1969 season.
27. The said punishment was and is the malicious, wanton, wilful, malevolent boycott and lockout of the plaintiffs and each of them from their employment by each and every defendant fronton.
28. The said joint boycott and lockout commenced at a time unknown to the plaintiffs and has persisted continuously since.
29. Until said conspiracy is terminated, the plaintiffs and each of them will be unable to secure employment in their chosen occupation of jai-alai player. (Emphasis
Churruca v. Miami Jai-Alai, Inc., 353 So. 2d 547, 549-50 (Fla. 1978)
The plaintiff in Margolin, a surgeon and member in good standing of the Morton F. Plant Hospital medical staff, sued the executive director of the hospital, the president of the hospital’s staff, and the licensed physicians who practice anesthesiology as members of the hospital staff. The defendants as a whole allegedly exercised absolute control over the availability and rendering of general anesthesia services to all surgeons and patients at the hospital. Plaintiff alleged that the anesthesiologists had maliciously conspired as a group to refuse to perform services for his patients, thereby hoping to bring about his financial ruin by effectively precluding him from using the hospital. The court, speaking through Judge Grimes, held that the complaint stated a cause of action under the Snipes rationale. In summarizing Snipes, Judge Grimes stated:
In essence, even though a person has the privilege of selecting those with whom he wishes to conduct business, when several persons who occupy a coercive position with respect to another act in concert to decline to do business with him, their refusal may under certain circumstances constitute an independent tort. Id. at 1094.
Churruca v. Miami Jai-Alai, Inc., 353 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1978)
Florida recognizes that civil conspiracies may exist as an independent tort. Snipes v. West Flagler Kennel Club, Inc.,105 So.2d 164 (Fla. 1958). Florida also recognizes a cause of action for the tortious interference with an advantageous business relationship. Martin v. Marlin,529 So.2d 1174 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), rev. denied, 539 So.2d 475 (Fla. 1988).
Wilcox v. Stout, 637 So. 2d 335, 336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
And there is an interesting twist on service of process and jurisdiction of the court:
We conclude that if appellant has successfully alleged a cause of action for conspiracy among appellees and Morse to commit tortious acts toward appellant, and if she has successfully alleged that any member of that conspiracy committed tortious acts in Florida in furtherance of that conspiracy, then all of the conspirators are subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Florida through its long-arm statute, section 48.193, which provides that any person, whether or not a resident of Florida, who personally or through an agent, commits a tortious act within Florida submits to the personal jurisdiction of the courts of Florida for any cause of action arising out of the tortious act committed in Florida. Where a civil conspiracy to commit tortious acts has been successfully alleged, and some of those acts are alleged to have been accomplished within the state of Florida, we have no hesitancy in applying the well-accepted rules applicable to the liability of co-conspirators in the criminal context. Those rules make every act and declaration of each member of the conspiracy the act and declaration of them all. Additionally, each conspirator is liable for and bound by the act and declaration of each and all of the conspirators done or made in furtherance of the conspiracy even if not present at the time. Honchell v. State,257 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1971); Farnell v. State,214 So.2d 753 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968); Martinez v. State,413 So.2d 429 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). We conclude that the well-established rules of criminal conspiracy comport with our application of section 48.193 in this case.
Wilcox v. Stout, 637 So. 2d 335, 337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (e.s.)


6 Responses

  1. Ian — you are correct as to legislation at the national level. Trump wants the fraud under the Dems back. The fraud will all continue – indefinitely.

  2. I think the comsummation of the sheriff’s sale would start a new tolling on the Statute of Limitations for the fraud, resulting in the commensurate foreclosure.
    Not really interested in all that work again, but an interesting proposition, to be sure.

  3. Ole Scott Anderson…I have him on my assignment also. Judge Schack, rest his soul…one of the best! And the “alleged” lenders all have the same address on Worthington Rd, W. Palm Beach…

  4. I just reread this post,and noticed that is seems to be specific to Florida, although I’m sure that other states have similar statutes.
    But there were a pile of mortgage servicers working out of “The Forum”, an office complex in West Palm Beach. NY judge Arthur Schack, seeing hundreds of foreclosures being brought by dozens of different servicers/banks/trusts, commented that the office must be “vast”.
    Ocwen robosignor Scott Anderson, with 41 known different signatures, operated from there. He was never found, identified, questioned or deposed.

  5. CRIMINAL conspiracy, Neil,


    I plan to file for criminal conspiracy with intent to defraud; plus RICO of course; and grand theft

    BTW, RICO apply when someone makes more than two attempts to collect unlawful debt by interstate commerce in 10 years

    But again, Judges will stand for the banks. They only serve money.

    Here were many cases filed against banks – most of them were dismissed instantly.

    Very few survived, no matter how many torts were committed.

    We need to make a movie something like “The Trial of Tears” – similar to the Trail of Tears

    The Trail of Tears was a series of forced relocations of approximately 60,000 Native Americans in the United States from their ancestral homelands in the Southeastern United States. The forced relocations were carried out by government authorities following the passage of the Indian Removal Act in 1830. The relocated peoples suffered from exposure, disease, and starvation while en route to their new designated reserve, and approximately 4,000 died before reaching their destinations or shortly after from disease. The forced removals included members of the Cherokee, Muscogee (Creek), Seminole, Chickasaw, and Choctaw nations, as well as their African slaves. The phrase “Trail of Tears” originates from a description of the removal of many Native American tribes, including the Cherokee Nation relocation in 1838.[1][2][3]

    Between 1830 and 1850, the Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, Seminole, and Cherokee people (including mixed-race and black slaves who lived among them) were forcibly removed from their traditional lands in the Southeastern United States, and later relocated farther west.[4] State and local militias forced Native Americans who were relocated to march to their destinations.[5] The Cherokee removal in 1838 (the last forced removal east of the Mississippi) was brought on by the discovery of gold near Dahlonega, Georgia in 1828, resulting in the Georgia Gold Rush.[6] Approximately 2,000–8,000 of the 16,543 relocated Cherokee perished along the way.

  6. There is legislation at the national level being discussed to allow nonbank financial companies to “partner” with banks. While I haven’t thought this through, it appears as if this will further enable and obfuscate the fraud we are all dealing with. Please comment.

Leave a Reply

%d bloggers like this: