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I think it is worth noting that securitization of loans was never completed in most scenarios. Value was paid by the Investors who, contrary to popular belief, never received ownership of the debt, note or mortgage.

1. Cash flow was promised by the investment banker doing business as an alleged Trust, but the investors who were the recipients of that promise had no recourse to the mortgages (or the notes and underlying debts) and hence no recourse to enforce them.
2. The alleged Trust never acquired the debt. Neither the trust nor any trustor or settlor ever entered into a transaction in which value was paid for the debt as required under Article 9 § 203 of the Uniform Commercial Code. It should be emphasized the this is not a guideline. It is statutory law in all U.S. jurisdictions. People get confused by court rulings in which ownership of the debt was presumed. Those decisions are not running contrary to Article 9 § 203 of the Uniform Commercial Code. To the contrary, those decisions seek to conform to that statutory requirement and the common law Doctrine that any reported transfer of the mortgage without transfer of ownership of the debt is a legal nullity. In short they avoid the issue by presuming compliance — contrary to the actual facts. 
3. Under Article 3 of The Uniform Commercial Code it is possible that the trust acquired the note but under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code the trust could not have acquired the mortgage, unless the transferor had sold the debt to the trust or the transferor was a party to the trust and had paid value for the debt. This is black-letter law.
4. Endorsement of the note is of questionable legality since the endorser did not own the debt. In addition, the endorser had no legal right to claim a representative capacity for the investors who had paid value for the promise of the Investment Bank  (ie, they did not pay value for the debt). 
5. I think that the only way an endorsement could be valid is if the endorser owned the debt or has legal authority to represent the owners of the debt who had paid value for the debt. I don’t believe that such a party exists.
6. The only party who had barely legal title to the debt, the investment banker, had sold all or part of the cash flow from the mortgage loans for amounts in excess of the amount due on the debts. The remaining attributes of the debt or indirectly sold by financial instruments whose value was derived from the value of the derivative certificates issued in the name of the trust.
7. There is no one party who has legal ownership of the debt and who has paid value for it. The brokerage of the note was merely a process of laundering title and rights to the debt to create the illusion that someone had both. The actual owner of the debt is a collection of legal entities that are not in privity with each other. That Gap was intentional and that is what enabled the Investment Bank to effectively sell the same loan an average of 12 times — for its own benefit.
8. A Court of equity needs to allocate those sales proceeds. The implied contract with borrowers required disclosure of all compensation arising from the loan transaction. The implied contract with investors was the same. Both would have bargained for a piece of the pie that was generated by the investment bank. Neither one could do that because the large accrual of  heretofore impossible profits and compensation was both unknown and actively concealed from any reporting by investment banks.
9. It is through no fault of the borrower that the investors put up money without acquiring the debt.
10. The only way to bridge this problem is by somebody pleading Reformation or some other Equitable remedy in which the liability on the note or the liability on the debt is canceled.
    1. Anything less than that leaves the borrower with an additional prospective liability on either the debt or the note.
    2. But for the court to consider such a remedy in a court of equity it must restructure the relationship between the Investors and either the debt or the note and mortgage.
    3. And in turn it must then restructure the relationship between the party claiming a representative capacity to enforce the mortgage and the investors.
    4. In short, the investors must be declared to be the owner of the debt and the owner of the mortgage who has paid value for the debt.
    5. Only after a court order is entered to that effect may the investors then enforce the mortgage.
    6. The only way the Investors could enforce the mortgage would be if they were each named as the claimant and the investor(s) were receiving the proceeds of foreclosure sale to reduce or eliminate the debt.
    7. They could act through a collective entity, such as a trustee under a trust agreement in which the trustee was directly representing the investors. In that event the named trust in the Foreclosure action could be ratified and come into full legal existence as the legal claimant.
    8. Until then virtually all foreclosures naming a trust as claimant or naming “certificate holders” as unnamed claimants are fatally defective requiring dismissal with prejudice.
11. However, this restructuring could interfere with the other derivative products sold on the basis of the performance of the certificates. The proceeds of such sales went to the Investment Bank and Affiliates who assisted in the selling of the additional derivative products.
12. I repeat that none of this was caused by borrowers or investors or even known to be in existence.
13. And the problem would not exist but for the persistence of the investment banks in maximizing Revenue at the expense and detriment of both investors and Borrowers.
14. The problem with my solution is that much of the revenue collected by the investment Banks would accrue to the benefit of the investors.
15. So the court would need to claw back a substantial amount of the revenue collected by the Investment Bank in each securitization scheme and then allocate the proceeds as to principal and interest on the underlying debt. Hence principal balances on the debt and the accrual of interest could be affected by the restructuring.