Livinglies's Weblog

This is one more nail in the coffin of false securitization: the only assets attributed to apparent “Buyers” were those related to and including servicer advances. By severing the investors from their positions as creditors, the banks were able to create the illusion that they — or their “originators”, brokers, nominees, fronts and sham operators — were the owners of the debt. NONE of the “transfers” of the “loan documents” involved a purchase and sale of a loan. NONE of the original “loan documents” referred to an actual transaction between the homeowner and the originator. That is because at the base of the paper chain was an entity that served only as a conduit for the paperwork and which had nothing to do with the advance of money to or on behalf of any homeowner. The paper trail and the money trail diverged the moment the loan papers were executed.

Hat tip to CC who wrote to me with the following:

In the eye of the storm

I also wanted to share with you the LinkedIn career history of a young “document specialist” who claims familiarity with executing and creating loan documents. (Document specialist Matt Byas maintains a profile on LinkedIn.) He worked his way up through such foreclosure/loan mod fraud luminaries as Saxon Mortgage (Dennis G. Stowe, COO, later acquired by Ocwen), Bank of America (where his job was “filing back several file folders containing loan information and processing them at various points along the line as well”), Homeward Residential, Inc. (later acquired by Ocwen, received $1.31B in TARP money, disbursed $280M) where his job included “creating allonges”), Residential Credit Solutions, Inc. (plaintiff in the successfully appealed judgement above, beneficiary of Geithner’s first, entirely bogus PPIP auction and another less well-known, similar sweetheart deal with Tim and Amtrust’s loans in 2010, which led to the $2M verdict for the Illinois widow in Hammer vs RCS, receiver of $43M in TARP money, $6.6M spent aiding borrowers, dissolved in 2016 by 2013 acquirer MTGE after non-stop quarterly losses from the point of acquisition onwards, and again featuring Dennis G. Stowe, CEO). His services were also utilized at a law firm that collapsed into a spectacular heap of revealed fraud, Butler & Hosch, P.A., and a loan servicer prone to deals so distant from comprehensibility that they had to issue this clarification to a press release in 2009:

No actual mortgage loans were part of the transaction. The acquired assets consisted principally of advances made on behalf of borrowers who are in arrears and of the Master Servicing Rights pursuant to which the loans are serviced. (e.s.) Mortgage servicing consists of collecting payments from homeowners, remitting them to appropriate parties and managing the default cycle. The transaction with Citi Residential Lending is similar to AHMSI’s earlier acquisitions from Option One and other sellers of servicing. In addition, while $1.5 billion has been described in a number of media reports as a “payment” in the transaction for the Master Servicing Rights, the vast portion of this amount is related to outstanding servicing advances.”

That loan servicer, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. eventually changed its name to Homeward Residential, and the document specialist no longer names it as a separate entity on his LinkedIn profile.

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: AHMSI, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Bank of America, Butler & Hosch, Citi Residential Lending, Dennis G. Stowe, Homeward Residential, Master Servicing Rights, Matt Byas, Ocwen, Option One, saxon mortgage |