Livinglies's Weblog

Judicial Arrogance and Intolerance Keeps leading back to the same point — that TILA Rescission is not common law rescission. Yet Judges continue to rule on TILA rescission as though it were common law rescission. Here again the 9th Circuit confirms what the Supreme Court of the United States has already said — neither tender nor lawsuit is required for rescission to be effective. Any other holding is directly contrary tot eh wording of the statute, which as a matter of law is clear and NOT subject to interpretation.

The second important part of this decision is that the Court may not lay down conditions or advice concerning the filing of an amended complaint. The corollary is that the fact that an amended complaint was filed without the rescission count does not prevent the homeowner from preserving the issue on appeal — if the lower court said don’t file it unless you plead and prove tender of money.

And the third implied issue is what Congress intended when they passed TILA and the rescission statute, to wit: The whole notion of “tender” is ridiculous in the face of the legal conclusion that the note and mortgage no longer exist (void) and the factual basis that the whole issue of identification fo the creditor may not subverted. Hence the question “Tender to whom?”

Lastly the issue of whether a Trustee is a debt collector appears to be answered in the affirmative. Yes they are and not just because of the reasons set forth in the decision (see concurring opinion). Creditors are not normally regarded as debt collectors. But there is a growing awareness that the REMIC trusts are empty; hence the trustee of the REMIC Trust cannot be anything but a debt a collector unless they can prove that they are indeed the creditor — i.e., the party to whom the debt is owed. Likewise the Trustee on a Deed of Trust MUST be a debt collector because by definition it is an intermediary seeking to collect money.

Hat tip to stopforeclosurefraud.com, whose article is republished in part.

The ruling upholds the ability to rescind despite ability to repay- Split court ruling of FDCPA applying to Trustee- dissenting judge vigorously argues that the FDCPA should apply to Trustee’s for all the right reasons. See below……

http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2016/11/03/vien-phuong-ho-v-recontrust-company-n-a-et-a-9th-cir-holds-foreclosure-trustee-not-fdcpa-debt-collector/ 

I

The district court twice dismissed Ho’s TILA rescission claim without prejudice, and Ho didn’t replead it in her third complaint. We have held that claims dismissed without prejudice and not repleaded are not preserved for appeal; they are instead considered “voluntarily dismissed.” See Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012). Here, however, the district court didn’t give Ho a free choice in whether to keep repleading the TILA rescission claim.

Rather, the court said that if Ho wished to replead the claim she “would be required to allege that she is prepared and able to pay back the amount of her purchase price less any downpayment

she contributed and any payments made since the time of her purchase.” The judge concluded that if Ho “is not able to make that allegation in good faith, she should not continue to maintain a TILA rescission claim.” It’s unclear whether the judge meant this as benevolent advice or a stern

command. But a reasonable litigant, particularly one proceeding pro se, could have construed this as a strict condition, one that might have precipitated the judge’s ire or even invited a sanction if disobeyed. Ho could not or would not commit to pay back the loan, and dropped the claim in her third complaint.

The district court based its condition on Yamamoto v. Bank of N.Y., which gave courts equitable discretion to “impose conditions on rescission that assure that the borrower meets her obligations once the creditor has performed its obligations.” 329 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 2003). But, after

the district court dismissed Ho’s claims, we held that a mortgagor need not allege the ability to repay the loan in order to state a rescission claim under TILA that can survive a motion to dismiss. Merritt v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 759 F.3d 1023, 1032–33 (9th Cir. 2014). Ho argues that her rescission claims were properly preserved for appeal and should be reinstated.

Where, as here, the district court dismisses a claim and instructs the plaintiff not to refile the claim unless he includes certain additional allegations that the plaintiff is unable or unwilling to make, the dismissed claim is preserved for appeal even if not repleaded. A plaintiff is the master of his claim and shouldn’t have to choose between defying the district court and making allegations that he is unable or unwilling to bring into court.

This rule is a natural extension of our holding in Lacey. The Lacey rule—which displaced our circuit’s longstanding and notably harsh rule that all claims not repleaded in an amended complaint were considered waived—was motivated by two principal concerns: judicial economy and fairness to the parties. 693 F.3d at 925–28. Those concerns apply here. We see no point in forcing a plaintiff into a drawn-out contest of wills with the district court when, for whatever reason, the plaintiff chooses not to comply with a court-imposed condition for repleading. We remand to the district court for consideration of Ho’s TILA rescission claim in light of Merritt v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 759 F.3d at 1032–33.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED and REMANDED in

part. No costs.

KORMAN, District Judge, dissenting in part and concurring

in part:

The majority opinion opens with the principal question presented by this case: “[W]hether the trustee of a California deed of trust is a ‘debt collector’ under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).” Maj. Op. at 6. After a discussion of the issue, the majority concludes by observing that the phrase “debt collector” is “notoriously ambiguous” and that, given this ambiguity, we should refuse to construe it in a manner that interferes with California’s arrangements for conducting nonjudicial foreclosures. Maj. Op. at 18–19. My reading of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), consistent with the manner in which it has been construed by every other circuit that has addressed whether foreclosure procedures are debt collection subject to the FDCPA, suggests that the only reasonable reading is that a trustee pursuing a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding is a debt collector. See Kaymark v. Bank of Am., N.A., 783 F.3d 168, 179 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 794 (2016); Glazer v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 704 F.3 453, 461–63 (6th Cir. 2013); Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, P.L.L.C., 443 F.3d 373, 376–77 (4th Cir. 2006); see also Alaska Tr., LLC v. Ambridge, 372 P.3d 207, 213–216 (Alaska 2016); Shapiro & Meinhold v. Zartman, 823 P.2d 120, 123–24 (Colo. 1992) (en banc). The same is true of a judicial foreclosure proceeding—an alternative available in California. See Coker v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 364 P.3d 176, 178 (Cal. 2016). Both are intended to obtain money by forcing the sale of the property being foreclosed upon.

Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: 9TH CIRCUIT, common law rescission, DEBT COLLECTOR, FDCPA, lawsuit, tender, TILA rescission, Vien-Phuong Ho, voluntary dismissal |