Arizona Supreme Court Hogan Case Holds that Note is Not required to Start Foreclosure

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the trustee owes the trustor a fiduciary duty, and may be held liable for conducting a trustee’s sale when the trustor is not in default. See Patton v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Phoenix, 118 Ariz. 473, 476, 578 P.2d 152, 155 (1978).” Hogan Court

Editor’s Comment: Here is another example of lawyers arguing out of a lack of understanding of the securitization process and trying to compress an elephant into a rabbit hole. They lost, unsurprisingly.

If you loaned money to someone, you want the money repaid. You DON’T want to be told that because you don’t have the note you can never enforce the loan repayment. You CAN start enforcement and you must prove why you don’t have the note in a credible way so that the court has footprints leading right up to the point that you don’t have the note. But the point is that you can start without the note. 

The Supreme Court apparently understood this very well and they didn’t address the real issue because nobody brought it up. The issue before them was whether someone without the note could initiate the foreclosure process. Nobody mentioned whether the same party could submit a credit bid at the auction which is what I have been pounding upon for months on end now.

Apparently, right or wrong, the feeling of the courts is that there is a very light burden on the right to initiate a foreclosure whether it is judicial or non-judicial. It is very close to the burden of the party moving to lift stay in a bankruptcy procedure. Practically any colorable right gives the party enough to get the stay — because the theory goes — whether it is a lift stay or starting the ball rolling on a foreclosure there is plenty the borrower can do to  oppose the enforcement procedure. I don’t agree with either standard or burden of proof in the case of securitized mortgages but it is about time we got real about what gets traction in the courtroom and what doesn’t.

In the Hogan case the Court makes a pretty big deal out of the fact that Hogan didn’t allege that WAMU and Deutsch were not entitled to enforce the note. From the court’s perspective, they were saying to the AG and the borrowers, “look, you are admitting the debt and admitting this is the creditor, what do you want from us, a free pass?”

This is why you need real people with real knowledge and real reports that back up and give credibility to deny the debt, deny the default, deny that WAMU and/or Deutsch are creditors, plead payment and force WAMU and Deutsch to come forward with pleadings and proof. Instead WAMU and Deutsch skated by AGAIN because nobody followed the money. They followed the document trail which led them down that rabbit hole I was referencing above.

In order to deny everything without be frivolous, you need to have concrete reasons why you think the debt does not exist, the debt does not exist between the borrower and these pretender lenders, the debt was paid in full, and deny that the loan was NOT secured (i.e. that the mortgage lien was NOT perfected when filed).

For anyone to do that without feeling foolish you must UNDERSTAND how the securitization model AS PRACTICED turned the entire lending model on its head. Then everything makes sense, which is why I wrote the second volume which you can get by pressing the appropriate links shown above. But it isn’t just the book that will get you there. You need to give rise to material, relevant issues of fact that are in dispute. For that you need a credible report from a credible expert with real credentials and real experience and training.

I follow the money. In fact the new book has a section called “Show Me the Money”. To “believe” is taken from an ancient  language that means “to be willing”. I want you to believe that the debt that the “enforcers” doesn’t exist and never did. I want you to believe that the declarations contained in the note, mortgage (deed of trust), substitution of trustee etc. are all lies. But you can’t believe that unless you are willing to consider the the idea it might be true. That I might be right.

At every “Securitized” closing table there were two deals taking place — one perfectly real and the other perfectly unreal, fake and totally obfuscated. The deal everyone is litigating is the second one,  starting with the documents at closing and moving up the chain of securitization. Do you really think that some court is going to declare that everyone gets a free house because some i wasn’t dotted or t crossed on the back of the wrong piece of paper when you admit the debt, the default and the amount due?

It is the first deal that is real because THAT is the one with the money exchanging hands. The declarations contained in the note, mortgage and other documents all refer to money exchanging hands between the named payee and secured party on one side and the borrower on the other. The deal in those documents never happened. The REAL DEAL was that money from investor lenders was poured down a pipe through which the loans were funded. The parties at the closing table with the borrower had nothing to do with funding; acquiring, transferring the receivable, the obligation, note or the mortgage or deed of trust.

Every time you chase them down the rabbit hole of the document trail you miss the point. The REAL DEAL had no documents and couldn’t possibly be secured. And if you read the wording from the Hogan decision below you can see how even they would have considered the matter differently if the simple allegation been made that the borrower denied that WAMU and Deutsch had any right to enforce the note either as principals or as agents. They were not the creditor. But Hogan and its ilk are not over — yet.

There is still a matter to be determined as to whether the party who initiated the foreclosure is in fact a creditor under the statute and can therefore submit a credit bid in lieu of cash. THAT is where the rubber meets the road — where the cash is supposed to exchange hands. And THAT is where nearly all the foreclosures across the country fail. The failure of consideration means the sale did not take place. If the borrower was there or someone for him was there and bid a token amount of money it could be argued in many states that the other bid being ineligible as a credit bid, the only winning bidder is the one who offered cash.


Hogan argues that a deed of trust, like a mortgage, “may be enforced only by, or in behalf of, a person who is entitled to enforce the obligation the mortgage secures.” Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Mortgages § 5.4(c) (1997); see Hill v. Favour, 52 Ariz. 561, 568-69, 84 P.2d 575, 578 (1938).

We agree. (e.s.) But Hogan has not alleged that WaMu and Deutsche Bank are not entitled to enforce the underlying note; rather, he alleges that they have the burden of demonstrating their rights before a non-judicial foreclosure may proceed. Nothing in the non-judicial foreclosure statutes, however, imposes such an obligation. See Mansour v. Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181 (D. Ariz. 2009) (citing A.R.S. § 33-807 and observing that “Arizona’s [non-]judicial foreclosure statutes . . . do not require presentation of the original note before commencing foreclosure proceedings”); In re Weisband, 427 B.R. 13, 22 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2010) (stating that non-judicial foreclosures may be conducted under Arizona’s deed of trust statutes without presentation of the original note).



17 Responses

  1. Here is the rest of the section from the ruling quoted below (not directly related to tony’s discussion of trustee) and it makes a distinction between actual damages and statatory damages and attorney fees (the latter two are not dependent on proving actual damages). I just see this as a way for attorneys to be paid by people who have no money or who are hopefully temporarily unemployed. All the other claims can be brought up at the same time as the liability of assignees.

    b) Damages Pleaded by Plaintiffs

    U.S. Bank argues that Plaintiffs must plead actual damages to state a claim, and that the actual damages pleaded in the complaint do not meet the appropriate pleading standard. MTD, at 2-3. Plaintiffs respond that a 1641(g) claimant may recover actual damages, statutory damages, and attorneys’ fees and that they appropriately pleaded all three types of damages. Opp., at 8.

    15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) authorizes claims for actual damages, statutory damages, and attorneys fees for violations of 15 U.S.C.
    § 1641(g). Russell v. Mortgage Solutions Mgmt., —Inc., No. CV 08-1092-PK, 2010 WL 3945117, at *6-*7 (D. Or. Apr. 6, 2010) (acknowledging all three types of damages are authorized by § 1640 against original creditor’s assignee).

    In this case, Plaintiffs pleaded that U.S. Bank’s violation of § 1641(g) caused their home to be foreclosed, presumably because they were unable to contact their actual creditor to negotiate a modification of their loan as they explained in another part of their complaint. Compl., at 28. They also pleaded that they had to hire an attorney in order to determine who held their loan. Id. Finally, Plaintiffs pleaded that U.S. Bank is subject to statutory damages and fees. Id. The Court notes that despite pleading all of these damages, Plaintiffs have not pleaded a causal connection between the alleged § 1641(g) violation and their actual damages because the event precipitating the foreclosure was their default, not a lack of notice as to who owned the loan. Plaintiffs admit that they were unable to make the required payments on the loan without receiving a modification, and they do not plead that a modification is legally required. Compl., at 16. Even if plaintiffs are not entitled to actual damages based on the allegations in their Complaint, they did adequately plead that they are entitled to attorneys’ fees and statutory damages.

    Plaintiffs pleaded a claim arising out of U.S. Bank’s alleged violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g) and damages associated with that claim, making dismissal at this stage improper. As a result, U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss this claim is DENIED.

  2. @tony

    I wanted to share this with you. A CA federal judge makes a distiction between the trustee on the deed of trust and the trustee for the benefciary trust investors. I have posted it before but no one ever comments which is ok but just in case you haven’t seen this wanted to share it. I think it is very telling and there is much more in the ruling of important significance for CA re tila, juisdiction and tender:

    The TILA Claim Against U.S. Bank

    Plaintiffs’ sole federal claim is against U.S. Bank for allegedly violating a provision of TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g). U.S. Bank seeks dismissal of this claim on the grounds that as a trustee for a mortgage backed security, TILA does not apply to it. Defendants also seek dismissal by arguing that Plaintiffs failed to plead damages arising from a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g). For the following reasons, the Court finds that U.S. Bank as trustee for WFMBS 2005-AR12 may be subject to liability arising from a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g) and therefore Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim must be denied.

    15 U.S.C. § 1641(g), titled ―Liability of Assignees,‖ requires that when an entity purchases or is assigned the beneficial interest in a loan on a property, it must notify the borrower in writing within 30 days of when the loan is transferred. 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g). Subsection (g) lists the particular information that the assignee’s notice must contain. This subsection only applies to the ―new owner or assignee of the debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g). 15 U.S.C. § 1640 authorizes a civil action for violations of § 1641 for (1) actual damages, or (2) statutory damages that may included (a) damages equal to twice the amount of any finance charge or (b) for a credit transaction secured by real property an amount not less than $400 and not greater than $4000. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a).

    a) Application of 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g) to Trustees
    U.S. Bank argues that as a general rule, trustees are not subject to TILA in California because trustees have limited liability in California’s non-judicial foreclosure process. Plaintiffs respond that U.S. Bank cannot both foreclose on their home, thereby claiming a beneficial interest in the note securing Plaintiffs’ loan, and simultaneously claim that it is not a creditor subject to TILA’s provisions.

    Under California law, the trustee of a deed of trust has no beneficial interest in the mortgage associated with the deed of trust. Heritage Oaks Partners v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 510, 514 (Ct. App. 2007). The trustee for a deed of trust has only two duties: (1) to foreclose the deed of trust upon default, or (2) when the secured debt is satisfied to convey the deed of trust to the borrower. Id. Due to the limited duties and lack of beneficial interest assigned to the trustee of a deed of trust, federal courts in California hold that TILA does not apply to the trustee of a deed of trust. Guerrero v. Citi Residential Lending, Inc., No. CV F 08-1878 LJO GSA, 2009 WL 926973, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009) (holding that TILA does not apply to the trustee of a deed of trust and explaining that the limited role of such a trustee under California law precludes TILA liability).
    U.S. Bank’s argument conflates the trustee of a deed of trust with other types of trustees. To support their position, U.S. Bank cites Wilson v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C 11–03394 CRB, 2011 WL 3443635, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011). Wilson does support U.S. Bank’s position but is without citation to any Ninth Circuit authority. Id. (citing Hargis v. Wash. Mut. Bank, No. C 10-02341 CRB, 2011 WL 724390 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011)). The Hargis case cited by the Wilson court involves the trustee of a deed of trust, not a traditional trustee or as in this case the trustee of a mortgage backed security. Hargis, 2011 WL 724390, at *2. It appears that the Wilson court failed to note the distinction between a trustee of a deed of trust and the trustee of a mortgage backed security, as well as the basis for the rule exempting the trustee of a deed of trust from TILA. The trustee of a deed of trust is exempt from TILA because of its limited role under California law, but there is no analogous reason to exempt other types of trustees from TILA’s provisions.

    The potential breadth of U.S. Bank’s position is easily illustrated by hypothetically granting limited liability to a common law trustee. Under the common law of trusts, a ―trustee is subject to personal liability to third persons on obligations incurred in the administration of the trust to the same extent that he would be liable if he held the property free of trust.‖ Restatement (2d) of Trusts § 261. This common law rule shows a stark contrast between the duties of the trustee of a deed of trust, as limited by California law, and those of a common law trustee. A traditional trustee holds title to trust property and is responsible for omissions related to the administration of that property. Exempting all trustees from TILA would permit trusts acting as lenders to completely evade TILA’s provisions.

    Further, as Plaintiffs point out, U.S. Bank was assigned the ownership interest in the loan by the January 11, 2011 assignment, meaning that U.S. Bank is Wells Fargo’s purported assignee. MTD, at 2. As an assignee, U.S. Bank falls squarely within 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g), which creates liability for the assignees of the loan’s original creditor if the assignee fails to notify the borrower of the acquisition. 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g).

    The Court declines to follow the Wilson court’s decision with respect to TILA liability of trustees. The trustee of a deed of trust enjoys limited liability because it only has two duties in the California statutory foreclosure process, but there is no legal basis to support a holding that limits the liability of all trustees in this manner. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have properly alleged that U.S. Bank as trustee for WFMBS 2005-AR12, a mortgage-backed-security, is liable for violations of TILA.

  3. 20 May 11:22 update — Attorney McLeod returned my phone call. She will reconsider after I submit more material. She is trying to put me into the freelancer status where my material is republished by other press but that is not my point. My point is that I am covered by the statute on my own merits. “What I do is no different than what I did as an editor or reporter for the Call & Post or Indianapolis Star 20 years ago even if it has more opinion in it… a luxury that I am not afforded by major press.”

  4. @Pie,

    Belgium? I doubt it. Next should be Spain, shouldn’t it? Plus… Belgium is where most of Europe’s federal offices are located.

  5. Owner Patent ‘Novel method for Funding’
    Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. formerly known as Norwest Mortgage, Inc. CONDUIT to NASCOR/CTSLink/SecuritiesLink/MortgageExpress/SalesLink service marks. NASCOR (sm) and NISTAR (sm) and NMI strategic partner with First American Real Estate Solutions dba CORELOGIC since 1997, and Lawyers Title Corp ‘LTC’ Brokers, close CORRESPONDENTS’ Business & Originator/Servicer endless supply of cash, no loans created, real estate application held, insurance pyramid through Associations, Purchase Groups, ‘Commonwealth Virginia’ security interests of commodities in form of real estate receivables NOTES not LOANS reclaim DEED in exchange for new sales contract, meanwhile INVESTORS BUYER/Seller agree to debt settlement endless supply of alternative investements. ‘Individual’s NOTE Sold to Investor’ – cash used to hedge credit risk, preferred stockholder keeps Alternative Investment abandoned by consumer due to broken promise, equity of property converted to perpetual receivable -ETF Linked Notes – CIBC through Exceptions SKADDEN filing agent


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  7. There is no “trustee” in modern day mortgages. I wrote this before and still waiting for guest to give case law and transcripts to prove me wrong. A party can not be sold the right to sue. This is the foundation of case law. Now Randy Frodsham wrote some case law so lets break these case laws down some bit.

    Hatch v Collins:
    This case was mostly about statue of limitations but lets quote the part about trustee:

    “A trustee under a deed of trust has neither the powers nor the obligations of a strict trustee; rather, he serves as a kind of common agent for the trustor and the beneficiary. His agency is a passive one, for the limited purpose of conducting a sale in the event of the trustor’s default or reconveying the property upon satisfaction of the debt. Often the trustee is a title company, which is unaware of its selection as trustee and has no knowledge of either the transaction or the identity of the beneficiary. Consequently, the use of the term trustee in the deed of trust is unfortunate and misleading. The trustee of a deed of trust is not a trustee at all in a technical or strict sense. He does not assume the obligations which are imposed on a trustee by operation of law, and the statutes applicable to trustees of express trusts do not apply to deeds of trust. The trustee of a deed of trust does not possess the personal confidence for the benefit of another required for a true trust relationship.”

    This quote proves what I was saying before, this is not a trust but a mere mortgage with the power to sell. DEED OF TRUST is nothing more than a mortgage with the power to sell. A mere encomberance.
    Defeasable purchase, no equity of redemption.Redeemable mortgage, equity of redemption.

    CONWAY’S EXECUTORS AND DEVISEES v. ALEXANDER. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 11 U.S. 218; 3 L. Ed. 321; 1812 U.S. LEXIS 390; 7 Cranch 218 talks about this deeper.

    Plus Hatch v Collins was even questioned by Howl v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2011 U.S. Dist. (A pro se case at that) that went into statute of limitations, and explained it a little deeper.

    “Defendants argue that California Code of Civil Procedure section 338(d) also bars this claim. However, California Code of Civil Procedure section 337(3), not section 338(d), applies. Section 337(3) imposes a four-year limitations period on an “action based upon the rescission of a contract in writing.” This section also contains a delayed discovery provision, stating that where “the ground for rescission is fraud or mistake, the time does not begin to run until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 337(3). Hatch v. Collins, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1104, 275 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1990), does not concern rescission based on fraud or address section 337(3), and does not support Defendants’ position. Because this claim was asserted within the four-year limitations period, it is not time-barred.”

    I. E. Associates v. Safeco Title Ins. Co:

    This case is as almost the same but has some very interesting quotes.

    “At least three months before the foreclosure sale, the trustee must record a notice of default setting forth the nature of the breach and, where curable, the amount necessary to cure the default. (§§ 2924, 2924c.) The content and form of the notice are specified in the statute. (§§ 2924, 2924b, 2924c.) If the trustor has recorded a request for notice, or if the deed of trust contains a request for notice, 4 the trustee is required, within certain time limits, to mail a copy of the notice of default to the trustor at the address specified therein and at his last known address if different than the address specified. (§ 2924b.)

    4 Since 1972, Government Code section 27321.5 has required all deeds of trust with a power of sale to specify the trustor’s address and to contain a request for a copy of notice of default and sale.

    After the notice of default has been recorded, the trustee must allow three months to elapse to afford the trustor or junior lienholders an opportunity to cure the default. (§ 2924c.) The statute also specifies the costs and fees that may be charged in conjunction with curing the default.” (Ibid.)

    From these quotes it is clearly a mortgage not a defeasable purchase, but a mortgage with power to sell. As supreme court judge Marshall state on this very subject:

    “As to the question of mortgage. “Every contract for the receiving of money, by the conveyance of a real estate to the lender, not made in contemplation of an eventual arrangement of property, is, in equity, deemed a mortgage.” Mellor v. Lees, 2 Atk. 495. And all provisoes and stipulations between the parties, tending to alter, in any subsequent event, the original nature of the mortgaged interest, or prevent the redemption of the estate pledged, upon payment of the money borrowed, with interest, are void. For were any such agreements suffered to prevail, they would put it in the power of every mortgagee to take advantage of the necessities of the mortgagor, by inserting restrictive clauses to prevent a redemption of the estate pledged, unless upon terms injurious to the latter. In equity, therefore, the right of redemption is considered as inseparably incident to every contract founded on a mortgage, and can no more be restrained than the power of tenant in fee simple to alien generally, or of tenant in tail, to suffer a recovery; it being a maxim in equity, that the same estate or interest cannot be a mortgage at one time, and at another time cease to be so.” Powell on Mortgages, 146. Nor will an agreement to make the conveyance absolute upon payment of a further sum, if the money lent be not paid at the day appointed, alter the case; such stipulations being deemed unconscionable; because a man ought not to have interest for his money, and a collateral advantage besides; nor may he clog the redemption by any bye agreement. 1 Vern. 488. Willet v. Winnel. Powell, 152.”

    No mortgage can hide and try to act like a deed of trust, when it is truly a mortgage with the right to redeem. Thus judicial hearing must be used not a non judicial matter.

    Next case is Stephens v. Hollis, 196 Cal.App. 3d, 948: (I had a hard time finding this case because you cited wrong there should be no 955 after 948)

    This case is the same but I will take the quote about trustee:

    “Although commonly called a “trustee,” a trustee under a deed of trust is not the kind of trustee identified in former Civil Code section 2229. Just as a panda is not an ordinary bear, a trustee of a deed of trust is not an ordinary trustee. trustee under a deed of trust has neither the powers nor the obligations of a strict trustee; he serves as a kind of common agent for the parties. [Citations.]” ( 3 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1973) Security Transactions in Real Property, § 9, p. 1497; see 7 Witkin, op. cit. supra, Trusts, § 3, pp. 5368-5369.)”

    Now again if the trustee in this is not deemed a trustee but an agent. The reason is clear, because the home owner has the right of redemption. This is just a mortgage with power to sell because home owner admitted a default.

    Again I hope that people will use there law library and seeks these cases, then check the transcripts to see what they are trying to tell you. Stop using Google as your lawyer, it does not work.

  8. 12-2-7 = 21

    12- 21-12

    Goodbye Greece – Belgium next big euro area.

  9. “The failure of consideration means the sale did not take place. If the borrower was there or someone for him was there and bid a token amount of money it could be argued in many states that the other bid being ineligible as a credit bid, the only winning bidder is the one who offered cash.”

    Which states as in above? Should homeowners show up and bid $1.00 cash? What would happen?

  10. @C.King: as far as I know to sue a U.S. entity you must first obtain their written permission to sue them, else they don’t have to respond..also, plaintiff must be a real person. Do you have a personal identification that has JD as part of your name? + DOJ is always a necessary part of massive criminal cover-ups like this ongoing crisis…Hell, it is a part of all such massive crime scenes…

  11. Again, what Neil is rightfully saying is, there is a BIG difference between “initiating” foreclosure proceedings and “sustaining” them…unfortunately, litigants seem to be missing the opportunity to argue that point and are allowing these kinds of rulings to stand for something they do NOT. Please, please, get competent…find the help you need to make these arguments. DISTINGUISH THESE CASES!!!

  12. Look; I’m not an attorney, but I have observed that it seems that no one ever wants to “take on the judge” – but this type of situation truly seems to be the one time that you MUST use the writs available to challenge the judges “choice” here – to CHOOSE to ignore the black letter law… Because from what I can see – “THIS” situation (ie: the ‘possibility’ that this type of judge’s wrongful ‘choice’ might occur) is exactly WHY those writs are part of the process.

    If all of you lawyers here are going to spend all these hours and all this energy trying to sincerely fight against “THIS” type of mishandling of justice – then it should be obvious – you MUST GO ALL THE WAY!

    Just an outsider’s observation…

  13. Yes Bart, The credit bids really floor me….. Ocwen’s bid on my second foreclosure THEY DID states they bid 442.250.00. But my original deed of trust in Texas states 353.250.00 over 4 years later!
    WHAT a SCAM!


    SUNDAY, MAY 20, 2012

    KingCast/Mortgage Movies to Sue U.S. DOJ Over FOIA Free Press No Fee Clause 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(4)(A)(ii) on U.S. Trustee Lawrence Sumski B10 Mortgage Proof of Claims info.

    The DOJ Attorney Janice Galli McLeod arbitrarily and capriciously denied my free press fee exemption to help cover up U.S. Trustee Lawrence Sumski’s failures of Due Diligence on Bankruptcy B10 Proofs of claim. There is no logical reason why I was denied the exemption based on years of experience as a paid journalist and mortgage industry professional in addition to my current journalism activities that include actual courtroom coverage and analysis of current legal cases and other legislative developments. FOIA was specifically modified to reflect the changes in in journalism to incorporate people like Neil Garfield or me, and a recent NH case of Mortgage Specialists v. Implode-Explode supports my contentions in every aspect. Note that the case involved now is based in NH.

    Read the draft lawsuit here:

  15. The credit bids really floor me… bid at all, no one at sale……..this is no sale all around. And yes you do need to present real money there.totally agree with the real deal.

  16. Been saying that forever: “Follow the damn money!!!”

    Jay Patterson said the same thing on Mandelman Podcast: “Follow the damn money and get the reports ONLY if you have an attorney. otherwise, you’re wasting your money. Further, real experts willing to testify in court are very, very few and far between. Don’t get any forensic report from anyone who will not defend it in court: it is merely hearsay and has no legal weight. Lastly, check the reputation of the forensic expert. How many times has he/she appeared in court and testified? What was the outcome? Of all the cases on which he/she testified, how many were won by the homeowner?”

    It’s a game. Learn to play it and to play it well.

  17. The Hogan decision is fine for Arizona. Here in California, we already have a couple decisions that state thet the Trustee is there to do only what the Lender and Deed of Trust tell it to (see Hatch v. Collins _1990_ 225 Cal.App.3d 1104 [275 Cal.Rptr. 476] and I. E. Associates v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. _1985_ 39 Cal.3d 281 , 216 Cal.Rptr. 438; 702 P.2d 596 and Stephens v. Hollis, 196 Cal.App. 3d, 948, 955)

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