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Editor’s Comment:
As I have reported on past occasions I have sources from the securities and more specifically the securitization industry that provide comments and information on the promise that I will keep their identities anonymous. This one in particular caught my attention. The source is from a Southeastern state who packaged and sold pools of loans of all types and qualities.
I believe regardless of whether the note and mortgage / deed of trust was assigned or not, it can be demonstrated they did not move as a unit, unless the price paid was the payoff value of the loan and/or value of property. [Editor’s Note: The importance of this fellow’s statement cannot be overstated. And his method for determining the true nature of an assignment, allonge or indorsement transaction is extremely helpful. While there are contrary arguments to his contention, they are a stretch to accept]
A different price (which I have hitting on this theme) would indicate the two are not a unit, because the value of the promissory note is not related to the actual security value. Also how the transaction was booked and valued on the bank’s accounts would reveal the same. I am guessing that they were valuing notes at a price much higher than the market value of the home. [Editor’s Note: Yes and as I have already been seen informed with documentation, the transactions were never booked as accounting transactions because from the standpoint of the assignor or assignee no transaction took place. These were assignments of convenience. They do not show on the balance sheet of the either the assignor or the assignee as a loan receivable. If they come to court claiming ownership or that someone else acquired ownership through them, they are doing so contrary to their own admissions in the own bookkeeping. THIS is where confidence and knowledge in motion practice and confidence and knowledge in discovery will put the homeowner in either extreme jeopardy or in a winning position — because the loan was never owned by ANY of the intermediaries who acted as conduits]
I believe the key is to assert the note as a ‘financial asset.’ That there is a market or exchange in which it trades. In fact on many of the bank’s annual reports, they speak that the primary business is originating loans for sale/securitization, i.e. a market exists. Along with pricing, this will be an easy case to make. [Editor’s Note: Read this carefully — it proves the point by reference to information in the public domain — and it is not subject to attack as being opinion or questionable fact or standing to raise the issue. What I believe he is telling me here is that even if there was ($10.00, or other valuable consideration), there are only three values that conceivably be used — the principal due on the note, the value of the collateral or the fair market value of the loan as determined by the freely traded secondary market. In nearly all cases the “traders” never even pretended that this was a real transaction and so there was no exchange of money at all. But if there was an exchange of money, this index could be used to prove that the transaction was a sham because it never met the elements of a reasonable business transaction. Judge Shack in New York asked the question himself — why and under what terms would anyone buy a loan that is in default? How could a loan declared in default be assigned into an investor pool where the investors were promised that they would at least initially receive performing loans. And how could they receive any loan after the 90 day cutoff period included in the PSA and the REMIC statute? The collateral question that Judge Shack might have asked is why anyone would pay a price different than the price set on the secondary market regardless of the principal stated on the note or the current fair market value?]
Here is the kicker: SECTION 36‑8‑406. Obligation to notify issuer of lost, destroyed, or wrongfully taken security certificate.
If a security certificate has been lost, apparently destroyed, or wrongfully taken, and the owner fails to notify the issuer of that fact within a reasonable time after the owner has notice of it and the issuer registers a transfer of the security before receiving notification, the owner may not assert against the issuer a claim for registering the transfer under Section 36‑8‑404 (wrongful registration) or a claim to a new security certificate under Section 36‑8‑405 (replacement of a lost, destroyed or wrongfully taken security certificate).
I wonder out loud why I should not reregister my note. Imagine the bank now arguing all the points of having to present an actual note, etc in order to change ownership.
The next big thing I am digging into is whether an owner/purchaser of a security has any authority to electronically register and transfer ownership. I believe, but cannot find exact wording, that such is only limited to the issuer. On the entire face, MERs may not even be allowed because the issuer of the note, the homeowner, never authorized them to keep track.
Think of why there are laws that require lenders to notify borrowers when their mortgage is sold, it is because the issuer needs a record. Worse case is that the bank argues the issuer under Chapter 8 is the one who ‘becomes responsible for, or in place of, another person described as an issuer in this section.’ That is still not the bank, but the county registrar.
Filed under: foreclosure | Tagged: accounting transactions, allonge, assignment, auction fraud, borrower, Chapter 8, county registrar, current fair market value, financial asset, foreclosure, foreclosure defense, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure offense, fraud, indorsement, investor pool, Judge Shack, Mortgage, Obligation to notify issuer of lost destroyed or wrongfully taken security certificate, owner/purchaser of a security, predatory lending, PSA, REMIC, secondary market, Section 36-8-405, Section 36-8-406, securitization, securitization industry, security certificate, who would buy a loan in default? |
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Collateral Assignment of Mortgage or Deed of Trust Revised: 10/1999AUTHOR: David Dickard
DEFINITION
A collateral assignment of a Mortgage or Deed of Trust is primarily a personal property right, i.e., the rights to the underlying Note itself given to the assignee, but the collateral assignment can be insured if certain steps are followed. One way to look at a collateral assignment is that the Note and Deed of Trust now have two beneficiaries, both of whom must be dealt with if the Deed of Trusts to be foreclosed, released, or reconveyed. When a Note and Deed of Trust are created, they become a receivable, or asset, in the hands of the lender. If the lender itself subsequently decides to raise cash, they can sell the asset to another investor and assign the Note and Deed of Trust outright to that investor. Sometimes the original lender decides instead to raise cash by borrowing money from another lender. As part of that transaction, they can pledge that asset as security or collateral for the loan they are receiving. The collateral assignments the document that is recorded to show that the original lender used the asset as security to borrow money, rather than selling the asset outright to a new investor.
RELATED TOPICS DETAILED EXPLANATIONPERSONAL VERSUS REAL PROPERTY The holder of a Collateral Assignment does not own an estate in real property. This is because the collateral they hold is the promissory note itself, as opposed to the lien against real property created by the Deed of Trust. Default by the original lender on the collateral loan does not directly entitle the collateral assignee to foreclose on the Deed of Trust. This makes sense if you consider that the property owner should not be vulnerable to losing their property to foreclosure unless the property owner itself has defaulted on the original Note and Deed of Trust. By law, a promissory note is personal property, which is governed by the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. If the original lender defaults on the collateral loan but the property owner has not defaulted on the original loan, the collateral assignee must assert its rights to the original promissory note pursuant to the UCC. See related topics, Uniform Commercial Code.
LENDER PRIORITY It is common for both the original lender and the collateral lender to have simultaneous, proportionate rights to the original Note and Deed of Trust. One reason for this is that the collateral loan is often for less money than the original loan. When this scenario occurs, the original lender will not want to assign all of its rights to the original security to the collateral lender. Accordingly, anyone dealing with a Deed of Trust that has been collaterally assigned should presume that both lenders have rights to that security. If a collaterally assigned Deed of Trust is being paid off, either both lenders should sign the release or the collateral lender should reassign its rights back to the original lender. If the property owner has defaulted on the original Note and Deed of Trust and a foreclosure is looming, the foreclosure should be conducted on behalf of both lenders and the foreclosure proceeds should be distributed according to their proportionate interests in the original Note and Deed of Trust. As will be discussed further in the next section, it is critical that the collateral lender has actual possession of the original promissory note. Even if a collateral assignment is recorded in the real property records, the UCC will still give priority to the actual holder of the original note. See related topics, Uniform Commercial Code.
TITLE POLICY TREATMENT The willingness of title companies to insure a collateral assignment will vary from state to state. Some states will be prohibited from issuing loan policies on collateral assignments because the primary collateral (the promissory note) is characterized as personal property. Title companies that are willing to insure a collateral assignment may do so via a new loan policy, but will typically insure by endorsement to the original loan policy. There is one common denominator to every request to insure a collateral assignment; the only way to validly transfer a note is by written endorsement on the original, together with physical transfer of it to the new lender. Before agreeing to insure a collateral assignment, the title company should inspect the original note to verify that the collateral assignee is the current holder and that any chain of endorsements is consistent with the recorded chain of assignments. In some cases, the title insurer will accept written assurances of these facts from a reputable lender or escrow holder in lieu of inspecting the original note. However, in the event that the title insurer cannot verify these facts to their satisfaction, they may either refuse to insure the collateral assignment or will except from coverage any loss or damage incurred due to failure by the collateral lender to hold the original note. The title insurer should also decline to provide any type of UCC coverage, because the issue of UCC security priority is beyond the scope of real property interests covered by a title policy. Title policy endorsements insuring collateral assignments contain the following language: The Company assures
The Assured’ (a) That the beneficial interest under the mortgage referred to in paragraph ___ of Schedule ___ has been assigned to the Assured as collateral security; (b) That no reconveyance either full or partial of the insured mortgage or any modification or subordination thereof appears in the public records. The Company hereby insures the Assured against loss, which the Assured shall sustain in the event that the assurances herein shall prove to be incorrect.
Lender fraud defined by LENDER: http://dtc-systems.net/2012/04/lenders-definition-fraud/
They likely sold interests in the mortgages as bonds. They never sold the notes as individual notes Investors bought interests in bundles of mortgage notes. The notes were thrown in and blended and packaged up and sold as cdos and other derivatives . The investors invested in bundles of scrap notes. Like they threw 2000 notes in big can and sold interests in that big can of notes. When the investors took the lid off of the can, they found a can full of shredded notes. Worthless because they oversold the notes, they shredded the notes and the paper trail to the mortgages. The whole thing about delivering the individual loan files containing the mortgages and notes to a trust is a fallacy. The title co’s most likely delivered the mortgages to where some fake trusts were set up so the banks could sell interests in mortgages as bonds. The note fraud was a whole different industry. The entire industry was a giant fraud machine. It takes a lot of fraud to create $1.2 quadrillion dollars in derivatives fraud debt. That is why the mbs’s are worthless junk and the trusts are empty. The debt the fraudsters created can never be repaid and the mortgages are now absolutely insolvent.
johngaultwhoam@yahoo.com
@needcaselaw – what was the email address? like to see your complaint
http://www.palmbeachpost.com/money/foreclosures/florida-supreme-court-to-review-dismissed-foreclosure-lawsuit-2345517.html?page=2
you can watch the live feed on thursday, link in article pino v bony
Guest
Re “crooked opinion” in Haynes per your link…..
There is a footnote in the opinion:
“7 We are cognizant that there continues to be a controversy among the various federal courts concerning whether section 2932.5‟s limitation to mortgages continues to be viable given the similarities between mortgages and deeds of trusts. The issue is one that the Legislature may wish to consider.”
Amazing they would actually say that. CA needs a moratorium. The nation needs a moratorium.
Another footnote says the opinion in Salazar was reversed in March 2012.
We need to get news of these rulings along with the good ones. What goes on in courts both good and bad needs to go mainstream.
And some wonder why those about to lose homes use the “hopeless” word. In CA you don’t have to show an ID to break down a door and throw a family out. Anyone can do it and no one questions it or can question it. Weapon of mass destruction was not even derivatives (did Warren Buffet say that?) – the weapon of mass destruction was “because we can”.
Neil: what do you think of this crooked opinion, against all laws???
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/nonpub/A131023.PDF
What the hell is wrong with people? It’s back to borrow your way through life. Know what? If people lose it all, they’re too stupid to keep it anyway!!! No wonder we can’t get our banks under control: people continue buying… MONEY!!!!!
http://www.marketwatch.com/banking
Banking Headlines
Consumer credit surges again in March
WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) – U.S. consumers increased their debt in March by a seasonally adjusted $21.3 billion, the Federal Reserve reported Monday. This is the seventh straight monthly gain in consumer borrowing. The increase in March, the largest since November 2001, was double the roughly $10 billion gain expected by Wall Street economists. Most of the increase came from non-revolving debt such as auto loans, personal loans and student loans-these three categories combined for a $16.2 billion jump in March. Credit card debt rose by $5.1 billion in the month after a $2.3 billion decline in February. Consumer credit increased at a 7.75% annual rate in the first quarter.
3:00 p.m. Today3:00 p.m. May 7, 2012
johngault –
Ironically something close to your question is addressed in my Complaint which gets filed this week. In Washington foreclosers have been using phantom trustees – that don’t actually exist, although they have apparent paperwork and very important sounding names; this eliminates any chance for a homeowner to prevent a wrongful foreclosure because the trustee is the one you must contact. I told you I’d send you a copy of the Complaint if you wish. But I’ve never gotten any response from the email address you provided. Are you still there?
Hagens Berman: Lawsuit Filed Against JPMorgan Chase Over Force-Placed Flood Insurance
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/hagens-berman-lawsuit-filed-against-163919154.html
Eventually it’s going to come down very, very hard… And I’ll be there, with my hand wide open.
Most interesting brain teasers in this short piece. I do have a question regarding the phrase “Think of why there are laws that require lenders to notify borrowers when their mortgage is sold, it is because the issuer needs a record.” I know that mortgagees have a duty (and under the note too) to advise of any change in SERVICER of the mortgage, but where may one find this legal basis of advising when a mortgage has been sold? And espcially who to? (which is seldom revealed).
Synchronous with this discussion is an article from the Harvard Law Review, Vol. 125. See pages 830-833. I downloaded this and have it, but could not locate it again via Googling. One point brought out in this analysis of the Ibanez case is that “assignment” of a note does not constitute a legal TRANSFER (a defined term under the UCC), which was admitted to by the bankers in that case. I’m well aware that “everybody’s doing it”, but like your mother told you… In other words, the mortgage/deed of trust might follow the note in at least two senses (see the Harvard Law Review article), but the note has to have legally gone somewhere.
There is also another point that seems to have escaped virtually everyone: the banks want the world to ignore the laws governing who has the right to enforce a mortgage or deed of trust, and substitute instead the right to enforce the note. Yes, that’s key (unless you live in California) – no enforceable defaulted note, no foreclosure; but a subtle thing happend in 1993: the UCC was modified to permit indorsement of notes on behalf of anonymous owners thereof. Ibanez pointed out (also in article) that while notes may be assigned in blank, most states prohibit deeds being assigned to anyone but a named person or entity (in Washington ALL conveyances must be accomplished by deed, including assignments of deeds of trust).
Quoting from current UCC Official Comment: “former Section 3-401(1) stated that ‘no person is liable on an instrument unless his signature appears thereon.’ This was interpreted as meaning that an undisclosed principal is not liable on an instrument. This interpretation provided an exception to ordinary agency law that binds an undisclosed principal on a simple contract.” UCC Official Comment Sect. 3-402(1). This “exception” was virtually identical to that which has always been in place for deeds: a deed must be “signed by the party bound thereby.” RCW 64.04.020 (Part of Washington’s Real Estate Statute of Frauds). To permit an anonymous principal to convey real property interest would eliminate chain of title as the system for establishing property rights, and legalize “wild deeds.” Regarding the deed of trust following the note, putting the revised UCC together with the Real Estate Statute of Frauds would appear to produce the Biblical expression, “Where I am going you cannot follow…” John 13:36. With regard to those claiming down the line from such an event, it also would appear to legally sever chain of title to the property (in title states) and empowerment of a trustee to exercise power of sale on behalf of a beneficiary (in lien states).
@hman – interesting pt you raise – the breach being raised by a party who was not the ben at the time of the breach. Have to think about that one.
I was just made aware that in some states, banksters are granting poa’s to law firms to f/c. Are these yeahoos skipping the subs of trustees? Anyone know?
hman,
If a servicer is an agent via a written servicing agreement with its principal that gives it administrative authority to declare a default to its principal’s interests, then it would be legit. The principal, however, must be the party that owns the debt evidenced by the note as the security instrument only binds and benefits the lender or its successor and assigns. The servicer is either an agent of the lender OR has accepted a role as independent contractor which means its been given its own means to execute and produce results. Its own means = the inherent right to collect payments and service the loan. The right to collect belongs to the owner of a debt unless it has been assigned, sold, transferred in a distinct transaction to a third party. Another way of saying this is that the servicer has received a partial assignment of the debt owner’s rights. That means the assignor no longer owns all rights, title, and interest derived from the note and so it no longer owns the full note. Likewise, the assignee has only taken the debt owner’s right to collect derived from the note and is also not a full note owner. Neither party owns the full rights derived from the note and so both fall short of full note ownership. A lien instrument only binds the lender or its successor = the full owner of the note and all the rights that come with it. Is the servicer an agent or is it an independent contractor? Has it been sold, assigned, or been transferred the right to collect? Does it report a debt owner’s right to collect as a distinct asset on its own balance sheet ledger? Does it have a written servicing agreement with its principal that spells out its administrative authority?
In CA you should really consider quiet title due to the recent Calvo v. HSBC decision that states deed of trust loans don’t have to be recorded in order to foreclose (because they are not an ‘other encumbrancer’). So a quiet title allows you to record the judgment and reference the right of title to the HO in that way.
BTW, my take is that the Calvo decision dis-connects deed of trust loans from Recorders offices, making it impossible for any but the holder of the note at any given moment to know who the beneficiary is. The lenders can’t just Judicially Notice the recorders’ documents to base their claim as beneficiary. It follows that since third party verification is impossible, the standing of anyone claiming to be the beneficiary is automatically challenged, which, under the Lona v. CitiBank, provides an exception to having to tender the loan before being allowed to challenge a foreclosure action by a supposed beneficiary.
Kinda off topic but just something I was wondering. When the servicer first starts a foreclosure they do an assignment, then a substitution of trustee, and then trustee sale. (Well at least this has been my expierence.)
There is a very vague breach of contract that occurs. It does not say who is alleging the breach, only that a breach has occurred. Also, the breach references the original DOT. Assuming the servicer is the party alleging the breach. How can a the servicer claim breach of contract to an instrument they are not a party too?
MERS is the only party still around on the DOT so I would think they might be the only party that might have some chance at making this allegation. However, we all know this is a lie.
Common sense would say the assignment would have to be done first but does anybody know if this is accurate? If the breach is alleged prior to the assignment than how can a party without an interest claim breach of contract? The breach of contract also references the original DOT? How can the servicer allege breach of contract to an instrument they’re not a party too?
Resignation seen as proof Spanish government set to rescue ailing Bankia
Bankia’s Rodrigo Rato steps down hours after prime minster Mariano Rajoy announced shake-up of troubled Spanish banks
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/07/spanish-resignation-government-rescue-bankia
It does say “Shake up”… Well, since it won’t start here, it’s gotta start somewhere…
CITING 27 Cal. Jur. 3d Deeds of Trust § 4:
According to: Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 10028 defining: “Trust deed; deed of trust”:
“Trust deed” or “deed of trust” as used in this part includes “mortgage.”
But, I heard that last week a Ca. appeal ruled against this statute!!!
I just posted that entire article from Huff Post but “moderator” is blocking it. Takes 48 hours to get it unblocked. By then, we’ll have moved on.
So, check on the site posted by Las Vegas and read that whole article. Makes your head spin: all this is now out in the open. Our government may not want to prosecute our bankers but, between Europe, China and many other countries that were sold those securities, prosecutions should start soon… especially now that the US have joined the International Criminal Court (that Bush refused to do to cover his treatment of prisoners…)
Here is that Huffington Post’s article. I bet they are “terrified”!!!!!!! Now, for the good news: American bankers have screwed over so many countries, methodically, systematically and intentionally, that there is absolutely NO WAY they are not going to jail. AND… has anyone wondered why, a few days ago, Obama decided to have the US join the International Criminal Court? From what i understand, Bush refused, knowing that his “waterboarding” could get him in hot water.
I find Obama’s timing quite interesting…
Here it that article refered to by Las Vegas:
Here’s What Has The Wealthy ‘Terrified’
Follow: Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers , Financial Crisis, Citibank, Lehman Brothers , Video, Great Recession, Jenner & Block LLP, Dick Fuld, Hedge Fund, Mortgage Loans, Business News Bloomberg View:
If one wants to understand the full complicity of Wall Street in the Great Recession, look no further than the voluminous package of pre-collapse Lehman Brothers documents that have been made available by the law firm Jenner & Block LLP, which has acted as the coroner in the Lehman post-mortem.
Most important, the cache dispels the myth that Dick Fuld, chief executive officer of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., and his close associates were unaware of the risks their business faced in 2007 and 2008. That would be bad enough, but the more devastating reality is that Fuld and his sycophants were warned repeatedly but were blinded by their hubris.
The records confirm, yet again, that the “forces-out-of- our-control” argument we hear from Wall Street leaders is bunk. It is the ill-advised behavior of one banker after another, day in and day out, that leads to the sort of devastating financial crisis we are only now emerging from.
For instance, at a Lehman board meeting in September 2007, according to a copy of the presentation in the data cache, Lehman executives presented a clear summary of the brewing crisis. “The initial tremors were felt at the end of 2006,” the board was told, “when the poor loan performance of sub- prime borrowers began to be a cause for concern in the marketplace. This was evidenced by a gradual spread widening in the asset backed index.” The presentation continued: “The market continued to widen as it became apparent that the performance problems in mortgage loans was not going to abate and was no longer limited to the sub-prime market but also affecting the Alt-A product.”
Read About How Wall Street’s Legal Magic Ends an American Right
Dumping Assets
Then the board heard about the problems at two Bear Stearns Asset Management hedge funds that “ran out of liquidity” in June and July 2007 and were forced to shut down, leading to other hedge funds dumping assets into the market “adding additional stress to the market.” By August 2007, the commercial paper market was “facing challenging conditions, with very little liquidity” and “funding for almost any type of mortgage or ABS” — asset-backed security — “product dried up.” You can’t say the top Lehman management didn’t understand what was happening in the market.
So did other firms: At Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS), these “initial tremors” in December 2006 were sufficient to get the firm to make a huge proprietary bet — referred internally at Goldman as the “Big Short” — that paid off big-time in 2007 and helped to put the firm in a position to weather the financial crisis a year later.
At Lehman, though, it was business as usual. Management chose to ignore the rising concerns. By Labor Day weekend 2007, Lehman, like Bear Stearns and Citigroup, had been in talks with Citic Group, the leading Chinese investment bank, which wanted to make an investment in a Wall Street firm, a potential lifeline in a crisis. Lehman’s top executives — Fuld and David Goldfarb, the firm’s chief financial officer — weren’t interested, at least on the terms that Citic was proposing. If Lehman were to do a deal with Citic, Goldfarb wrote Fuld and others in an e-mail, “This will signal a major sign (which obviously isn’t true and will feed into rimors, etc) and put us in a category of those who needed an infusion to help them out of this market mess.”
Fuld responded with his usual misguided bravado: “Sounds to me like another non-starter. If it’s just about price [and] who is the right partner then tell them NFI.” Goldfarb couldn’t resist piling on. “Agreed 1000 percent,” he wrote back to Fuld. “How do you spell stupidity in Chinese!!!”
Read About How Rules For Bank Capital Are Still Broken After Four Years
Will and Skill
Then the conversation descended into a pathetic display of macho arrogance. “What happened,” Fuld asked Goldfarb, “u didn’t like my sumdum spelling?” Responded Goldfarb, “I love it, better said then I could have. I think Mizuho is the best option for strategic partner. Any potential investor that would consider BS” — Bear Stearns — “in the same breath as LB should go fungoo themselves!!!” Fuld replied, “I agree we need some help — but the Bros always wins!!” Goldfarb agreed. “Absolutely, will and skill always win, and that be us!!!!” Concluded Fuld: “Got it so do u.”
Fuld was well-paid for these insights. Between 2000 and 2007, according to various documents released as part of Fuld’s testimony before Congress, he took out of Lehman some $500 million in cash.
The Jenner & Block trove shows that instead of seeking the capital they so desperately needed, Fuld and Goldfarb believed Lehman was an impenetrable fortress. “During the last downturn” — 2001-02 — “the firm outperformed its competitors and established a platform for further growth,” Lehman management told the board in January 2008. “The firm pursued a counter-cyclical strategy, investing in talent while its competitors were in retrenchment mode” and then outperformed the peer group.
The clear message: Lehman would use a similar approach through the 2008 downturn. At the board meeting in January, Lehman management explained that while other Wall Street firms were raising “significant capital” in the “past three months,” for Lehman “aggressive capital raising is not necessary” because the firm “remains strongly capitalized” thanks to capital “generated by earnings.”
Knowing that Lehman would be belly up by the end of September 2008, reading these e-mails and documents is cringe- inducing. Unfortunately, given the lack of leadership we still see on much of Wall Street, they will hardly be the last of their kind.
(William D. Cohan, a former investment banker and the author of “Money and Power: How Goldman Sachs Came to Rule the World,” is a Bloomberg View columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.)
Read more opinion online from Bloomberg View.
Today’s highlights: the View editors on bank-capital rules and force-placed insurance; Pankaj Mishra on accusations against the Indian military; Albert R. Hunt on congressional elections; Michael Ross on Vladimir Putin’s oil-money machinations.
To contact the writer of this article: William D. Cohan at wdcohan@yahoo.com.
To contact the editor responsible for this article: Tobin Harshaw at tharshaw@bloomberg.net
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/07/lehman-documents-wall-street-collapse_n_1495047.html?ref=business
Thinking out loud and it may not make sense but I’m digging as everyone else and I still have a slew of unanswered questions.
“I believe regardless of whether the note and mortgage / deed of trust was assigned or not, it can be demonstrated they did not move as a unit, unless the price paid was the payoff value of the loan and/or value of property.”
That would make sense in a situation where loan were securitized in slices. As an example, out of a $100,000 mortgage note, maybe a portion valued at $30,000 was sent to trust A, 25,000 to B and the remaining one of $45,000 to trust C. From what I understand, not only were those notes bundled but they were also sliced and diced afterwards. No one has been able to show yet that all three slices had been sold/transferred to one TRUST in its entirety, let alone one TRUSTEE. Could they have been transferred to 3 different trustees? The only time where we would (maybe) find a payment for the entire $100,000 is in a refinance (and even then, we know it not to be always true) or a sale of the property (still questionable).
Under that scenario, when Servicer files for foreclosure on behalf of Deutsche Bank (for example), Deutsche Bank should be required to prove that, indeed, the whole $100,000 was sent/transferred to it. So, one of the questions is: how many trustees were on that one mortgage? What would give Deutsche the right to claim the entire amount if only $30,000 was transferred to it? And once we can verfy that, indeed, Deutsche got all three slices, where did it invest them? What if the note was sliced and diced and transferred to 3 different trusts but two of them were closed afterwards? Was the money transferred back and reconciled into one global amount? If yes, by whom and how?
I’m not sure I understand all the responses. Sometimes, I don’t even understand the questions anymore…
[…] Filed under: foreclosure Tagged: accounting transactions, allonge, assignment, auction fraud, borrower, Chapter 8, county registrar, current fair market value, financial asset, foreclosure, foreclosure defense, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure offense, fraud, indorsement, investor pool, Judge Shack, Mortgage, Obligation to notify issuer of lost destroyed or wrongfully taken security certificate, owner/purchaser of a security, predatory lending, PSA, REMIC, secondary market, Section 36-8-405, Section 36-8-406, securitization, securitization industry, security certificate, who would buy a loan in default? Livinglies’s Weblog […]
if this is the case this puts more strength in a quiet title and the original homeowner to reregister the title and assert a stronger position of this ownership anywhere in court. especially if party of interest has abandoned the claim in a foreclosure before or after the disposal of said home. so stay in the home to the most possible moments of the action. ROBERT WADE……………….