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“They are Filing Fraudulent Documents to Take the Homes across the U.S.”



Watch this short video to get the whole problem in a nutshell. Title has been corrupted throughout the country, homes have been taken with fraudulent documents (not my words, but official statements from recorder offices around the country), fraud was committed against investors, homeowners and the taxpayers.

Homeowners, knowing they had not made a payment that was “required” under the promissory note they signed, have walked from their homes without a fight or have lost the fight despite the fact that unknown to them, the payment was not due and there was no default. Lawyers who concede the default may be committing malpractice.

This is not just about the paperwork. It’s about the money and the lie we are living about who is losing money and who is making money at whose expense. This should not be fought out on the internet — it should be fought in the courtroom with real evidence and the Judges need to start hearing that evidence and judging it objectively without any assumptions arising from the “default” of the borrower.

Wherever you look there is fraud and the Banks are about to give large bonuses to their executives. Why not? They certainly did well by the bank didn’t they? Well, no, not really. despite Federal Law making it a crime for the top executives to sign a statement that they have adequate internal control and that the controls were working and therefore the statements are true, those statements are NOT true and they knew it.

So the executives are getting bonuses for committing fraud on their own shareholders too. When will someone actually pick up the ball and run with it?

“This is disgraceful. Somebody has to stand up for the little guy”

So here is a little primer on why this is all happening like this. The fact is that the mortgages are probably invalid in most instances in the sense that they do not perfect a lien against the property. This is because of the way the securitization was set up and because of the way securitization was practiced (two different things, which is why you need the COMBO, Loan level accounting, etc.). At the nub of this crisis is the fact that third parties who are not on the mortgage, not on the note and had nothing to do with the funding of the loan are  foreclosing on these invalid mortgages and even if the mortgages were valid, these third parties have no right to enforce them. The reason is that there has been no sale of the loan. Even if the the third party has a potential cause of action against the homeowner for money, they still have no right to foreclose because the debt is either unsecured or not secured to the third party bringing the foreclosure.

What does all that legalese mean? It means that people without a lien are taking homes without benefit of due process, a money judgment where the actual money is counted — all of it — and normal enforcement procedures of a money judgment. The people doing this have no chance of success if they are required to prove the case that they lost money. But they are succeeding because they are not being required to show it in most foreclosure proceedings. They are gaming the system with presumptions instead of facts.

28 Responses

  1. Interesting conversation with a US Attorney the other day. It’s funny how they know all the right questions, but never any answers. Then I got ahold of a BlackRock guy. “No, your loan is not part of our pool.” I said: who owns it? “I can’t tell you. But somebody does.”

  2. The judge in my federal foreclosure case in Mass district court said to me in Sept 2010 ” oh email her a copy of the note”, I objected she said ok, mail her a copy of one. JUSTICE are you kidding me? I wonder if she would like a copy of her paycheck.

    Well Judge Zobel………………..ha ha ha your pension is going down the tubes with every foreclosure that we are preventing out here and no longer is it JUST US against your IN JUSTICE. The little people are waking up and there is no turning back. WE ARE WATCHING EVERY MOVE THESE COURTS ARE MAKING. Did you know I am still in my house in spite of your allowing fraudulent docs and no evidence to decide the taking of my home? Well I am and I AM NOT MOVING.

    I am that constituent that Register O’Brien speaks of in the news clip. Thanks to Register John O’Brien, his staff and Attorney General Coakley, the Ibanez case, the Larace case, the Belivaca case and the soon to be decided “Eaton case” the little people in Mass are getting justice. Judge Rya Zobel, I will be back in your court someday and you will be eating crow, and again in case you didn’t hear me for and on the record, I AM NOT MOVING!!!!!!!!!!! THANK YOU REGISTER O’BRIEN FOR HELPING US, YOU WILL AGAIN BE REELECTED BECAUSE YOU DO THE JOB WE ELECTED YOU TO DO. SHOULD YOU WANT TO PUT A SIGN IN MY WINDOW OR ON MY FRONT LAWN YOU ARE MORE THAN WELCOME, FOR THAT MATTER YOU CAN SLAP A CAMPAIGN SIGN IN EVERY WINDOW IN MY HOUSE BECAUSE AS I SAID BEFORE “I AM NOT MOVING”

  3. usedkarguy,

    Nothing but fraudulent collection rights.

    Anyone watching NJ?? Oral argument in important case???

  4. Nancy Drewe,

    Except for a few states, that is not what we have had — AG intervention. Happening, finally, now in MA,and in CA and Nevada. Will they be efficient?? And, what about the rest of the country???

    This is what we have long needed. And, courts making decisions WITHOUT the benefit of these investigations are inadequate.

  5. Does anyone know how to reach Spitfire?

  6. @Nancy Drewe,

    Special Real Estate “Layers”??? Layers??? You are very confusing…;)

  7. Solly, they are starting to figure it out. You whispered three little words to me years ago………

    surrender of control………..ssshhhhhhhhhh


  9. joann

    Appearing by telephone?? Who is appearing by telephone? The attorneys or the attorneys and their clients??? Bet not the clients because the clients are not as stated.


    Yes. Violation of laws. The sharpest judges are, however, finally starting to catch on. Many more to go.

  10. N.Y. Estates, Powers and Trusts Law:

    § 1-2.7 Fiduciary
    A fiduciary is a person who meets the description, in this part, of a “personal representative” or who is designated by the creator or by the court to act as an assignee for the benefit of creditors, or a committee, conservator, curator, custodian, guardian, trustee or donee of a power during minority.

    § 7-1.4 Purposes for which trust may be created
    An express trust may be created for any lawful purpose.

    § 9-1.5 Trust with transferable certificates
    A trust with transferable certificates, heretofore or hereafter
    created, is not invalid as violating the rule against perpetuities; but such trust may continue for such time as may be necessary to accomplish the purposes for which it is created if the instrument creating such trust provides that it may be terminated at any time by action of the trustees or by affirmative vote of the beneficiaries having a specified percentage of interest therein. This section applies to an investment trust, which is an unincorporated trust or association managed by trustees not holding any property for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its trade or business, the beneficial ownership of which is evidenced by transferable shares or by transferable certificates of beneficial interest offered for sale to the public.

    § 11-1.1 Fiduciaries’ powers
    (a) As used in this section, unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires, (1) the term “estate” means the estate of a decedent; (2) the term “trust” means any express trust of property, created by a will, deed or other instrument, whereby there is imposed upon a trustee the duty to administer property for the benefit of a named or otherwise described income or principal beneficiary, or both. A trust shall not include trusts for the benefit of creditors, resulting or constructive trusts, business trusts where certificates of beneficial interest are issued to the beneficiary, investment trusts, voting trusts, security instruments such as deeds of trust and mortgages, trusts created by the judgment or decree of a court, liquidation or reorganization trusts, trusts for the sole purpose of paying dividends, interest, interest coupons, salaries, wages, pensions or profits, instruments wherein persons are mere nominees for others, or trusts created in deposits in any banking institution or savings and loan institution; (3) the term “fiduciary” means administrators, executors, preliminary executors, administrators d.b.n., administrators c.t.a.d.b.n., administrators c.t.a., ancillary executors, ancillary administrators, ancillary administrators c.t.a and trustees of express trusts, including a corporate as well as a natural person acting as fiduciary, and a successor or substitute fiduciary, whether designated in a trust instrument or otherwise.

    (b) In the absence of contrary or limiting provisions in the court order or decree appointing a fiduciary, or in a subsequent order or decree, or in the will, deed or other instrument, every fiduciary is authorized:
    (1) To accept additions to any estate or trust from sources other than the estate of the decedent or the settlor of a trust.
    (2) To acquire the remaining undivided interest in the property of an estate or trust in which the fiduciary, in his fiduciary capacity, holds an undivided interest.
    (3) To invest and reinvest property of the estate or trust under the provisions of the will, deed or other instrument or as otherwise provided by law.
    (4) To effect and keep in force fire, rent, title, liability, casualty or other insurance to protect the property of the estate or trust and to protect the fiduciary.
    (5) With respect to any property or any estate therein owned by an estate or trust, except where such property or any estate therein is specifically disposed of:
    (A) To take possession of, collect the rents from and manage the same.
    (B) To sell the same at public or private sale, and on such terms as in the opinion of the fiduciary will be most advantageous to those interested therein.
    (C) With respect to fiduciaries other than a trustee, to lease the same for a term not exceeding three years and, in the case of a trustee, to lease the same for a term not exceeding ten years although such term extends beyond the duration of the trust and, in either of such cases, including the right to explore for and remove mineral or other natural resources, and in connection with mineral leases to enter into pooling and unitization agreements.
    (D) To mortgage the same.
    (E) Any power to take possession of, collect the rent from, manage, sell, lease or mortgage, granted by this subparagraph (5), which is prohibited by the terms of the will, deed or other instrument or by the provisions of this subparagraph (5), nonetheless exists, upon the approval of the surrogate, where such power is necessary for the purposes set forth in SCPA 1902.
    (F) A fiduciary acting under a will may exercise all of the powers granted by this subparagraph (5) notwithstanding the effect upon such will of the birth of a child after its execution or of any election by a surviving spouse.
    (6) To make ordinary repairs to the property of the estate or trust.
    (7) To grant options for the sale of property for a period not exceeding six months.
    (8) With respect to any mortgage held by the estate or trust (A) to continue the same upon and after maturity, with or without renewal or extension, upon such terms as the fiduciary deems advisable; (B) to foreclose, as an incident to collection of any bond or note, any mortgage securing such bond or note, and to purchase the mortgaged property or acquire the property by deed from the mortgagor in lieu of foreclosure.
    (9) To employ any bank or trust company incorporated in this state, any national bank located in this state or any private banker duly authorized by the superintendent of financial services of this state to engage in business here (who, as private banker, maintains a permanent capital of not less than one million dollars) as custodian of any stock or other securities held as a fiduciary, and the cost thereof, except in the case of a corporate fiduciary, shall be a charge upon the estate or trust. The records of such bank, trust company or private banker shall at all times show the ownership of such stock or other securities. Such stock or other securities shall at all times be kept separate from the assets of such bank, trust company or private banker and may be kept by such bank, trust company or private banker
    (A) in a manner such that all certificates representing the securities from time to time constituting the assets of a particular estate, trust or other fiduciary account are held separate from those of all other estates, trusts or accounts; or
    (B) in a manner such that, without certification as to ownership attached, certificates representing securities of the same class of the same issuer and from time to time constituting assets of particular estates, trusts or other fiduciary accounts are held in bulk, including, to the extent feasible, the merging of certificates of small denomination into one or more certificates of large denomination, provided that a bank, trust company or private banker, when operating under the method of safekeeping security certificates described in this subparagraph (B), shall be subject to such rules and regulations as, in the case of state chartered institutions, the state superintendent of financial services and, in the case of national banking associations, the comptroller of the currency may from time to time issue. Such bank, trust company or private banker shall, on demand by the fiduciary, certify in writing the securities held by it for such estate, trust or fiduciary account.
    (10) To cause any stock or other securities (hereinafter referred to as “securities”) held by any bank or trust company, when acting as fiduciary, whether alone or jointly with an individual, with the consent of the individual fiduciary, if any (who is hereby authorized to give such consent), to be registered and held in the name of a nominee of such bank or trust company without disclosure of the fiduciary relationship; and, in the case of an individual acting as fiduciary, to direct any bank or trust company incorporated under the laws of this state, any national bank located in this state or any private banker duly authorized by the superintendent of financial services of this state to engage in business here (who, as private banker, maintains a permanent capital of not less than one million dollars) to register and hold any securities deposited with such bank, trust company or private banker (hereinafter referred to as “bank”) in the name of a nominee of such bank. The bank shall not redeliver such securities to the individual fiduciary, who authorized their registration in the name of a nominee of the bank, without first registering the securities in the name of the individual fiduciary, as such. But, any sale of such securities by the bank at the direction of the individual fiduciary shall not be treated as a redelivery. The bank may make any disposition of such securities which is authorized or directed by an order or decree of the court having jurisdiction of the estate or trust. Any such bank shall be absolutely liable for any loss occasioned by the acts of its nominee with respect to the securities so registered. The records of the bank shall at all times show the ownership of any such securities and of those held in bearer form. Such securities and those held in bearer form shall at all times be kept separate from the assets of the bank and may be kept by such bank
    (A) in a manner such that all certificates representing the securities from time to time constituting the assets of a particular estate, trust or other fiduciary account are held separate from those of all other estates, trusts or accounts; or
    (B) in a manner such that, without certification as to ownership attached, certificates representing securities of the same class of the same issuer and from time to time constituting assets of particular estates, trusts or other fiduciary accounts are held in bulk, including, to the extent feasible, the merging of certificates of small denomination into one or more certificates of large denomination, provided that a bank, when operating under the method of safekeeping security certificates described in this subparagraph (B), shall be subject to such rules and regulations as, in the case of state chartered institutions, the state superintendent of financial services and, in the case of national banking associations, the comptroller of the currency may from time to time issue. Such bank or trust company shall, on demand by any party to an accounting by such bank or trust company as fiduciary or on demand by the attorney for such party, certify in writing the securities held by such bank or trust company as such fiduciary.
    (11) In the case of the survivor of two or more fiduciaries, to continue to administer the property of the estate or trust without the appointment of a successor to the fiduciary who has ceased to act and to exercise or perform all of the powers given to the original fiduciaries unless contrary to the express provision of the will, deed or other instrument.
    (12) As successor or substitute fiduciary, to succeed to all of the powers, duties and discretion of the original fiduciary, with respect to the estate or trust, as were given to the original fiduciary, unless the exercise of such powers, duties or discretion of the original fiduciary are expressly prohibited by the will, deed or other instrument to any successor or substituted fiduciary.
    (13) To contest, compromise or otherwise settle any claim in favor of the estate, trust or fiduciary or in favor of third persons and against the estate, trust or fiduciary.
    (14) To vote in person or by proxy, discretionary or otherwise, shares of stock or other securities held by him as fiduciary.
    (15) To pay calls, assessments and any other sums chargeable or accruing against or on account of shares of stock, bonds, debentures or other corporate securities held by a fiduciary, whenever such payments may be legally enforceable against the fiduciary or any property of the estate or trust or the fiduciary deems payment expedient and for the best interests of the estate or trust.
    (16) To sell or exercise stock subscription or conversion rights, participate in foreclosures, reorganizations, consolidations, mergers or liquidations, and to consent to corporate sales, leases and encumbrances. In the exercise of such powers the fiduciary is authorized to deposit stocks, bonds or other securities with any protective or other similar committee under such terms and conditions respecting the deposit thereof as the fiduciary may approve.
    (17) To execute and deliver agreements, assignments, bills of sale, contracts, deeds, notes, receipts and any other instrument necessary or appropriate for the administration of the estate or trust.
    (18) In the case of a trustee, to hold the property of two or more trusts or parts of such trusts created by the same instrument as an undivided whole without separation as between such trusts or parts, provided that such separate trusts or parts shall have undivided interests and provided further that no such holding shall defer the vesting of any estate in possession or otherwise.
    (19) When a legacy, a distributive share, the proceeds of any action brought as prescribed by 5-4.1, or the proceeds of a settlement of an action brought in behalf of an infant for personal injuries are payable to an infant, incompetent, conservatee or person under disability and the sum does not exceed ten thousand dollars, to make payment thereof to the father or mother or to some competent adult person with whom the infant, incompetent, conservatee or person under disability resides or who has some interest in his welfare for the use and benefit of such infant, incompetent, conservatee or person under disability. If the sum payable to a patient in an institution in the state department of mental hygiene is not in excess of the amount which the director of the institution is authorized to receive under section 29.23 of the mental hygiene law, to make payment of such sum to such director for use as provided in that section.
    (20) To make distribution in cash, in kind valued at the fair market value of the property at the date of distribution, or partly in each, without being required to make pro rata distributions of specific property.
    (21) To join with the surviving spouse or the executor of his will or the administrator of his estate in the execution and filing of a joint income tax return for any period prior to the death of a decedent for which he has not filed a return or a gift tax return on gifts made by the decedent’s surviving spouse, and to consent to treat such gifts as being made one-half by the decedent, for any period prior to a decedent’s death, and to pay such taxes thereon as are chargeable to the decedent.
    (22) In addition to those expenses specifically provided for in this paragraph, to pay all other reasonable and proper expenses of administration from the property of the estate or trust, including the reasonable expense of obtaining and continuing his bond and any reasonable counsel fees he may necessarily incur.

    (c) The court having jurisdiction of the estate or trust may authorize the fiduciary to exercise any other power which in the judgment of the court is necessary for the proper administration of the estate or trust.

    (d) The powers set forth in this section shall apply to all estates and trusts now in existence or which may hereafter come into existence and are in addition to the powers granted by law or by the will, deed or other instrument.


    I asked the servicer and the foreclosure mill who is real creditor—they sent me paperwork (the foreclosure mill), stating:

    “Your current lender (creditor) is DBNTC, as Trustee of the (blah blah blah) Loan Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series (blah blah blah), under PSA dated June 1, 2006. The current servicer for your lender is OneWest Bank, FSB.” …and the “payoff check” should be made out to “OneWest Bank,FSB.”

    We all know the Deutsche trusts are CLOSED and DEAD. They are not sending ANY money to Deutsche and/or some investor—and when they say: “your current lender (creditor)” is the DB Trust Company—it is a blatant LIE. They are NOT a “creditor”—and NOT a “lender”…and they are getting away with selling/stealing houses because of these lies.

    How can they continue to say they are the lender/creditor when it is a known FACT that the trusts are DEAD? That they are not collecting for ANYONE except OneWest Bank,FSB—A DEBT COLLECTOR? This is in direct violation of Federal FDCPA and TILA Amendment laws—is it not?

    And of course—in bold letters at the top of the foreclosure mill paper it says (just like it does on the servicer papers):


    FYI—in case someone missed it—Deutsche info from

  12. @anonymous

    Read this case. Interested in what you have to say about it.

    Vogan et al v. Wells Fargo Bank NA et al

  13. Security investors are not the creditor by TILA and Fed Res Opinion — will be next for an astute attorney or pro se.

  14. Of course, case does not address that security investors, by the Federal Reserve Opinion, are also not the creditor, because the trust is not the before the court.

  15. Cannot have your cake and eat it too. How does a servicer define itself? Finally, a case that refers to Fed Res Opinion (now RULE) to TILA Amendment.

    WILLIAM C. SQUIRES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP, Defendant.
    CIVIL ACTION 11-0413-WS-M
    2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137581
    November 29, 2011, Decided November 29, 2011, Filed

    CORE TERMS: mortgage, disclosure, mortgage loan, actual damages, transferred, assigned, servicer, servicing, statutory damages, foreclosure sale, claim-splitting, occurrence, assignee, beneficial interest, factual allegations, notify, citation omitted, splitting, consumer, new owner, quotation marks omitted, foreclosure, convenience, borrower, construe, styled, claims relating, attorney’s fees, factual determinations, reasonable inference
    COUNSEL: [*1] For William Squires, Lorretta Squires, Plaintiffs: Earl P. Underwood, Jr., Fairhope, AL; Kenneth J. Riemer, Mobile, AL.For BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, Defendant: Edward A. R. Miller, Jones Walker LLP, Mobile, AL; Kirkland E. Reid, Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, LLP, Mobile, AL.JUDGES: WILLIAM H. STEELE, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.OPINION BY: WILLIAM H. STEELEOPINION
    This matter comes before the Court on defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 10). The Motion has been briefed and is now ripe for disposition.
    I. Background.
    Plaintiffs, William and Loretta Squires, brought this action against defendant, BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, alleging a single violation of the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (“TILA”). According to the well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint, plaintiffs executed a real estate mortgage with non-party Countrywide Home Loans in June 2007, with the loan being secured by plaintiffs’ principal residence. (Doc. 2, ¶¶ 5, 7.) The Complaint further alleges that “[o]n July 21, 2010 beneficial interest in the Plaintiffs’ mortgage and note was assigned to BAC,” and that a written assignment identifying BAC as assignee was executed on that date and recorded [*2] shortly thereafter. (Id., ¶ 6.) 1
    – – – – – – – – – – – – – – Footnotes – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
    1 Appended to the Complaint is a one-page exhibit, styled “Assignment of Mortgage,” and stating that on July 21, 2010, nonparty Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), conveyed and assigned to BAC the Squires’ mortgage, “together with the debt thereby secured and the property therein described.” (Doc. 2, Exh. A.)
    – – – – – – – – – – – – End Footnotes- – – – – – – – – – – – – –
    The lone claim asserted in the Complaint is a violation of TILA’s requirement that a creditor to whom a mortgage loan is sold, transferred or assigned must notify the debtor in writing within 30 days after that transfer occurs. See 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g)(1) (“not later than 30 days after the date on which a mortgage loan is sold or otherwise transferred or assigned to a third party, the creditor that is the new owner or assignee of the debt shall notify the borrower in writing of such transfer”). The Complaint alleges that “BAC failed to notify Plaintiffs at all” of the July 21, 2010 assignment, such that it “therefore failed to make the requisite disclosures.” (Doc. 2, ¶ 15.) On that basis, plaintiffs claim that BAC violated § 1641(g), and seek an award of statutory damages, costs and attorney’s fees.
    BAC has now filed a Rule 12(b)(6) [*3] Motion, seeking dismissal of the Complaint on the following enumerated grounds: (i) the claim is time-barred; (ii) BAC was not the plaintiffs’ creditor for § 1641(g) purposes; (iii) BAC is expressly excluded from liability by TILA and its implementing Regulation Z; (iv) plaintiffs have alleged no actual damages stemming from the purported violation of § 1641(g); and (v) plaintiffs have engaged in impermissible claim-splitting. Plaintiffs oppose the Motion to Dismiss.
    II. Analysis.
    A. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss.
    On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “the court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accepts all well-pled facts alleged … in the complaint as true.” Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010) (“In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”); Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010) (similar).
    To withstand [*4] Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny, plaintiffs must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” so as to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citation omitted). Thus, minimum pleading standards “require[] more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, Twombly/Iqbal principles require that a plaintiff plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” whose allegations are “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Speaker, 623 F.3d at 1380 (citations omitted). The factual content of the complaint must “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct [*5] alleged.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 958 (11th Cir. 2009) (“A plaintiff must provide enough factual allegations, which are assumed to be true, to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”).
    B. Timeliness.
    Defendant’s first argument for seeking dismissal is that the Squires’ Complaint is time-barred on its face. Under TILA, plaintiffs’ claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (“Any action under this section may be brought in any United States district court … within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation ….”); Bittinger v. Wells Fargo Bank NA, 744 F. Supp.2d 619, 628 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (“A one-year statute of limitations governs claims under the TILA.”); Rodrigues v. Members Mortgage Co., 323 F. Supp.2d 202, 210 (D. Mass. 2004) (“Most courts have held that a claim for statutory damages under TILA must be brought within one year of the date the disclosure violation occurred.”).
    According to defendant, the Squires’ action is untimely because the well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint show that assignment of the mortgage and note to BAC occurred on July 21, 2010, [*6] yet plaintiffs did not file suit until July 27, 2011, one year and six days later. This argument is misguided because it ignores the timing of the alleged violation. Accepting the Complaint’s allegations as true, as of July 21, 2010, BAC had not violated anything. Recall that the Squires’ TILA claim is that BAC failed to make disclosures that were due “not later than 30 days after the date on which a mortgage loan is sold or otherwise transferred or assigned to a third party.” § 1641(g). No violation occurred on the July 21, 2010 transfer date, because BAC had until 30 days thereafter (or August 20, 2010) to provide the statutory disclosures. Thus, the Squires’ claim did not accrue until August 20, 2010. That is when the alleged § 1641(g) violation occurred, because that marked the date on which the 30-day statutory window closed, without BAC having furnished the requisite notice. BAC points to neither legal authority nor persuasive reasoning favoring a contrary result. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the limitations clock on plaintiffs’ § 1641(g) claim began running on the 30th day after the assignment occurred because the statute was violated only when no disclosures were [*7] given within 30 days. The Complaint was filed within one year after the alleged § 1641(g) violation occurred (i.e., within one year after August 20, 2010); therefore, defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on limitations grounds is properly denied. 2
    – – – – – – – – – – – – – – Footnotes – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
    2 Defendant’s reliance on Velardo v. Fremont Investment & Loan, 298 Fed. Appx. 890, 2008 WL 4768850 (11th Cir. 2008), for the proposition that TILA violations occur “when the transaction is consummated” is misplaced. 298 Fed. Appx. 890, Id. at *2. In Velardo, the plaintiffs’ TILA claims were that defendants had failed to provide disclosures of terms such as finance charges, interest rates, and rights of rescission at the time they refinanced their mortgage. Those disclosures obviously must be made at or before the time of the proposed transaction to be of any help to the consumer in making an informed decision; therefore, it only makes sense that the violation would be complete at the time of the transaction. By contrast, the § 1641(g) disclosures have nothing to do with assisting a borrower in assessing the desirability of a transaction, but rather are intended to keep the borrower informed as to who holds his or her mortgage. There is thus no reason to run the limitations period [*8] for § 1641(g) violations concurrently with consummation of the underlying transfer. Defendant does not identify a single authority that has held otherwise. Furthermore, defendant’s position is unpersuasive because it would require either disregarding or contorting the plain language of § 1641(g), which provides that an assignee has 30 days post- transfer to provide the necessary disclosures, to conclude instead that the violation is complete at the exact moment of the transfer if no disclosure is given then.
    – – – – – – – – – – – – End Footnotes- – – – – – – – – – – – – –
    C. Whether BAC May Be Held Liable under § 1641(g).
    Next, BAC asserts that the Squires’ claims should be dismissed because (i) it is not a “creditor” within the meaning of § 1641(g), and (ii) as a mere “servicer,” it is exempt pursuant to § 1641(f). Neither theory is persuasive at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.
    As to the first point, BAC focuses on language in § 1641(g) imposing the disclosure obligation on “the creditor that is the new owner or assignee of the debt.” Id. Defendant notes that the Assignment of Mortgage appended to the Complaint shows that MERS assigned the mortgage to BAC; however, defendant argues, “MERS was never plaintiffs’ creditor, therefore BAC[] was never plaintiffs’ [*9] creditor.” (Doc. 10, at 5.) There are several problems with this argument. As an initial matter, on a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion, all factual allegations in the Complaint are taken as true. The Squires’ Complaint alleges that “beneficial interest in the Plaintiffs’ mortgage and note was assigned to BAC.” (Doc. 2, ¶ 6 (emphasis added).) The Court is not free to disregard that factual allegation — which yields a plausible Twombly / Iqbal inference that BAC, in fact, became plaintiffs’ creditor when it obtained beneficial interest in both mortgage and note — merely because BAC disputes it. 3
    – – – – – – – – – – – – – – Footnotes – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
    3 Defendant’s response is that this factual allegation can be ignored because it contradicts the Assignment of Mortgage attached to the Complaint. As a general proposition, it is correct that facts in a complaint need not be credited if they are contradicted by exhibits to same. See generally Daniels-Hall v. National Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[w]e are not … required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the Complaint”). But there is no obvious contradiction here. After all, the Assignment of Mortgage states that MERS is transferring to BAC the Squires’ [*10] mortgage “together with the debt thereby secured and the property therein described.” (Doc. 2, Exh. A.) Just as the Complaint states, then, the Assignment of Mortgage confirms that the mortgage “and the debt thereby secured” were transferred to BAC. Nor does BAC advance its cause by suggesting that other evidence supports other factual inferences that MERS lacked creditor status. A Rule 12(b) Motion is not the time for such factual determinations to be made on an incomplete, undeveloped record relying on a movant’s self-serving representations. This is particularly true where defendant would point to a mortgage document from 2007 as the definitive statement of MERS’ rights vis a vis the Squires’ mortgage at the time of assignment in 2010, without an iota of proof as to anything that might or might not have transpired in the interim to alter MERS’ status. At the pleadings stage, this Court cannot make a factual determination of MERS’ rights and interests in the loan as of 2010, beyond accepting plaintiffs’ allegation that MERS transferred both mortgage and note to BAC.
    – – – – – – – – – – – – End Footnotes- – – – – – – – – – – – – –
    More importantly, defendant’s argument is flawed because it imports the definition of the term “creditor” taken from [*11] elsewhere in TILA, without rebutting or even acknowledging the Federal Reserve Board’s statement that such an application is improper. See 74 Fed. Reg. 60143-01, at 60145 (“Section 404(a) imposes the disclosure duty on the ‘creditor that is the new owner or assignee of the debt.’ The Board believes that to give effect to the legislative purpose, the term ‘creditor’ in Section 404(a) must be construed to refer to the owner of the debt following the sale, transfer or assignment, without regard to whether that party would be a ‘creditor’ for other purposes under TILA or Regulation Z.”); 12 C.F.R. § 226.39(a)(1) (§ 1641(g) disclosure requirements apply generally to “any person … that becomes the owner of an existing mortgage loan by acquiring legal title to the debt obligation, whether through a purchase, assignment or other transfer, and who acquires more than one mortgage loan in any twelvemonth period”). Defendant does not explain how its argument that BAC is not a “creditor” for § 1641(g) purposes can be squared with § 226.39 or statements by the Board, much less offer any basis for departing from that interpretive guidance. 4 Nor does defendant reconcile its belief that “creditor” [*12] should be construed narrowly for § 1641(g) purposes with this Court’s obligation to interpret TILA liberally in light of its remedial purposes. See, e.g., Brown v. CitiMortgage, Inc., F. Supp.2d , 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117612, 2011 WL 4809142, *4 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 11, 2011) (“The Eleventh Circuit has emphasized the strong remedial purpose of TILA and has heeded continual admonitions that we construe TILA … liberally in the consumer’s favor.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, by admitting that it “acquired all rights and titles necessary to conduct a valid foreclosure sale” of the Squires’ property, BAC effectively concedes the presence of a viable Twombly / Iqbal inference that it is a “covered person” within the meaning of § 226.39. (Doc. 20, at 2.)
    – – – – – – – – – – – – – – Footnotes – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
    4 Curiously, defendant cites § 226.39 in other aspects of its brief, but ignores it altogether in making its “creditor” argument. (See doc. 10, at 7.) Such selective recognition of Regulation Z does not further defendant’s position. Also, BAC does cite to Kebasso v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, F. Supp.2d , 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79257, 2011 WL 2960219, *2 n.7 (D. Minn. July 20, 2011), to bolster its proposed narrow scope of creditors who are subject to § 1641(g). [*13] However, the cited footnote in Kebasso is of limited utility because the plaintiffs in that case did not even brief the TILA issue, such that the court’s summary disposition of the issue lacked the benefit of balanced advocacy by both sides, but was a mere afterthought. Nor is there any indication that the Kebasso court was aware of the relevant regulation and Board statement for use in interpreting the term “creditor” in § 1641(g). Also, it bears noting that other courts have found that § 1641(g) does apply in analogous situations. See Schafer v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64558, 2011 WL 2437267, *6 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2011) (“when MERS assigned or transferred any beneficial interest it had in the DOT and Note to Citi, Citi became the new creditor and would need to provide Plaintiff with” § 1641(g) disclosures).
    – – – – – – – – – – – – End Footnotes- – – – – – – – – – – – – –
    BAC’s alternative argument fares no better. According to defendant, everyone agrees that BAC “merely service[d]” the Squires’ mortgage loan, which therefore exempts BAC from any disclosure obligation under § 1641(g). (Doc. 10, at 6.) Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the Complaint neither states nor suggests that BAC was a mere servicer of the Squires’ mortgage; to the contrary, it repeatedly [*14] alleges that BAC came to possess a beneficial interest in plaintiffs’ mortgage and note. 5 At a more fundamental level, defendant has not shown that it is entitled to the benefit of the statutory “servicer” exclusion as a matter of law. That exclusion provides that “[a] servicer of a consumer obligation arising from a consumer credit transaction shall not be treated as the owner of the obligation for purposes of this section on the basis of an assignment of the obligation from the creditor or another assignee to the servicer solely for the administrative convenience of the servicer in servicing the obligation.” 15 U.S.C. § 1641(f)(2) (emphasis added). BAC asserts in conclusory fashion that the Assignment of Mortgage conveyed MERS’s rights to BAC solely for its administrative convenience, but does not identify any facts supporting — much less dictating — that result. (Doc. 10, at 7.) It appears that BAC’s position is that MERS executed the Assignment of Mortgage solely for the purpose of facilitating BAC’s ability to foreclose on the subject property. But defendant does not identify any record facts shedding light on the purposes of the Assignment or whether BAC’s servicing obligations [*15] included foreclosure, much less facts that would mandate a singular plausible inference that the assignment was solely for BAC’s administrative convenience in servicing the mortgage loan. 6 Accordingly, the Court cannot find that BAC is entitled to Rule 12(b)(6) relief based on the § 1641(f)(2) “servicer” exclusion.
    – – – – – – – – – – – – – – Footnotes – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
    5 On this point, defendant cites an allegation in the Complaint that “[s]ervicing of the loan was transferred to BAC.” (Doc. 2, ¶ 5.) But this statement plainly refers to BAC’s status with respect to the loan as of June 2007, without saying anything about BAC’s role and interest in the loan as of July 2010, when the subject assignment occurred. Taken as a whole, the Complaint cannot rationally be read as indicating that “[p]laintiffs concede that BAC[] merely services their mortgage loan.” (Doc. 10, at 6.)6 At most, defendant points to Fannie Mae Servicing Guidelines and suggests that it is routine for loan servicers to acquire title to a mortgage loan “for the limited purpose of conducting a foreclosure sale in their own name.” (Doc. 20, at 4.) Even if defendant is correct in its assertion that such assignments are commonplace, it says nothing about the reasons for this particular [*16] assignment. The Court cannot and will not simply assume that such a purpose existed for the Assignment of Mortgage to BAC in this case, as would be necessary to grant the Motion to Dismiss.
    – – – – – – – – – – – – End Footnotes- – – – – – – – – – – – – –
    D. Actual Damages and § 1641(g).
    Next, BAC asserts that dismissal of the Complaint is warranted because “if a plaintiff has not alleged actual damages resulting from an alleged failure to comply with the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g), then he has not stated a claim under that statute.” (Doc. 10, at 8.) In their Complaint, the Squires neither allege any actual damages, nor make a demand for same, but instead limit their ad damnum clause to “statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a).” (Doc. 2, at 3.)
    The parties’ briefs give short shrift to the issue of whether actual damages are necessary to state a claim under TILA for a § 1641(g) violation. Nonetheless, during the briefing process on this Motion to Dismiss, the undersigned issued an opinion addressing this issue in a case styled Brown v. CitiMortgage, Inc., F. Supp.2d , 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117612, 2011 WL 4809142 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 11, 2011). In Brown, the Court rejected this very argument by a § 1641(g) defendant, reasoning that “the [*17] plain statutory text creates liability for a creditor that fails to comply with § 1641(g) in the form of the sum of actual and statutory damages. … Thus, the mere fact that the [plaintiffs]’ Complaint does not allege actual damages in no way impairs their right to hold [defendant] liable for a § 1641(g) violation, as long as they are eligible for statutory damages.” 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117612, [WL] at *2. There being no suggestion that the Squires are ineligible for statutory damages, BAC’s “no actual damages” argument is conclusively defeated by Brown. Inasmuch as defendant offered no viable basis for departing from the reasoning and conclusion of Brown here, the Court rejects its assertion that actual damages are necessary for the Squires to state a claim under § 1641(g).
    E. Claim-Splitting.
    The final stated ground for defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion is that the Squires have engaged in improper claim-splitting by bringing certain claims against BAC in this action and certain other claims against BAC in proceedings pending in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama, and styled Federal National Mortgage Association v. William C. Squires, et al. (the “State-Court Action”). In that regard, BAC shows that in [*18] March 2011, the Squires brought third-party claims against BAC (and related entities) in the State-Court Action for wrongful foreclosure, wantonness, negligence, breach of mortgage agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, fraudulent suppression, equitable/ promissory estoppel, and declaratory/injunctive relief. All of these state-law claims relate to a foreclosure sale that BAC conducted on September 21, 2010 and certain representations that BAC allegedly made to the Squires in connection with a proposed loan modification and the foreclosure sale. (See doc. 10, Exh. 1.)
    Defendant is quite correct that federal and Alabama courts have long recognized a rule prohibiting plaintiffs from splitting into multiple lawsuits claims relating to the same transaction or occurrence. See, e.g., Robbins v. General Motors De Mexico, S. DE R.L. DE CV., F. Supp.2d , 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105287, 2011 WL 4346575, *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2011) (“Federal courts also recognize a prohibition against splitting of claims relating to the same transaction or occurrence.”); Dorsey v. Jacobson Holman PLLC, 764 F. Supp.2d 209, 212 (D.D.C. 2011) (“The rule against claim splitting requires that all claims arising out of a single wrong [*19] be presented in one action.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Kelecseny v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 262 F.R.D. 660, 672 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (explaining that “all damages sustained or accruing to one as a result of a single wrongful act must be claimed and recovered in one action or not at all”) (citation omitted); Gross v. Lappin, 648 F. Supp.2d 48, 50 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Generally, a plaintiff is expected to present in one suit all the claims for relief that he may have arising out of the same transaction or occurrence.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ex parte Leasecomm Corp., 886 So.2d 58, 63-64 (Ala. 2003) (to avoid vexatious litigation and multiplicity of lawsuits, “Alabama has a strong policy against splitting causes of action or claims”).
    Nonetheless, BAC’s argument fails because comparison of the Squires’ claims in the State-Court Action with those presented here reveals that they do not involve the same transaction or occurrence. After all, the only claim interposed by the Squires in this action is a TILA claim alleging that BAC breached its obligation to notify plaintiffs in a timely manner after the Squires’ mortgage loan was transferred [*20] to it in July 2010. By contrast, the Squires’ claims in the State-Court Action have nothing to do with the July 2010 Assignment of Mortgage and BAC’s purported failure to notify plaintiffs of same. Rather, the State-Court Action claims concern the September 2010 foreclosure sale and BAC’s alleged misrepresentations relating to that foreclosure. This is a different occurrence and a different wrong, involving a different time period. The Squires have not engaged in improper claim-splitting because the subject matter of the two sets of claims is not the same, but rather is factually and temporally distinct. 7 Dismissal of the Complaint on claim-splitting grounds is therefore unwarranted.
    – – – – – – – – – – – – – – Footnotes – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
    7 In so concluding, the Court has considered BAC’s contention that the allegations in both sets of claims “arise out of the same operative nucleus of facts, i.e., BAC[]’s servicing of Plaintiffs’ mortgage loan.” (Doc. 10, at 10.) But BAC’s servicing of the Squires’ mortgage loan was not itself a singular operative factual nucleus; rather, it had different features at different times. The transfer of the loan to BAC in July 2010 is of crucial importance to the Squires’ claims in this action, but appears [*21] only of tangential relevance to the State-Court Action. Similarly, the foreclosure sale and BAC’s communications to the Squires in relation to same are of minimal relevance to this proceeding, but likely are at the heart of the State-Court Action. In short, the claims involve different conduct at different times. The possibility that “discovery in both cases is likely to involve many of the same documents and witnesses” (doc. 20, at 5) is not, without more, enough to justify dismissal of this action on claim-splitting grounds. At any rate, BAC appears to overstate the likely degree of that overlap, given the different conduct and events on which each set of claims is predicated. Finally, the Court declines BAC’s invitation to “require Plaintiffs to assert their TILA claims in the pending state court litigation” (doc. 20, at 5), which (assuming the deadline for amending pleadings has not passed in the State-Court Action) would pave the way for BAC to remove that entire State-Court Action to federal court.
    – – – – – – – – – – – – End Footnotes- – – – – – – – – – – – – –
    III. Conclusion.
    For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 10) is denied. Defendant is ordered to file its answer to the Complaint on or before December 13, [*22] 2011.
    DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of November, 2011.

  16. Enraged

    We are in Federal Court to what state are you from?

  17. @Joann,

    That’s exactly what I decided to do: go through federal court. Attack in Federal court since all the parties were incorporated elsewhere and have branches everywhere, I had received mail from 7 different states, fraudulent assignments and transfers had been done all over the country (16 in 6 years… Makes you think!) and the most serious violations are federal statutes.

    Plus (and even though federal court judges have been slow to move) it makes it that much easier to quote case law that applies across the board.

    Lastly, banks hesitate to file foreclosures in federal court. It forces them to play by the rules and to fork up hefty legal expenses. Banks want quick and sneaky. Can’t do that when it’s a federal case…

  18. grover, 10:30 a.m. 341 Hearing. I’ll let you know what transpires. My lawyer can already envision the duct tape going around my head…….

  19. I will be in court at 8:15 am attempting to get a judge to hear this and stop a UD action in the works by none other than Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, As Trustee Under Pooling and Servicing Agreement Dated as of April 1 2007 Securitized Asset-Backed Trust Receivables LLC Trust 2007-BR2 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-BR2

  20. Regarding bogus NOD and bogus ADOT from bogus “beneficiary”

    Vogan et al v. Wells Fargo Bank NA et al November 16

    California Eastern District
    Federal Court

    CA Federal Judge makes the distiction between trustee on deed of trust and trustee for the securitized trust…..first has no beneficial interest and second one does as trustee for the trust investors…..not exempt from TILA and other ect…..not limited liability as in trustee on deed of trust……(this is just my take – read it for your own take – I think it is an important opinion)

    “As an assignee, U.S. Bank falls squarely within 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g), which creates liability for the assignees of the loan’s original creditor if the assignee fails to notify the borrower of the acquisition. 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g).”

    “Plaintiffs alleged that the recorded assignment was executed well after the closing date of the MBS to which it was allegedly sold, giving rise to a plausible inference that at least some part of the recorded assignment was fabricated. Plaintiffs allege that such conduct, if proven, constitutes a violation of Cal. Penal Code § 532f(a)(4). Compl., at 24. That section prohibits any person from filing a document related to a mortgage loan transaction with the county recorder’s office that is known to be false, with the intent to defraud. Cal. Penal Code § 532f(a)(4).
    Accordingly, the Court DENIES Wells Fargo and U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss this claim.”

    “Plaintiffs are not saying that U.S. Bank failed to follow the letter of California’s statutory foreclosure law; they are claiming that U.S. Bank did not have standing to foreclose in the first place. Thus, relying on Onofrio, requiring Plaintiffs to tender the full amount of the indebtedness to an entity, U.S. Bank, that is allegedly not the beneficiary to the deed of trust in order to protect Plaintiffs’ interest in the Property would be inequitable”

    “The Court holds that the tender requirement does not apply to this case because Plaintiffs are challenging the beneficial interest held by U.S. Bank in the deed of trust, not the procedural sufficiency of the foreclosure itself. For this reason, U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss these claims because Plaintiffs failed to plead tender is DENIED.”

    Further bit explored in this case also: “Plaintiffs also allege that the officer who executed the assignment to U.S. Bank on behalf of Wells Fargo was actually a First American employee.”

    My question to anyone – advice used to be stay out of federal – don’t mention federal issues in a complaint at lower level because banker attorneys will try to move it to federal and they get preferential treatment there – has time come to go straight to federal? I know may be dumb question but asking it here anyway – no one else to ask. Thinking bringing up the federal codes and violations strengthens the local case doesn’t it even if the local court cannot rule directly but might comment in declaratory ect…

  21. Great interview. John O’Brien is a hero.

  22. Jordana, I have been saying for years, and even got basically into an argument with April Charney saying FILE COMPLAINTS against them. They are the little people, but they are adults, and know right from wrong, and know it is illegal to do what they are doing. I know they are not the ultimate target, but how do you get to the ultimate target – GO AFTER THE LITTLE PEOPLE with valid complaints that can be substantiated with wrongdoing and what statute, law, code, etc., has been violated!!!! About damn time others start to see it, and to all that feel their complaint got nowhere, your wrong KEEP FILING THEM!!!

  23. Nobody “owns” it…there was NEVER a LENDER. Only debt collectors on false default debt. That’s it. Always has been—is now.

    Every time I ask: Who owns my loan? They say the same damn thing: “You loan is part of a pool..blah blah blah…” NEVER tell me where my payments went or who is real creditor…never. And they ignore me when I say—“…but the trust is dead and closed! Deutsche went into probate for these trusts!”

    They do it because they have been getting away with it. We need to STOP THEM from “getting away with it.” I am SO SICK of their LIES.

    This is the battle.

  24. E.Tolle—the media is owned by the banks…as is the government…we are on our own!!!

  25. Thats the thing no one knows who the real lender is and so many of them in the subprime market went defunct almost at inception.In my case my paperwork was never changed when the lender that I refied with went belly up.4 years after the refi. US Bank changed it into thier names and attempted to register it into the trust 4 years after the trust closed.Unsecured debt or what? Still don’t know who owns it and now the OCC wants to research it to find out who really owns it. Nice!

  26. It was always going to be the “little guy” who cries out “The emperor has no clothes.” It was always destined to be a notary (too bad the first brave one was killed) or a county recorder or a bank loan document employee who would get the ball rolling in the opposite direction. This should not surprise anyone. I applaud the little guy.

  27. Great interview. I have never heard the word “wrong” so many times in such a short piece!

    And E.Toile, you’re right: it clearly states, right before it starts that it is a “web only” interview.

    Pisses me off.

  28. Lisa Myers is a good journalist, and the senior investigative correspondent for NBC Nightly News. But this piece begs the question…..why is such an important piece of journalism….one that details the clouding of title across the entire nation for every girl and boy right here at Christmas, available on the WEB ONLY!

    Does GE have bigger interests than the sanctity of the land records system….say….maybe their corporate masters for instance? Whores, one and all.

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