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EDITOR’S NOTE: Blame the victim, blame the lawmakers, and now blame the regulators. I was expecting this. It’s an obvious move and it provides plenty of cover for virtual amnesty to the Banks by claiming the whole mess was the fault of the regulators, who it turns out are immune from prosecution unless you can prove that they had a personal interest in the transactions and the interest was known to the agency.

With looming prosecutions and civil suits mushrooming across the land, the Banks are desperate to avoid dealing with the consequences of that which they created. This idea of blaming the regulators has been in the works for a long time, and they are piloting the idea in a number of jurisdictions to see what happens. If it works, the largest financial crime in human history and the largest land grab in human history and the largest power grab in the human politics will have worked perfectly. Where is Perry Mason when you need him?

And there is truth in the allegation. The revolving door that exchanges regulators and employees of the banks has long been noted. Some of these “regulators” played a part in the Lincoln Savings and Loan scandal in the 1980’s where more than 800 people went to jail. This time, if the tactic works, nobody goes to jail and all the Banks on Wall Street get to keep our money — all $16 trillion of it and they get to claim mortgages they never funded, foreclose and take possession of houses in which they have no interest, leaving the investors and the homeowners literally out in the cold this winter.

Their first line of attack was the time-honored tradition of creating a public relations settlement with the attorneys general who want Bank contributions to finance their ambitions for higher office. But then some of the major states involved in foreclosure pulled out of those settlement talks. Somebody there was either smart, recognizing that voters are not asleep at the wheel anymore, or it just might be that they take the words “public servant” seriously. No settlement for pennies on the dollar will fix our housing problem our societal problems associated with foreclosures and underwater homes or the failing economy that depends so heavily on the housing sector.

Financial Finger-Pointing Turns to Regulators

By and

From New York Times

In the whodunit of the financial crisis, Wall Street executives have pointed the blame at all kinds of parties — consumers who lied on their mortgage applications, investors who demanded access to risky mortgage bonds, and policy makers who kept interest rates low and failed to predict a housing market collapse.

But a new defense has been mounted by a bank executive: my regulator told me to do it.

This unusual rationale is presented by the bank executive in one of the few fraud suits brought against a mortgage banking official in the aftermath of the financial crisis — the one filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission against Michael W. Perry, former chief executive of IndyMac Bancorp, which failed spectacularly in mid-2008.

After being accused of fraud and misleading investors about his company’s financial health just before it collapsed, Mr. Perry set up a Web site this fall to defend himself.

In a document on the site, he said that a top official at the federal Office of Thrift Supervision, IndyMac’s overseer, directed and approved an action related to the S.E.C.’s allegations.

“It was O.T.S. who had the final say regarding IndyMac Bank’s capital levels,” Mr. Perry wrote.

He went on to say that Darrel W. Dochow, former regional director for the Western region of the agency and a financial regulator for more than 30 years, had “specifically directed” Mr. Perry to backdate IndyMac’s report to regulators to include an $18 million cash infusion that would make it appear well capitalized.

The shift masked IndyMac’s problems for any investors trying to assess its soundness and allowed it to continue attracting large deposits crucial to its operations.

The S.E.C., in its suit against Mr. Perry, contends that more details about the cash infusion should have been disclosed, though the commission did not accuse him of accounting fraud.

Mr. Dochow was not accused of wrongdoing by the commission or any other prosecutor, though his role has been criticized by the inspector general of the Treasury Department, which oversees some bank regulators. It does not appear that Mr. Perry’s argument persuaded the commission to back off. The S.E.C., as is its custom, did not elaborate.

A representative for Mr. Perry said he did not care to discuss the case further, but his lawyer described the lawsuit in an e-mail as “exceedingly weak, unfair and meritless.” Mr. Dochow, who retired as a regulator in 2009 at age 59, said: “There’s a lot more than what’s been written, but I can’t talk. I could go to jail.”

The IndyMac collapse, with its multibillion-dollar cost to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation fund, highlights the role played by federal overseers of financial companies in the years leading up to the crisis. It also raises questions about whether government officials should be held accountable for dubious conduct related to the failure of an institution and whether the government has avoided pursuing some cases because of the roles regulators have played. For years, some bank overseers have maintained cozy ties with the institutions they monitor, treating bankers like clients because of the fees that banks pay to be regulated.

The Justice Department could not cite any regulator that it had named in a prosecution related to the crisis. However, Mr. Dochow’s conduct was referred to Justice for possible criminal charges in 2009, according to Eric Thorson, the inspector general of the Treasury Department. Mr. Thorson said Mr. Dochow’s action “was clearly improper and wrong.” A spokeswoman for the Justice Department in Washington declined to comment on the case and on whether the department investigated regulators for possible wrongdoing.

IndyMac is not the only institution whose questionable accounting was approved by regulators in recent years, though it is by far the largest of several highlighted by the Treasury inspector general.

Even if regulators are involved in wrongdoing, they have some immunity. Internal disciplinary measures are rarely taken against regulators who perform badly in their jobs, say government officials.

Some regulatory shortcomings may be chalked up to innocent mistakes and failures to spot problems. Still, some economists and lawyers would like the government to examine regulatory actions leading up to the financial crisis to determine whether officials actively participated in improper behavior. And, they say, in cases like Mr. Dochow’s, penalties should be levied on overseers who acted improperly.

“The word conspired needs to be used here,” said Edward J. Kane, a finance professor and regulatory expert at Boston College who is familiar with the case. “Dochow conspired with IndyMac management to misrepresent this. He was trying to fool certainly the F.D.I.C. and the public, and anyone who lost a dollar as a creditor to this institution was harmed by relying on something they had every right to rely on.”

Longtime defense lawyers say one reason there have been so few prosecutions related to the credit crisis is because financial executives often solicited advice from outside parties — like accountants and lawyers — and experts shelter them from some potential charges because they can argue they relied on the advice. Regulatory advice may be a similar shelter against prosecution.

A Comeback From Demotion

Mr. Dochow had had a long run as a financial regulator when IndyMac ran into trouble. He started out in 1972 as an assistant national bank examiner with the Comptroller of the Currency. He rose through the ranks and in 1985, became a senior regulator with the Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle and later with the Federal Home Loan Bank System’s Office of Regulatory Activities in Washington.

It was during his time in that office that Mr. Dochow played a central role in trying to stop a regulatory attempt to rein in Lincoln Savings and Loan, an Arizona institution run by Charles Keating, with $5.5 billion in assets. After regulators in San Francisco uncovered fraudulent sales and other improprieties at the institution, Mr. Dochow worked in Washington to avoid the issuance of a cease-and-desist order, the normal course of action in such a case, according to records handed over to Congress. The savings and loan institution failed in 1989 at significant cost to taxpayers, and Mr. Keating was convicted on multiple fraud charges, some later overturned. Mr. Dochow was demoted, according to a half dozen regulators who had worked with him, but remained a bank regulator.

Once again, he worked his way up in the organization, which became the Office of Thrift Supervision. By September 2007, he had been promoted to head the Western region, reporting directly to the agency’s top officials in Washington.

In that position, Mr. Dochow oversaw a host of institutions that had dived headlong into risky mortgage lending. Among them were Countrywide Bank, IndyMac Bancorp and Washington Mutual, three of the most aggressive lenders — and largest flameouts — in the crisis.

Mr. Dochow was known within the O.T.S. to be bank-friendly. One former examiner said: “His approach was negotiating with the banks, as opposed to regulating the banks, and viewing them more as clients, as opposed to people or entities that needed to comply.”

According to three former examiners who worked with Mr. Dochow but who requested anonymity because they feared retaliation from regulatory colleagues, he would sometimes negotiate between the banks and their lower-level O.T.S. overseers, arguing that an institution should be allowed to keep one component of its regulatory rating high if another was dropping. That way, the composite score representing a bank’s financial standing, would change little, if at all.

At other times, Mr. Dochow exhibited a close relationship with a savings and loan association when it was under investigation. In 2007, when the attorney general of New York was investigating Washington Mutual for its possible role in appraisal fraud, Mr. Dochow called Kerry K. Killinger, the institution’s chief executive, to discuss the matter, according to e-mail messages released by a Senate subcommittee in the spring of 2010. Washington Mutual had hired a law firm to do an internal investigation. Mr. Dochow told Mr. Killinger that he wanted to rely on Washington Mutual’s investigation as much as possible as opposed to having O.T.S. officials do a completely separate one.

Mr. Dochow told his superiors that he planned to leverage the Washington Mutual report but noted that “we need to be able to defend that we have done our own independent examination.”

Mr. Dochow retired in 2009, with his full government pension, according to the Treasury inspector general. Because of its woeful regulatory record during the recent mania, O.T.S. was abolished last summer. Of its remaining employees, 95 were transferred to the F.D.I.C., and 670 to the Comptroller’s office.

IndyMac’s Survival Struggle

The S.E.C. case against Mr. Perry, IndyMac’s longtime chief executive, and two former chief financial officer centers on disclosures made from February through mid-May of 2008. The disclosures related mostly to IndyMac’s capital and liquidity. The bank collapsed in July of that year and was taken over by the F.D.I.C., which had to pay insured depositors $10.7 billion.

By early May, it had become clear inside IndyMac that it could no longer be considered “well capitalized” unless money was shifted from its holding company.

This meant that IndyMac could not accept so-called brokered deposits, large amounts of money from investors looking for the highest possible rates of return. Brokered deposits represented just over a third of IndyMac’s deposits; without them, it would have been out of business.

And so on May 9, Mr. Perry instructed his deputies to shift money into the bank from the holding company and account for $18 million of it as if it had been there on March 31.

Mr. Dochow as well as IndyMac’s auditors, Ernst & Young, had signed off on the move, according to the Treasury inspector general. And Mr. Perry highlighted the regulatory approval in a document on his Web site.

”Mr. Dochow, with full knowledge of the circumstances, communicated O.T.S.’s approval,” Mr. Perry wrote. “Mr. Dochow also directed Mr. Perry to amend the bank’s thrift financial report to reflect the $18 million receivable.”

D. Jean Veta, a partner at Covington & Burling who represents Mr. Perry, said in an e-mail message that IndyMac’s financial statements followed accounting rules and that Mr. Perry “was a completely transparent leader who always favored more disclosure rather than less.” But the O.T.S., the Comptroller’s office and the inspector general’s office at the Treasury Department have all said the backdating of the cash infusion was improper.

Mr. Thorson, the Treasury inspector general, said last week that Mr. Perry and Ernst & Young could reasonably say that they acted with permission of the O.T.S. “I’m sure they said ‘O.K., that’s the guy who calls the shots; the umpire has called the shots,’ “ Mr. Thorson said.

Indeed, when asked about the IndyMac accounting, a spokesman for Ernst & Young said last week that it was “approved by the bank’s regulator, not Ernst & Young.” And there has been no enforcement action against the accounting firm.

Mr. Thorson said that his referral for a case against Mr. Dochow was given to Ranee Katzenstein, an assistant United States attorney in Los Angeles, and that Ms. Katzenstein told his office she did not intend to pursue a prosecution. When reached by phone, Ms. Katzenstein declined to say why. A spokesman for her office said she could not discuss the case. The spokesman said the investigation into Mr. Dochow’s actions was still open, although he cautioned that it might not yield a case.

Another backdated capital shift with regulator approval took place in 2008 at a savings and loan association in Florida, according to Mr. Thorson’s report. In August of that year, O.T.S. officials directed BankUnited to backdate capital that it had moved within its holding company. The report does not list their names, but it does include their titles, indicating that they were Timothy T. Ward, the deputy director for exams; Scott M. Polakoff, the agency’s senior deputy director; and Jack Ryan, the Southeast regional director.

In another instance in July 2008, O.T.S. officials objected to a backdated capital shift at Century Bank, also of Florida, but did not require corrective action.

Mr. Polakoff was placed on leave in March 2009 pending a review of the capital backdating by the Treasury department. He now works as executive managing director at FinPro Inc., a financial services consulting firm in Liberty Corner, N.J. Mr. Polakoff defended his actions last week, saying that with BankUnited, it was a “rather innocuous accounting mistake.”

Mr. Ward is a senior official at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; through a spokesman, he declined to comment.

Mr. Ryan, who retired in 2009, said on Tuesday that he had pointed out at the time that the capital shift violated accounting rules, though he says he now regrets that he did not fight forcefully for his position.

“I think the regulators have to abide by the rules,” he said. “And, yeah, if they tell them, ‘forget the rule, go ahead and do it’ — they shouldn’t be doing that.”

Mr. Dochow, interviewed only briefly in front of his home outside Seattle, said he could not talk, but added that “I’m not sure there’s more to say.”

Regulators like Mr. Dochow, of course, would have the chance to publicly defend themselves if accusations against them ever resulted in court cases.

Regulators’ Protection

It would be difficult and unusual for the Justice Department or the S.E.C. to bring a case against a bank regulator, longtime securities lawyers say. Regulators enjoy some immunity from allegations of wrongdoing under the Securities Exchange Act, which says that you cannot file a case against an officer of a United States agency for violation of a securities law if the officer was acting within the scope of the job. For financial regulators like Mr. Dochow, a conflict comes into play when banks run into trouble — on one hand, regulators try to help banks maintain their stability. But, on the other hand, securities laws require companies to be transparent in their disclosures to public investors.

Jeffrey M. Kaplan, a lawyer at Kaplan & Walker in Princeton, N.J., said: “In a case of a regulator contributing to misrepresentations made to shareholders, you could have individual criminal liability. But those cases are pretty rare.” More common are cases involving a bribe or another element of corruption.

Congressional oversight could help identify regulatory misconduct, but such efforts have been less than fruitful. Indeed, when Senate investigators tried to get information about the capital backdating that O.T.S. had allowed at IndyMac and other institutions, officials from the agency were not forthcoming, said a former Senate aide who was not allowed to speak publicly about the investigation.

Any financial crisis case that named a regulator probably would turn into a huge political battle, because it would question many of the nontransparent acts that bank regulators take while trying to save banks, said Denise Voigt Crawford, former commissioner of the Texas securities board and now a law professor at Texas Tech University.

In any prosecution of bank regulators, she said, “you’d have the Justice Department in a fight with the policy goals of the Department of Treasury. Particularly in this environment, you know the banking regulators would fight it tooth and nail.”

Some longtime lawyers go further and say the overall scarcity of cases related to the financial crisis might be in part because regulators want to avoid scrutiny of their own kind.

“It’s not just one 30-year-old wunderkind who was responsible for the financial crisis,” said Dennis C. Vacco, who was the New York State attorney general in the 1990s and now is a lawyer at Lippes Mathias Wexler & Friedman. “Once you start pulling the string through in these complex cases, you might be surprised what you find at the other end.”

Mr. Vacco continued: “What’s at the end of the string? The defense may be that ‘at the highest echelons of the financial institutions, we were in regular contact with the government.’ “

Isolde Raftery contributed reporting.



19 Responses

  1. My NPV,

    Maybe. But, if “your long your wrong” — for WHAT???

    Valid MBS??? Valid mortgages??? Valid anything???

    NO. Fraud from the onset that is no where near being exposed.

  2. Had Mr. Perry fleeced investors to the extent the true leaders have, he would not have needed to get a website to try to show himself in the light of being caught – off guard. If he truly had stolen like a champ, he could have chipped in with the other CEO’s, Treasury Secretary, NY Fed Chair, and Mr. Bernanke himself to make a movie like, er.. let’s say “Too Big To Fail”. Everyone in the entire movie leveraged the bank under their control (assets) 50-1 at a minimum, changed bankruptcy laws, and than shorted the very pools they were the seller or underwriter for. Yeah, you guys were caught off guard. “If you’re long – you’re wrong!

  3. @ ANONYMOUS True again. So very true.

  4. Trespass Unwanted,

    Yes. My only point about the SEC is that the SEC is a regulatory agency only for security investors. They cannot help consumers/homeowners even if they wanted to because it is not their role.

  5. @ANONYMOUS, true.

    Opinions/Thoughts to ponder…not you ANONYMOUS….just thoughts to ponder in general for anyone reading this post.

    How many consumers are victims but still think they owe a ‘building’ some money? They can’t get past the illusion.
    Assuming Bank of Oh Aye. You could not get me to say I owe Bank of Oh Aye anything because I never sat across the table from Bank of Oh Aye, I sat across the table from one of the employees of Bank of Oh Aye..that’s two different things.

    How did the employee know how much Bank of Oh Aye would loan me? Ah, some process where I ask for money and they have computers that kick out an approval or is Bank of Oh Aye a computer?

    Did it loan me money or credit and wanted money in return?

    SEC sure won’t protect victims but sometimes the victim needs to know how they got swindled and they can’t hold a decent conversation about it.

    They go to court and fight Bank of Oh Aye, which is represented by an attorney. Never once do they wonder how the heck can a building that’s not alive, hire an attorney?

    Never once do some victims pull back the curtain on the illusion and say O.M.Gee I’m fighting something that doesn’t exist, and that’s why they are treating me like I’m an idiot.

    Now when they really look and say, ‘hey’. Mr Attorney of Bank of Oh Aye, who do you ‘really represent’? Did your client even know you are representing it? How can you produce a valid contract? If he did it was signed by an employee who was acting (yes acting) as vice President of company at the time, but did that employee loan the money? Well who are they representing? The CeeEeeOh? Well did he loan any money?

    Don’t you see why there were no signatures on the notes? They were moved from building to building to building and a building can’t sign a contract, loan money, or do anything.

    There is someone real behind all of this. When the s. hit the fan, people jumped and entered into new agreements not even understanding the fact that the old was was no good.

    The new one told them to give up their rights and immunities, and for the sake of a piece of property, one of millions placed on the land, some people did. They just about signed away their first born or their birth name to keep that home.

    In the mother of all deception, some people would do anything…anything to stay in that home…including die in it.

    Who’s the victim?

    They know some of us are capable of living in illusions and believing we owe buildings just because paperwork got pushed back and forth. They know we believe we are fighting a building for a right to stay in our home even though no one asks the questions?

    I went to buy a car one day. I wanted to put 10% down and they wanted 20%. The ‘lender’ was a business with the word ‘credit’ after it. It could have been ‘Eeny Meeny Miney Credit’ for all I know. But the finance guy, someone living called me and said they wanted 20% to let me have the car. I told him I budgeted for 10%. I asked him…they are not a bank, are they loaning me money or credit? He said credit.

    I thought to myself, wow, thin air is where credit comes from, yet this company want me to toil the earth with my sweat equity and give them real money from my life energy to get that car.

    Imagine going to court over this….who can I sue? Who would sue me? Someone would have typed in some digits in a computer and passed some documents behind the scene for me to get a car, but when I handed over my real money, someone would be depositing it into a bank account and benefiting from it…probably even get a big fat bonus.

    Point is, even with TILA (Truth in Lending Act), we never really know who we are dealing with…we never know the ‘life’ behind the transaction, we never know all the facts of the transaction, and we fight among ourselves over rights to property where possession is 9/10ths of the law because we fight someone hiding behind the transaction who is not truly revealed.

    What a dishonor it creates when someone wants to claim to be a victim but fights with the wrong enemy, or better yet, doesn’t even know with whom they fight.

    There is a corporation that is represented doing business with you and you are presumed to be the representative of your corporation. A ‘presumption’ (is an assumption without all the facts).

    Imagine now, after what you know, that someone does take the home/. Who had standing to do so? No note. No signatures on the note. Someone initiated the theft. Someone created documents to say you owed the none speaking, none breathing, none living bank building.

    You hire someone to represent you, and they say they represent IT, and the two fight in court…You paying your representative and someone cutting a check for the representative of IT, who has deeper pockets.

    Tell me about the transfer of wealth when you lose the battle, your money and your home.

    Who is the victim?

    I was robbed. I didn’t lay in bed with the enemy by entering into a contract (mod) to keep the home, I told him NO, you can’t have it!.

    I didn’t run to a representative and say, liquidate my past/present/and future so i can keep this property. I ignored all offers to transfer my wealth through liquidation.

    These people who could go to jail, are afraid of people like me.

    The ones who did not transfer our wealth, the ones who did not lay in bed with them. The ones who were truly robbed because we had no contractual agreement with them in the first place and they never loaned us any money and weren’t across the table signing documents with us to be in a valid agreement.

    All the news is owned by them. What comes out is what they want you to hear…the stupid things quoted, like the woman who’s home was foreclosed and she supposedly only missed one payment and had the home something like 28 years, she saw the settlement would be $1500 and said, ‘Oh, goody, goody, I’m glad they are coming up with a settlement, now I can pay for my storage!’.

    People will believe anything! Just because they gave us a name, and told us that mess doesn’t mean it’s true.

    They NEVER speak under penalty of perjury…without that obligation do you REALLY think anything they say or that their representative will say is true?

    The last bastion of hope was the judge.

    Let’s just say, if Namaste’ a greeting used by people in India, really means, The Creator in me is the same Creator in you.

    Well, I’m glad I’m not some of the judges who have fallen for the illusion and transferred property rights to someone….the real party behind all this…a Roths-child or whoever….when the Creator in me, just wanted to be here to ‘experience life’ in a flesh and blood body without conflict or war….ie…that means a peaceful inhabitant.

    Job, was made whole. He lost everything…and he lived with the loss, and he got it back.

    But if you haven’t lost anything, all you are is a fighter of an invisible enemy, someone at war and don’t even know who the enemy is, so everyone is the enemy to you.

    Who’s most dangerous? The one who walked away, or the one who fights everyone and don’t know who they are fighting?

    Trespass Unwanted, a free and independent People.

  6. Had Mr. Perry fleeced investors to the extent the true leaders have, he would not have needed to get a website to try to show himself in the light of being caught – off guard. If he truly had stolen like a champ, he could have chipped in with the other CEO’s, Treasury Secretary, NY Fed Chair, and Mr. Bernanke himself to make a movie like, er.. let’s say “Too Big To Fail”. Everyone in the entire movie leveraged the bank under their control (assets) 50-1 at a minimum, changed bankruptcy laws, and than shorted the very pools they were the seller or underwriter for. Yeah, you guys were caught off guard. “If you’re long – you’re wrong!

  7. Trespass Unwanted,

    Government only wants a “certain” consumer, which does not include victims. Unfortunately for them, they need the victims.

  8. consumer is a person.

  9. In mercibus illicitis non sit commercium.
    NO commerce should be in illicit goods. 3 Kent, Com. 262, n.

    Gankers/Bankers played the game. They cheat. They lose. Now they want a pinch hitter to take their place.

    You can’t change the rules in the middle of the game and you certainly can’t change games when you break the rules — bankers/gankers.

    Trespass Unwanted, Corporeal, Life, a Free and Independent State, Jure Divino (by divine right), In Jure Proprio (In One’s Own Right)

  10. SEC only regulates security investments. SEC is not there for the consumer. SEC cannot intervene on behalf of consumers – this job is left to the Department of Justice and FTC.

    We have no concern as to whether or not the SEC “approved” — or failed to regulate security investments. Why? Security investors are not the homeowners creditor.

    We do have concern that the AGs are negotiating a settlement that fails to investigate fraud against homeowners by fraudulent “mortgage” origination and by fraudulent foreclosures.

    We have not granted the AGs any right to negotiate away our right to be heard in courts and certainly not without investigation first.

    I know of no government agency or regulator that approved fraud against homeowners. I do know of deregulation that allows concealment of the fraud. But, that deregulation just means we do not have public access to records. It does not mandate that those records are not available to us via a court action and does not mandate that fabricated documents may be submitted to a court of law.

    We DO have consumer protection laws that have been violated, and this is not the fault of failed regulation, but rather the fault of deceit and fraud – including in OUR courts.

    Any AG settlement is not for security investors. Security investors are not our creditor. Any AG settlement MUST be to protect our rights from fraud that has been continued WITHOUT disclosure to regulators – and without investigation. And, without approval by a REGULATORY agency.

    As to the acquiescence of some government agencies by “policies” or decisions that looked the other way, these agencies are not immune if proper procedure is followed. However, SEC is not one of these agencies. SEC is for security investors, and security investors are NOT our creditor. Our complaints are not under the “wrongdoing under the Securities Exchange Act” — unless you insist on (wrongly) making them so. .

  11. Recently released lobbyist Abrams has a new book outing how those elected
    or work for the government are owned by the lobbyists. Lock, stock, and barrel.
    This another part of the systematic pillaging of the United States.

  12. @Shelley,

    I posted that memo a few days ago and no one even seems to have read it. When you look up that firm, you learn that they gloat about “owning” 16 congressmen. An Ohio supporter of OWS sent it to me. My reaction was… “the bastards! They won’t be happy until it turns violent!”

  13. Conclusion? They were all in on it together. Thanks Gretchen.

  14. Link to the Bankers Ass letter:
    Clark Lytle Geduldig Cranford Occupy Wall Street Lobbyist Response…

  15. Sorry about the typos I should have re read it first. I was being talked to while typing.

  16. Do they believe pointing the finger at each other is going to devert the guilt? They are all in it. AS WE ALL KNOW the regulators were blocked by bank backed politiins. See the threat letter from the banks to all politicians that support the people? From the American BAnkers Ass.(and I mean ASS) from Sam Geduldig, Steve Clark, Gary Lytle, Jay Cranford dat3d November 24, 2011 Subject Propoasl: Occupy Wall Street Response, threatening politicians they will dig up all the dirt on the politians and severly cut champain funds on any politiciain supporting the Occupy Wall Street protestors, or sympathizing with teh 99%. And they point the finger at the regulators? They are the regulators.

  17. When so we get justifiable debt restructuring without being labeled a defaulter, amnesty?

  18. @Enraged—can you email me? I need to ask you something…thanks.

  19. When are they going to devour each others? What can we do to speed up that process? I mean, beside leaving banks in droves and stopping all payments toward everything they “allege” we owe them but… we’ve fully paid back since 2007, and then some…

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