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Remember that just because FANNIE says it is a FANNIE Trust doesn’t mean the the Trust exist or that the loan is in it. In your quest for certainty don’t take the burden off the other side — make them prove where the loan is, and don’t let them get away with partial data. The “loan” consists of an obligation that arises by law when the funding occurs (if the funding actually occurred), then the note (if it is valid) and finally the mortgage (if it is valid).

Based upon current data, there appears to be confidence that Trusts claimed to be within the FANNIE and Freddie rubric ever actually took ownership of the loans because the transfer documents were incomplete or because the data was submitted to FANNIE MAE while the actual money was handled as though it was securitized another way. Taking data from the FANNIE MAE or FREDDIE MAC website is no substitute for actual discovery and disclosure where you can see the transfer documents, the trust creation, the transfer of the entire loan package into the trust and the appointment of a working trustee.



28 Responses

  1. no owenrship that would mean liability only lease ‘mortgage interests’

  2. I have my pool number and investor’s loan number from Freddie Mac. How do you look that up?

  3. I think that skipping recordation fees had nothing to do with the formation of MERS or the way the banksters wanted to operate. That was a cover story (albeit one I hope bites them in the heinie but good) for their real goal, something like this:

    Well let’s see. Loans are sold to a trust so fractional ownership interests may be sold to investors mol who are also sold good odds on receiving a better-than-average-return on their investments. Okay.
    So loans are originated and sold down the pike to the depositor who puts them in a trust and the notes and deeds of trust are endorsed and assigned to the trustee who is appointed to perform the trustee duties to the trust for the benefit of the certificate holders. MERS was created so that the deed of trust assignments needn’t be recorded until the dots found their way to the end user, the trustee on behalf of the investors.
    According to MERS’ membership rules, the assignment of the deed of trust must be recorded in the land records when the beneficial interest is held by a non-MERS member, the trust. The notes get transferred from A to B to C to their final endorsement to the trust, D, as a special endorsement, that is, by name. This finds us with properly negotiated notes (all endorsements done, paid for in full
    at each transfer, possession transferred), and the assignments, heretofore executed but unrecorded, are now recorded in the land records along with the final assignment to the trustee.
    Movement of these loans toward securitization was accomplished at mock speed, the only impediment, the recordation of the assignments, having been handled momentarily by “MERS” nominee status in the deeds of trust.
    The investors are ‘secure now’. The loans have all been assigned to the trustee for his administration. In the event of the borrower’s default, the trustee may garner the collateral for the benefit of the end users, the certificate holders, the owners of mbs’s. Right? The put-off recordations of the executed assignments of the deeds of trust are now recorded in proper order along with the last one, the assignment to the trust.
    The borrower knows the party to whom he must answer for any breach of his contract. Right?

    Wrong. This is the way it could have been done, but was not. Why not? Surely with a gaggle of Savile-Row-clad attorneys, this mission could have been not only successfully formulated but carried out.
    The ‘why not’ starts with the investors being horn-swoggled that they were purchasing interests in notes secured by deeds of trust on real property, and thus had recourse for non-payment. It may be the only thing the investors actually had was whatever was or is the value of third party (like fnma and master servicers) guarantees.
    If the loans were meant to be owned by the trusts, or held in trust by the trustee for the benefit of the investors, those notes would have been so endorsed and the assignments would have been done to the trusts. Then it would clearly be the sec’n trustee who is the proper party to bring foreclosure actions for the benefit of the investors whose mountains of dollars are ultimately at risk as the final buyers.
    But the trustee didn’t want all the responsibility, you say? Now here
    I have to leave the building for a moment to upchuck the bile. Wall Street BOUGHT the names such as Wells Fargo as Trustee or Bank of America as Trustee in a very large and heartless scam on the investors, the appearance of propriety by the involvement of the country’s most formidable financial institutions.

    We all know a lot of the loans were the sacks of junk in the first place
    what’s-his-WS-ceo-face literally said they were, so enough about that.
    But why do we suppose MERS, WS, et al didn’t want the enforcement of those notes and deeds of trust in the hands of the trustees, a scenario easily structured, and just now being implemented when necessary as a Hail Mary?

    WS took out insurance policies betting on the failure of loans it OWNED. If this were not the case, the investors might demand those insurance proceeds as the rightful beneficiaries. They should, anyway, imo. It looks to me like the default insurance was the true goal of securitization aided by the ever-helpful MERS-machine. (This does beg the question why in the world AIG, et al would write such policies. Production bonuses, kind of like those jackals at FNMA a few years ago?) The WS-ers, with the aid of their dirty-bed partners, those same ‘formidable financial institutions’ who formulated and underwrote loan by loan the killer of home-ownership loan programs like the ‘2% for five minutes and then 12% for life adjustable rate’, drove up the price of land to artificial and wholley unsustainable numbers with one insane loan program after another, and then thanks to MERS, hid the TRUE ownership of these designed-to-fail loans from primarily the
    end-investors, and the hapless homeowner, as well.

    Can any of us prove all this? I do think it could be done with
    a group, a consortium, of dedicated, knowledgeable attorneys. Maybe some Harvard student will make this his or her thesis. It could happen.

    When there is a straight-forward way to do a thing (and that straight-forward way avoids the production of tomes of contracts and judicial interpretations thereto), and it is instead done circuitously, it is not at all unreasonable to surmise that the circuitous route was purposeful, and in this case, just plain evil.
    It looks to me like the deals where structured to make the investors believe they were buying something they weren’t: investments secured by real property with rights of recourse against those properties.
    The investors bought only borrower-receivables, as Anonymous posits. This appears to be the biggest charade, if the true biggest isn’t that the note has been destroyed because one party owns it but another has a right to payments in an unprecedent bifurcation of the note itself.

  4. Newt Ginrich and fnma and fhlmc are in the news again over bonuses and millions in pay. Mr. Ginrich started ‘consulting’ for them in l999. Now that’s interesting. MERS is on its 3rd corporate iteration; it was done in l999. What was worth Mr. Ginrich’s 30k (1.2m in the aggregate) per month to that gang starting in l999? Who was he being paid to influence and about what?
    A few years ago a thoroughly rotten secret came out about fnma which we shouldn’t lose sight of. FNMA engaged in the bs it engaged in so a few of its mucks could receive 4 million dollar production bonuses. Not kidding here. I remember when I heard this. I thought, “FNMA participated in if not forumlated this bs, this crime against a nation, so this guy (and a few others), could get bonuses.” I, not knowing this was the tip of the iceberg, naively thought ‘you gotta be kidding me’.


    Here is a clue to the 2004 shanigans at FNMA, orignally published in 2008:

    The Associated Press
    WASHINGTON — Former Fannie Mae chief Franklin Raines and two other top executives have agreed to a $31.4 million settlement with the government announced today over their roles in a 2004 accounting scandal.” Criminal charges? Nah, I don’t remember any.

    We KNOW that deal is messes up, yet we gave them billions (156) and they want more. Heck with that: “Let it bleed”. I think it is inescapable that our government is operating at the highest degree of incompetency ever seen. A 156 billion is a pretty damn big bandaid. Do those guys ever even CONSIDER alternatives?

    Good info, ND, especially the clues about the guarantees. Let’s see….
    the investors don’t own the loans that were supposed to be in trusts even if the loans made it to the trusts, whatever the heck that really means.
    Someone else does. That someone got default insurance and someone- who? – is getting FNMA guarantees, as well. The guarantee explains fnma’s insolvency it seeks to hide. But what is not explained is where the h (take 10) all the money has gone. The only thing which reads imo is that a particular loan was sold to more than one trust whether by accident or design – God only knows how many loans were and to how many different trusts. I mean look at that gang – they couldn’t even pass muster on the simplest of tasks. In too much of a hurry to bother with the slightest “detail”. This would explain why with all the default insurance(s) and guarantees paid by we the people still aren’t cutting it. And thanks to MERS and the horrendous, abysmal lack of transparency, it was all made possible. And I can’t help wondering what hand Mr. Ginrich might have played in cementing an appearance of propriety to the lack of transparency which has had such horrifically devastating consequences.




    Certificates (SPCs),

    Series K-014

    Co-Lead Managers and Joint Bookrunners

    J.P. Morgan

    Wells Fargo Securities



    Deutsche Bank Securities


    Morgan Stanley

    August 1, 2011

    The placement agents named on the front cover

    (the “Placement Agents”) intend to deliver the SPCs on our

    behalf to third party purchasers;

    however, if the SPCs are not placed with third parties, they will be resold to us by the Placement Agents.

    Co-Lead Managers & Joint Bookrunners

    J.P. Morgan; Wells Fargo Securities;

    Co-Managers Citi, Deutsche Bank Securities, Jefferies, Morgan Stanley

    “… as an investor you will bear the other risks of owning mortgage securities.”

    “The SPCs are complex securities.”

    Freddie Mac was chartered by Congress in 1970 under the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
    Act (the “Freddie Mac Act”) with a public mission to stabilize the nation’s residential
    mortgage markets and expand opportunities for homeownership and affordable rental housing.
    Our statutory mission is to provide liquidity, stability and affordability to the U.S. housing market.
    We fulfill our mission by purchasing residential mortgages and mortgage-related securities in the
    secondary mortgage market and securitizing them into mortgage-related securities that can be sold to
    investors. Our participation in the secondary mortgage market includes providing our credit guarantee for
    residential mortgages originated by mortgage lenders and investing in mortgage loans and mortgagerelated
    securities. Through our credit guarantee activities, we securitize mortgage loans by issuing PCs to
    third-party investors.We also resecuritize mortgage-related securities that are issued by us or Ginnie Mae
    as well as private, or non-agency, entities by issuing structured securities to third-party investors. We
    guarantee multifamily mortgage loans that support housing revenue bonds issued by third parties and we
    guarantee other mortgage loans held by third parties.
    Although we are chartered by Congress, we alone are responsible for making payments on our
    securities. Neither the U.S. government nor any agency or instrumentality of the U.S. government, other
    than Freddie Mac, guarantees our securities and other obligations.
    Our statutory mission, as defined in our charter, is:
    • To provide stability in the secondary market for residential mortgages;
    • To respond appropriately to the private capital market;
    • To provide ongoing assistance to the secondary market for residential mortgages (including
    activities relating to mortgages for low- and moderate-income families, involving a reasonable
    economic return that may be less than the return earned on other activities); and
    • To promote access to mortgage credit throughout the U.S. (including central cities, rural
    areas and other underserved areas).
    We continue to operate under the conservatorship that commenced on September 6, 2008, conducting
    our business under the direction of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”), our
    conservator (the “Conservator”). FHFAwas established under the Federal Housing Finance Regulatory
    Reform Act of 2008 (the “Reform Act”). Prior to the enactment of the Reform Act, the Office of Federal
    Housing Enterprise Oversight and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”),
    had general regulatory authority over Freddie Mac, including authority over our affordable housing goals
    and new programs. Under the Reform Act, FHFA now has general regulatory authority over us, though
    HUD still has authority over Freddie Mac with respect to fair lending.
    Upon its appointment, FHFA, as Conservator, immediately succeeded to all rights, titles, powers and
    privileges of Freddie Mac and of any stockholder, officer or director of Freddie Mac with respect to us
    and our assets, and succeeded to the title to all books, records and assets of Freddie Mac held by any other
    legal custodian or third party. During the conservatorship, the Conservator has delegated certain authority
    to our Board of Directors to oversee, and to management to conduct, day-to-day operations so that
    Freddie Mac can continue to operate in the ordinary course of business. There is significant uncertainty as
    to whether or when we will emerge from conservatorship, as it has no specified termination date, and as to
    what changes may occur to our business structure during or following our conservatorship, including
    whether we will continue to exist. While we are not aware of any current plans of our Conservator to
    significantly change our business structure in the near term, Treasury and HUD, in consultation with
    other government agencies, are expected to develop legislative recommendations on governmentsponsored
    enterprises Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae and the Federal Home Loan Banks.
    To address deficits in our net worth, FHFA, as Conservator, entered into a senior preferred stock
    purchase agreement (as amended, the “Purchase Agreement”) with the U.S. Department of the
    Treasury (“Treasury”), and (in exchange for an initial commitment fee of senior preferred stock and
    warrants to purchase common stock) Treasury made a commitment to provide funding, under certain
    conditions. We are dependent upon the continued support of Treasury and FHFA in order to continue
    operating our business. Our ability to access funds from Treasury under the Purchase Agreement is
    critical to keeping us solvent and avoiding appointment of a receiver by FHFA under statutory mandatory
    receivership provisions.
    Our Initiatives Under the Making Home Affordable Program
    On February 18, 2009, President Obama announced the Homeowner Affordability and Stability
    Plan, designed to help in the housing recovery, promote liquidity and housing affordability, expand our
    foreclosure prevention efforts and set market standards. The Obama administration subsequently
    announced additional details about these initiatives under the Making Home Affordable Program
    (the “MHA Program”).
    Under the MHA Program, Freddie Mac is carrying out initiatives to enable eligible homeowners to
    refinance qualifying mortgages and to encourage modifications of such mortgages for eligible homeowners
    who are in default and those who are at risk of imminent default, including the following:
    • Home Affordable Refinance initiative. We call our initiative in this area the “Relief Refinance
    Program.” Under this program, we have set forth the terms and conditions under which we will
    purchase refinancings of mortgages we own or guarantee. Borrowers under “Relief Refinance
    Mortgages”SM must be current on their original mortgages. Certain eligible borrowers applying
    for Relief Refinance Mortgages may be subject to streamlined underwriting procedures and, for
    certain eligible mortgages, the value of eligible properties may be determined using an automated
    valuation model. The loan to value (“LTV”) ratio on fixed rate Relief Refinance Mortgages may
    be more than 105% and equal to or lower than 125%. A Relief Refinance Mortgage may be
    without mortgage insurance if the original mortgage did not bear mortgage insurance. Relief
    Refinance Mortgages must be originated on or before June 30, 2011.
    • Home Affordable Modification initiative.We call our initiative in this area the “Home Affordable
    Modification Program” or “HAMP.” Under this program, our servicers offer eligible borrowers
    in owner-occupied homes who are delinquent or who are current but at risk of imminent default on
    their mortgages modifications that reduce their monthly principal and interest payments on their
    mortgages. HAMP seeks to provide a uniform, consistent regime that servicers can use in
    modifying mortgages to prevent foreclosures. Under HAMP, servicers that service mortgages are
    provided incentives to reduce at-risk borrowers’ monthly mortgage payments to a minimum of
    31% of gross monthly income, which may be achieved through a variety of methods, including
    interest rate reductions, term extensions and principal forbearance. Borrowers are subject to a trial
    period under which they are required to remit a number of monthly payments that are an estimate
    of the anticipated modified payment amount. After the borrower successfully meets the requirements
    of the trial period and provides all required documentation, a borrower’s mortgage is
    modified. We bear the full cost of these modifications and do not receive a reimbursement from
    Treasury. Servicers are paid incentive fees both when they originally modify a loan, and over time,
    if the modified loan remains current. Borrowers whose mortgages are modified through this
    program will also accrue monthly incentive payments that will be applied to reduce their principal
    as they successfully make timely payments over a period of five years. Freddie Mac, rather than
    Treasury, will bear the costs of these servicer and borrower incentive fees. Mortgage holders are
    also entitled to certain subsidies for reducing the monthly payments from 38% to 31% of the
    borrower’s income; however, we will not receive such subsidies on mortgages. HAMP applies to
    mortgages originated on or before January 1, 2009 and will expire on December 31, 2012.

    I was relying also on the phone call to FreddieMac and to Neil Garfield’s Securitization and Analysis that I purchased thru which only relied on the website that I steered him to with my last four of my social security number. I understand that it is hard to get any information from the GSEs but I think the banks here in New Jersey are slowing trying to claim that they are Servicers for these GSEs in their prima facia(?) since 2010 when they say they obtained authority .
    Think you for all the good information that you put out.

  8. Hey Folks,

    Can we really afford to lose anyone here with information that can help. Sometimes I cannot understand all of the format either, but I take all the information, print it and try and apply it to what I already know/have. It is almost impossible to get help out here, the cover-up is overwhelming. Please don’t chase some of these folks away. regardless of your emotional take on this, all this information is priceless and needed. Just my 2 cents!

  9. @ Anonymous…. when I called Freddie Mac, to inquire, the woman asked me and I quote, ” about how much do you owe? And who are you paying”. Any thoughts? Besides the obvious.

  10. @Carie,

    Damn it! It’s getting to us on a stupid website!!! Can’t imagine spending 2 months in a tent, in a park. I admire those guys.

    Sheesh! Just for them, we have to do better.

  11. Geez…ANONYMOUS has been extremely helpful to me…can we please…all get along?

  12. @Anonymous

    You’re right: I don’t have to read your post if you keep writing in morse code. Guess what? I don’t read them.

    “Be careful who you attack”? Was that a threat? Check your grammar if you want be taken seriously. I don’t attack anyone. I attack whether their posts are legible or not. I don’t give a rat’s ass who you are. Either you have something to share and you make sure it reaches the people you want to share it with or you’re so self-absorbed that you don’t give a damn and you ramble just for the hell of it. No skin off my bone either way.

    Be-careful-who-you-attack. 1st amendment: I can say whatever I want.

  13. Enraged,

    I have no business to engage readers. I have no business at all. I am here simply to share what I know and have experienced. If you do not like morse code, then do not read it.

    You have no idea of who I am, and why I am here, or what it is that I do.

    I have never been attacking to anyone here, and never critical.

    Not the same for you……….be careful who you attack.

  14. Eugene Villarreal,

    Website not reliable.

  15. When you check with FreddieMac’s website and it shows that they own your Mortgage and then you call them and ask them for the name of the trust, they say ” a Trustee has not been assigned.” This after the loan has been in foreclosure for some time and Counsel has been assigned. Is the Trustee later assigned for the purpose of bidding at an auction for FreddieMac who is later assigned the Mortgage/Note after the auction ?

  16. Good post – Neil.

    But, go further. Go into refinances. Just because a servicer was paid by a refinance, does not mean Fannie or Freddie was.

  17. @Leapfrog:

    I am self-employed. When I started in my field, I was making $40.00/hr (but far from 160hrs/week. Yearly earnings averaged $38 K). It paid the bills. If I wanted to make more, I had to work more. If clients had complaints, I stopped getting work and I didn’t make a living. I refused to sell my soul and bend my principles a few times and learned the hard way. Still won’t bend my principles. God, come and get me. NOW!!! Your word that I misery that I’m living day in, day out. Come and get me, for Pete’s sake!!!!

    As Robert de Niro said: “If there realy is a God, He’s gona have a lot of explaning to do…!”

    Here we have people earning monthly incomes (Fannie/Freddie), regardless whether they work or not, regardless of performance, regardless of anything: they clock in and out. $900K/year.

    ON TOP OF THAT and despite the fact that their very own employer is in receivership, THEY EARN BONUSES, not for having gotten them out of receivership but simply for allowing them to keep existing in a state of receivership.

    You bet I’m enraged!

    And there’s 60 minutes and Boehner and Pelosi.

    Yep. Enraged.

  18. @Carie,

    Post what you need to and, please, don’t apologize!

    We’re all in the same boat. We’re all doing our thing, the one thing we are good at, to further the cause. You’re great at gathering and posting. I simply wish the prose was not in morse code. That thing about putting hyphens everywhere is… well, hard to read. And, quite frankly, I skipped a S*%& load of Anonymous’ writings because of the format…

    BUT you have no obligation to edit Anonymous’ stuff. Let him know, though, that he is losing readers…

  19. (sorry Enraged)

    I am re-posting ANONYMOUS’ answers because of new questions posted here—for informational purposes only—glean what you like:

    ANONYMOUS, on August 3, 2011 at 7:34 pm said:
    You need to get head out of the securitization process. As documented — we know
    the process was —- hmmm— fraudulent.
    Securitiztion can be for any cash flows — but the security investors are NEVER
    the creditor. In the case of subprime/alt-a/jumbo securitization — there were no
    mortgage liens — the cash flow pass-through was only for pass-through of cash
    payments to collection rights. No mortgage lien – not mortgage — no pass-through
    of collection rights itself. Transfer of servicing rights only.
    The “investors” were the debt buyers that purchased the collection rights —
    period. The security investors were duped to believing that the cash
    pass-through was to valid mortgage liens. But, these security investors never
    were the lender, never were the creditor, and never were the mortgagee — because
    there was never any valid mortgages!!!!! And, security investors are NEVER the
    CDOs??? nothing more than derivatives from the false assets that the false
    securitizations were based upon to begin with!!!
    In your mind — Quote — “In my scenario, there is a loan.” Even if that is
    possible — it is NOT a mortgage. — no lien. And, when presented to borrower as a
    mortgage — when it was not a mortgage — which is was not — then the “loan” is
    false. But, more important, the so-called loan is unsecured!!! Thus, even if the
    “loan” was somehow valid — which it was not — it can — and should be —discharged
    in BK.
    You are still on the kick that these fraudulent loans were somehow valid MBS
    security investors know they were not. How can the borrowers be held accountable
    to fraudulent loans?
    Time to go after the the perpetrators — the “investors” — the debt buyers who
    purchased collection rights — falsely procured as “mortgage” refinances. And,
    they try to portray these collection rights as valid mortgages!!! Can never be.
    Mortgage title??? Long gone.
    Big difference between security investors and “investors.” But, no one wants to
    address this. This is the crux of the problem. And, as far as I am concerned —
    these “investors” will never come forward — would show criminality if they did.
    Why criminal??? Insurance fraud.- always criminal.
    So — just have to keep plugging away to show that the so-called “Trusts” were
    bogus — and transfer of any “mortgage/loan” — was bogus. Follow the path of the
    refinance proceeds. There are none!!!!!!
    We are winning. Tide is turning.

    ANONYMOUS, on August 3, 2011 at 7:03 pm said:
    Gwen Caranchini,
    I do not need to know the “processes” — subprime/alt-a/jumbo refinances (as
    nearly 100% were refinances) — were and are nothing more than a transfer of
    servicing rights to false collection rights. And, jumbo new purchases fit in the
    same category.
    Sorry — Gwen — I stand by what I state.
    This does not preclude QT challenge — all for it — just want most to understand
    — we are not challenging mortgage title — it never existed in the first place —
    we are challenging ANY title based on fraudulent loan (collection rights)
    assumption – and fraudulent mortgage title origination – to begin with.
    All is NOT as THEY would like it to appear to be. Far from it. If you them a
    “mortgage” — when it is not a mortgage — they well try to find some way to hold
    accountable —-this is wrong – and it is fraud. Just because it looks like a
    “duck” — does not mean it is a “duck” — no matter how it “quacks.”
    Unsecured — name of the game. .
    johngault,— depends on how you define “mortgage” — as I know it —
    subprime/alt-a/jumbo — were not mortgages — they were transfers of collection
    rights (albeit — with escalated balance owed and egregious terms). Once the
    Note/loan — is charged off — no more mortgage — only collection rights survive.
    TARP Inspector General — Footnote 35 again — and again– and again.
    “Without the note, a mortgage is unenforceable, while without the mortgage, a
    note is simply an unsecured debt obligation, no different from credit card

  20. Mary:

    It was a purchase in 2007, 2 weeks before the bk filing of New Century, when I closed on the property.

    After looking at various SEC documents and a forensic accounting analysis for the bk court; there were a lot of “unfunded” loans from New Century. In other words the monies were never paid to the pool/trust/investors. At this point I don’t know which of the entities they used, that is why I am trying to trace my mortgage. It matters if it was a security, pool or trust. The original trust for the mortgages collapsed in 2005, so I have a lot of questions as you might imagine. The forensic report is compelling. They knew in advance of the risks of default and largely insured them, under estimated buy-backs and repurchases of risky loans to make it appear they were not in trouble to the investors and generate huge bonuses, then filed false documents to the SEC, in that they misstated much of their financial data. So, I am reading hundreds of pages of what may be relevant information, to include the accounting and servicing contracts. It seems most of my case will lie in the type of loan it was, where it is/went and how it was dealt with and whether or not it was “satisfied” to the lending party/agency/pool, etc…like a maze.

  21. Enraged: Thanks for that article. I found this paragraph truly ENRAGING (pardon the pun):

    “DeMarco added that executives who work at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, regardless of how well they perform their duties, “risk tarnish to their reputations” just by working at the firms.

    PULEEEEZZZZZE!!! This colossally incompetent a-holes were solely responsible for any “tarnishing” of their own reputations. Time to FIRE DeMarco and the two phoney/fraudie big-wigs.

  22. “It’s touching that FHFA, a small agency just created in 2008, would get to “regulate” this new electronic registration system. But the thing is, there’s already a perfectly acceptable “MERS 2″ out there. It happens to have worked for over 200 years in the US. It’s called the public land recording system. It may be inconvenient for the banks, which would have to pay $35 every time they transfer ownership of a property. But the argument in its favor is that property rights are, you know, the backbone of modern civilization, and that public record-keeping has been found to be the most transparent and effective system to sustain that backbone.

    In addition, by sanctioning MERS 2, Corker would essentially rob local communities of recording fees owed to them, which would starve local budget of billions of dollars in potential revenue. This is tax evasion, aided and abetted by a politician.

    All this is done in the name of “certainty.” But the genie cannot be put back in the bottle on the sins of the past. And all that Corker would do about that is to dress up those same sins under a different name and a federal imprimatur.”

  23. Chris: How would the loan not have been funded?? Did a closing take place, whereby you got cash out and prior entity satisfied a mortgage?? Or was this a purchase?? What would lead you to believe the loan did not get funded?? Curious, I have thought that about my own…

  24. I am sure it is supposed to say confidence that trusts…Never actually took ownership….

    Putting it in context of the incomplete documents and other problems….

  25. Executives of Fannie and Freddie (in receivership, mind you) have made over $100 millions in BONUSES since 2009!!!!!!!!!

  26. Does anyone here know how to track your loan? New Century brokered the loan and used Ocwen as a servicer. I have good documents for forgery, not enough. New Century filed BK in 2007 in Delaware and sold its “supposed” loans to Ellington, (Greenwich, CT) approved by the court. Numerous cease and desist orders and filed 8-K with SEC in 2007 around the time of my loan. Can someone here put me in the right place? I think my loan may not have been funded and oh, the trust collapsed in 2005. Any suggestions? I think I am close, but need to connect the dots.

  27. Jack: I don’t know, could be a typo, but I took it another way… as in “confidence” games played by con men!

  28. Is this a typo? Is it supposed to say “little confidence…”?

    “Based upon current data, there appears to be *confidence* that Trusts claimed to be within the FANNIE and Freddie rubric ever actually took ownership of the loans…”

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