COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE

Fannie and Freddie should be held accountable for (1) failing to check whether the loans were in fact viable, in conformity with GSE requirements and industry standards for underwriting (2) failing to check whether the loans were properly transferred by the actual owner of the obligation and (3) failing to provide easy access to the loan and trust information so that Banks, auditors, regulators and borrowers would be able to determine whether a particular loan was claimed as an asset of the pool (trust) was in fact present.” Neil Garfield,


EDITOR’S ANALYSIS: Fannie and Freddie were not responsible for the housing bubble, nor were they pressuring the Banks to issue more loans, subprime loans or any kind of loans. Contrary to ideological dogma these government sponsored entities didn’t make any loans. They were neither depository nor lending institutions. They merely served as conduits through which the Banks securitized the loans using Fannie and Freddie as a Master Trustee of pools that were supposed to be Trusts holding pools of loans.

As we have seen, the pools were largely empty because the documents of transfer referred to defective or even non-existent loans and the Assignor frequently didn’t own the loan it said it was transferring into these GSE trusts. But Fannie and Freddie should be held accountable for (1) failing to check whether the loans were in fact viable, in conformity with GSE requirements and industry standards for underwriting (2) failing to check whether the loans were properly transferred by the actual owner of the obligation and (3) failing to provide easy access to the loan and trust information so that Banks, auditors, regulators and borrowers would be able to determine whether a particular loan was claimed as an asset of the pool (trust) was in fact present.

This last item, information access should be a no-brainer, but the GSE’s are like a brick Wall when we do our securitization analysis causing much confusion and irritation amongst analysts and borrowers. This information should be totally transparent but it isn’t. When you get to Fannie or Freddie, you are met with an entry on their website that says nothing about any of the questions raised above and which will make the OCC Review process that much more difficult. Either they have the information or they don’t. If they don’t, the entry shouldn’t be made on their website because they don’t actually know anything about particular loan or loan transaction.

“Fannie owns it” is a statement that many are making when not even the agency itself knows if that is true. And in the effort to prove the location of the loan, Borrowers are repeatedly making the same mistake: proving their opponent’s case for them. The burden of proof after any serious question regarding title or loan ownership is raised, shifts to the would-be forecloser. Beau Biden, Delaware AG who just filed suit against MERS, says that at the very least, 25% of the time the Banks are getting it wrong just because of the use of MERS. Add in other reasons and the numbers go sharply up.

I would say to the lawyers who are litigating these issues: don’t get caught in the trap of assuming the burden of the other side. Proving that the loan IS in a pool defeats part of your case. Later you are going to present evidence that they didn’t execute transfer documents properly. How do you expect a Judge to take that seriously when you have already admitted that the loan is in the pool? SUBPOENA THE RECORDS.

Today in doing securitisation research a loan may be discovered on the Fannie and Freddie websites. but this provides little help to the auditor or analyst. The entry onto the website indicates that these now government nationalised entities might be involved and not that the loan documents or mortgage was perfected as a lien, not that a transfer of the loan ever occurred and not whether the GSE’s are or ever were creditors since at no point in time did their charters permit them to act as lenders. It is this Wall of Silence that keeps us from knowing what we really went on.

If Fannie and Freddie show the loan their website the most that can be said about it is that they accepted the filings of the Banks without checking the paperwork, they assisted in the securitisation of the loan but won’t tell the average researcher anything about the name of the trust into which the loan was supposedly placed and they MAY have a guarantee liability to buy or pay off the loans. They demand money to give you any information beyond the website and then they don’t give you enough information.

The entire Fannie and Freddie myth is a Bank spin on private sector loans. The real data shows that it was the private sector Banks who originated ALL the loans — and then those same Banks supplanted the function of then GSE’s by going directly to the secondary Market and no doubt mixing in the GSE trust pools with the private pools so they could claim to investors that their investment into bogus mortgage bonds was guaranteed by the Federal government — a classic sales trick to make the bonds more appealing by reducing the appearance of any risk of loss.

The MO (method operations) was then same one they used in the creation of MERS wherein they privatised the recording system present in all states. By replacing the public system with their own non-secure data they could play with the data and claims and force us into accepting the representations of counsel as to the status of the loan.

Despite the very active PR machine, the Banks have been shown to have co-opted the role of government in tracking and diminished the assurance from a title record that Buyers of anything are actually getting to legal title to whatever they bought — whether it is real or personal property. THE BANKS WANT TO FORCE THE BORROWERS INTO ACCEPTING THE LOSSES CREATED BY MASSIVE FRAUD AND SCREW-UPS BY THE BANKS. But the borrowers had the least information about the transactions they were tricked into signing and clearly have the least amount resources to pay for the crisis.So the creative spin machine managed to convince our government but not our citizenry that the people as taxpayers should pay if the people as borrowers could not pay on deals that nobody could pay.

If you want to do something, then send a barrage of letters to Fannie, Freddie, and your congressmen about opening up that information on Freddie and Fannie. If they have the information let them say so and then make it available like any other public records request. If they don’t have the information let them explain why they show the loan on their website.

McClatchy Washington Bureau

Private sector loans, not Fannie or Freddie, triggered crisis

David Goldstein and Kevin G. Hall | McClatchy Newspapers

WASHINGTON — As the economy worsens and Election Day approaches, a conservative campaign that blames the global financial crisis on a government push to make housing more affordable to lower-class Americans has taken off on talk radio and e-mail.

Commentators say that’s what triggered the stock market meltdown and the freeze on credit. They’ve specifically targeted the mortgage finance giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which the federal government seized on Sept. 6, contending that lending to poor and minority Americans caused Fannie’s and Freddie’s financial problems.

Federal housing data reveal that the charges aren’t true, and that the private sector, not the government or government-backed companies, was behind the soaring subprime lending at the core of the crisis.

Subprime lending offered high-cost loans to the weakest borrowers during the housing boom that lasted from 2001 to 2007. Subprime lending was at its height from 2004 to 2006.

Federal Reserve Board data show that:

  • More than 84 percent of the subprime mortgages in 2006 were issued by private lending institutions.
  • Private firms made nearly 83 percent of the subprime loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers that year.
  • Only one of the top 25 subprime lenders in 2006 was directly subject to the housing law that’s being lambasted by conservative critics.

The “turmoil in financial markets clearly was triggered by a dramatic weakening of underwriting standards for U.S. subprime mortgages, beginning in late 2004 and extending into 2007,” the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets reported Friday. [Editor’s note: A weakening standard caused by the fact that Wall Street wanted weak loans because the worse the loan the more money they made in the spread between what was advanced by the investor for funding mortgages and what the amount actually funded in loans to borrowers.]

Conservative critics claim that the Clinton administration pushed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to make home ownership more available to riskier borrowers with little concern for their ability to pay the mortgages.

“I don’t remember a clarion call that said Fannie and Freddie are a disaster. Loaning to minorities and risky folks is a disaster,” said Neil Cavuto of Fox News.

Fannie, the Federal National Mortgage Association, and Freddie, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., don’t lend money, to minorities or anyone else, however. They purchase loans from the private lenders who actually underwrite the loans.

It’s a process called securitization, and by passing on the loans, banks have more capital on hand so they can lend even more.

This much is true. In an effort to promote affordable home ownership for minorities and rural whites, the Department of Housing and Urban Development set targets for Fannie and Freddie in 1992 to purchase low-income loans for sale into the secondary market that eventually reached this number: 52 percent of loans given to low-to moderate-income families.

To be sure, encouraging lower-income Americans to become homeowners gave unsophisticated borrowers and unscrupulous lenders and mortgage brokers more chances to turn dreams of homeownership in nightmares.

But these loans, and those to low- and moderate-income families represent a small portion of overall lending. And at the height of the housing boom in 2005 and 2006, Republicans and their party’s standard bearer, President Bush, didn’t criticize any sort of lending, frequently boasting that they were presiding over the highest-ever rates of U.S. homeownership.

Between 2004 and 2006, when subprime lending was exploding, Fannie and Freddie went from holding a high of 48 percent of the subprime loans that were sold into the secondary market to holding about 24 percent, according to data from Inside Mortgage Finance, a specialty publication. One reason is that Fannie and Freddie were subject to tougher standards than many of the unregulated players in the private sector who weakened lending standards, most of whom have gone bankrupt or are now in deep trouble.

During those same explosive three years, private investment banks — not Fannie and Freddie — dominated the mortgage loans that were packaged and sold into the secondary mortgage market. In 2005 and 2006, the private sector securitized almost two thirds of all U.S. mortgages, supplanting Fannie and Freddie, according to a number of specialty publications that track this data.

In 1999, the year many critics charge that the Clinton administration pressured Fannie and Freddie, the private sector sold into the secondary market just 18 percent of all mortgages.

Fueled by low interest rates and cheap credit, home prices between 2001 and 2007 galloped beyond anything ever seen, and that fueled demand for mortgage-backed securities, the technical term for mortgages that are sold to a company, usually an investment bank, which then pools and sells them into the secondary mortgage market.

About 70 percent of all U.S. mortgages are in this secondary mortgage market, according to the Federal Reserve.

Conservative critics also blame the subprime lending mess on the Community Reinvestment Act, a 31-year-old law aimed at freeing credit for underserved neighborhoods.

Congress created the CRA in 1977 to reverse years of redlining and other restrictive banking practices that locked the poor, and especially minorities, out of homeownership and the tax breaks and wealth creation it affords. The CRA requires federally regulated and insured financial institutions to show that they’re lending and investing in their communities.

Conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer wrote recently that while the goal of the CRA was admirable, “it led to tremendous pressure on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac — who in turn pressured banks and other lenders — to extend mortgages to people who were borrowing over their heads. That’s called subprime lending. It lies at the root of our current calamity.”

Fannie and Freddie, however, didn’t pressure lenders to sell them more loans; they struggled to keep pace with their private sector competitors. In fact, their regulator, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, imposed new restrictions in 2006 that led to Fannie and Freddie losing even more market share in the booming subprime market.

What’s more, only commercial banks and thrifts must follow CRA rules. The investment banks don’t, nor did the now-bankrupt non-bank lenders such as New Century Financial Corp. and Ameriquest that underwrote most of the subprime loans.

These private non-bank lenders enjoyed a regulatory gap, allowing them to be regulated by 50 different state banking supervisors instead of the federal government. And mortgage brokers, who also weren’t subject to federal regulation or the CRA, originated most of the subprime loans.

In a speech last March, Janet Yellen, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, debunked the notion that the push for affordable housing created today’s problems.

“Most of the loans made by depository institutions examined under the CRA have not been higher-priced loans,” she said. “The CRA has increased the volume of responsible lending to low- and moderate-income households.”

In a book on the sub-prime lending collapse published in June 2007, the late Federal Reserve Governor Ed Gramlich wrote that only one-third of all CRA loans had interest rates high enough to be considered sub-prime and that to the pleasant surprise of commercial banks there were low default rates. Banks that participated in CRA lending had found, he wrote, “that this new lending is good business.”

36 Responses

  1. […] FANNIE AND FREDDIE BLOCK INFORMATION, PROTECTING BANKS AND FORECLOSURES « Livinglies’s Weblog. Rate this: Share this:TwitterFacebookLinkedInDiggRedditStumbleUponEmailPrintLike this:LikeBe the first to like this post. Filed under Forged Mortgage, Other Interesting Articles ← Avid Law Center Fights for Homeowners by Filing Wrongful Foreclosure Lawsuit – MarketWatch […]





    SETUP WITH FANNIE/FREDDIE DEAL WHERE ALL ‘GSE’ REJECTED Loan APPLICATIONS Fall INTO PIPELINE where Qualfied Intermediaries pickup like RELS TITLE dba WFHM (RELIANCE FINANCIAL – LAWYERS TITLE SERVICES ‘REL S’ ’11 BANK CREDIT FACILITY’ IS ‘CLEARING HOUSE’ Key figure for anyone writing book on largest ponzi money laundering scheme of 21st Century.

  4. Fannie and Freddie did not directly purchase subprime —– only the MBS (not really MBS) to the banks subprime — which was, largely, formerly — Fannie/Freddie loans. Ah — that is how they went from GSE to bank subprime???? No problem for Freddie/Fannie — they got a higher yield by the purchased MBS (not really MBS).

  5. Fannie and Freddie should check insurance contracts — what a field day that would be.

    Important information and relates back to FREDDIE Mac and Fannie Mae … big listing (NO DATE) on FDIC Receivership Assistance Contractors website:


    Awards and Contact Information for FDIC Securitization Master Servicer Contractors

    Master Servicer shall oversee the servicing activities of servicers assigned loans by the FDIC, monitor the servicer, and verify that the servicer’s efforts are adhering to the servicer’s obligations. This must be accomplished pursuant to the applicable servicing agreement, FDIC’s contract with the servicer, or other governing agreements. The Master Servicer has authority to enforce servicer obligations as well as calculate and administer the servicer’s monthly servicing fee and any other ancillary or incentive fees due to the servicer.

    Todd Whittemore
    10350 Park Meadows Dvie
    Littleton CO 80124

    Wells Fargo
    Peter Masterman
    420 Montgomer Street
    San Francisco CA 84104
    Legal Services: Michael Carter 415-397-5581 (locaction above)

    FDIC Loan Servicing Contractors:
    Scope of work under Loan Servicing Contracts (LSCs), which have been awarded to the contractors listed below, encompasses the full range of Commercial, Residential, and Consumer loan servicing functions for loans received from failed financial institutions, which are placed in Receivership or Conservatorship and managed by the FDIC. These LSCs are charged with safeguarding assets while providing loan services, including general loan administration, debt restructuring, and collection services appropriate to the type of loan being serviced. These loans under these contracts may be performing or non-performing.


    Mark Nieberlein
    350 Highland Dr
    Lewisville TX 75067
    972-315-8837 F

    Steven Nesmith
    1661 Worthington Rd Suite 100
    West Palm Beach FL 33409
    202-293-3083 F



    -Barclays Capital Inc.
    -Castle Oak Securities LP
    -Deutshche Securities Inc.
    -Grove Street Investment LLC
    -MHM Capital LLC
    -Milestone Advisors LLC
    -Nomura Securities International Inc.
    -Orestes Capital Management LLC
    -RBS Securities Inc.

    (ORE) Owned Real Estate provide contractor support at failed institution closings. Contractors assist FDIC identifying owned real estate and provide full range of asset management ‘and marketing’ services for bank-owned real estate obtained from failed financial institutions nation-wide.

    2100 ROSS AVE, #400
    DALLAS TX 75201

    Persicent, inc.
    2600 Douglas Rd Suite 800
    Coral Gabels FL 33134

    Quantum/G&A Joint Venture
    Paul Wallace


    Michael Dryden
    745 7th Avenue, 2nd FLOOR
    NEW YORK, NY 10019
    917-265-1109 F

    First Financial Network
    John Morris
    1400 Quail Springs Parkway, Suite 200
    Oklahoma City, OK 73134

    Awards and Contact Information for FDIC Loan Servicing Assistance, Surveillance and Oversight Services

    The scope of work under the FDIC Loan Servicing Assistance, Surveillance and Oversight Services Receivership Basic Ordering Agreements (RBOA), which have been awarded to the contractors listed below, is to provide Loan Servicing Assistance, Surveillance and Oversight at potentially failing or failed financial institutions at which the FDIC has purview. The work entails, but is not limited to, the contractor assisting the FDIC in its work by conducting servicing reviews, reporting any weaknesses identified and recommending strategies for improvement; ongoing oversight and review of institutions internal practices, policies and procedures of servicing for loans held in portfolio(s), securitized loans, loans serviced for others, and other assets the FDIC may be involved with. Loan servicing portfolios will include a variety of products, i.e., agency conforming mortgages, reverse mortgages, Alt-A mortgages, sub-prime mortgages, private label Residential Mortgage and Commercial Mortgage securitizations, commercial loans, construction and development loans, and other assets the FDIC may be involved with.

    9062 Old Annapolis Rd
    Columbia MD 21045
    410-715-0184 F

    Charles Cacici
    60 Sacket Street, Suite 5
    Brooklyn NY 11231





    Raymond B. Kalustyan
    Corporate SVP
    250 Johnson RD
    Morris Plains NJ 07950

    Michael J. Weathers
    SVP of Government Services
    601 Riverside Ave
    Jacksonville FL 32204

    Awards and Contact Information for Securitization Program – Underwriter Services Contractors
    The FDIC has developed a securitization program to facilitate the sale of secured real estate loans (residential performing and nonperforming) owned by banks for which the FDIC is appointed as conservator or receiver. The securitizations will be in the form of private or public offerings. The FDIC has selected the following firms to underwrite securities backed by a pool of loans identified by the FDIC, from one or more banks.

    The Underwriter will assist the FDIC and/or any of its financial advisors, in connection with the FDIC’s Program, with respect to analyzing the Loans and the results of due diligence obtained on the Loans. The Underwriter may propose alternative structures and disposition strategies, and recommend an optimal securitization structure, assist the FDIC in reviewing and monitoring the preparation of transaction documentation. The Underwriter may also work with the credit rating agencies to potentially obtain credit ratings for the securities, coordinate the marketing and settlement process, and support the securities in the secondary market.

    -Amherts Securities Group
    -Banc of America Securities LLC
    -Barclays Capital
    -Castle Oak Securities LP
    -Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
    -Detusche Bank Securities Inc.
    -Goldman Sachs
    -Jefferies & Company Inc.
    -JP Morgan Securities Inc.
    -Morgan Stanley
    -M.R. Beal & Company
    -RBS Global Banking & Markets
    -The Williams Capital Group LP

    Total market value: $25,420,800
    Total assessed value for property: $25,420,800
    Total land value: $14,862,680
    Land usage: Office,Submerged Land
    Assessment for fiscal year: 2008/2009

    Building 1:

    Usage: Office 3-8 Sty
    Actual year built: 1952
    Effective year built: 1972
    Heated area: 63,534 square feet
    Stories: 6
    Baths: 49
    Rooms / Units: 12
    Base Area (actual / effective / heated): 624 / 624 / 624 square feet
    Canopy (actual / effective / heated): 1,018 / 254 / 0 square feet
    Finished Basement (actual / effective / heated): 624 / 437 / 624 square feet
    Finished Storage (actual / effective / heated): 624 / 312 / 0 square feet
    Unfinished Basement (actual / effective / heated): 152 / 53 / 0 square feet
    Conc Loading Plat Fin (actual / effective / heated): 324 / 97 / 0 square feet
    Finished upper story 1 (actual / effective / heated): 176 / 176 / 176 square feet
    Finished upper story 4 (actual / effective / heated): 1,429 / 5,716 / 5,716 square feet
    Finished upper story 5 (actual / effective / heated): 624 / 3,120 / 3,120 square feet

    Building 2:

    Usage: Office 3-8 Sty
    Actual year built: 1972
    Effective year built: 1982
    Value: $1,837,450
    Heated area: 54,812 square feet
    Stories: 4
    Baths: 52
    Rooms / Units: 12
    Base Area (actual / effective / heated): 1,584 / 1,584 / 1,584 square feet
    Canopy (actual / effective / heated): 4,600 / 1,150 / 0 square feet
    Finished Storage (actual / effective / heated): 1,584 / 792 / 0 square feet
    Finished upper story 2 (actual / effective / heated): 4,600 / 9,200 / 9,200 square feet
    Finished upper story 3 (actual / effective / heated): 1,584 / 4,752 / 4,752 square feet

    Building 3:

    Usage: Office 3-8 Sty
    Actual year built: 1972
    Effective year built: 1972
    Value: $279,570
    Heated area: 55,448 square feet
    Stories: 4
    Baths: 52
    Avg Story Height: 12 feet
    Base Area (actual / effective / heated): 7,871 / 7,871 / 7,871 square feet
    Canopy (actual / effective / heated): 1,040 / 260 / 0 square feet
    Finished Storage (actual / effective / heated): 1,633 / 816 / 0 square feet
    Unfinished Storage (actual / effective / heated): 1,040 / 416 / 0 square feet
    Finished upper story 2 (actual / effective / heated): 1,040 / 2,080 / 2,080 square feet
    Finished upper story 3 (actual / effective / heated): 7,871 / 23,613 / 23,613 square feet

    Building 4:

    Usage: Office 9+ Sty
    Actual year built: 1994
    Effective year built: 1994
    Value: $20,307,196
    Heated area: 290,801 square feet
    Stories: 13
    Bedrooms: 2
    Baths: 316
    Rooms / Units: 9999
    Avg Story Height: 14 feet
    Balcony (actual / effective / heated): 2,917 / 438 / 0 square feet
    Base Area (actual / effective / heated): 1,554 / 1,554 / 1,554 square feet
    Canopy (actual / effective / heated): 27 / 7 / 0 square feet
    Finished Storage (actual / effective / heated): 1,584 / 792 / 0 square feet
    Semi-Finished Base (actual / effective / heated): 713 / 570 / 713 square feet
    Unfinished Upper Story (actual / effective / heated): 2,137 / 1,068 / 0 square feet
    Lobby Good (actual / effective / heated): 1,554 / 1,942 / 1,554 square feet
    Conc Loading Plat Fin (actual / effective / heated): 2,137 / 641 / 0 square feet
    Finished upper story 10 (actual / effective / heated): 1,554 / 15,540 / 15,540 square feet
    Finished upper story 12 (actual / effective / heated): 168 / 2,016 / 2,016 square feet

    Building 5:

    Usage: Parking Garage
    Actual year built: 1994
    Effective year built: 1994
    Value: $3,141,141
    Heated area: 77,830 square feet
    Stories: 2
    Rooms / Units: 1
    Avg Story Height: 11 feet
    Base Area (actual / effective / heated): 77,830 / 77,830 / 77,830 square feet
    Unfinished Upper Story (actual / effective / heated): 77,830 / 38,915 / 0 square feet

    Building 6:

    Usage: Wholesale Storage
    Actual year built: 1994
    Effective year built: 1994
    Value: $230,326
    Heated area: 9,246 square feet
    Stories: 1
    Rooms / Units: 6
    Avg Story Height: 18 feet
    Common Wall: 5
    Base Area (actual / effective / heated): 108 / 108 / 108 square feet
    Canopy (actual / effective / heated): 24 / 10 / 0 square feet
    Fair Office (actual / effective / heated): 144 / 252 / 144 square feet
    Finished upper story 1 (actual / effective / heated): 144 / 144 / 144 square feet


    601 Riverside Avenue
    Jacksonville, FL 32204
    Find on map >>
    Total market value: $23,914,900
    Total assessed value for property: $23,914,900
    Total building value: $26,062,744
    Total land value: $5,070,400
    Land usage: Commercial
    Assessment for fiscal year: 2008/2009

    Building 1:

    Usage: Office 3-8 Sty
    Actual year built: 2006
    Effective year built: 2006
    Value: $26,062,744
    Heated area: 250,793 square feet
    Stories: 8
    Baths: 98
    Rooms / Units: 32
    Avg Story Height: 14 feet
    Base Area (actual / effective / heated): 5 / 5 / 5 square feet
    Canopy (actual / effective / heated): 5 / 1 / 0 square feet
    Unfinished Storage (actual / effective / heated): 4,270 / 1,708 / 0 square feet
    Conc Loading Plat Fin (actual / effective / heated): 779 / 234 / 0 square feet
    Finished upper story 1 (actual / effective / heated): 5 / 5 / 5 square feet
    Finished upper story 2 (actual / effective / heated): 4,270 / 8,540 / 8,540 square feet
    Finished upper story 6 (actual / effective / heated): 215 / 1,290 / 1,290 square feet
    Finished upper story 7 (actual / effective / heated): 779 / 5,453 / 5,453 square feet

    Building 2:

    Usage: Parking Garage
    Actual year built: 2006
    Effective year built: 2006
    Value: $2,563,492
    Heated area: 74,329 square feet
    Stories: 2
    Rooms / Units: 2
    Avg Story Height: 10 feet
    Base Area (actual / effective / heated): 74,329 / 74,329 / 74,329 square feet
    Unfinished Upper Story (actual / effective / heated): 74,329 / 37,164 / 0 square feet

    Back to: Duval County, FL property tax assessment data, Jacksonville, Florida, All US cities

    Read more:

  7. CUBED2K ,

    Market Makers were killed by GS and others that trade with computers , HFT (high frequency trading) , pulling quotes for each stock 10,000 or more times per second and trading in increments of 1/100 ¢ , this , combined with the fact that GS (and others) OWN the computer networks your trade will arrive over makes it impossible for human Market Makers on the trading floor to make a profit which is why they no longer exist.. They KNOW what your “limit” prices are , how much is at each price and how to “walk” a price up and down to capture your trade at a price most favorable to them.

    This has made the markets EXTREMELY dangerous as witnessed by the recent “FLASH CRASH” ,,, no human intervention , just computers trading hundreds of thousands of trades per second one step at a time in the same direction over and over..

  8. here’s an old term not used nowadays

    market maker

    oh how we forget. Who are market makers. Why that would be wall st who are now connected to international banks across the globe, it’s global dude…………..always was since 1913 when the federal reserve system of banks was passed by paid off politicians.

  9. Vary important line in this video——

    “rather it is how you make it that we are concerned about”

    Do you get it?

    It is money.
    How is it actually called nowadays. It is called “financial engineering”. Or more actually it is called manipulation.. Look up the word manipulation.

    Re-listen to the video –

  10. FBI (Ted Gunderson): SATANISM one of the methods used to rule the 99.9%

  11. vote with your money that you earned.


    that means you didn’t borrow to earn your money, you had to work for it. No leverage, But International banks and Wall St use leverage. But you can’t for the most part. You can not hedge yourself in your working wage.

    The lock, stock and barrel of the international banks (and central banks, not governments since they gave to power to private international banks) is getting you to borrow, to take out loans, use credit cards thru international banks. And via media or commercials is to take out loans from them…………..let’s see it costs big bucks to pay for a commercial using Cap 1 credit cards on network TV, your local credit union can’t afford to do so-WHY? Who Controls THAT?


  12. LOOK,

    you got a potato farm and some workers, some employees, or family owned.
    You are being bombed by Jap zero’s. Nothing you can do you think. Well why not throw your potato’s at the zero’s. It put’s you at cause and not the effect, you are fighting back.

    But you might think what is a potato against a bomb. I will tell you. One potato gets into the intake of the engine of the Zero, and it goes down. Consider some sand into the intake of an engine, it will stop. Consider some sulfuric acid into the intake on an engine, it will stop.

    So I tell you we are many and many potato’s tossed will do something no doubt about it.

    Look all computers are based on logic of yes, no, and maybe. You operate that way in every decision you make. More yes, you go, you made a decision. More no’s, you decide to not go. Go would mean action. You get a maybe, nothing happens. To solve it you need more data to decide. Tip the balance of maybe’s to a yes or a no.
    Wall Streets and International Bankers models are all based on this.
    Want to tip the balance.

    Then stay away from International Banks, go with local credit unions. Don’t use credit cards, use cash. Don’t take out loans, use friends and family to borrow to get the big purchase item. You will ti the balance from the International Bankers……………….vote with your money that you earned.

  13. you want to help and spend the word on the corruption of wall street and the international bankers…………

    here’s what you can do………..

    go to vista print or your local copy shop.

    Get some business cards printed,,,,,,,,,,,vista print is something like 20 bucks for 500 cards.

    put on the cards whatever you wish to communicate…… don’t have to put your name on it. Word of Mouth is much more powerful than media advertising.

    Put on your card ————–

    end international bank corruption- go to www. end the fed….

    end mortgage corruption – go to livinglies
    go to foreclosurefraud dot com


    hand them out to people.


    why do I say the above. I had an idea and wished to tell others. Why? I went to a local antiques fare today. I talked with several people on the mortgage mess and modifing loans, etc. Jeepers, I thought why not have some calling cards to hand to people to check it out.

  14. How on Earth can 1% control the 99%? I mean that is 1 person controlling 99 people. How is that possible?

    Because they, the 1%, control the money supply, the quantity of money issued and the issuance thereof. Governments using a central bank control, central banks control the money supply, not the government’s. The money supply is debt based. If you give out loans, you create money. And you charge interest.

    Why can’t any government do that? And why can’t any government do that and collect interest at 2% or whatever figure is needed to keep the money supply constant with population growth or technology growth or whatever? And keep inflation low? And the interest charged is what pays the government to do their job? And if the governments were actually the banks, why it would be very easy to find out who was stealing the money, via corruption and manipulation of the money supply or creation of it. Wall St and the present banking system are simply manipulation of the money.

    The real evil-doers are the international bankers, not people creating successful companies or corporations that exchange a good product with others. Who are international? That would be BofA, Chase, Citi, UBS, Deutshe Bank, and and on. Is your local credit union international?

    And then you got idiots like Hannity and Levin on Fox News who think banks are companies that should earn a profit and that is capitalism. No it ain’t you dumb shits or paid hacks via Cap 1 Credit Card doing commercials on your shows – international bankers.

    Please there is a difference between a local sound banker and an international banker. Big difference.


  15. Haven’t read much about anyone who has a lawsuit against Freddie or Fannie, but I do. I had the same experience with being stopped dead in my tracks after discovering one of these GSE’s claims to own my loan. I pursued it a bit and got an email from their legal department identifying my loan with Fannie’s own loan number, not the loan number of the bank I had been paying. None of defendants will admit that loan was securitized when it was originated in 2005, has a MERS Min number, and the fact that Fannie securitizes rather than holds loans.
    This should be interesting as I begin discovery. I don’t know if they will stonewall the interrogatories and request for documents, or cough up the data.

  16. Freedom————-we need it now………….watch the video

  17. @ enraged difference in conservatorship and receivership. We don’t own them.

  18. Interesting that when I called Wells Fargo Home Mortgage back in 2009 to find out if our loan was a Fannie Mae loan when seeking a modification, the lady said, “It says, ‘Maybe.'” She was apparently looking at our loan on a computer. Two years later, our Deed of Trust was transferred from the original “lender” (now defunct) to a 2007 non-GSE trust that is no longer reporting to the SEC.

  19. Nope. When ‘FDIC’ bails out a takeover
    JPMorgan gets all assets for $50,000,000 rest written off
    they did not purchase the assets they get to service the assets and collect money from them and make as much as they want and there is no payback

  20. @Nancy Drewe

    Thank you for that clarification. With all due respect, though, weren’t they part of the entities heavily bailed out by taxpayers in 2008 (and possibility subsequently)? And if they are in receivership, obviously, they have never reimbursed one cent, correct?

    Under that scenario, don’t they technically and for all intended purpose “belong” to the taxpayers? I am not trying to be obtuse or purposely difficult but it seems to me that if we gave money, we bought…?

  21. When I actually called Freddie Mac, as they “own” my loan…. the girl asked me, and I quote ” About how much do you owe, and who are you paying?” I took the phone away from my ear and stared at it. Seriously??!! I asked for the trust name and cusip number after that, and they reply I got was ” well we don’t give that out, as it is not something the customer needs to know”. Go figure.


  23. ABN AMRO Bank N.V.;
    Bank of America, National Association;
    The Bank of New York Mellon;
    Citibank, N.A.;
    Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas;
    HSBC Bank USA, National Association;
    JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association;
    UBS AG;
    U.S. Bank National Association; and
    Wells Fargo Bank, National Association.
    Clearing House Members



  24. I happen to believe that if, on April 15, 2012, no one filed a tax return, be it federal or state, the feds would take notice. Our money has been grossly mismanaged: why keep on giving it to the feds?

    Is that going to happen? I doubt it.

    I see that as the only solution.

  25. CRASH heard around the world directly related to:

    Banc America Securities, BONY Indenture Trustee
    Private wealth management:
    Foothills Group Inc., subsidiary Foothills Group Capital was as NATIONSBANK when acquiring Norwest Corporation assisted by USB Financial Services Securities Investor back in 1992/1993.

    FOOTHILLS the same FOOTHILLS part of Norwest’s Wells Fargo Foothills….

    1992/1993 IndyMac and Countrywide Funding birthed by Nationsbanc and

    IndyMac Bancorp Inc. (Registrant)
    Closely Related (4):
    •Indymac Capital Trust I – SEC# 1157668 6/10/04
    •Indymac Capital Trust II – SEC# 115670 6/30/06
    •Indymac Capital Trust III – SEC# 1157671 – 6/30/06
    •Indymac Capital Trust IV – SEC# 1157669 6/30/06
    Formerly Assigned On
    Indymac Mortgage Holdings Inc. 6/2/98
    Inmc Mortgage Holdings Inc 8/13/97
    CWM Mortgage Holdings Inc 10/25/94
    Countrywide Mortgage Investments Inc/DE
    7/3/92: Address: 888 East Walnut Street
    Pasadena, California 91101-7211 U.S.A.

  26. 9/7/2008
    Federal Housing Finance Agency took over placing Fannie & Freddie (private companies) benefactors ‘ClearingHouse members’, placed under conservatorship (equivalent Chapter 11) appoint new leadership.

    Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac (own) (or back) over $5 Trillion U.S. Alt-A mortgages as of 2009. Account for almost half of $12 Trillion U.S. Mortgage Market. (Where did Chase and BOA each come up with over $70 Trillion CDO’s booked about 2 weeks ago?). Did the market go up because nonobdy balked?

    US Real Estate Bubble fo early 2000’s. Housing boom spurred by increase in Alt-A mortgage loan business and the related institutional commercial subprime lending or alternative investments. In 2004, HUD directed Fannie & Freddie (private companies) to purchase more loans from subprime lenders in order to fufill ‘affordable housing mandate.’

    2004-2006 documentation requirements dropped in 2005 allowed purchase over $434 billion in securities backed by subprime loans further fueling the BOOM. 2004 alone ‘GSE’ purchased 44% of market an increase over 116% from 2003. In 2005 purchases accounted for 33% of market and in 2006 scaled back purchases to almost one-half. 2007 correction, defaults on Alt-A mortgage business resulted in global credit crunch turned worse March 2008.

    Fannie and Freddie recorded $14.9 Billion combined net losses in 2007 depleting capital and undermining financial strength.

    Fannie down 83% and freddie Down 88% –
    Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson ‘grave concerns over solvency’
    (an understatement) committed federal regulators would back the two GSEs, asked Congress to inject unlimited amounts of capital into both companies!

    Hello ‘crack head’ wall street investors! continue to sell junk. Stocks resumed their slide July 2008. Meanwhile under convervatorship agreement,

    Under the conservatorship agreement, the U.S. Treasury would make a capital infusion of (up to) $100 billion into each GSE. In exchange, each GSE would issue $1 billion of senior preferred stock with a 10% coupon to the U.S. Treasury

    Other conditions of the agreement were that each GSE’s retained mortgage and mortgage-backed securities portfolio should not exceed $850 billion as of December 31, 2009, to be reduced by 10% per year until it reached $250 billion.

    It was one of the factors, along with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the near-demise of AIG, that contributed to the dramatic escalation of the financial crisis in September, 2008.

    Structured Asset Securities Corp (SACO) a pass through agency received ‘sale of notes’ care of Indenture Trustee ‘Deutsche Bank Trust Co’ who passed cash to Indenture Trustee Wells Fargo Bank NA for Wilmington Trust Co. WHo passed to ALS-Wilmington Trust Co c/o MERS beneficiary and DB STRUCTURED PRODUCTS

    Aurora Loan Services receives from DBTCO ‘treasury’ trust schedule and passes custody to Aurora Loan Services, Inc. (conduit for Lehman Brother Inc.) c/o Lehman Institutional – Lehman Securities. All went BOOM except for ‘Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas’ and ‘Wells Fargo Bank NA.

    Read more:

    Read more:

    Read more:


  27. Non-conforming and Alt-A: A classification of mortgages where the risk profile falls between prime and subprime

    Alt-A important to Title and companies who issue LENDER policies related loans sold to REMICS.

    “2007 Alt-A mortgage business dried up, nearly disappeared. ”

    Senator Charles Schumer of New York in a letter wrote to regulators said ‘INDYMac could face a failure.” Letter leaked to public, along with a collapsing housing market caused the bank run. INDYMAC flooded with customers withdrawing money. $1.3 Billion in 11 days. Federal Government seizes bank due to liquidity crisis. Listing assets of $32 Billion and deposits of $19 Billion.

    Alt-A suspected to be reason for fall of INDYMAC.

    Alt-A mortgage business and INDY Mac not an isolated indicdent. INDY Mac one of the biggest dominoes until BOA being setup to take th hi. Benefactors CLEARING HOUSE. MEMBERS>

    American Land Title Association – ALTA (Norwest Corp)
    Members of the ALTA agree to a code of conduct that outlines ethical business practices, including operating in a legal and compliant manner that is fair to the consumer. The Land Title Institute (LTI), a subsidiary of ALTA, offers educational training in the industry.

    8/1/2008 INDYMAC filed Chapter 7.

    Read more:

  28. Fannie and Freddie belong to the tax payers, i.e., you and me. We purchased them at an incredibly high price and I would expect that they are subject to FOIA. Until We The People demand to know what we purchased, we will be kept in the dark. Shouldn’t we start asking the hard questions?

  29. February 27, 2006

    The Honorable Warren B. Rudman
    Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, LLP
    1615 L Street, NW, Suite 1300
    Washington, DC 20036-5694


    Dear Senator Rudman:

    I have completed my initial review of your Report and have come away with the impression that you and your firm were duped by the Board of Directors of Fannie Mae and quite possibly OFHEO officials.

    Since 1996, I have been in contact with the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors at Fannie Mae pursuant to their fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders and stakeholders, reporting to the committee the mischief of management. Despite being repeatedly assured by members of the Audit Committee and members of management that my concerns were dutifully being taken up at Audit Committee’s meetings, they appear nowhere in your Report. I also have had numerous correspondence with OFHEO which to date has fallen upon deaf ears.

    The gist of my reporting to the Audit Committee reflects the concern of shareholders and stakeholders at the very core of Fannie’s business and to the fundamental problem prompting the “creative” accounting you referred to in your Report at all levels of Fannie . Specifically, I am referring to Fannie Mae being the “mother” of all what has come to me know as predatory lending practices which are only cursorily mentioned in your Report.

    Mother Fannie, as you are aware, in their annual effort to secure the implicit guarantee of the US Treasury, proffers to congress on an annual basis its Servicer/Guidelines as an explanation of why congress should not concern itself with safety and soundness issues when it comes to Fannie Mae’s business . Mother Fannie touts that all Seller/Servicers are contractually bound to adhere to those Guidelines which should abate any anxiety of those concerned about safety and soundness issues. Only one problem… one audits for compliance with those Guidelines which is the very reason why our courts across the country have been burdened with vast increases in foreclosure lawsuits.

    Page 2

    Monday, February 27, 2006

    The Honorable Warren B. Rudman

    Attendant with the predatory lending practices are the issues of ownership, debt collectors calling themselves “servicers”, agents, nominees, lost notes, holders, Fannie’s reliance on the errant servicers financial information, etc. all words and actions that would confuse any CPA as to the location of debt which, in turn, reeks havoc with financials.

    My contact with the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors of Fannie Mae depict a different scenario that what is projected by your Report, that is, the culprits are gone and the current folks are cooperative. Specifically, in my instance I am referring to the fact that current Audit Committee members as well as current members of management including corporate secretary Phil Weber have been complicit with in allowing predatory lender Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp. to perpetrate a fraud against me under the color of law. In support , I am attaching my correspondence with the Audit Committee of Fannie of October 21, 2005 as well as November 7, 2005, which to date I have had no response nor are they alluded to in your Report as mandated by Sarbanes Oxley pursuant to the Audit Committee’s fiduciary responsibilities. FYI, I am also attaching my correspondence to the members of the Audit Committee of seller/servicer Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp. reporting their conduct in their campaign IN TERROREM being waged against me. If the thought that I might be unique has entered your mind , please visit a website called

    There is no doubt in my mind that that “Mother” Fannie has allowed and in fact have encouraged the predatory lending practices that have bogged down America’s court system. The likes of which the Nationsbanc’s, Ameriquest, Ocwen, Fairbanks, EMC Mortgage, etc. could all be held accountable by Mother Fannie tomorrow by virtue of their contractual Agreement to abide by Servicer Guidelines. Frankly speaking, the $10.5 billion reported meltdown thus far at Fannie is miniscule compared with the liability inherent in their failure to mandate compliance with the Seller/Servicer Guidelines which would be placed on the doorstep of the American taxpayers.

    As a shareholder, stakeholder in Fannie Mae as well as being a taxpayer I would like to ask you to amend your Report to insist that Fannie’s Seller/Servicers Agreements be immediately audited for compliance and that Congress refuse any implicit or explicit guarantee of the US Treasury until Fannie is complaint with

    Page 3

    Monday, February 27, 2006

    The Honorable Warren B. Rudman

    this request. I stand ready to assist you and your staff in formulating a procedure to accomplish this task.

    Please confirm your receipt of this correspondence as well and giving me an outline of your anticipated course of action.

    Thank you.

    Sincerely yours,


    Richard Davet

    Encls. 10-21-05 Corresp Audit Committee FNMA
    11-07-05 Corresp. Audit Committee FNMA
    02-15-06 Corresp. Audit Committee, Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp.

    P.S. I would appreciate you sending me the name(s) of the individuals charged with the criminal investigations in this matter so they possibly might help me as a victim of Fannie.
    Cc: SEC
    The Federal Reserve Board
    The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
    Ohio State Regulators
    Deloitte & Touche
    Board of Directors, Fannie Mae
    Congressional Representatives

  30. ‘sub-prime’ is term that does not apply to consumer.

    Sub-prime is misused part of Financial Universe and institutional lenders not consumers.

    Consumers who get the AAA ratings for REMIC are ‘Alt-A’ Loans
    Alternative Investments are attaache to the Alt-A Loans.

    The promise to pay our promissory note became Annunity for 30 years.

    When you applied for a loan ‘GSE’ rules applied first goes into one pipelien any nonconforming are considered to be Alt-A loans.

    Sub-prime means in financial world, the way the information was intpu into the computer resuled in forcing Alt-A loans to pipeline who charged more ‘rates above prime’ suggesting such loans have reasonable chance of defaulting on debt repayment making lots of money for beneficiary through alternative investments which include annunity in the event of default. The Lenders Policy the consumer pays for is an annual policy? or 5Year Policy. Will relate to credit swaps.

  31. FHMLA can’t negotiate due to annunities. What?
    The annunities (our loans resold and first converted to an annunity) then passed to REMICS c/o Qualified Intermediaries.SERVICERS

  32. Indenture Trustee to Indenture Trustee
    SASCO to Wells Fargo Bank NA
    DBTCO to Wilmington Trust Co

    DBTCo ‘Sale of Note’ &
    Wells Fargo Bank NA ‘Sale of Note’ for Wilmington Trust Co
    both passed by DBTCo to Aurora Loan Services.

  33. Coming into your living rooms, right to rent property, pay all taxes, repairs, etc for 30 years.

    GMAC Mortgage is really ‘RELS TITLE’ aka ‘ATI TITLE’ in state of Maryland.

    Norwest Mortgage, Inc. renamed in IOWA to GMAC Mortgage Company of Iowa, and renamed to GMAC Mortgage Company of Pennsylvania dba affiliate of ‘WFHM’ c/o RELS TITLE and ATI TITLE Qualified Intermediary Servicers who are the ‘debt collector’ of performing loans and receive orders from ‘WFHM Institutional c/o Premier Asset Services (strategic partnership with ‘Chase’ GMAC’ and WFC’ c/o RESIDENTIAL FUNDING CORP 1985 foreward dba Norwest Mortgage, Inc.

    June 1998, Wells Fargo Bank, Sioux Falls South Dakota became Indenture Trustee for Wilmington Trust Company, taking place of GMAC’s Residential Funding Corporation.

    Indenture Trustee ‘Wells Fargo Bank NA’ for Wilmington Trust Company handle business passing cash from DBTCo Indenture Trustee for Structured Asset Securities Corp.

    Transactions via Qualified Intermediary – collection of loans sold to ‘originator’ c/o Purchase & Sale Agreement are passed to both Servicer for collection on promissory note and passed in a series of transactions – short term investmenets, each note paid off passes 60 days later to ‘Aurora Loan Services, Inc. bailee manager for Sale of Note and Sale of Loan, Assignment of Mortgage (beneficiary) if part of ‘Title Exchange’ MERS will be grantee for life or beneficiary will be name of Mortgage Originator or Warehouse Lender.
    Larry Gilmore CEO HOPE LOAN PORT colorful INTEGRATOR

    Wonder why State of Maryland in Partnership with GMAC Mortgage?





    Larry has been actively involved in developing solutions to providing affordable housing to underserved communities throughout his career.

    Larry currently serves as the CEO and President for HOPE LoanPort, the mortgage industry portal designed to facilitate the submission of full modification applications to mortgage servicers by non profit counselors across the country. He formerly served as the Deputy Executive Director for the HOPE NOW Alliance where he assisted in managing a comprehensive strategy to preserve homeownership facilitating partnership initiatives between investors, servicers, counselors, consumer advocates, multiple government entities. This includes executing strategies specific to consumer outreach, education, and ensuring borrower’s access to long-term solutions.

    Larry served as Vice President of Emerging Markets and VP of Government, Housing, and Industry Relations for Option One Mortgage Corporation (a subsidiary of H & R Block Corporation), where he had direct responsibilities for directing strategies designed for lending opportunities among growing segments, expanding the company brand by managing ongoing relationships with community organizations, consumer advocacy groups, industry trade associations, regulators, legislators and GSEs. Larry also worked on specific strategies to increase cultural diversity and served as the Chair for the Mortgage Bankers Association of America’s Diversity Task Force.

    Prior to Option One, Larry served as the Associate Director of Industry Relations at the Mortgage Bankers Association of America (MBA) with core responsibilities managing outreach and policy issues. Larry served as MBA’s liaison for the Association’s Committee’s assisted in developing MBA’s position on affordable housing and nonprime lending issues. In addition, Larry coordinated MBA conferences, launching an industry cultural diversity initiative, and facilitating MBA’s development of numerous affordable housing efforts.

    Larry joined Norwest Mortgage in 1996 where he served as the Manager of Market Opportunities. Larry managed a research division that identified market opportunities and developed strategic plans to increase lending across the country. Larry assisted in the development of national programs and identified partnership opportunities.
    Larry has and continues to serve on numerous boards that provide services specific to affordable housing and other underserved communities.

    Managing Director
    Gilmore Consulting Group, LLC
    Banking industry

    November 2007 – Present (4 years) Washington D.C. Metro Area

    President and CEO
    Hope LoanPort
    Banking industry

    November 2009 – August 2011 (1 year 10 months) Washington D.C. Metro Area

    January 2010 – August 2011
    • Board Administration and Support – Supports operations and administration of Board by advising and informing Board members, interfacing between Board and staff, and supporting Board recommendations.
    • Program, Product and Service Delivery – Oversees design, marketing, promotion, delivery and quality of programs, products and services
    • Financial, Tax, Risk and Facilities Management – Recommends yearly budget for Board approval and prudently manages organization’s resources within those budget guidelines according to current laws and regulations
    • Human Resource Management – Effectively manages the human resources of the organization according to authorized personnel policies and procedures that fully conform to current laws and regulations
    • Community and Public Relations – Assures the organization and its mission, programs, products and services are consistently presented in strong, positive image to relevant stakeholders
    • Fundraising – Oversees fundraising planning and implementation, including identifying resource requirements, researching funding sources, establishing strategies to approach funders, submitting proposals and administrating fundraising records and documentation
    • Results:
    o A proven market solution to streamline the delivery of foreclosure prevention solutions, Hope LoanPort has become the portal of choice for nonprofit counselors; with nearly 3000 counselors and 700 organizations in 50 states sign-up to use.
    o Secured government contracts at the state and federal level focused on addressing foreclosure prevention and leveraging Treasury Hardest Hit Funds
    o Established a diverse Board of Directors.
    o Secured contractual relationships.
    o Secured initial start-up capital.
    o Built a competent staff to manage onboarding, training, finance, business development, marketing/communications, technology, office administration, and customer service and client relations.

    Deputy Executive Director
    HOPE NOW Alliance
    Banking industry

    2007 – January 2010 (3 years) Washington D.C. Metro Area

    • Developed and executed a comprehensive industry strategy to address foreclosures by increasing outreach to borrowers, leveraging a network of counseling organizations, expanding mortgage servicer best practices, while working with the investment community to foster the availability of appropriate workout solutions.
    • Speak on behalf of HOPE NOW Alliance and members on a collaborative industry approach. This includes testifying to Federal Congressional Committees, briefing regulatory and executive branches of government, speaking to the press, and presenting at numerous industry venues.
    • Execute and maintain a multi-state/city homeownership preservation strategy; this consists of targeting 17 markets in 13 states in less than 4 months. This includes coordinating a collaborative partnership with Alliance members (investors, servicers, counseling organizations, and all key industry trade associations) to provide adequate workout solutions for borrowers face-to-face. This also includes securing appropriate venues and equipment contracts, soliciting and securing member sponsors, securing participation of local housing organizations and elected officials to speak, developing and moderating official speaking programs, and overseeing the event’s overall success.
    • Coordinate and Staff Alliance committees: this includes coordinating and working with committee chairs, trade associations’ (particularly MBA, Financial Services Roundtable, Housing Policy Council, etc.) legislative and executive leadership, and HOPE NOW’s Executive Committee to drive succinct results. These committees include specific strategies on government affairs, communications, technology innovations, counselor capacity, borrower outreach, and data collection.
    • Identify and secure new members. This includes the development of a series of sponsorship packages aligning Hope Now services to specific client needs.

    VP of Industry Relations
    Option One Mortgage
    Public Company; HRB; Financial Services industry

    2004 – 2007 (3 years) Washington D.C. Metro Area

    • Develop and manage company relationships with community organizations, consumer advocacy groups, industry trade associations, regulators, and government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs).
    • Manage strategic partnerships to advance company best practices, national anti-predatory lending legislation, risk associated with the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), proactive efforts on Hurricane Katrina, emerging markets, homeownership preservation, consumer education and outreach, product development and the like.
    • Best Practices – Obtain ongoing feedback from trade associations and industry peers on consumer best practice positions. Provide input to senior executive, risk management, compliance, and legislative affairs colleagues to ensure company’s servicing and origination best practices are a leader in the industry.
    • Fair Lending and Fair Housing– Manage long-term consulting relationship that reviews entire company operation, providing feedback and recommendations on activities to ensure company is in compliance with applicable law and proactive in approach. Also serving on companies Fair Lending Committee.
    • Home Mortgage Disclosure Act – Participating on industry trade coalition tasked with developing industry position, developing legislative approach, and a succinct communication’s strategy. Within OOMC, working with internal committee providing feedback on how to analyze data, it’s potential implications, and development of an action plan to address in local markets.
    • Anti-Predatory Lending Legislation – Participate in numerous industry coalitions providing strategic input to advance legislation.
    • Emerging Markets – Ayssist in developing OOMC’s strategy specific to emerging markets.
    • Homeownership Preservation – facilitated the development of OOMC’s regional strategy focused on developing public and nonprofit partnerships designed to reduce delinquencies and foreclosures.

    Deputy Director
    Mortgage Bankers Association
    Nonprofit; Banking industry

    2000 – 2004 (4 years) Washington D.C. Metro Area

    • Staff MBA Affordable Housing and Subprime Lending Committees; provide guidance and facilitated member’s policy positions, developed association issue papers and comment letters.
    • Develop partnership alliances with government, industry, and community organizations that advance MBA affordable housing and subprime lending efforts.
    • Manage the implementation of MBA core commitments to the 2002 White House Administration’s “Blue Print for the American Dream” initiative. This included an affordable housing website and facilitating a series of local private/public/non-profit roundtables focused on homeownership that were held in conjunction with the U.S. Conference of Mayors.
    • Developed initiative to increase cultural diversity throughout the real estate finance industry, “Path to Diversity,” by providing educational services to diverse interns and real estate finance professionals.
    • Manage MBA’s Annual Subprime Lending Conference; responsible for marketing and advertising, content development, speaker selection, entertainment, etc.

    Associate Director
    Mortgage Bankers Association
    Nonprofit; Banking industry

    2000 – 2004 (4 years) Washington D.C. Metro Area

    • Staff MBA Affordable Housing and Subprime Lending Committees; provide guidance and facilitated member’s policy positions, developed association issue papers and comment letters.
    • Develop partnership alliances with government, industry, and community organizations that advance MBA affordable housing and subprime lending efforts.
    • Manage the implementation of MBA core commitments to the 2002 White House Administration’s “Blue Print for the American Dream” initiative. This included an affordable housing website and facilitating a series of local private/public/non-profit roundtables focused on homeownership that were held in conjunction with the U.S. Conference of Mayors.
    • Developed initiative to increase cultural diversity throughout the real estate finance industry, “Path to Diversity,” by providing educational services to diverse interns and real estate finance professionals.
    • Manage MBA’s Annual Subprime Lending Conference; responsible for marketing and advertising, content development, speaker selection, entertainment, etc.

    Manager of Market Opportunities
    Wells Fargo Home Mortgage
    Public Company; 10,001+ employees; WFC; Banking industry

    1996 – 2000 (4 years)

  34. BILL DALLAS C/O FIRST FRANKIN SETUP WITH FANNIE/FREDDIE DEAL WHERE ALL ‘GSE’ REJECTED Loan APPLICATIONS Fall INTO PIPELINE where Qualfied Intermediaries pickup like RELS TITLE dba WFHM (RELIANCE FINANCIAL – LAWYERS TITLE SERVICES ‘REL S’ ’11 BANK CREDIT FACILITY’ IS ‘CLEARING HOUSE’ Key figure for anyone writing book on largest ponzi money laundering scheme of 21st Century. 11 Bank Clearing House communcating with FDIC and US TREASURY include:

    ABN AMRO Bank N.V.;
    Bank of America, National Association;
    The Bank of New York Mellon;
    Citibank, N.A.;
    Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas;
    HSBC Bank USA, National Association;
    JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association;
    UBS AG;
    U.S. Bank National Association; and
    Wells Fargo Bank, National Association.
    Clearing House Members

    Losses not showing up as they should be –
    Are servicers recognizing bottom slice losses?
    How is it not securities fraud
    The servicers generally own that bottom tier. And if they do what they’re supposed to, and recognize the losses, it will blow holes in their balance sheets. So they don’t recognize losses and keep paying themselves money they’re not entitled to. (Reminds me of banker bonus time.)

  35. CA AG Harris Attacks FHFA’s DeMarco on Principal Reductions
    By: David Dayen Saturday November 5, 2011 8:41 am

    California Attorney General Kamala Harris has been awfully quiet amid pressure from the Obama Administration to agree to a settlement with the big banks over foreclosure fraud. So it’s interesting that she popped up this week to call for the resignation of Ed DeMarco, the head of the Federal Housing Finance Agency.

    California Attorney General Kamala Harris has called on the head of the agency that houses Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to “step aside” if he continues to refuse to reduce mortgage loans for underwater homeowners.

    “It has become clear to me that the only way to keep distressed California homeowners in their homes is through meaningful principal reduction,” Harris said in a statement Thursday […]

    Harris’ pressure on Edward DeMarco, who oversees Fannie and Freddie as the acting director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, serves to further highlight the inadequacies of a deal that does not include Fannie and Freddie, although they own half of the mortgage debt in the country.

    Some of my colleagues have characterized this as Harris doing the dirty work of the Administration. They don’t like DeMarco, in this telling, because he’s tough on the banks; witness the FHFA lawsuit against 17 financial institutions over misrepresentations on mortgage-backed securities purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

    I think it’s a bit more complicated. First of all, DeMarco is a bottom-line guy. He views the FHFA mandate very narrowly. He wants to limit taxpayer exposure to Fannie and Freddie, and that’s it. Now that’s a good thing when he sues the banks over representations and warranties, because he’s trying to recoup money on agency MBS. But it’s a bad thing when he refuses to allow the GSEs to give principal reductions to homeowners with Fannie and Freddie-backed loans, which has been the case since March. This is how I put it then:

    The FHFA (Federal Housing Finance Administration), which oversees Fannie and Freddie, has rejected a government-administered principal modification program, because their mission is to minimize losses to the taxpayer in the short-term, and mods would reduce the overall portfolio value. But houses in foreclosure do nothing for Fannie and Freddie’s bottom line, either. FHFA is also seeking put-backs on mortgages on the banks, also to reduce taxpayer exposure, but we see with their rejection of principal mods that the sword is double-edged […]

    Basically, by refusing to modify principal, traditionally the most sustainable modification, FHFA is setting off a death spiral, where home values continue to drop because of foreclosures, and borrowers go more underwater, leading to more foreclosures. With Fannie and Freddie holding so many mortgages, they are a serious impediment to a more stable solution to the foreclosure crisis.

    Here’s where this gets interesting. If FHFA maintains this position, it has a major effect on any global settlement. The way a settlement would work, according to reports, is that the banks would have to fill a quota of a certain amount of principal reductions or refinances on underwater loans. But if FHFA denies such a measure, then over half the mortgages in the country would not be part of the settlement. The banks would only be able to extend their credits to bank-owned loans, or loans owned by outside investors.

    This would be a bad deal for California. There are very few bank-owned loans here, because Countrywide, a major player in the state during the bubble years, securitized almost everything they got their hands on. So Harris, by asking DeMarco to step aside, may be asking him to participate in the settlement.

    To be clear, I want DeMarco to allow principal mods on loans the GSEs own or guarantee, because it’s the only way to fix the housing crisis. Former Deutsche Bank trader Gregg Lippmann, who famously bet against subprime mortgages during the height of the bubble, has come around to that reality. Joe Nocera has a good opinion column on this today. It’s the right thing to do. And it’s good that Harris is focused on principal reductions as the key step.

    But in the context of the settlement, it’s a different story. This sounds to me like Harris is demanding that DeMarco relent on principal reductions so those loans can be included in the settlement terms. Then the banks can spread the $20 billion earmarked for principal mods across the full suite of loans. I’ve already discussed at length why the terms for the settlement are shockingly weak, and why a settlement on ongoing activity without an investigation to plumb the depths of it is flat-out wrong.

    It’s also important to note that DeMarco could simply grant principal mods under the existing Principal Reduction Alternative run by the Treasury Department. It doesn’t have to be part of a settlement at all.

    This is just one explanation of Harris’ motives in going after DeMarco. But if it’s right, then DeMarco’s unwillingness to allow principal mods could be what keeps Harris out of the settlement – which in all likelihood keeps the settlement from happening.


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