FEDERAL RESERVE FINES Wells Fargo $85,000,000.00 for Falsifying Information on Loan App

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0 Posted by Dan Edstrom on September 5, 2011 at 6:38 pm

Wells Fargo Fined $85,000,000.00 for Falsifying Information on Loan Applications

By Daniel Edstrom
DTC Systems, Inc.

On July 20, 2011, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System issued an Order to Cease and Desist and Order of Assessment of a Civil Money Penalty Issued Upon Consent to Wells Fargo & Company and Wells Fargo Financial, Inc.

Here is an excerpt from this Order:

WHEREAS, this Order is issued with respect to the following allegations:

A. During the period from at least January 2004 to the Reorganization (the “Relevant Period”), Financial’s business model with respect to home mortgage lending was to sell debt consolidation, cash-out refinance loans at sub-prime rates (“nonprime loans”) to customers principally through a network of more than 800 offices located throughout the United States, called “stores.” The principal marketing method was salespersonnel making outbound, unsolicited telephone calls to individuals who had some existing customer relationship with Financial. Under Financial’s underwriting process, the salespersonnel were responsible for obtaining income-related documents (such as pay stubs and W-2 forms) and forwarding them to Financial’s centralized underwriting centers. Financial typically did not require that borrowers fill out and sign loan applications that included the borrower’s representation of his or her income.

B. Under Financial’s sales performance standards and incentive compensation programs, Financial salespersonnel, called “team members,” were expected to sell (a) a minimum dollar amount of loans to avoid performance improvement plans that could result in loss of their positions with Financial, and (b) a minimum dollar amount of loans to receive incentive compensation payments above their base salary.

C. In some cases, contrary to Financial’s written policies and procedures, salespersonnel marketed these loans to customers by representing that the debt-consolidation home mortgage refinancing loans would improve or repair a consumer’s credit.

Income Document Alteration or Falsification

D. Financial’s internal controls were not adequate to detect and prevent instances when certain of its salespersonnel, in order to meet sales performance standards and receive incentive compensation, altered or falsified income documents and inflated prospective borrowers’ incomes to qualify those borrowers for loans that they would not otherwise have been qualified to receive.

E. During the Relevant Period, particular instances of customer income document alteration or falsification by individual Financial salespersonnel came to the attention of Financial’s compliance officers. The compliance officers investigated the particular instances brought to their attention and disciplinary action was taken against certain individual salespersonnel if their involvement in income document alteration or falsification was admitted or otherwise proven. In mid-2008, Financial took steps to improve its internal controls that made it more difficult for salespersonnel to alter or falsify income-related documents.

Steering Potential Prime Borrowers Into Nonprime Loans

F. In or around August 2005, in response to public and regulatory criticism, Financial initiated a process, referred to as the “A-Paper Filter,” to provide prime pricing to customers for qualifying debt consolidation cash-out refinancing mortgage loans. Initially, if a transaction “passed” the filter and a further underwriting process, the customer would be offered prime pricing from Financial. Beginning in or around February 2006, the A-Paper Filter was modified so that customers with potentially qualifying transactions instead would be referred to Financial’s affiliate, Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (“Home Mortgage”), which would determine the customer’s eligibility for prime pricing and, if eligible, originate the prime priced home mortgage loan. At approximately the same time, Financial revised its performance standards and compensation programs so that it generally was less advantageous for salespersonnel to sell a prime loan to the customer than a nonprime loan.

G. As a result of the modifications and revisions, some customers during the Relevant Period who may have qualified for a prime priced home mortgage loan at Financial or through referral to Home Mortgage were sold loans by salespersonnel priced at nonprime rates, primarily through “upselling” prospective borrowers so that the borrowers requested cash-back loans that were sufficiently large that the borrowers’ transactions no longer qualified for prime pricing. While the customers received disclosures regarding the nonprime rates they were being charged, the customers were not advised that they may have qualified for prime priced loans or that it was generally more advantageous for the salesperson to sell a nonprime, rather than a prime, loan.

H. Financial’s internal controls, including controls relating to Financial’s sales performance standards and compensation programs, were not adequate to detect and prevent incidents of evasion of the A-Paper Filter by Financial salespersonnel.

I. Deficiencies specified in paragraphs D. through H. above resulted in:

a. Unsafe or unsound banking practices;

b. Unfair or deceptive acts or practices within the meaning of section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1);

c. Violations of various state laws pertaining to fraud and false or misleading statements in home mortgage loan-related documents, and to unfair or deceptive acts or practices.

WHEREAS, the Board is assessing a civil money penalty of $85 million against Wells Fargo and Financial pursuant to section 8(i)(2)(B) of the FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(B);

WHEREAS, Wells Fargo and Financial have agreed to make restitution to borrowers with respect to the Legacy Assets (and with respect to home mortgage loans that would be Legacy Assets except that they are no longer outstanding (“Former Legacy Assets”)) in accordance with the provisions of this Order pursuant to section 8(b)(6)(A) of the FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6)(A). The amount of remedial compensation (in the form specified in subparagraph 5.a. below) that each eligible borrower is expected to receive ranges between $1,000 and $20,000, but some eligible borrowers may receive less than $1,000 and others may receive more than $20,000, depending on their particular circumstances. The number of eligible borrowers who may receive remedial compensation is estimated to be between about 3,700 to possibly more than 10,000;

Download this Order:http://dtc-systems.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Wells_Fargo_enf20110720a1-1.pdf

26 Responses

  1. […] title, rescission, RESPA, securitization, TILA audit, trustee,WEISBAND « FEDERAL RESERVE FINES Wells Fargo $85,000,000.00 for Falsifying Information on Loan App WHAT’S A COMBO AND WHAT DO I DO […]

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  4. Center Studies Federal Exemption From Anti-Predatory Lending Laws
    in News > Residential Mortgage
    by MortgageOrb.com on Wednesday 24 March 2010

    Highlights go to article via Google

    The study, “The Preemption Effect: The Impact of Federal Preemption of State Anti-Predatory Lending Laws on the Foreclosure Crisis,” was conducted by researchers at the UNC Center for Community Capital. It found that foreclosures and risky lending increased as a direct result of the preemption order enacted by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) in 2004.

    “Our research confirms that state consumer protection laws worked, but that when one group of lenders is handed a regulatory free pass, they are going to take advantage of it,” says Center for Community Capital Director Roberto G. Quercia. “In this scenario, unfortunately, we see preemption shifting the activities of federally insured banks to riskier activities than they would otherwise have pursued.”

    The research findings are the result of two companion reports that offer the first comprehensive look at loan quality and performance following the federal preemption of state laws in states with and without strong anti-predatory lending laws.

    The OCC’s order exempted nationally chartered banks and their subsidiaries from most state laws regulating mortgage lending, including stricter laws that had been passed by some states to curb predatory lending.

    Second, mortgage default rates for exempt lenders increased faster in those states after preemption than those made by independent mortgage companies that remained subject to state laws.

    The preemption effect was most visible and significant in the refinance market, likely because most state anti-predatory lending laws placed greater restrictions on such loans, researchers said.

    The mortgages examined were issued from 2002 through 2006, and represent about 30% of U.S. subprime or Alt-A mortgages.

    SOURCE: UNC Center for Community Capital

  5. 2002 has turned out to be a good year
    for the CMBS industry. CMSA®, along
    with other real estate associations, won
    the passage of landmark terrorism
    insurance legislation. The industry has
    also worked successfully with FASB
    to avoid consolidating entire CMBS
    pools into the balance sheets of issuers
    or below-investment-grade investors.
    Despite declining real estate fundamentals, commercial
    mortgage delinquencies are still low. Domestic issuance
    volume was also strong.
    However, there were some unpleasant surprises during
    the past year. Several single asset CMBS were downgraded
    due to lack of or insufficient terrorism insurance coverage.
    The crisis also revealed some structural problems:
    inadequate compensation to the master servicers and lack of
    consideration for the stability of bond ratings in the pooling
    and servicing agreements. The result? Senior bonds were
    downgraded due to interest shortfalls as a result of non-credit
    related issues, a risk most investors had not bargained for.

    The second challenge is a probable widening of spreads.
    As defaults and losses from CMBS rise and the corporate
    sectors recover, investors may begin to rotate out of CMBS.
    Although the widening should be limited because CMBS
    spreads are already wide and the credit problems will not be
    as bad as in 1991, any spread widening will be a challenge
    for an industry that has been in favor for so long.

    Let me end with a happier note: our past experience
    indicates that mortgages originated at the bottom of a real
    estate cycle tend to perform much, much better than the
    historic averages, and we are very close to the bottom. The
    true challenge for the industry is to underwrite mortgages
    conservatively in today’s highly competitive marketplace. As
    long as we do our jobs, the odds are good that investors will
    get better returns from their CMBS investments during
    2003. Happy Hunting.

    Editor-in-Chief
    JUN HAN
    John Hancock Real Estate
    Finance

    President
    DEBORAH McANENY
    John Hancock Real Estate
    Finance, Inc.

    JOAN M. SAPINSLEY (She have any friends left?)
    Teachers Insurance and
    Annuity Association
    (2000-2002)

    Midland Loan Services, highest servicer ratings gives your portfolio center stage. Leading third-party provider of customized loan servicing, responsive aset management, and innovative technologies for commercial real estate finance industry.
    Midland Loan Services a PNC Real Estate Finance Company

    Jeannette I. Rice – Is she a visionary? How did she know?
    “The real estate industry: anxiously awaiting market recovery, sunshine, and therainbow with a pot of gold at its end”

    “The economy, in this real estate cycle,
    is the key. And it’s the big question mark. As most forecasters
    see it, the U.S. economy will be sufficiently strong to create
    positive demand for all types of real estate. No one expects
    robust growth this year, but with new supply pretty well
    dried up (except for multi-family), there should be enough
    demand to start moving vacancy rates down by mid-year and
    rents up in the second half of the year. It won’t be until 2004,
    however, until we can enjoy full sunshine.:

    Brian P. Lancaster & Kathleen A. Mixon ‘Wachovia Inc’s CMBS expect to be a safe haven in coming months.

    Leon DaDoun, Growing Canadian CMBS market
    can be bifurcated into two distinct groups. There are
    the conduit originators and there are balance sheet
    originators. The motivations for the conduit originators
    are primarily as they are in the U.S. For conduit originators
    the motivation is the arbitrage that can be earned from
    origination to execution and the distribution fees that can
    be earned on their own originated or purchased portfolios.
    For Canadian balance sheet originators the motivation is
    primarily the transference of risk to third parties that
    results in an ability to optimize levered balance sheet
    returns through the liberation of capital.

    Lawrence D. Ashley:
    “CMBS transactions include a sophisticated
    formula intended to mitigate
    losses to the trust when borrowers
    default. When loans default because
    borrowers fail to pay, servicers are
    usually required to advance monthly
    debt service payments. The servicer’s
    advances are reimbursed later from
    proceeds when the loan collateral is
    liquidated. Often defined like something as Appraisal
    Subordinate Entitlement Reduction (ASER), the formula
    operates to adjust downward the amount of advances
    made by the servicer. Since repayment of servicer
    advances come out of and, therefore, reduce net
    liquidation proceeds, advocates of the ASER reason that
    to the extent advances are lower, losses will be lower”

    Subscribers to this line of
    thought reason that, when a loan goes into default, the
    servicer will obtain a new appraisal and can derive a
    reasonable estimate of the pending loss. The loss,
    however, will not be “realized” until the collateral is
    liquidated, which is usually months or years after the
    initial default. Meanwhile, interest is being advanced
    and paid on the full balance of the junior certificates

    Unlike the U.S. model, the Canadian CMBS market
    has had to develop against a backdrop of commercial
    mortgage domination by balance sheet originators. The
    largest such lenders are the life insurance companies and
    the banks. The Lifecos traditionally originate the bulk of
    their commercial mortgages through broker networks.
    Lifecos typically use a broker channel to originate
    medium to large 5 commercial mortgages. The Canadian
    banks 6 have traditionally maintained portfolios of smaller
    ticket commercial mortgages.

    The main question therefore for growth in the
    Canadian CMBS market has been the following:
    given that Canada did not experience the same
    cataclysmic event with its attendant pull back by
    balance sheet originators, how can the conduit originators
    build portfolios that can be efficiently CMBS’ed? How
    successful can the conduit originators be in competing
    against balance sheet originators?
    Against this backstop in early 1998, Merrill Lynch
    attempted to begin originating commercial mortgages by
    bringing standard U.S. CMBS technology to the Canadian
    real estate market. It was the first attempt in Canada to
    originate a portfolio of commercial mortgages for capital
    markets distribution in Canada.

    As a result, the collateral in the first
    Merrill CMBS were loans that had higher advance rates, on
    weaker credits, in less desirable real estate sectors, and at
    wider origination spreads than was typical of balance sheet
    originated loans. The deal got done with 26% subordination
    to AAA. The balance sheet originators were unfazed.
    As word spread that conduit originators provided a viable
    alternative to balance sheet originators and that higher
    advance rates could be had, the reach of the conduit
    originators in the Canadian market started to expand. The
    conduit origination platform started to originate in more
    mainstream markets. As the reach of the conduit originators
    expanded, the origination spreads necessary to make the
    economics work started to decline. As origination spreads
    declined, the quality of product improved. As quality
    improved, subordination began to decline even further.
    The result was that the subordination level to AAA in the
    second Merrill transaction was 22 1/4 %. The subordination
    level on the latest conduit transaction was 14 3/4 %. The
    conduits are now beginning to take away business from the
    balance sheet originators.

    The first Lifeco-originated transaction was
    competed by SunLife through its conduit “Mansfield
    Trust.” Other firsts in the Canadian market have taken
    place this year including the first A/B note structure (N-
    45°), the first floating rate transaction (GMAC’s conduit),

    CMSA Sponsors January 2003
    Diamond • $20,000 and above
    Banc of America Securities
    Credit Suisse First Boston
    RBS Greenwich Capital
    Morgan Stanley
    Nomura Securities International, Inc.
    Standard & Poor’s
    Thacher Proffitt & Wood
    Platinum • $15,000 up to $20,000
    Andrews & Kurth L.L.P.
    Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc.
    Dechert
    FitchRatings
    GE Capital Real Estate
    Intex Solutions, Inc.
    JPMorgan Chase
    Gold • $10,000 up to $15,000
    ABN AMRO/LaSalle Bank, N.A.
    Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft
    CIBC World Markets Corp.
    Ernst & Young
    Keybank, Key Commercial Mortgage
    Lehman Brothers Inc.
    LNR Property Corporation
    Merrill Lynch & Co.
    MERS
    Midland Loan Services, Inc.
    Moody’s Investors Service
    Principal Global Investors
    Prudential Mortgage Capital Company
    Salomon Smith Barney
    Secured Capital Corp
    Trepp, LLC
    Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A.
    Silver • $5,000 up to $10,000
    CapMark Services, L.P.
    The Debt Exchange
    Freddie m Mac
    Goldman, Sachs & Co.
    Bronze • Less than $5,000
    Capital Lease Funding
    Capital Thinking, Inc.
    Pentalpha Capital Group
    Media Sponsors
    Commercial Mortgage Alert
    Commercial Mortgage Insight
    Real Estate Finance & Investment
    Thomson Media

  6. Who will bear the blame for money laundering never mind the ponzi scheme. The money laundering harmed the economy and was orchestrated by foreign organizations of which 65% controlled by Federal Reserve. Hmmm.

    Was only March 2003, MERS COMMERCIAL ‘Version 1.0’
    National Registry released. Read for yourself.
    MERS MEMBERS (all affiliates of Mortgage Servicers (national banks, federal savings banks, federal associations c/o Chase Manhattan Corp 1998-5/1999 as a data processing servicer undre parent as reported over Federal Reserve System…) made all MERS MEMBERS affiliates of national banks who 2002 forward per OCC ‘exempted’ from recording all cash transactions attached to mortgage servicers who are affiliates of national bank.

    May 2003 Wells Fargo from under grip of State of California Department of Corporations wins to move Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. out of California and under ‘Wells Fargo Bank NA’ as approved by OCC May 2003. Executed May 2004.

    Coincidently, now that Wells Fargo out from under the piercing investigative eyes of State Attorney General, c/o OCC visitorial powers, Wells Fargo Bank NA on July 28, 2003 “MERS Liberates Commercial Marketplace From Assignments” in which we read that “MERS announces the release of its latest
    product, MERS® Commercial, designed to eliminate the repurchase risk and costs associated with preparing, recording and tracking assignments for the commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) marketplace.”

    Since that time, CMBS issues propagating and 2004 – 2008 flooding the market with hundreds of billions of commercial real estate securitizations.

    Begs the question: if residential mortgage foreclosures are being halted and if the very fabric of the MBS securitization architecture is put into question, when will someone ask whether MERS® Commercial c/o Freddie Mac partner with Chase, and Wells Fargo, and GMAC, are soley responsible for allowing such pervasive title frauds (allowing third parties to take possession of property through deceptive acts is larceny) nevermind moving cash attached to ‘mortgage’s to launder deposits without having to record registration under FinCEN to protect enconmy from money laundering is HUGE.

    MERS Commercial, instructs members in National Registry manual to destroy original note an eNote acceptable no matter how many rubber stamped eNotes also known as eallonges allowed Wells Fargo & MERS to open up tthe market to placing residential loans inside of CMBS space by storm, How many billions in dollars will Banc of America Securities, Bear Stearns (d/b/a JP Morgan), GE Capital Real Estate, GMAC Commercial, John Hancock and Wells Fargo be forced to buy back loans that were fraudulently certified?

    And what’s the OCC got to do with it? Everything. Whats SEC got to do with it everything. Can the Comptrollers of OCC and SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro , Chairmain Bernanke of Federal Reserve, attest they did not make billions personally during 2004-2008 and were totally completely so focused on personal gains they were totally unaware that money was being laundered out of US harming economy, thrid element of our national security. Where is Homeland Secuirty? Where is our Commander-in-Chief?

    Companies like John Hancock bought out to make way for Finance Universe. Merger 9/26/2003… stock merger In the proposed merger, John Hancock will become a wholly-owned subsidiary of Manulife
    David F. D’Alessandro

    Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
    John Hancock Financial Services, Inc.

    8/30/2010:A. Name of issuer or person filing (“Filer”): MANULIFE FINANCIAL CORPORATION
    Name of Registrant: Manulife Financial Corporation
    Form type: F-10
    File Number (if known): 333-169111
    Filed by: Manulife Financial Corporation
    Date Filed (if filed concurrently, so indicate): August 30, 2010 (filed concurrently)

    D. Filer is incorporated or organized under the laws of Canada and has its principal place of business at 200 Bloor Street East, Toronto, Ontario, M4W 1E5.
    E. Filer designates and appoints John Hancock Life Insurance Company (U.S.A.), 601 Congress Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02210 Attention: Emanuel Alves, (617) 663-3000 as the agent of the Filer upon whom may be served any process, pleadings,

    2/13/2009 A. Name of issuer or person filing (“Filer”): CIBC MELLON TRUST COMPANY
    Name of Registrant: Manulife Financial Corporation
    Form type: F-9
    File Number (if known): 333-157309
    Filed by: Manulife Financial Corporation
    Date Filed (if filed concurrently, so indicate): February 13, 2009 (filed concurrently)

    D. Filer is incorporated or organized under the laws of Canada, and has its principal place of business at 320 Bay Street , P.O. Box 1, Toronto, Ontario M5H 4A6 telephone (416) 643-5000.
    E. Filer designates and appoints Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, 101 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10178 telephone (212) 808-7800, Attention: Merrill B. Stone as the agent of the Filer upon whom may be served any process, pleadings, subpoenas, or other papers in:
    (a) any investigation or administrative proceeding conducted by the Commission; and

    2/13/2009 A. Name of issuer or person filing (“Filer”): MANULIFE FINANCIAL CORPORATION
    Same File Number information as above.

  7. […] Livinglies’s Weblog Filed Under: Foreclosure Law News, Foreclosure News Tagged With: crisis, foreclosure, […]

  8. Oh and by the way when you read 450K Israelis demonstrated that’s like 25Million Americans Demonstrating.

    They are really demonstrating against the IMF and the Banksters.

    NEVER AGAIN
    BE STRONG AND COURAGEOUS

  9. These are all distractions.

    Where did our payments to the banksters go?
    How do we get to Discovery?

  10. Geitner and Bernanke are not to blame.

    The Congress and The President have the power to put a stop to this thievery. This Anarchy This lawlessness.

    NEVER AGAIN.

  11. Jean Michel LeTennier
    QUICK QUESTION you all? How many here believe that the ECONOMIC HEALTH of teh USA should be controlled by 7 UNELECTED PRIVATE Citizens(FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD) and by an institution that is owned 64% by Foreigners?

  12. this is appropriate, the world is a global economy, and many countries have central banks, and then there is the IMF. And all money in this system is based on debt, as money is debt, the more people go into debt, the more money is created as governments do not issue money, but issue money based on debt, thus money flows around based on debt,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, problem is when people don’t or stop or default on credit or loans, why the money dwindles, and as more and more people stop using credit or getting loans,,,,,,,,,,the more and more the money dwindles. And all this debt is based on leverage from the institutions which gave the credit or money, these institutions on their books have leverage money or debt, so when less money or debt is created, why their leverage really hits them hard…………thus the bank bailouts. of course what the media fails to mention is that the leaders of these institutions still make their incomes while laying off thousands……….

    And this is the line to remember on this debt based money system called the Federal Reserve System:

    “In the US, each additional dollar of debt doesn’t presently have any positive effect on growth anymore. ”

    http://theautomaticearth.blogspot.com/2011/09/september-5-2011-us-sues-itself-while.html

    But the question is, if money is issued really by debt, then who gets to keep the money? If money is debt, then it flows back to the person or institution that issued the debt, so the money or debt flows back to them, the banks, federal reserve, central banks, IMF

  13. And Geithner is Lucifer and Bernanke’s the Santa that only visits bankster chimneys.

  14. Abby the emails dont work. The peaceful demonstrations work.

    NEVER AGAIN.

    OBAMA IS THE ANTI CHRIST. AND GEORGE BUSH IS THE DEVIL

  15. The Israelis know how to do it

    http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/05/israel-protests-march-million_n_949268.html#s350139

    Israelis dont care who the criminals are Jewish Christians Muslims Atheists etc….. Israelis demand justice.

    NEVER AGAIN.

  16. REALLY OLD NEWS!! STILL NO HELP FOR BORROWER-HOMEOWNERS.

    EMAIL THE PRESIDENT

  17. @ alan that is the 1st thing i thought of when i saw wells fargo was not listed in the lawsuit. how much did they pay not to be sued..????
    i am a wells fargo vicitim. i have everything done to me by wells fargo that a person could have done.

    appraisal fraud of course. found out about the application fraud/falsifying my income when i was coached to find all my mortgage docs. i am a nurse and make an hourly wage not salary. my work week is 24-36 hours. sometimes on a busy day i might have to work longer then the 12 hr shift. theose hours are not part of the regular work week. somehow the mortgage broker fasified my icome to the tune adding 700 bucks. an amount smalll enough that it will not be noticed at closing (i guess they ar taught to keep it undrer a thousand)

    but enough to pass underwriting. i have emails from 3/2006 that i sent her my pay check stubs. and small enough that it would not be noticed at closing because this mortgage loan application was done over the phone. this was a distance sale i lived 300 miles south i trusted the mortgage broker if my salary was to low for this home there were over 2500 homes for sale in the same area. and to top it off the salaeries in the area i moved to had lower slaries. so from the day we closed i felt the pressure. and they new eventually i would not beable to afford this home.

    my husband was unemployed. they did not put him on the note. he had no salary. this was 3/2006. flash back to 6/2004 22 months earlie i found the loan application for the home we bought then but had to “SELL” because my huisband became unemployed. granted i did not get a raise. i was working at the same hospitall….gets this the difference between the 6/04 application and the 3/06 application was 1k. unbeleivable so they are saying 22 months ealier mmy husband made only 1k. remember my salary did not change ame hourly wage, same job, same hospital.
    then you can also add modification fraud. moving files and losing files.

    the clincher wells fargo telling me to apply for a hamp loan i must be in eminent default to apply. so they told me to “NOT
    pay my mortgage misconstueing hamp loan words. actually unbeknown to hem this is called promissary estoppel, whicj=ch null and voids the contract.

    there is just so mu. i have complained to every entity. but question how do they find the homeowners involved in this fraud.

    this is all crazy stuff. nothing ever for the homeowners. we are the vicitims here.

  18. is that 5 cents per predatory loan?

    and the NYT today says the EU are gonna adopt a US style common political–economic system? They are simply awed by the integrity of the US system I guess. Or is this a bankers dreaming? Freedom to roam and rape anywhere in the world without risk of recrimination?

  19. Just wanted to express some thoughts here. If the bank falsified the loans, made toxic loans, and then sold them to Wall Street, it is apparent that they were out to “fraud the investors”. If one knows that their mortgage was securitized-without assignments of mortgage or endorsement of note, could one stop making their payments with the argument that they refuse to be a co-conspirator of the fraud?

    Also, if one knows they have robo-signed documents, why not sue the signer BEFORE the forelcosure – if more individuals get sued – perhaps the bank will “run out” of individuals willing to do the signing!

  20. Is Wells Fargo an illegal Alien? Wasnt this hole economic mess created by the Illegal Aliens and the deadbeat Home Owners?

    What is $85Million for Wells Fargo? $85Million for Wells Fargo is like $85 for most of us. Where is the Jail Time for Falsifying documents?

    Can somebody give me a discovery questionaire for California?

    Can Somebody tell me where my payments went? Did it really go to pay off my loan? Or to some toxic pool? or a Black hole? In light of the news 60 Minutes why would I want to deal with the pretender lenders? My title is clouded? etc…..

    Never Again

  21. Again, where is the help for the victims?????????

    “Money was Real?”” — quote from above.

    No — money was NOT REAL. These “loans” were purchased by servicers from GSEs — with insurance collected on false default — to get out of GSE. Why could they just not purchase without fabricated default from GSEs?? Because this would be securities fraud by the GSEs.

    How else did they get “loans” out of GSE control into their own hands??? These loan were likely quite “complaint” to be refinanced by the GSEs themselves. GSEs compliant with fraud — by purchasing — for “guaranteed” higher yield — the fraudulent MBS from Wall Street — subject of the new lawsuit — after they sold fabricated default to the servicers.

    NO MONEY necessary — a wash — purchase collection rights from GSE — collect insurance — and “refinance” fabricated default — collection rights — NO NOTE required — NO Money required (except for cash-outs) —simply an “assignment” of collection rights. .

    And, this is WHY — the “subprime” trusts — required little or no funding — thank you. And, why NOTES were never validly transferred to trusts.

    You think we care about the docs for the fabricated “refinance””????? That is the least of the concern.

    But, at least making some progress. How about sharing the 85 million with the victims???????????????? Refinance — with valid principal reduction and interest rate. Why does the Fed Res get to keep the money — on fraud against homeowners???

  22. Well, well. Here we have a case of common mortgage broker/lender fraud. That $85,000,000 ought to pay the court costs and the balance go to homeowners. And what of the homeowners? Shouldn’ such blatant fraud justify rescission? Shouldn’t the lender have to give the home free and clear by forgiving the loan?

    And how many WF victims have since then lost their homes to foreclosure? Shouldn’t the victims get a reversal, a vacation of the judgment of foreclosure?

  23. Nothing but pennies considering the damage they created and the money they deceitfully took. Send the sorry ass C.O.E and his gang of bastards to jail.

  24. this is old news, but I would suggest that everyone request loan level files from the title agency ASAP. That is one place the records must be maintained for at least 7 years, maybe longer. Don’t know what that obligation is. The agency getting a check for gross amounts is standard practice. It’s the ongoing securitization fraud. If you knowingly signed “liar” loans, you could be up for fraud charges yourself. IF you have proof of doctored/falsified/application and asset statements and can PROVE your case, they’re talking about YOU. Lots of subprime borrowers never able to pay upon reset. Now, so what? Where’s your $85 million? You’re not getting a DIME unless you sue them for that fraud, and fraud must be plead with specificity. Meet the burden, file the case.

    How is Allen, as of late? Best wishes always, RPR

  25. what was that figure….I can’t even say it! There all going down, back to your local banks and credit unions, they will never sell you out or fraud you to the get go, always a face to talk to. It will be like 50 years ago real soon. and not soon enough! now what do we do with all those crooks that stole from everyone with out any guilt or fear of ever being caught? hum……..The more junk I get the more I think about this.

  26. I wonder how more protection that five billion bought old Warren Buffet, since Wells Fargo not named in FHFA Lawsuit.

    Going to be “fun” on Tuesday when the markets open.

    Watch out …next to implode the bond market !

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