MERS STATUS CERTIFIED TO WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT

MOST POPULAR ARTICLES

COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE

see 63801551-Order-Certifying-MERS-Questions

CERTIFIED QUESTIONS:

  1. Is Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., a lawful “beneficiary” within the terms of Washington’s Deed of Trust Act, Revised Code of Washington section 61.24 .005 (2), if it never held the promissory notes secured by the deed of trust?
  2. If so, what is the legal effect of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting as an unlawful beneficiary under the terms of Washington’s Deed of Trust Act?
  3. Does a homeowner possess a cause of action under Washington’s Consumer Protection Act against Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., if MERS acts as an unlawful beneficiary under the terms of Washington’s Deed of Trust Act?

This is the second time that a trial court has certified questions to the Supreme Court of a state with respect to the pattern of conduct by those who acted as intermediaries in the process of securitization of debt. In this case, similar to the case being heard by the Supreme Court of the state of Arizona on September 22, 2011, the specific issue can be boiled down to a single point, to wit:  if a strawman is being used essentially as merely a placeholder on what would otherwise be a legal document, what is the effect on title, what is the effect on foreclosure, and what right of action exists in favor of the homeowner if the strawman had no interest in the financial transaction?

The very manner in which the questions are phrased makes it clear that the trial court believes that it will require a change in the law for the pretender banks to prevail in the past, present or future foreclosures or mortgage litigation. The impact of the current pattern of conduct in corrupting the title system in all 50 states continues to have a pervasive effect on the housing market, our national economy, and our standing in world opinion. A correction is certainly required. It seems clear that both sides of the issue have proponents who admit that a correction is necessary. If the correction involves changing our notions of certainty in the marketplace wherein a buyer must make further inquiry than what is reflected in public records, the amount of investigation and paperwork involved in virtually any transaction will skyrocket. If the correction involves applying existing law and the rules of evidence, the title to property involved in tens of millions of transactions will be put in doubt, requiring a massive streamlined effort to “quiet title” thus restoring confidence in the marketplace.

Either way, we are in for a prolonged period of time in which title defects and uncertainty in the marketplace will dominate our attention.

 

 

 

17 Responses

  1. This was all predicted by Andrew Jackson back in 1835 when he paid off the national debt. He saw a premonition. Ron Paul says he can fix it by fireing the federal reserve. Our constitution says “Congress shall have power to coin money and regulate the value thereof” Not the mafia type bankers. If Ron Paul says he can fix it, lets give him a try. He has been pretty consistant for several years. He certainly would be better than what we have.

  2. 3/23/2011 SEC upheld NY pension funds request ‘bank shareholder’ get to vote whether ‘vested’ financial institutional conduct foreclosure reviews. Shareholders BOA, Citigroup, Wells Fargo annual meetings are in March.
    Wells Fargo did not contend the proposal at the SEC.
    New York Comptroller John Liu asked banks and JPMorgan Chase (would that include Chase Manhattan Corp’s transactions with Wells FArgo c/o NASCOR?) asked to conduct review to catch ‘potential problems’ related to robo-signing and other documentation issues.

    Similar group of shareholders requested Chase conduct reviews.
    SEC allowed bank to remove pension funds request from its annual meeting agenda.

    SEC ‘Rejected’ banks arguments problems were ‘Technical Glitches’ sounds like a real good reality TV show!

    NY Comptroller Liu what is status? We need an update. Did the ‘shareholders prevail’?

  3. ANN,
    Sadly, you’ll be sorely disappointed in your expectations that ‘FHMA’ created in 2008 as pass thru agency for FEDERAL RESERVE to view control public and private issues c/o Federal Reserve. OCC powers vested to Federal Reserve under US Code 2006. OCC Visitorial powers attach all national banks, federal savings banks, Mortgage Servicers’ affilaites. This lawsuit is a portal to control all discovery that is attached to national banks affilaites and GSE’s to be proprietary.

  4. @usedkar – many jurisdictions have moved away from the “shock the conscience” stance. double check it before using

  5. Fighting Bank Fraud – No Longer the Minority Position
    Posted on September 2, 2011 by Mark Stopa
    For years, I’ve felt like I was on the right side of the foreclosure fight, but I’ve always felt like I was in the minority.

    To illustrate, when this article came out in October, 2009, there was lots of backlash. I surivived, but there weren’t a lot of people in my corner (or, if there were, I didn’t know it, because speaking out for homeowners’ rights wasn’t terribly common).

    In the two years since, though, a lot has changed. Foreclosure defense attorneys proved that homeowners facing foreclosure have viable defenses and that banks aren’t exactly wearing white hats. As the media helped educate the public about bank misconduct and robo-signing, public sentiment began shifting in favor of homeowners. These weren’t “deadbeats” – this was middle class America, falling victim to the greed of Wall Street.

    Yet, on a national level, it seemed nothing was really changing. Recently, for example, I’ve lamented how Eric Schneiderman, the NY Attorney General, seems to be the only political figure pushing for any sort of real punishment for the banks as part of the AG settlement. And Obama certainly hasn’t done anything to hold the banks accountable.

    So while I’ve still felt like I’m on the right side, and that our side has gained a lot of momentum, it has still felt like we’ve been in the minority.

    Until now.

    The New York Times reports that the United States is set to sue big banks for fraud in connection with the mortgage securitization process.

    Finally! Vindication! This is the sort of thing we’ve needed – our government, on a national level, saying “yes, the banks committed fraud with these mortgages, and we’re doing something to remedy it.”

    Now, it finally feels like we’re no longer in the minority. We’re on the right side of this fight against Wall Street greed and foreclosure fraud, and everyone, except the banks, knows it.

    Here’s the article. …

    The federal agency that oversees the mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is set to file suits against more than a dozen big banks, accusing them of misrepresenting the quality of mortgage securities they assembled and sold at the height of the housing bubble, and seeking billions of dollars in compensation.

    The Federal Housing Finance Agency suits, which are expected to be filed in the coming days in federal court, are aimed at Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank, among others, according to three individuals briefed on the matter.

    The suits stem from subpoenas the finance agency issued to banks a year ago. If the case is not filed Friday, they said, it will come Tuesday, shortly before a deadline expires for the housing agency to file claims.

    The suits will argue the banks, which assembled the mortgages and marketed them as securities to investors, failed to perform the due diligence required under securities law and missed evidence that borrowers’ incomes were inflated or falsified. When many borrowers were unable to pay their mortgages, the securities backed by the mortgages quickly lost value.

    Fannie and Freddie lost more than $30 billion, in part as a result of the deals, losses that were borne mostly by taxpayers.

    In July, the agency filed suit against UBS, another major mortgage securitizer, seeking to recover at least $900 million, and the individuals with knowledge of the case said the new litigation would be similar in scope.

    Private holders of mortgage securities are already trying to force the big banks to buy back tens of billions in soured mortgage-backed bonds, but this federal effort is a new chapter in a huge legal fight that has alarmed investors in bank shares. In this case, rather than demanding that the banks buy back the original loans, the finance agency is seeking reimbursement for losses on the securities held by Fannie and Freddie.

    The impending litigation underscores how almost exactly three years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the beginning of a financial crisis caused in large part by subprime lending, the legal fallout is mounting.

    Besides the angry investors, 50 state attorneys general are in the final stages of negotiating a settlement to address abuses by the largest mortgage servicers, including Bank of America, JPMorgan and Citigroup. The attorneys general, as well as federal officials, are pressing the banks to pay at least $20 billion in that case, with much of the money earmarked to reduce mortgages of homeowners facing foreclosure.

    And last month, the insurance giant American International Group filed a $10 billion suit against Bank of America, accusing the bank and its Countrywide Financial and Merrill Lynch units of misrepresenting the quality of mortgages that backed the securities A.I.G. bought.

    Bank of America, Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan all declined to comment. Frank Kelly, a spokesman for Deutsche Bank, said, “We can’t comment on a suit that we haven’t seen and hasn’t been filed yet.”

    But privately, financial service industry executives argue that the losses on the mortgage-backed securities were caused by a broader downturn in the economy and the housing market, not by how the mortgages were originated or packaged into securities. In addition, they contend that investors like A.I.G. as well as Fannie and Freddie were sophisticated and knew the securities were not without risk.

    Investors fear that if banks are forced to pay out billions of dollars for mortgages that later defaulted, it could sap earnings for years and contribute to further losses across the financial services industry, which has only recently regained its footing.

    Bank officials also counter that further legal attacks on them will only delay the recovery in the housing market, which remains moribund, hurting the broader economy. Other experts warned that a series of adverse settlements costing the banks billions raises other risks, even if suits have legal merit.

    The housing finance agency was created in 2008 and assigned to oversee the hemorrhaging government-backed mortgage companies, a process known as conservatorship.

    “While I believe that F.H.F.A. is acting responsibly in its role as conservator, I am afraid that we risk pushing these guys off of a cliff and we’re going to have to bail out the banks again,” said Tim Rood, who worked at Fannie Mae until 2006 and is now a partner at the Collingwood Group, which advises banks and servicers on housing-related issues.

    The suits are being filed now because regulators are concerned that it will be much harder to make claims after a three-year statute of limitations expires on Wednesday, the third anniversary of the federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

    While the banks put together tens of billions of dollars in mortgage securities backed by risky loans, the Federal Housing Finance Agency is not seeking the total amount in compensation because some of the mortgages are still good and the investments still carry some value. In the UBS suit, the agency said it owned $4.5 billion worth of mortgages, with losses totaling $900 million. Negotiations between the agency and UBS have yielded little progress.

    The two mortgage giants acquired the securities in the years before the housing market collapsed as they expanded rapidly and looked for new investments that were seemingly safe. At issue in this case are so-called private-label securities that were backed by subprime and other risky loans but were rated as safe AAA investments by the ratings agencies.

    In the years before 2007, “the market was so frothy then it was hard to find good quality loans to securitize and hold in your portfolio,” said David Felt, a lawyer who served as deputy general counsel of the finance agency until January 2010. “Fannie and Freddie thought they were taking AAA tranches, and like so many investors, they were surprised when they didn’t turn out to be such quality investments.”

    Fannie and Freddie had other reasons to buy the securities, Mr. Rood added. For starters, they carried higher yields at a time when the two mortgage giants could buy them using money borrowed at rock-bottom rates, thanks to the implicit federal guarantee they enjoyed.

    In addition, by law Fannie and Freddie were required to back loans to low-to-moderate income and minority borrowers, and the private-label securities were counted toward those goals.

    “Competitive pressures and onerous housing goals compelled them to operate more like hedge funds than government-sponsored guarantors, ” Mr. Rood said.

    In fact, Freddie was warned by regulators in 2006 that its purchases of subprime securities had outpaced its risk management abilities, but the company continued to load up on debt that ultimately soured.

    As of June 30, Freddie Mac holds more than $80 billion in mortgage securities backed by more shaky home loans like subprime mortgages, Option ARM and Alt-A loans. Freddie estimates its total gross losses stand at roughly $19 billion. Fannie Mae holds $38 billion of securities backed by Alt-A and subprime loans, with losses standing at nearly $14 billion.

    Mark Stopa

    http://www.stayinmyhome.com

  6. […] Livinglies’s Weblog Filed Under: Foreclosure Law News, Foreclosure News Tagged With: crisis, foreclosure, […]

  7. Discretion is abused unless the trial court employs “a process of reasoning which depends on facts that are in the record or are reasonably derived by inference from the record….”
    – in In Interest of BS, 1991

    “However, the sale may be set aside or not confirmed if the inadequacy of the price is caused by a mistake, misapprehension, or inadvertence on the part of the interested parties or intending bidders, or the inadequacy is so great as to shock the conscience of the court.”
    – in Home Bank v. Becker, 1970

    As stated in State Bank of Drummond, ” `[t] he rule [of the statute of frauds] requires reasonable caution and prudence in the transaction of business, and is deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence…. better that men should be held to the consequences of their own culpable carelessness, than that courts of equity should undertake to relieve therefrom.'”
    – in Weber v. Weber, 1993

  8. This is the bomb right here, yo! That’s the whole MERS issue in a nutshell.

  9. Stanley Putra what Complaint have you filed and what remedy does the law offer? Research who filed the statutory recordings, paid for title insurance Lenders Policy, Owners Policy? The ‘Seller’ of the loan and the Purchaser c/o REO Lender who is again a Tempoary Lender who will place REO property into which Issuing Entity what Loan# issued on new REO Loan? c/o Mortgage Servicers affiliate who allowed property to be purchased and resold. Do you have an active case?

  10. No, Chase did not record RETAIL Assignments using MIN# when they resold Assignment. For example, Nexus Financial Temporary Lender, for a loan Nexus did c/o a Wells Fargo Home Mortgage ‘broker’ in which Chase by letter only acquired servicing rights. The only assignment recorded is Nexus Financial. Will they now issue on all loans a ‘letter’ and a statutory assignment on performing loans at retail being serviced? Now sure why a party with great knowledge sees relationship of OCC and Chase fixing assignments but for the existing foreclosures already filed c/o OCC – how Significant is it that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. entity of Chase Manhattan Corp ? Yes that organization merged into and acquired and did MERS follow?

  11. Interesting ‘Assignment Issues’ related to Chase

    JP Morgan Chase NA is quietly merging Chase Home Finance Inc. and Chase Home Finance LLC into the bank. The reason – ASSIGNMENT ISSUES. They are now going to claim they are all just one in the same. They have done plenty of foreclosures already playing fast and loose with corporate entities.

    http : // www . occ . gov / static / interpretations-and-precedents/may11/ca996.pdf
    www . occ . gov

  12. What significance is there that the Chase Manhattan Corporation
    entity Mortgage Electronic Registration System through 5/1999?

    1998-06-30 MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEM, INC. located at MCLEAN, VA was established as a Data Processing Servicer

    FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM REPOSITORY OF INFORMATION REPORTED BY CHASE MANHATTAN CORPORATION THROUGH LAST DAY 5/1999.

    ‘MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATON SYSTEM, INC. RSSD ID 2812542 MC LEAN VA, DATA PROCESSING SERVICER ATTACHED TO THEIR ‘FFIEC . GOV’ FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM FLOW OF MONEY?

    #1037 —*+ Mortgage Electric Registration System, Inc. 2812542 Mc Lean VA, Data Processing Servicer

    Money flows to/from #1019

    #1019 —* Chase Bank of Texas, National Association Houston, TX a National Bank.

    Money flows to/from #108

    #108 -* Chase Equity Holdings, Inc (1832132) Wilmington DE Bank Holding Company

    Money flows to/from #1 Parent last day 5/03/1999

    Chase Manhattan Corporation – RSSD ID 1039502 New York Bank Holding Company.

    All ‘MERS’ members THEREFORE PER OCC VISIORIAL POWERS REENFORCED UNDER SUPRAMACY CLAUSE 2002 – ALL MERS MEMBERS IN 1990′S are affiliates of national banks, federal savings banks, etc.

    OCC visitorial powers attach privilegs of national bank to all Mortgage Servicers affiliates’

    Visitorial Powers of OCC prevent enforcement of cosumer protection laws and have allowed money laundering of all cash attached to Mortgage Servicers affiliate sof national banks.

    How simple
    The ‘No’ bypassed on all ‘loan applications’ feed to Alt-A Loan Lenders. Consumer never told the property was placed with CREDITOR who sold mortgage backed note as collateral to third party and sold servicing of debt to another third party and the consumer signed promissory note with Mortgage Servicer’s affiliate who acted as Temporary Lender the commercial client of the ‘Seller’ of the loan.

    All Loan transactions c/o MERS c/o National Bank as described above significant.

    The seller a national bank and therefore all of the related transactions are Mortgage Servicers Affiliates include Purchaser of loan, and the RETAIL transaction c/o Temporary Lender and Institutional investors Alt-A Loan and Alternative investments ‘cash’ passed c/o Mortgage Servicers affiliates all exempted from FinCEN requirements that cash transactions be disclosed under Patriot Act.

    SEC:
    CHASE MANHATTAN CORP (REGISTRANT)
    EXHIBIT 21 – Subsidiaries 12/31/1993 SEC File 1-05945 AND 12/31/1994
    The Company’s only significant subsidiaries, as defined in Rule 1.02(d) of Regulation S-X, are The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. and The Chase Manhattan Bank (USA).

    A significant element of credit risk management is portfolio
    diversification, achieved primarily through Chase’s lending franchise. This franchise is comprised of the global wholesale businesses, which target multinational and local corporations, governments, financial institutions and wealthy individuals on a global basis; the National Consumer Product companies that provide nationwide origination, distribution and servicing of consumer products; and a full service Regional Bank that serves consumers, small businesses and middle market companies located in the Northeast corridor.

    Diversification and targeted risk retention levels are also achieved by thsale or securitization of loans. Credit facilities, such as loans and loan commitments, may be syndicated or sold or securitized after origination.

    Syndication consists of arranging a credit facility between a borrower ana group of lenders, in which each lender assumes a share of the facility, thereby limiting Chase’s risk with regard to the facility, since the syndicatedportions are not recorded on Chase’s Consolidated Statement of Condition. Theseactivities, primarily conducted through the Global Capital Markets sector, enable Chase to function as a financial intermediary between other suppliers and users of funds. In contrast, loan sales occur only after a loan is funded by Chase. Such loans are generally sold to maturity and without recourse to Chase. Securitization involves the pooling of a number of loans and then selling interests in the pool.

    CONSUMER PORTFOLIO:
    Consumer loans consist of residential mortgage loans, home equity loans, credit card receivables, automobile loans and other forms of installment credit.

    Secured by 1-4 family residential property loans due to increased demand for refinancings and originations as a reault of lower interest rates, acqusition of residential property loans from Chase’s purchse of Troy & Nichols, Inc.

    WHOLESALE PORTFOLIO:
    Domestic wholesale portfolio largely comprised loans extended to entities in commercial real estate businesses.

    CONSUMER DEFAULTS PAST DUE 90 DAYS LOANS THAT ARE BOTH WELL SECURED OR GUARANTEED BY FINANCIALLY RESPONSIBLE THIRD PARTIES AND ARE IN PROCESS OF COLLECTION.

    PAST DUE CONSUMER LOANS CHARGED OFF DELINQUENCY SCHEDULES DO NOT PERMIT DELINQUENCIES TO EXCEED 180 DAYS.

    1-4 FAMILY RESIDENTIAL PROPETY LOANS ARE PLACED IN NONACCRUAL STATUS IF REASONABLE DOUBT EXISTS AS TO TIMELY COLLECTIVILITY OR IF PAYMENT OF PRINCIPAL OR INTEREST IS CONTRACTUALLY PAST DUE 90 DAYS OR MORE AND LOAN IS NOT WELL SECURED AND IN PROCESS OF COLLECTION.

    CHASE CAN LIQUEFY OTHER ASSETS, THROUGH SECURITIZING LOANS TO SATISFY FUNDING NEEDS.

    CHASE’S PRIMARY LIQUIDITY SOURCES INCLUDE LARGE PORTFOLIO OF ASSETS INCLUDING FEDERAL FUNDS SOLD AND SECURITIES PURCHASED UNDER RESALE AGREEMENTS.
    CHASE’S TRADING ACCOUNT ASSETS AND INVESTMEENT SECURITIES AVAILABLE FOR SALE. 12/31/1993 CHASE ADOPTED SFAS 115, WHICH REQUIRES DECURITIES TO BE CLASSIFIED AS TRADING, AVAILABLE FOR SALE OR HELD TO MATURITY.

    CHASE PLACES DEPOSITS WITH OTHER BANKS, PRINCIPALLY AT THEIR ‘OVERSEAS OFFICES’ FOR EARNINGS AND LIQUIDTY PURPOSES.

    LIABILITIES:
    DEPOSITS REPRESENTS CHASES’ PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF FUNDS.

    RETAIL DEPOSITS REPRESENT LARGE PORTION OF CHASE’S FUNDING.

    CHASE GROWING AMOUNT OF DEPOSITS RECEIVED FROM CORPORATE INSTITUTIONAL CLIENT SOURCES.

    CHASE BRANCH DISTRIBUTION NETWORK ENHANCED STABILITY OF DEPOSIT BASE, CONJUNCTION WITH DIRECT SOURCES OF FUNDING, SUCH AS ISSUANCE OF INTERMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM DEBT AND COMMERCIAL PAPER, PROVIDED RELIABLE AND DIVERSIFIED SOURCES OF FUNDS.

    DEPOSITS
    CHASE’S DEPOSIT BASE CONSISTS OF DEMAND DEPOSITS, CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT, SAVINGS AND MONEY MARKET ACCOUNTS, OTHER TIME DEPOSITS.

    SHORT-TERM FUNDS BORROWERED
    PRINCIPALLY FEDERAL FUNDS PURCHASED, SECURITIES SOLD UNDER REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS, COMMERCIAL PAPER AND OTHER SHORT-TERM BORROWINGS.

    FEDERAL FUNDS PURCHASED REPRESENT OVERNIGHT FUNDS, SECURITIES SOLD UNDER REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS GENERALLY MATURE BETWEEN ONE DAY AND THREE MONTHS (SHORT-TERM INVESTMENT MAXIMUM 90 DAYS) PASS-THRU AGENCY….

    COMMERCIAL PAPER ISSUED WITH MATURITIES OF NOT GREATHER THAN 270 DAYS.
    OTHER SHORT-TERM BORROWRINGS PRINCIPALLY OF TERM FEDERLA FUNDS PURCHASED, NOTES PAYABLE AND FUNDS BORROWED IN OVERSEAS OFFICES, WHICH HAVE ORIGINAL MATURITIES OF ONE YEAR OR LESS.

    SUBORDINATED DEBT, MEDIUM-TERM NOTE PROGRAM ONGOING ISSUANCE OF SENIOR AND SUORDINATED MEDIUM-TERM NOTES WITH MATURITIES OF NINE MONTHS OR LONGER.

    CHASE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT ONGOING PROCESS PROVIDING EQUITY AND LONG-TERM DEBT.
    CHASE MANAGES ITS CAPITAL TO EXECUTE ITS STRATEGIC BUSINESS PLANS AND TO SUPPORT ITS GROWTH AND INVESTMENETS, INCLUDING ACQUISTION STRATEGIES, IN ITS CORE BUSINESSES.

    CHASE AND ITS BANKING SUBSIDIARRY SUBJECT O CAPITAL ADEQUACY – FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY.

    ACQUISTIONS AND DIVESTITURES
    CONSUMER MORTGAGE ORIGINATION AND SERVICING COMPANY, ‘TROY & NICOLS, INC’.
    CHASE PURCHASED OTHER MORTGAGE SERVICING PORTFOLIOS TOTALLY $7.4 BILLION IN 1993.
    1992, AND 1991, MORTGAGE SERVICING PORTFOLIOS $10 BILLION WERE PURCHASED.
    1993, CONTINUING RESTRUCTURING CONSUMER PRODUCTS U.S. DISTRIBUTION CAPABILITIES.

    REAL ESTATE FINANCIAL SECTOR, NY BASED BUSINESS SERVES FINANCIAL NEEDS OF CERTAIN COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE OWNERS AND DEVELOPERS IN US, MANAGES ASSETS RELATED TO DISCONTINUED REAL ESTATE LENDING ACTIVITIES FOR BOTH THESE BUSINESSES AND THOSE IN REGIONAL BANKING UNITS OUTSIDE NY. ASSETS INCLUD ELOANS NOT CATEGORIZED AS COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE.

    LDC PORTFOLIO MANAGMENET OF CROSS-BORKER CREDIT TO REFINANCING COMPANIES FROM SALE OF BRAZILIAN AND ARGENTINE PAST DUE INTEREST BONDS.

    3/19/1996 – MERGER CHEMICAL BANKING CORP AND CHASE MANHATTAN CORPORATION. THE ‘NEW’ CHASE MANHATTAN CORPORATION. The companies also said that they expected 30 percent of the savings to be realized by the end of 1996, 70 percent by year-end 1997 and the total by the end of 1998.

    PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT 1995.

    TECHNOLOGY INTEGRATION, SYSTEMS CONVERSIONS ‘TO BE UNDERTAKEN’ IN CONNECTION WITH THE MERGER INCLUDE 67 MAJOR SUITES OF SYSTESM AND OVER 1,500 UNDERLYING INDIVIDUAL APPLICATIONS.

    OPERATING EARNINGS TARGET EXCLUDES SPECIAL ONE TIME ITEMS AND IMPACT OF SECURITIZATIONS. OVERALL REVENUE GROWTH EXCLUDED IMPACT OF SECURITIZATIONS UNDERTAKEN DURING YEAR. CORPORATIONS NON-INTEREST REVENUE WOULD INCREASE.

    U.S. TRUST CORPORATION 11/18/1994
    CHASE MANHATTAN ANNOUNCES AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE SECURITIES PROCESSING BUSINESSES FROM U.S. TRUST.

    US TRUST CORPORATION SPUN OFF ASSET MANAGEMENT, PRIVATE BANKING, SPECIAL FIDUCIARY AND CORPORATE TRUST BUSINESSES AND RELATED SUBSIDAIREIS TO NEW HOLDING COMPANY TO BE NAMED U.S. TRUST CORPORATION.

    BUSINESSES BEING ACQUIRED BY CHASE ARE
    — UNIT INVESTMENT TRUST SERVICES
    — INSTITUTIONAL ASSET SERVICES
    — MUTUAL FUNDS SERVICES
    SIGNIFICANTLY EXPAND SERVICES TO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR CLIENTS STRONG POSITION IN CUSTODY.

    CHASE WILL SIGNIFICANT ENHANCE ITS MUTUTAL FUNDS SERVICING CAPABILITIES, INCLUDING FUND ACCOUNTING, ADMINISTRATION AND TRANSFER AGENCY. LEADING GLOBAL CUSTODY PRODUT MEET NEEDS OF MUTUAL FUND COMPLEXES THAT BUY FULLY-INTEGRATED SERVICE PACKAGES. US TRUST ACQUISITION MAKES CHASE SECOND-LARGEST OVERALL PROVIDER OF MUTUAL FUNDS SERVICES.

    CHASE BECOMES MARKET LEADER IN SERVICING UNIT INVESTMENET TRUST. WILL GAIN U.S. TRUST’S UNIT TRUST SERVICING AND PROCESSING TECHNOLOGY — A TECHNOLOGY THAT IS VIEWED AS A BENCHMARK IN THE INDUSTRY.

    CHASE’S POSITION AS LEADING PROVIDER INVESTOR-FOCUSED SECURITIES SERVICES FURTHER STRENGTHENED GAINING U.S. TRUSTS INSTITUTIONAL ASSET SERVICES DIV, CONSISTING OF NEARLY 300 CUSTOMERS MORE THAN $125 BILLION IN CUSTODY ASSETS. ‘C/O CHASE GLOBAL SECURITIES SERVICES UNIT.

    CHASE BECOMES THE WORLD’S LARGEST CUSTODIAN, WITH TOTAL TRUST AND CUSTODY ASSETS OF $1.8 TRILLION IN US AND CROSS-BORDER ASSETS.

    CHASE LEADING GLOBAL CUSTODIAN TO TOP 20 MUTUAL FUND COMPLEXES.
    AND BECOME MARKET LEADER IN UNIT INVESTMENT TRUST BUSINESS, SERVING SOME OF MOST PROMINENT PROVIDERS OF UITs.

    INSTITUTIONAL ASSET SERVICES CUSTODY AND RELATED CAPABILITIES CRITICAL TO SERVING MAJOR INSURANCE COMPANIES, FUND MANAGER,S CORPORATE PENSIONS AND ENDOWNMENTS AND FOUNDATIONS.

    CHASE NAD U.S. TRUST SIGNED AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH CHASE WILL PROVIDE PROCESSING SERVICES FOR U.S. TRUST’S REMAINING BUSINESSES INCLUDING ASSET MANAGEMENT AND PRIVATE BANKING.

    MERGERS & ACQUISTIONS GROUP OF CHASE MANHATTAN BANK ADVISED CHASE MANHATTAN COPROATION IN THIS TRANSACTION AND ASSISTED IN NEGOTIATIONS.
    ACE02665

    /S/ DEBORAH L. DUNCAN LATEST FILING AS SIGNATORY 3/31/05

    Deborah L. Duncan” has been a Signatory for/with the following 18 Registrants:
    Chase Bank USA/National Association [ formerly Chase Bank USA ]
    Chase Capital I
    Chase Capital II
    Chase Capital III
    Chase Capital IV
    Chase Capital V
    Chase Capital VI
    Chase Manhattan Corp
    Chase Manhattan Credit Card Master Trust
    Chase Manhattan Marine Owner Trust 1997-A
    Chase Manhattan Rv Owner Trust 1997-A
    Chase Mortgage Finance Corp
    Chase Preferred Capital Corp
    Fremont Mutual Funds Inc
    J P Morgan Chase & Co [ formerly Chase Manhattan Corp/DE ]
    JPMorgan Chase Bank/National Association [ formerly Chase Manhattan Bank/NY ]
    Managers Trust I [ formerly Smith Breeden Trust ]
    US Trust Corp

    1995 8K
    /S/ RONALD C. MAYER LATEST FILING 3/9/06
    “Ronald C. Mayer” has been a Signatory for/with the following 7 Registrants:
    Chase Capital I
    Chase Capital II
    Chase Capital III
    Chase Manhattan Corp
    J P Morgan Chase & Co [ formerly Chase Manhattan Corp/DE ]
    US Trust Corp
    US Trust Corp/NY [ formerly New Ustc Holdings Corp ]

    “Ronald C. Mayer” has/had a Signatory interest in the following Registrant:
    J P Morgan Chase & Co [ formerly Chase Manhattan Corp/DE ]

    CHASE SECURITIES S-3 10/28/1996
    2-3/1 AMENDMENT #2: CHASE MANHATTAN CORP
    11/22/1996 S-3/A AMENDMENT NO 3 TO FORM S-3
    11/25/1996 S-3/A AMENDMENT #4 TO FORM 2-3

    If any of the securities being registered on this Form are to be offered ona delayed or continuous basis pursuant to Rule 415 under the Securities Act of 1933 other than securities offered only in connection with dividend or interest reinvestment plans, check the following box. [X]

    CHASE CAPITAL I

    Chase Capital I (the “Series A Issuer”) is a statutory business trust
    created under Delaware law pursuant to (i) the Trust Agreement executed by the Corporation, as Depositor, The Bank of New York, as Property Trustee, The Bank of New York (Delaware), as Delaware Trustee, and the Administrative Trustees named therein, and (ii) the filing of a certificate of trust with the Delaware Secretary of State on October 28, 1996. The Series A Issuer’s business and affairs are conducted by the Issuer Trustees: The Bank of New York, as Property Trustee, and The Bank of New York (Delaware), as Delaware Trustee, and two individual Administrative Trustees who are employees or officers of or affiliated with the Corporation.

    THE CHASE MANHATTAN CORPORATION

    GENERAL

    The Corporation is a bank holding company organized under the laws of Delaware in 1968 and registered under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended. On March 31, 1996, The Chase Manhattan Corporation (“Old Chase”) merged with and into Chemical Banking Corporation, and Chemical Banking Corporation, which was the surviving corporation in the merger, changed its name to “The Chase Manhattan Corporation.” As a result of the merger, the Corporation has become the largest banking institution in the United States, with over $300 billion in assets and $20 billion in stockholders’ equity.

    The principal bank subsidiaries of the Corporation are The Chase Manhattan Bank, a New York banking corporation (the “Bank”), Chase Manhattan Bank USA, National Association (“Chase USA”), headquartered in Wilmington, Delaware, and Texas Commerce Bank National Association (“Texas Commerce”).

    The merger of Old Chase with and into Chemical Banking Corporation was accounted for as a pooling-of-interests and, accordingly, the information presented in this Prospectus Supplement reflects the combined results of Old Chase and the Corporation as if the merger had been in effect for all periods presented.

    AND BUT FOR ONLY THESE GOOD REAONS, FREDDIE MAC TIGHT WITH ‘CHASE’

    5 PRINCIPAL LINES OF BUSINESS:
    GLOBAL BANK WORLDWIDE NETWORK OF 52 COUNTRIES, INCLUDING MAJOR OPERATIONS IN ALL KEY INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTERS.

    GLOBAL CLIENT MANAGMEENT focusing on corporate clients, credit and general advisory);
    Global Investment Banking including acquisition finance, syndicated finance, high yield finance, private placements, leasing, mergers and acquisitions, and other global investment banking activities;
    Global Markets foreign exchange dealing and trading, derivatives including equity and commodity derivatives trading and structuring, risk management, securities structruing, underwriting, trading and sales, and Corporation’s funding and securities investment activities, and Chase Capital Partners, a venture capital subsidiary of the Corporation (venture capital and mezzanine finance. In addition, the Global Asset Management and Private Banking group serves high net worth individuals worldwide with banking and investment services, including the Vista family of mutual funds and Vista unit trust funds.
    Regional and Consumer Banking includes credit cards -Chase cardmember services; Deposits and Investmeents (consumer banking and commercial and professional banking); Mortgage Banking; National Consumer Finance (home equity secured lending, student lending and other consumer lending); International Consumer (consumer activities in Asia and Latin America); Middle Market and Community Development (regional commercial banking); Texas Commerce; and the Corporations’ franchise in northeastern New Jersey, where its banking subsidiary has 39 braqnches and private banking operations. The Corporation maintains a leading market share position in serving the financial needs of consumers, middle market commercial enterprises and small businesses in the New York metropolitan area. Texas ACommerce is a leader in providign financial products and services to businesses and individuals throughout Texas and is the primary bank for more large corporations and middle market companies than any other bank in Texas.

    Global Services includes custody, cash management, payments, trade services, trust and other fiduciary services. 12/31/1995, Corporation was custodian or trustee for approximately $2.9 trillion of assets.

    Terminal Businesses Corporate represent discontinue dportfolios, which are primarily the refinan cing country debt portfolio and the Corporations nonp-erforming commercial real estate problem asset and nonperforming portfolio, primarily at the Bank. Corporateincludes the management results attributed to the parent company; the Corporations investmenet in the CIT GROUP HOLDINGS, INC; the impact of credit card securitizations; and some effects remaining at the corporate level after the implementation of management accounting policies.

    The Corporation is a Delaware corporation with its principal office at 270 Park Ave NY NY.

    MUCH MORE DETAILED INFORMATION AVAILABEL REGARDING ACCOUNT TREATMENT, SERIES A ISSUER TREATED AS A SUBSIDIARY OF CORPORATION. …

    THE CHANGES OF CHASE MANHATTAN CORPORATION, CHEMICAL BANK, AND U.S. TRUST CORPORATION SIGNIFICANT.

    ADD IN 1996 NORWEST CORPORATION ENTITY NORWEST ASSET SECURITIES CORP ‘NASCOR’ VENTURE BETWEEN CHASE VENTURES AND NORWEST LP LLP LTD AND GMAC-RFC.

    ADD IN 1998, WELLS FARGO BANK COMPANY MERGE WITH PARTNERS NORWEST CORPORATION.

    ADD IN 1998, ALL C/O CHASE ARE PARTNERS WITH ‘MERS’ AND THE REST IS HISTORY

    CERTIFICATE OF TRUST
    The ‘Trust’ 11/8/1996 executed and file to restate original Certificate of Trust of CHASE CAPITAL I, DELAWARE TRUSTEE THE BANK OF NEW YORK (DELAWARE), WHITE CLAY CENTER, ROUTE 273, NEWARK DE 19711 BANK OF NEW YORK TRUSTEE
    10/28/1996 Delaware Business Trust Act (12 Del.C. Section 3801, et seq.)

  13. and, lest we forget…re-posting because I can and I care:

    I AM NOT A LAWYER, BUT THIS IS GOOD STUFF:

    “…The Depositor owns the Trust — and while the Trust was performing – the Depositor, on behalf of the Trust would be the party to bring the action. However, these Trusts have now been brought back on parent corp. (to Depositor) balance sheets because the Trusts as “off-balance sheet” SPVs — have been effectively dissolved. The only tranche holders to remnants of the Trusts is the US Government or the Depositor (parent) itself. You should be preparing to demonstrate that the loan was not validly conveyed to any Trust (which they were not). Do this by requesting the Mortgage Schedule which should accompany the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement (MLPA) — and the MLPA cannot be an “intent” to sell — it must be validly executed and notarized (we know about those notaries). And, importantly, if MLPA and Mortgage Schedule can be proven, servicer must prove that all default payments have been paid to the trust on borrower’s behalf. If not, loan has been removed from the Trust with collection rights sold/swapped to a Third Party. This is how you may win — they can not prove anything.”

  14. The houses were taken illegally…here you go,tn:

    1) Some people here are partly right about sale of existing “note” —- but, the GSEs could not just sell the Note- on performing loans — this would be securities fraud to the GSE security investors. The Note (and it’s receivable stream) had to be falsely placed in default and charged-off in order to sell the “Note” — but, when this happens the Note no longer exists — thus, all that is sold is collection rights to a once existing note.

    2) Neil and others do not understand that security investors fund the BANK — not the borrowers — there is no direct relationship between security investors and borrowers. If banks are able to sell their income stream, that is an accounting transaction — it is not a “loan” to borrowers. This is why security investors are NEVER NEVER NEVER the CREDITOR.

    3) Collection rights transfers are NOT funded by borrower transactions (ie fabricated refinance). Collection rights are transferred by assignment — not NOTES (which is why NOTES are FAKE). When some people talk about Non-Deposit “trust” non-members — they are referring to derivative transactions — that “SWAP” out collection rights — although the credit enhancers pay cash for collection rights — they use insurance for the purchase of the rights. This is why the subprime was so profitable — the bank debt buyers put up no cash for transaction — but, were then able to profit by the “sale” of the receivable pass-throughs to security investors.. This is also why MBIA (insurance co.) legal action against BOA and others is hugely important.

  15. why should you be able to buy the house back at a $83k discount? and how were you entitled to a modification so that a denial of same counts as damages? there is no right to a modification, period.

    they may have bought title insurance, but they’re also bona fide purchasers without notice. there really is no getting the houses back now in all likelihood. there may be damages, but the houses may be off the table unfortunately

  16. I will NOT take any kind of Monetary settlement that does not include the return of the two homes that I lost, period. It was the selling agent’s falt for not informing the buyer and the buyer bought title insurance. Also I want the opportunity to by my house back at the last selling price of $29,000.00 not the $112K they claim I owe. Why should I care about some future modification programs. I am the one that lost. I am the one filing suits. I am the one that was denied a modification.
    Stan
    Wi

Leave a Reply

%d bloggers like this: