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bank is suddenly open to unlimited downside capital risk”

BofA’s $8.5 Billion Settlement Could Fall Apart After Request Made To Move Mortgage Case From State To Federal Court

As most know by now, the ridiculously low $8.5 billion putback settlement, which was supposed to have been closed by now, and which was the key driver in preventing Bank of America from trading far, far lower (and requiring much more capital), is the wildcard that would allow the bank to package tens if not hundreds of billions of claims against the bank in a “tidy (and very small) little package.” The key factor allowing this settlement to be structured in its existing form, was that the lawsuit was filed in New York State Court, which allows for a little something known as Article 77, or a provision permitting “special proceeding related to express trust.” The details are provided below, but in essence boil down to the following: the settlement in its current form can only be enacted if the lawsuit is conducted under New York State law. Well, minutes ago, David Grais, attorney for Walnut Place, which as we have repeatedly observed represents those interests who claim the $8.5 billion settlement is massively insufficient and are engaged in litigation seeking far greater recoveries, filed a request to transfer the lawsuit from State Court to Federal Court where everything basically begins a new. More than anything, this latest development may explain why Bank of America has been scrambling to raise tens of billions in the open market as an adverse court decision, one granting Grais’ request, means the bank is suddenly open to unlimited downside capital risk. In the meantime, add major litigation headline risk to everything else that BAC has going for it…

Manal Mehta explains why this could be a gamechanger:

If this happens, basically renders the Article 77 irrelevant. Article 77 is a New York Statute.  Bank of America wanted to use Article 77 to make the settlement binding upon all 530 trusts including those who objected to the settlement.  Class action in Federal Court allows parties to opt out of the settlement.

Check out the rest here…

Latest court filing below…

~

4closureFraud.org

(Super. Ct. No. SC20090170)

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on May 31,
2011, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports.
For good cause it now appears that the opinion should be
partially published in the Official Reports and it is so
ordered.

56 Responses

  1. […] BOA DEATH WATCH: SETTLEMENT FALLING APART, BOA SCRAMBLES FOR DOLLARS MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE “bank is suddenly open to unlimited downside capital risk” BofA’s $8.5 Billion Settlement Could Fall Apart After Request Made To Move Mortgage Case From State To Federal Court As most know by now, the ridiculously low $8.5 billion putback settlement, which was supposed […] […]

  2. foreclosureinfosearch,

    Well — you are right — cannot talk about all of it. But, that is for a reason. Sorry.

    Your problem is that you start at the onset of DOCUMENTED fraud — need to go back further.

    No one here is your enemy.

  3. anonymous -you said
    As to your “example” —You are missing information — But I do love your posts. Specifically, as to my sub prime colon exploration refinances/ Alt-A refinances. I Did not come from a magician’s magic hat. but fesces with “B” — but need to go back to my “A.”

    Anonymous – WHAT IN THE WORLD ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT .

    People – if you have a question you can write me. This “void” is a distraction.

    How many audits were sold with not one explanation of what all the moving pieces and entities really have to do in the bigger picture.

    Read, cut and paste and do what ever makes your time invested rewarding. But without ever having executed….its a lost cause.

    Your not going to beat the banks – your not!

    But you can devise a legal strategy to prevail under a gag stipulation to the award. The problem is – you just cant talk.about it.

    M. Soliman

    Blessed is the moron who never goes to bed…

  4. The A Man,

    Old friend, because — I care.

  5. Neil…. Thomas P. Dore’s so-called LE posse has been a frequent visitor to this homeowner since he filed suit against him…. and remember that same day I caught Maryland Office of State folks snooping on my Journal page AFTER he filed…. he finally got his summons today and told me he’s sent them Certified Mail to these clowns with a subpoena duces tecum on ZipCar….. Good work… keep you posted.

    foreclosure mill attorney Thomas P. Dore’s ignorant Goon Squad on the move, harassing homeowner:
    http://mortgagemovies.blogspot.com/2011/08/foreclosure-mill-attorney-thomas-p_2577.html

  6. Maher how much do you charge for your services these days?

    Anonymous why do you waste your time answering Soliman?

    Maher never got the contact info on the Attorney

  7. foreclosureinfosearch,

    Ahh—- I get it now —- government — you claim — fixed it AFTER floor fell out —

    Yeah — right — government could not fix what occurred BEFORE the floor fell out. THAT is the problem.

    You are back on the FDIC “safe harbor” for conservatorship/receivership. Did not even affect the big guns.

    Recording not the issue. And, I do not read your “work.” I am not in a business — and have no interest in what you do.

    As I have said many times before — best to you M. Soliman. Have a nice day!!

  8. Anonymous: Transfer??? What kind of VALID transfers do you THINK occurred??? Help me learn, please!

    The initial transfers were valid and GAAP was exploited. The US Government went right to work on GAAP and not case cole slaw. Corn Beef and case law on the side wont do it Chub .
    —————————————————————————–
    But Mr. Soliman, Help me please—Trying to make something valid — that was NOT. “Albeit” — that is your answer??
    —————————————————————————-
    Yes, its sad but an accounting exploitation made the “Conversion” lawful. Breath, sneeze do something please ….
    other than tease!

    expert.witness@live.com

  9. Okay –

    ANONYMOUS, on August 28, 2011 at 3:45 pm you said:
    M. Soliman , I like your “example” — so because I am slow, let me try and do this or have you say this about that, as you said that about this or I mean this about that ….please help me again….again and again …..

    Sure – Anonymous reader who investigates my work and comes back tomorrow and reprints it again. Sure ….

    Possessory Title –
    The law, in general states under commercial code “where the creditor has and retains possession of the mortgaged goods, his security title is good without recording the mortgage .Merscorp HAS Standing – They do not need to record ASSIGNMENTS or ANYTHING. Merscorp. is your friend.

    Ask a Real Question :
    SO IN FORECLOSURE – WHY does MERS COMMENCE F/C and RECORD THE ASSIGNMENT BACK TO THE NOTE IF THE NOTE HAS STANDING ……Possessory Title No recording requirement.

    M.Soliman
    expert.witness@live.com

  10. Yes, Mr.Soliman…where’s the LEDGER???

    Uh huh…

  11. Will give you — mezzanine — is relevant.

  12. foreclosureinfosearch,

    As to your “example” —

    You are missing information — specifically, as to subprime refinances/Alt-A refinances. Did not come from a magician’s magic hat.

    You start with “B” — but need to go back to “A.”

    Asked you this question elsewhere — you were unable to respond —-
    “do you provide accounting ledgers — prior to the mortgage “refinance” in question???? That is needed.”

    Mumbo jumbo — does not impress.

  13. foreclosureinfosearch /Mr. Soliman

    Transfer??? What kind of VALID transfers do you THINK occurred??? Trying to make something valid — that was NOT. “Albeit” — that is your answer??

    GAAP??? you rely on compliance???

    Bonefide?? by whose conclusion YOURS???

    Refinances?? Prior records — old chap– is what you are missing.

    But, done arguing with you — do not want to interfere with your “business.” Lender’s purpose??? What “lender” are you “purposing” for??

    .

  14. EXAMPLE –

    Mortgage loans acquired by the Company are secured by first liens on single (one-to-four) family residential properties with either fixed or adjustable interest rates.

    1.1 Upon delivery the Mortgage loans acquired by the Company are secured by first liens on single (one-to-four) as described and are transferred subsequent to “Cut-off Date and
    1.2 thereafter, by certain investment transfer procedures defined in “generally accepted accounting principals” the assets convert and upon contribution, cease to survive in their inherent form and substance as of the subsequent “Closing Date”.

    2.1 The mortgagors contract emerges subsequent to closing date a household installment vehicle that is divested of its basis in asset ;
    2.2 by simple definition; assets emerge in a controversy an “altered contract” is held in an electronic registration form.
    2.3 as to the subject matter note, it is conditioned by subsequent events; and therein fails as prima facia evidence to the right of a successor to recover its collateral
    2.4 whereupon such original or certified copy of the original note, introduced in discovery, fails to overcome counter claims of enforceability

    3.1 Possessory Title – The law, in general states under commercial code “where the creditor has and retains possession of the mortgaged goods, his security title is good without recording the mortgage .
    3.2 Under the theory for Trust Receipts – the notion of Trust Receipts is a security for the loan of money. Although mentioned in “sale” the seller is really not a party for he has been paid by the bank; or herein the finance company formed in a trust scheme who emerges the trustor in the receipt .
    3.3 All that the Trustee has as buyer is possession of goods.
    3.4 As agent for the bank who made the loans, the purchaser sells the goods and applies the proceeds “Deposits” to the loan balance outstanding.

    Note – the purpose of the older version of trust receipts is to enable the registrants “dealer” to utilize short term financing from bank lines of credit in financing his receivable purchases.

    In mortgage lending an aggregator delivers its production to the purchaser under existing lines or by an extension held in a buyer financed mezzanine, “gap” or trade gestation facility.

    expert.witness@live.com

    NOTE IMPORTANT not an attorney and not intended as legal advice. only a licensed practitioner can advise you of your legal title rights and claims.

  15. Mr. Soliman,
    With respect to Freddie Mac c/o Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp ‘FMCC’ ?

    FMCC earning grew last year _22.81%, Revenue Growth Last Year +95.6% c/o loan sales by GMAC Mortgage is that what you mean?

    That Wells FArgo Bank NA as ‘Seller’ of loans and subservicer GMAC Mortgage allowed institutional investors FREDDIE MAC c/o FANNIE MAE institutonal banks ‘Non-Deposit Trust Company Non-Member to be shareowner and benefactors of ‘Mortgages serviced by ‘GMAC Mortgage’ subservicers c/o BOA

  16. Nancy Drewe, on August 28, 2011 at 1:38 pm said: Etc Etc Purchase and sale / SOP ramble and delivery /secondary aquisition , boarding, demand for repurchase and execution….

    What do you want to know?

    Or can you isolate the one significant material misrepresentation that has yet to surface in court. Its there in the recitals your cut and pasting.

    Why – I don’t know but If there is anyone out there that would sincerely like to disprove my competency on subject matter . . . please – step up. Please ….it can be something done on tel-conference call in positive atmosphere.
    Don’t take shots at the information being provided , take shots at the culpable parties. Choose your own expert – do not hire me if there is a question – please.

    A forum, whatever . This site is still a chance for anyone , a chance for even those who lost a home to be found eligible for a settlement even after the fact .

    expert.witness@live.com

  17. Sorry tnharry history – facts are dry – and to be accurate have to be dry – sorry Brian.

    10K 12/31/93 Indymac Bancorp Inc.
    Filed 3/29/94 SEC File 1-08972 Accession Number 898430-94-223

    IndyMac Bancorp Inc. (Registrant)
    551 SEC Filings 3/18/94 to 8/7/08

    Closely Related (4):
    •Indymac Capital Trust I – SEC# 1157668 6/10/04
    •Indymac Capital Trust II – SEC# 115670 6/30/06
    •Indymac Capital Trust III – SEC# 1157671 – 6/30/06
    •Indymac Capital Trust IV – SEC# 1157669 6/30/06
    Formerly Assigned On
    Indymac Mortgage Holdings Inc 6/2/98
    Inmc Mortgage Holdings Inc 8/13/97
    CWM Mortgage Holdings Inc /25/94
    Countrywide Mortgage Investments Inc/DE 7/3/92
    Symbols
    IDMC, IDMP, IDMCQ, IDMPQ, IMB, NDE

    SIC Code – Souce: SEC EDGAR

    6035 Savings Institutions, Federally Chartered
    SEC 8/7/08
    6798 Real Estate Investment Trusts
    SEC 2/12/01

    Office Address
    888 East Walnut Street
    Pasadena, California 91101-7211U.S.A.

    SELLER

    10K 12/31/93 Indymac Bancorp Inc. Filed 3/29/94 SEC File 1-08972 Accession Number 898430-94-223
    Mortgage Loans Acquired:
    The Company’s highest concentration of jumbo mortgage loans relates to properties in California because of the generally higher property values and mortgage loan balances prevalent there. Mortgage loans secured by California properties have accounted for approximately 69% of the mortgage loans purchased in 1993.

    The Company generally purchases jumbo mortgage loans with original principal balances of up to $1 million. The Company’s loan purchase activities focus on those regions of the country where
    higher volumes of jumbo mortgage loans are originated, including California,
    Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New
    York, Ohio, Texas, Virginia, Washington and Washington, D.C.

    Mortgage loans acquired by the Company are secured by first liens on single
    (one-to-four) family residential properties with either fixed or adjustable
    interest rates. Fixed-rate mortgage loans accounted for over 90% of the
    mortgage loans purchased by the Company in 1993 primarily because of the desire of borrowers to lock in the low rates of interest prevailing in 1993. The Company anticipates that its adjustable-rate mortgage loan purchase volume as a percent of total loans purchased will grow as interest rates rise.

    The Company also purchases adjustable rate mortgage (“ARM”) loans which provide the borrower with the option to convert to a fixed rate of interest in the future. Although the Company sells or securitizes these ARM loans in connectionwith its mortgage conduit operations, it generally is obligated to repurchase the fixed-rate loans resulting from any such conversion. The Company generally has the right to require repurchase of any such converted mortgage loan by the servicer or seller of such loans.

    Seller Eligibility Requirements:

    The mortgage loans acquired pursuant to the Company’s mortgage conduit
    operations are originated by various sellers, including savings and loan associations, banks, mortgage bankers and other mortgage lenders.

    Sellers are required to meet certain regulatory, financial, insurance and performance
    requirements established by the Company before they are eligible to participate
    in the Company’s mortgage loan purchase program and must submit to periodic
    reviews by the Company to ensure continued compliance with these requirements.

    The Company’s current criteria for seller participation generally include a
    tangible net worth of at least $1 million, a servicing portfolio of at least $25
    million and loan production aggregating at least $50 million during the last
    three years.

    In addition, sellers are required to have comprehensive loan origination quality control procedures. In connection with their qualification, each seller enters into an agreement that provides for recourse by the Company against the seller in the event of any material breach of a representation or warranty made by the seller with respect to mortgage loans sold to the Company
    or any fraud or misrepresentation during the mortgage loan origination process.

    Servicing Retention
    Sellers of mortgage loans to the Company are generally expected to retain the rights to service the mortgage loans purchased by the Company.

    Servicing includes:
    • collecting and remitting loan payments,
    • making required advances,
    • accounting for principal and interest,
    • holding escrow or impound funds for payment of taxes and insurance,
    • if applicable, making required inspections of the mortgaged property,
    • contacting delinquent borrowers and
    • supervising foreclosures and property dispositions in the event of unremedied defaults in accordance with the Company’s guidelines.
    • The servicer receives fees generally ranging from 1/4% to 1/2% per annum on the declining principal balances of the loans serviced.
    • Under certain circumstances, sellers have the right to require the Company to purchase such servicing rights at a previously determined price.
    • If a seller/servicer breaches certain of its representations and warranties made to the Company, the Company may terminate the servicing rights of such seller/servicer and assign such servicing rights to another servicer

  18. QUESTION – the Sale of Loans as discussed in the actual agreements speak for themselves the problem is the attorney’s trained in Ford Mortor Plant Mentality c/o structure of flat Organization Charts of American Companies that reflect Parent Annual Reports for Federal Income Taxes.

    FMCC was a market leader in Consumer Credit and securitizing these contracts . Do you not feel the same for GMAC?

  19. sue, on August 27, 2011 at 10:44 pm said:

    I have one question for Neil Garfield in regards to your track record as a mortgage fraud expert retained to testimony in court? What is your opinion about retaining you as an expert in a mortgage foreclosure action, necessary?
    As a former expert witness, any advice for those who have ethics, are literate, who do not take advantage or prey on those people who trust LL and do not have the “superior” knowledge they claim to have?

    M. Soliman- Why did you send to me. Call Neil about it .

  20. Mr. Soliman the Sale of Loans as discussed in the actual agreements speak for themselves the problem is the attorney’s trained in Ford Mortor Plant Mentality c/o structure of flat Organization Charts of American Companies that reflect Parent Annual Reports for Federal Income Taxes.

    Real business conducted globally over www c/o UCC and contracts – agreements of competitors as collaborators shareowners that is not how private wealth turns millionaires into billionaires and billionaires into trilliionaries over past decade.

    Joint Ventures, partnerships, Managing Disrectors as companies, Compaies as Manaing Directors, make the world go around.

    Foreign entities are the ones who found the loopholes in which business conducted so borrowers and investors lose in court.

    The Company, similar to other mortgage conduits, customarily sells all loans that it purchases.

    When a sufficient volume of mortgage loans with similar characteristics has been accumulated, generally $100 million to $500 million, the loans are securitized through the issuance of mortgage-backed securities in the form of real estate mortgage investment conduits (“REMICs”) or collateralized mortgage obligations (“CMOs”) or resold in bulk whole loan sales.

    The length of time between the Company’s commitment to purchase a mortgage loan and when it sells or securitizes such mortgage loan generally ranges from ten to 90 days depending on certain factors, including the length of the purchase commitment period and the securitization process.

    The Company’s decision to form REMICs or CMOs or to sell the loans in bulk is
    influenced by a variety of factors. REMIC transactions are generally accounted
    for as sales of the mortgage loans and can eliminate or minimize any long-term
    residual investment in the loans. REMIC securities consist of one or more
    classes of “regular interests” and a single class of “residual interest.” The
    regular interests are tailored to the needs of investors and may be issued in
    multiple classes with varying maturities, average lives and interest rates.
    These regular interests are predominately senior securities but, in conjunction
    with providing credit enhancement, may be subordinated to the rights of other
    regular interests. The residual interest represents the remainder of the cash
    flows from the mortgage loans (including, in some instances, reinvestment
    income) over the amounts required to be distributed to the regular interests.
    In some cases, the regular interests may be structured so that there is no
    significant residual cash flow, thereby allowing the Company to sell its entire
    interest in the mortgage loans. As a result, in some cases the capital
    originally invested in the mortgage loans by the Company may be redeployed in
    the mortgage conduit operations. The Company generally retains any residual
    interests for investment. Management believes that because of the current low
    level of interest rates, investments in residual interest or “excess master
    servicing fees” are prudent, and if interest rates rise, the income from
    investments will mitigate declines in income that may occur in the Company’s
    purchase operations.

    As an alternative to REMIC sales, the Company may issue CMOs to finance mortgage
    loans to maturity. For accounting and tax purposes, the mortgage loans financed
    through the issuance of CMOs are treated as assets of the Company and the CMOs
    are treated as debt of the Company. The Company earns the net interest spread
    between the interest income on the mortgage loans and the interest and other
    expenses associated with the CMO financing. The net interest spread is directly
    impacted by the levels of prepayment of the underlying mortgage loans. The
    Company is required to retain a residual interest in its issued CMOs.

    Substantially all of the Company’s loans and mortgaged-backed securities (“MBS”)
    are sold at prices that are determined based on the cash market for MBS. As
    such, the Company’s interest-rate risk is directly correlated to the risk that
    the price of MBS changes between the date on which a loan is purchased by the
    Company and the date on which the mortgage loan is settled with the ultimate
    investor. In addition, the Company is exposed to the risk that the value of the
    loans that it has committed to purchase, but has not yet closed, will decline
    between the commitment date and the date of the settlement with the investor.

    In order to offset the risk that a change in interest rates will result in a
    decrease in the value of the Company’s current mortgage loan inventory, or its
    commitments to purchase mortgage loans (“Committed Pipeline”) the Company enters
    into hedging transactions. The Company’s hedging policies generally require that
    all of its inventory of loans and the expected portion of its Committed Pipeline
    that may close be hedged with forward contracts for the delivery of MBS or whole
    loans. The Company hedges its inventory and Committed Pipeline of mortgage loans
    by using whole-loan sale commitments to ultimate buyers, by using temporary
    “cross hedges” with sales of government sponsored MBS since such loans are
    ultimately sold based on a market spread to MBS or by selling forward private
    label MBS. As such, the Company is not exposed to significant risk nor will it
    derive any benefit from changes in interest rates on the price of the inventory
    net of gains or losses of associated hedge positions. The correlation between
    the price performance of the hedge instruments and the inventory being hedged is
    generally high due to the similarity of the asset and the related hedge
    instrument. The Company is exposed to interest-rate risk to the extent that the
    portion of loans from the Committed Pipeline that actually closes at the committed price is less than the portion expected to
    close in the event of a decline in rates and such decline in closings is not
    covered by options to purchase MBS needed to replace the loans in process that
    do not close at their committed price. The Company determines the portion of
    its Committed Pipeline that it will hedge based on numerous factors, including
    the composition of the Company’s Committed Pipeline, the portion of such
    Committed Pipeline likely to close, the timing of such closings and anticipated
    changes in interest rates.

    “FHLMC Security” shall refer to a Mortgage Participation Certificate issued and guaranteed by FHLMC and backed by a pool of Agency Mortgage Loans.

    “FHA” shall refer to the Federal Housing Administration.

    “FHLMC” shall refer to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation.

    “FHLMC Guide” shall refer to the Freddie Mac Seller’s and Servicers’ Guide,

    “FNMA” shall refer to the Federal National Mortgage Association.

    “FNMA Guide” shall refer to the Fannie Mae Selling and Servicing Guide, as such Guide may hereafter from time to time be amended.

    “GNMA” shall refer to the Government National Mortgage Association.

    “GNMA Guide” shall refer to the GNMA Mortgage-Backed Securities Guide, as such Guide may hereafter from time to time be amended.

    “GNMA Security” shall refer to a fully-modified pass-through mortgage-backed certificate guaranteed by GNMA and backed by a pool of Agency Mortgage Loans.

    “MLGSI” shall refer to Merrill Lynch Government Securities Inc.

    “MLMCI” shall refer to Merrill Lynch Mortgage Capital Inc.

    “GEMICO” shall refer to General Electric Mortgage Insurance Corporation, a North Carolina stock insurance company.

    “Securities” shall, in addition to the definition set forth in the Master Repurchase Agreement, refer to Mortgage Loans.

    “Security Release Form” shall refer to (i) Freddie Mac Form 996 (Warehouse
    Lender Release of Security Interest) in the case of a FHLMC Security, (ii)
    Fannie Mae Form 2004 (Secu-rity Release Certification) in the case of a
    FNMA Security and (iii) Form HUD 11711A (Release of Security Interest) in
    the case of a GNMA Security.

    “Mortgage Loans” shall refer to the residential mortgage loans secured by first liens delivered to the Custodian pursuant to the Custody Agreement
    and shall include both Agency and Non-Agency Mortgage Loans.

    “Non-Agency Mortgage Loans” shall refer to Mortgage Loans that are not intended to back an Agency Security or to be sold to an Agency under its
    cash purchase program; Mortgage Loans may, however, conform to Agency securitization requirements and may, at a later date, become Agency Mortgage Loans.

    “PMI” shall refer to PMI Mortgage Insurance Co.

    “Qualified Insurer” shall refer to GEMICO, PMI or UGI.

    “PMI” shall refer to PMI Mortgage Insurance Co.

    “GEMICO” shall refer to General Electric Mortgage Insurance Corporation, a
    North Carolina stock insurance company.

    “Qualified Originator” shall refer to a correspondent of CMI that originates Mortgage Loans and subsequently assigns its rights thereto to
    CMI pursuant to a warehouse lending agreement between CMI and such Qualified Originator.

    “Seller’s Margin Amount” shall have the meaning set forth in the Master
    Repurchase Agreement except that the percentage referred to therein for
    each Transaction shall be specified in the related Confirmation/Funding
    Request.

    “Servicer” shall, with respect to any Mortgage Loan, refer to the related
    Qualified Originator.

    “Mortgage Loan Income” shall mean income payable with respect to a Mortgage Loan including all amounts payable on account of such Mortgage Loan whether principal, interest, partial prepayments, prepayments in full, penalties,
    advance payments or expenses and whether payable by or from the mortgagor or the Servicer for such Mortgage Loan.

    “Instruction Letters” refer to the irrevocable instructions to Servicers
    substantially in the form of Exhibit A hereto

    “Takeout Commitment” shall refer to a trade confirmation from the Takeout
    Investor to a Qualified Originator, which trade confirmation has been
    assigned by the Qualified Originator to CMI, confirming the details of a
    forward trade between the Takeout Investor and such Qualified Originator
    with respect to one or more Agency Securities, which trade confirmation
    shall be valid, binding and in full force and effect and relate to pools of
    Agency Mortgage Loans that satisfy the “good delivery standard” of the
    Public Securities Association as set forth in the Public Securities Association Uniform Practices Guide.

    “Trade Commitment” shall refer to a trade confirmation or similar document
    from the Trade Investor to a Qualified Originator, which trade confirmation
    has been assigned by the Qualified Originator to CMI, confirming the
    details of a mandatory forward trade or similar arrangement reasonably
    acceptable to MLMCI between the Trade Investor and such Qualified
    Originator with respect to one or more Non-Agency Mortgage Loans, which
    trade confirmation or similar document shall be valid, binding and in full
    force and effect and relate to pools of Non-Agency Mortgage Loans that
    satisfy the delivery standards of the related Trade Investor.

    “Takeout Investor” shall refer to a securities dealer or other financial
    institution, reasonably acceptable to MLMCI, who has made a Takeout
    Commitment. A list of Takeout Investors that are acceptable to MLMCI as of
    the date hereof is set forth at Exhibit F hereto, which list may be
    modified from time to time by MLMCI in its reasonable discretion.

    “Trade Investor” shall refer to a securities dealer or other financial
    institution (other than an Agency), reasonably acceptable to MLMCI, who has
    made a Trade Commitment. A list of Trade Investors that are acceptable to
    MLMCI as of the date hereof is set forth at Exhibit F hereto, which list
    may be modified from time to time by MLMCI in its reasonable discretion.

    “Third Person” shall have the meaning set forth in the Custody Agreement.

    “Transaction” shall, in addition to the definition set forth in the Master
    Repurchase Agreement, refer to substitutions pursuant to Paragraph 9 of the
    Master Repurchase Agreement.

    “UGI” shall refer to United Guaranty Insurance Company.

    “VA” shall refer to the Department of Veterans Affairs.

    “Warehouse Lending Agreement” shall refer to a lending agreement between
    CMI and a Qualified Originator substantially in the form of Exhibit E
    hereto.

    COUNTRYWIDE MORTGAGE INVESTMENTS, INC.
    Jurisdiction DE, 95-3983415 IRS ID#
    Exchange where registered:
    New York Stock Exchange
    Commission File# 1-8972

    RSSDID 1616408 Countrywide Mortgage Investments, Inc. (was established as a Domestic Entity Other 5/5/1986)

    Countrywide Mortgage Investments, Inc.
    (“CMI” or the “Company”) was incorporated
    in the State of Maryland on July 16, 1985 and reincorporated in the State of
    Delaware on March 6, 1987.

    References to “CMI” mean either the parent company alone or the parent company

    Jeffrey F. Butler joined CCI in 1985 and became the Chief Information Officer in 1989 and Managing Director–Chief Information Officer in May 1991.

    4.1* Indenture (the “Indenture”), dated as of December 1, 1985, between Countrywide Mortgage Obligations, Inc. (“CMO, Inc.”) and Bankers Trust Company, as Trustee (“BTC”) (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.1 to

    CMO, Inc.’s Form 8-K filed with the SEC on January 24, 1986

    Definition:
    CMOs are debt instruments secured by fixed pools of mortgage instruments in which investors hold multiple classes of interest.

    A company’s residual interest of a CMO issued by Company or a qualifed real estate investment trust (REIT) trust subsidairy after 12/31/1991, pursuant to regulations yet to be published, may be “excess inclusion” income.

    Some excess inclusion income generally is subject to federal income tax in all events.
    See “Excess Inclusion”

    The Company has elected to be taxed as a real estate investment trust (“REIT”) under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended
    (the “Code”).

    Countrywide Mortgage Investments, Inc. (“CMI” or the “Company”) was incorporated
    in the State of Maryland on July 16, 1985 and reincorporated in the State of
    Delaware on March 6, 1987.

    The Company has elected to be taxed as a real estate investment trust (“REIT”) under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended
    (the “Code”). As a result of this election, the Company will not, with certain
    limited exceptions, be taxed at the corporate level on the net income
    distributed to the Company’s stockholders.

    Historically, the Company has been a long-term investor in single-family, first-
    lien, residential mortgage loans and in mortgage securities representing
    interests in such loans (the “CMO portfolio”). Under its new operating plan
    commenced in 1993, the Company conducts mortgage conduit activities through a
    newly formed subsidiary, Countrywide Mortgage Conduit, Inc. (“CMC”), which is
    not a qualified REIT subsidiary and which is subject to applicable federal and
    state income taxes. See “Certain Federal Income Tax Considerations.” As part
    of its new operating plan, the Company also conducts warehouse lending
    operations which provide short-term revolving financing to certain mortgage
    bankers.

    MORTGAGE CONDUIT OPERATIONS

    On October 22, 1992, the Company’s Board of Directors approved a new operating
    plan, implementation of which was begun in the first quarter of 1993.

    Under the new plan, the Company established CMC, which principally operates as a jumbo and
    nonconforming mortgage loan conduit. As a jumbo mortgage loan conduit, CMC is
    an intermediary between the originators of mortgage loans which have outstanding
    principal balances in excess of the guidelines of the government and government
    sponsored enterprises that guarantee mortgage-backed securities (“jumbo
    mortgage loans”) and permanent investors in mortgage-backed securities secured
    by or representing an ownership interest in such mortgage loans. Sellers
    generally retain the rights to service the mortgage loans purchased by the
    Company. The Company’s principal sources of income from its mortgage conduit
    operations are gains recognized on the sale of mortgage loans, the net spread
    between interest earned on mortgage loans owned by the Company and the interest
    costs associated with the borrowings used to finance such loans pending their
    securitization and the net interest earned on its long-term investment
    portfolio.

    Production
    ———-

    The Company’s mortgage conduit operations are designed to attract both large and
    small sellers of jumbo mortgage loans by offering a variety of pricing and loan
    underwriting methods designed to be responsive to such sellers’ needs. The
    Company focuses on sellers that originate loans in regions of the United States
    with generally higher property values and mortgage balances.

    The Company has established three loan underwriting methods designed to be
    responsive to the needs of jumbo mortgage loan sellers.

    The Company’s first
    method is designed to serve sellers who generally obtain mortgage pool insurance
    commitments in connection with the origination of their loans.

    The Company does
    not perform a full underwriting review of such mortgage loans but instead relies
    on the credit review and analysis of the mortgage pool insurer and its own
    follow-up quality control procedures.

    The second method established by the
    Company offers a delegated underwriting program for those loan sellers who meet
    higher financial and performance criteria than those applicable to sellers
    generally.

    Under the delegated underwriting program, loans are underwritten in
    accordance with the Company’s guidelines by the seller and purchased on the
    basis of the seller’s financial strength, historical loan quality and other
    qualifications.

    A sample of such loans is subsequently reviewed by the Company
    in accordance with its expanded quality control guidelines.

    Finally, sellers
    may submit to the Company loans for which there is no pool insurance commitment
    to be underwritten in accordance with the Company’s guidelines.

    Under all three
    methods, loans are purchased by the Company only after completion of a legal
    documentation and eligibility criteria review.

    See “Underwriting and Quality
    Control.”

    Underwriting and Quality Control
    ——————————–

    Purchase Guidelines. The Company has developed comprehensive purchase
    guidelines for its acquisition of mortgage loans. Subject to certain
    exceptions, each loan purchased must conform to the Company’s loan eligibility
    requirements specified in its Seller/Servicer Guide with respect to, among other
    things, loan amount, type of property, loan-to-value ratio, type and amount of
    insurance, credit history of the borrower, income ratios, sources of funds,
    appraisal and loan documentation. The Company also performs a legal
    documentation review prior to the purchase of any loan. For loans with mortgage
    pool insurance commitments, the Company does not perform a full underwriting
    review prior to purchase but instead relies on the credit review and analysis
    performed by the mortgage pool insurer and its own post-purchase quality control
    review. In contrast, for mortgage loans that have not been underwritten for
    mortgage pool insurance and are not part of the delegated underwriting program,
    the Company performs a full credit review and analysis to ensure compliance with
    its loan eligibility requirements. This review specifically includes, among
    other things, an analysis of the underlying property and associated appraisal
    and an examination of the credit, employment and income history of the borrower.
    For loans purchased pursuant to the delegated underwriting program, the Company
    relies on the credit review performed by the seller and its own follow-up
    quality control procedures.

    Mortgage Loans Acquired
    ———————–

    Substantially all of the mortgage loans purchased through the Company’s mortgage
    conduit operations are nonconforming mortgage loans. Nonconforming mortgage
    loans are loans which do not qualify for purchase by the Federal Home Loan
    Mortgage Corporation (“FHLMC”) or the Federal National Mortgage Association
    (“FNMA”) or for inclusion in a loan guarantee program sponsored by the
    Government National Mortgage Association (“GNMA”). Nonconforming mortgage loans
    generally consist of jumbo mortgage loans or loans which are not originated in
    accordance with other agency criteria. Currently, the maximum principal balance
    for a conforming loan is $203,150. The Company generally purchases jumbo
    mortgage loans with original principal balances of up to $1 million. The
    Company’s loan purchase activities focus on those regions of the country where
    higher volumes of jumbo mortgage loans are originated, including California,
    Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New
    York, Ohio, Texas, Virginia, Washington and Washington, D.C. The Company’s
    highest concentration of jumbo mortgage loans relates to properties in
    California because of the generally higher property values and mortgage loan
    balances prevalent there. Mortgage loans secured by California properties have
    accounted for approximately 69% of the mortgage loans purchased in 1993.

    Mortgage loans acquired by the Company are secured by first liens on single
    (one-to-four) family residential properties with either fixed or adjustable
    interest rates. Fixed-rate mortgage loans accounted for over 90% of the
    mortgage loans purchased by the Company in 1993 primarily because of the desire
    of borrowers to lock in the low rates of interest prevailing in 1993. The
    Company anticipates that its adjustable-rate mortgage loan purchase volume as a
    percent of total loans purchased will grow as interest rates rise.

    The Company also purchases adjustable rate mortgage (“ARM”) loans which provide
    the borrower with the option to convert to a fixed rate of interest in the
    future. Although the Company sells or securitizes these ARM loans in connection
    with its mortgage conduit operations, it generally is obligated to repurchase
    the fixed-rate loans resulting from any such conversion. The Company generally
    has the right to require repurchase of any such converted mortgage loan by the
    servicer or seller of such loans.

    Seller Eligibility Requirements
    ———————————

    The mortgage loans acquired pursuant to the Company’s mortgage conduit
    operations are originated by various sellers, including savings and loan
    associations, banks, mortgage bankers and other mortgage lenders. Sellers are
    required to meet certain regulatory, financial, insurance and performance
    requirements established by the Company before they are eligible to participate
    in the Company’s mortgage loan purchase program and must submit to periodic
    reviews by the Company to ensure continued compliance with these requirements.
    The Company’s current criteria for seller participation generally include a
    tangible net worth of at least $1 million, a servicing portfolio of at least $25
    million and loan production aggregating at least $50 million during the last
    three years. In addition, sellers are required to have comprehensive loan
    origination quality control procedures. In connection with their qualification,
    each seller enters into an agreement that provides for recourse by the Company
    against the seller in the event of any material breach of a representation or
    warranty made by the seller with respect to mortgage loans sold to the Company
    or any fraud or misrepresentation during the mortgage loan origination process.

    Servicing Retention
    ———————

    Sellers of mortgage loans to the Company are generally expected to retain the
    rights to service the mortgage loans purchased by the Company. Servicing
    includes collecting and remitting loan payments, making required advances,
    accounting for principal and interest, holding escrow or impound funds for
    payment of taxes and insurance, if applicable, making required inspections of
    the mortgaged property, contacting delinquent borrowers and supervising
    foreclosures and property dispositions in the event of unremedied defaults in
    accordance with the Company’s guidelines. The servicer receives fees generally
    ranging from 1/4% to 1/2% per annum on the declining principal balances of the
    loans serviced. Under certain circumstances, sellers have the right to require
    the Company to purchase such servicing rights at a previously determined price.
    If a seller/servicer breaches certain of its representations and warranties made
    to the Company, the Company may terminate the servicing rights of such
    seller/servicer and assign such servicing rights to another servicer.

    Sale of Loans
    ————-

    The Company, similar to other mortgage conduits, customarily sells all loans
    that it purchases. When a sufficient volume of mortgage loans with similar
    characteristics has been accumulated, generally $100 million to $500 million,
    the loans are securitized through the issuance of mortgage-backed securities in
    the form of real estate mortgage investment conduits (“REMICs”) or
    collateralized mortgage obligations (“CMOs”) or resold in bulk whole loan sales.
    The length of time between the Company’s commitment to purchase a mortgage loan
    and when it sells or securitizes such mortgage loan generally ranges from ten to
    90 days depending on certain factors, including the length of the purchase
    commitment period and the securitization process.

    The Company’s decision to form REMICs or CMOs or to sell the loans in bulk is
    influenced by a variety of factors. REMIC transactions are generally accounted
    for as sales of the mortgage loans and can eliminate or minimize any long-term
    residual investment in the loans. REMIC securities consist of one or more
    classes of “regular interests” and a single class of “residual interest.” The
    regular interests are tailored to the needs of investors and may be issued in
    multiple classes with varying maturities, average lives and interest rates.
    These regular interests are predominately senior securities but, in conjunction
    with providing credit enhancement, may be subordinated to the rights of other
    regular interests. The residual interest represents the remainder of the cash
    flows from the mortgage loans (including, in some instances, reinvestment
    income) over the amounts required to be distributed to the regular interests.
    In some cases, the regular interests may be structured so that there is no
    significant residual cash flow, thereby allowing the Company to sell its entire
    interest in the mortgage loans. As a result, in some cases the capital
    originally invested in the mortgage loans by the Company may be redeployed in
    the mortgage conduit operations. The Company generally retains any residual
    interests for investment. Management believes that because of the current low
    level of interest rates, investments in residual interest or “excess master
    servicing fees” are prudent, and if interest rates rise, the income from
    investments will mitigate declines in income that may occur in the Company’s
    purchase operations.

    As an alternative to REMIC sales, the Company may issue CMOs to finance mortgage
    loans to maturity. For accounting and tax purposes, the mortgage loans financed
    through the issuance of CMOs are treated as assets of the Company and the CMOs
    are treated as debt of the Company. The Company earns the net interest spread
    between the interest income on the mortgage loans and the interest and other
    expenses associated with the CMO financing. The net interest spread is directly
    impacted by the levels of prepayment of the underlying mortgage loans. The
    Company is required to retain a residual interest in its issued CMOs.

    Substantially all of the Company’s loans and mortgaged-backed securities (“MBS”)
    are sold at prices that are determined based on the cash market for MBS. As
    such, the Company’s interest-rate risk is directly correlated to the risk that
    the price of MBS changes between the date on which a loan is purchased by the
    Company and the date on which the mortgage loan is settled with the ultimate
    investor. In addition, the Company is exposed to the risk that the value of the
    loans that it has committed to purchase, but has not yet closed, will decline
    between the commitment date and the date of the settlement with the investor.

    In order to offset the risk that a change in interest rates will result in a
    decrease in the value of the Company’s current mortgage loan inventory, or its
    commitments to purchase mortgage loans (“Committed Pipeline”) the Company enters
    into hedging transactions. The Company’s hedging policies generally require that
    all of its inventory of loans and the expected portion of its Committed Pipeline
    that may close be hedged with forward contracts for the delivery of MBS or whole
    loans. The Company hedges its inventory and Committed Pipeline of mortgage loans
    by using whole-loan sale commitments to ultimate buyers, by using temporary
    “cross hedges” with sales of government sponsored MBS since such loans are
    ultimately sold based on a market spread to MBS or by selling forward private
    label MBS. As such, the Company is not exposed to significant risk nor will it
    derive any benefit from changes in interest rates on the price of the inventory
    net of gains or losses of associated hedge positions. The correlation between
    the price performance of the hedge instruments and the inventory being hedged is
    generally high due to the similarity of the asset and the related hedge
    instrument. The Company is exposed to interest-rate risk to the extent that the
    portion of loans from the Committed Pipeline that actually closes at the committed price is less than the portion expected to
    close in the event of a decline in rates and such decline in closings is not
    covered by options to purchase MBS needed to replace the loans in process that
    do not close at their committed price. The Company determines the portion of
    its Committed Pipeline that it will hedge based on numerous factors, including
    the composition of the Company’s Committed Pipeline, the portion of such
    Committed Pipeline likely to close, the timing of such closings and anticipated
    changes in interest rates.

    Master Loan Servicing
    ———————

    The Company acts as master servicer with respect to the mortgage loans it sells.
    Master servicing includes collecting loan payments from seller/servicers of
    loans and remitting loan payments, less master servicing fees and other fees,
    to trustees. In addition, as master servicer, the Company monitors compliance
    with its servicing guidelines and is required to perform, or to contract with a
    third party to perform, all obligations not adequately performed by any
    servicer.

    In connection with REMIC issuances, the Company master services on a non-
    recourse basis substantially all of the mortgage loans it purchases. Each series
    of mortgage-backed securities is typically fully payable from the mortgage
    assets underlying such series and the recourse of investors is limited to those
    assets and any credit enhancement features, such as insurance. Generally, any
    losses in excess of the credit enhancement obtained is borne by the security
    holders. Except in the case of a breach of the standard representations and
    warranties made by the Company when mortgage loans are securitized, the
    securities are non-recourse to the Company. Typically, the Company has recourse
    to the sellers of loans for any such breaches.

    Master Loan Servicing
    ———————

    The Company acts as master servicer with respect to the mortgage loans it sells.
    Master servicing includes collecting loan payments from seller/servicers of
    loans and remitting loan payments, less master servicing fees and other fees,
    to trustees. In addition, as master servicer, the Company monitors compliance
    with its servicing guidelines and is required to perform, or to contract with a
    third party to perform, all obligations not adequately performed by any
    servicer.

    In connection with REMIC issuances, the Company master services on a non-
    recourse basis substantially all of the mortgage loans it purchases. Each series
    of mortgage-backed securities is typically fully payable from the mortgage
    assets underlying such series and the recourse of investors is limited to those
    assets and any credit enhancement features, such as insurance. Generally, any
    losses in excess of the credit enhancement obtained is borne by the security
    holders. Except in the case of a breach of the standard representations and
    warranties made by the Company when mortgage loans are securitized, the
    securities are non-recourse to the Company. Typically, the Company has recourse
    to the sellers of loans for any such breaches.

    Financing of Mortgage Conduit Operations
    —————————————-

    The Company’s principal financing needs are the financing of loan purchase
    activities and the investment in excess master servicing rights. To meet these
    needs, the Company currently relies on reverse-repurchase agreements
    collateralized by mortgage loans held for sale and cash flow from operations.
    In addition, in 1993 the Company has relied on proceeds from public offerings of
    common stock. For further information on the material terms of the borrowings
    utilized by the Company to finance its inventory of mortgage loans and mortgage-
    backed securities, see “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial
    Condition and Results of Operations–Liquidity and Capital Resources.” The
    Company continues to investigate and pursue alternative and supplementary
    methods to finance its operations through the public and private capital
    markets.

    WAREHOUSE LENDING

    As part of its new operating plan, the Company engages in warehouse lending
    operations for small-and medium-size mortgage bankers. Warehouse lending
    facilities typically provide short-term revolving financing to mortgage bankers
    to finance mortgage loans during the time from the closing of the loan until its
    settlement with an investor. The Company’s warehouse lending program offers
    warehouse lending facilities up to a maximum aggregate amount of $20 million to
    mortgage bankers who have a minimum audited net worth of $300,000 subject to a
    maximum debt-to-adjusted-net-worth ratio of 20 to 1. The specific terms of any
    warehouse line of credit, including the amount, are determined based upon the
    financial strength, historical performance and other qualifications of the
    mortgage banker. All such lines of credit are subject to the prior approval of
    a credit committee comprised of senior officers and directors of the Company.
    The Company finances this program through a combination of reverse repurchase
    agreements and equity. The Company has a committed one-year reverse repurchase
    agreement facility with an investment bank in an aggregate amount of up to $100
    million for this warehouse lending program.

    As a warehouse lender the Company is a secured creditor of the mortgage bankers
    to which it extends credit and is subject to the risks inherent in that status,
    including the risks of borrower default and bankruptcy.

    In contrast to the Company’s new mortgage conduit and warehouse lending
    operations, which establish the Company as a niche mortgage banker and lender to
    mortgage companies, the Company historically has been a long-term investor in
    single-family, first-lien, residential mortgage loans and in mortgage securities
    representing interests in such loans.

    In 1987, the Company
    began to invest in Agency Securities representing undivided interests in pools
    of adjustable-rate mortgages (“Agency ARMs”) purchased through various broker-
    dealers and financed primarily through reverse repurchase agreements. During
    1992, the Company sold substantially all of its portfolio of Agency ARMs,
    resulting in a gain of approximately $9.0 million and the remainder of such
    portfolio was sold during the first quarter of 1993 at its approximate carrying
    value. At December 31, 1993, the Company’s assets included approximately $402.5
    million of fixed-rate jumbo mortgage loans and Agency Securities which were
    pledged to secure outstanding CMOs issued by the Company’s subsidiaries.

    During 1993, long-term interest rates, including mortgage rates, fell to their
    lowest levels in over twenty years. The collateral for CMOs experienced
    substantial prepayments, resulting in significantly decreased net earnings and,
    as mortgage loan premiums, original issue discount and bond issuance costs were
    required to be amortized, losses on the portfolio. If prepayments continue at
    high levels, the performance of this CMO portfolio will continue to be adversely
    impacted. Regardless of the level of interest rates or prepayments, the Company
    anticipates no significant earnings from this CMO portfolio. Any continued
    negative performance of this CMO portfolio will continue to adversely impact the
    earnings of the Company to the extent of its investment in such portfolio.

    EXHIBIT 10.52 MASTER REPURCHASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
    Merrill Lynch Mortgage Capital Inc. &
    Countywide Mortgage Investments, Inc. 8/16/1993
    Applicability Annex I (continued)
    To the extent that these Supplemental Terms
    conflict with the terms of the Master Repurchase Agreement, these
    Supplemental Terms shall control.
    Capitalized terms not otherwise defined have the meanings set forth in Master Repurchase Agreement.

    Dated as of October 1, 1993

    From time to time the parties hereto may enter into transactions in which one
    party (“Seller) agrees to transfer to the other (“Buyer”) securities or
    financial instruments (“Securities”) against the transfer of funds by Buyer,
    with a simultaneous agreement by Buyer to transfer to Seller such Securities at
    a date certain or on demand, against the transfer of funds by Seller. Each such
    transaction shall be referred to herein as a “Transaction” and shall be governed
    by this Agreement, including any supplemental terms or conditions contained in
    Annex I hereto, unless otherwise agreed in writing.——————————-

    As: Signatory (Director, Officer, Attorney, Accountant, Banker, Agent, etc.)
    List All Filings as Signatory

    Search Recent Filings (as Signatory) for “Angelo R. Mozilo”

    “Angelo R. Mozilo” – President
    a.k.a. “Angelo R.Mozilo”
    Latest Filing: 7/3/08 as Registrant

    “Angelo R. Mozilo” has been a Signatory for/with the following 16 Registrants:
    • Countrywide Capital I
    • Countrywide Capital II
    • Countrywide Capital III
    • Countrywide Capital IV
    • Countrywide Capital V
    • Countrywide Capital VI
    • Countrywide Financial Corp [ formerly Countrywide Credit Industries Inc ]
    • Countrywide Home Loans Inc [ formerly Countrywide Funding Corp ]
    • Home Depot Inc
    • Indymac Bancorp Inc [ formerly Indymac Mortgage Holdings Inc ]
    • Mozilo Angelo R
    • Paracelsus Healthcare Corp
    • Pic Investment Trust
    • Touchstone Investment Trust [ formerly Countrywide Investment Trust ]
    • Touchstone Strategic Trust [ formerly Countrywide Strategic Trust ]
    • Touchstone Tax Free Trust [ formerly Countrywide Tax Free Trust ]

    Angelo R. Mozilo” has/had a Signatory interest in the following 2 Registrants:
    • Countrywide Financial Corp [ formerly Countrywide Credit Industries Inc ]
    • Home Depot Inc

    “Sandor E. Samuels” – Secretary
    Latest Filing: 7/3/08 as Registrant
    ________________________________________
    As: Registrant
    • Samuels Sandor E
    ________________________________________
    As: Signatory (Director, Officer, Attorney, Accountant, Banker, Agent, etc.)
    List All Filings as Signatory

    Search Recent Filings (as Signatory) for “Sandor E. Samuels”
    “Sandor E. Samuels” has been a Signatory for/with the following 10 Registrants:
    • Countrywide Capital III
    • Countrywide Capital IV
    • Countrywide Capital IX
    • Countrywide Capital V
    • Countrywide Capital VI
    • Countrywide Capital VII
    • Countrywide Capital VIII
    • Countrywide Financial Corp [ formerly Countrywide Credit Industries Inc ]
    • Countrywide Home Loans Inc [ formerly Countrywide Funding Corp ]
    • Indymac Bancorp Inc [ formerly Indymac Mortgage Holdings Inc ]

    “Sandor E. Samuels” has/had a Signatory interest in the following Registrant:
    • Countrywide Financial Corp [ formerly Countrywide Credit Industries Inc ]

    73 “Issuer” Relationships (where the security “Owner” is…)
    Filing or “Owner”
    First Filing Last Filing Relationship Filed By Filer or Reporting Owner

    6/4/03 2/20/08 4 Abernathy S Blair
    9/17/03 2/20/08 4 Adarkar Ashwin
    9/16/03 3 Adarkar Ashwin
    3/28/07 3/19/08 4 Arredondo Canise Marie
    1/9/07 3 Arredondo Canise Marie
    4/9/07 3 Banks James M
    1/10/06 5/10/07 SC 13G BlackRock Institutional Trust Company/N/A [ formerly Barclays Global Investors NA/CA ]
    3/17/04 3/19/08 4 Caldera Louis E
    12/10/99 2/12/08 SC 13G Capital Group International Inc
    2/12/99 4/10/08 SC 13G Capital Guardian Trust Co
    2/12/07 2/13/08 SC 13G Capital Research & Management Co
    2/12/99 2/1/01 SC 13G Citigroup Inc [ formerly Travelers Group Inc ]
    8/20/07 7/22/08 SC 13G Classic Fund Management Aktiengesellschaft
    5/5/04 8/4/05 4 Del Ponti John D
    5/3/04 3 Del Ponti John D
    9/17/03 3/17/04 4 Dupont Sherry M
    9/16/03 3 Dupont Sherry M
    3/27/07 2/20/08 4 Ebers Anthony L
    1/9/07 3 Ebers Anthony L
    9/3/04 3/19/08 4 Gabriel Stuart A
    9/3/04 3 Gabriel Stuart A
    6/16/03 3/19/08 4 Gramley Lyle
    3/17/04 3/19/08 4 Grant Hugh M
    1/25/07 3/19/08 4 Greene Gabrielle E
    1/24/07 3 Greene Gabrielle E
    3/17/04 3/19/08 4 Haden Patrick C
    7/31/03 3/19/08 4 Hodel Terrance G
    2/5/07 5 Hodel Terrance G
    7/31/03 3 Hodel Terrance G
    8/6/03 3 Holroyd Charles T
    8/4/05 3/27/07 4 Hughes Terrence O
    7/26/05 3 Hughes Terrence O
    3/17/04 3/19/08 4 Hunt Robert L II
    2/20/08 3/19/08 4 Hymel Patrick A
    12/12/07 1/17/08 3 Hymel Patrick A
    2/5/04 3/17/06 4 Jackson R Patterson [ formerly Jackson Robert P ]
    1/29/04 3 Jackson R Patterson [ formerly Jackson Robert P ]
    3/17/04 3/19/08 4 Kennard Lydia H
    3/17/04 2/20/08 4 Keys A Scott
    2/14/08 SC 13G LMM LLC/MD
    3/27/07 4 Mahoney James R
    5/31/06 3 Mahoney James R
    3/26/07 2/20/08 4 Mathoda Rayman K
    1/9/07 3 Mathoda Rayman K
    3/17/04 4 Matsumoto Raymond D
    3/5/04 3 Matsumoto Raymond D
    3/17/06 3/19/08 4 Melbourne Ruthann K
    1/31/06 3 Melbourne Ruthann K
    3/27/07 2/20/08 4 Minier Michelle
    1/9/07 3 Minier Michelle
    11/7/03 3/17/04 4 Molvar Roger H
    6/6/03 4 Nelson Mark C
    2/3/00 SC 13G Neuberger Berman Inc
    2/10/97 2/11/99 SC 13G Neuberger Berman LLC/Adv [ formerly Neuberger & Berman LLC/Adv ]
    8/7/08 25-NSE New York Stock Exchange LLC
    6/17/03 3/17/04 4 Nichols Grosvenor G
    3/21/03 7/11/08 SC 13G NWQ Investment Management Co LLC [ formerly NWQ Investment Management Co/CA ]
    3/17/04 2/20/08 4 Olinski John D
    11/14/03 2/20/08 4 Perry Michael W
    3/17/04 4 Potts Thomas H
    1/18/08 1/30/08 SC 13D Ramat Securities Ltd
    9/24/07 2/14/08 SC 13G Second Curve Capital LLC
    6/3/03 5/19/08 4 Seymour John/Senator
    3/17/06 2/20/08 4 Sillman Frank M
    2/13/06 5 Sillman Frank M
    8/3/05 8/25/05 3 Sillman Frank M
    8/24/94 SC 13D Smith Thomas W [ formerly Thomas W Smith ]
    3/17/04 3/17/06 4 Ukropina James R
    2/14/05 2/14/07 SC 13G Wellington Management Co LLP [ formerly Wellington Management Co ]
    3/26/04 8/8/06 4 Williams Charles A
    7/26/05 3/19/08 4 Willison Bruce G
    7/26/05 3 Willison Bruce G
    6/4/03 3/19/08 4 Wohl Richard H

    ——————————————————————————–

    No “Owner” Relationships (where the security “Issuer” is…)

    ——————————————————————————–

    42 Affiliate Relationships (based upon SEC Files: Parents / Subs., Directors / Officers, et al.)
    Last Filing Registrant

    2/20/08 Abernathy S Blair
    2/20/08 Adarkar Ashwin
    3/19/08 Arredondo Canise Marie
    4/9/07 Banks James M
    3/11/11 Caldera Louis E
    8/4/05 Del Ponti John D
    3/17/04 Dupont Sherry M
    2/20/08 Ebers Anthony L
    1/14/11 Gabriel Stuart A
    3/19/08 Gramley Lyle
    3/2/11 Grant Hugh M
    2/11/11 Greene Gabrielle E
    3/2/11 Haden Patrick C
    3/19/08 Hodel Terrance G
    8/6/03 Holroyd Charles T
    3/27/07 Hughes Terrence O
    3/19/08 Hunt Robert L II
    3/19/08 Hymel Patrick A
    6/10/04 Indymac Capital Trust I
    6/30/06 Indymac Capital Trust II
    6/30/06 Indymac Capital Trust III
    6/30/06 Indymac Capital Trust IV
    3/17/06 Jackson R Patterson [ formerly Jackson Robert P ]
    1/3/11 Kennard Lydia H
    2/20/08 Keys A Scott
    3/27/07 Mahoney James R
    2/20/08 Mathoda Rayman K
    3/17/04 Matsumoto Raymond D
    3/19/08 Melbourne Ruthann K
    2/20/08 Minier Michelle
    3/17/04 Molvar Roger H
    6/6/03 Nelson Mark C
    3/17/04 Nichols Grosvenor G
    2/20/08 Olinski John D
    2/20/08 Perry Michael W
    6/21/04 Potts Thomas H
    5/19/08 Seymour John/Senator
    2/20/08 Sillman Frank M
    12/21/10 Ukropina James R
    8/8/06 Williams Charles A
    3/22/11 Willison Bruce G
    3/19/08 Wohl Richard H

    25 SEC Files (as “Issuer”)
    First Filing Last Filing SEC File Act Filings

    3/18/94 8/7/08 001-08972 ’34 10-K/A, 10-Q/A, DEFM14A, PRE 14A, NT 11-K, 8-A12B, 10-K405, 5, 3, 3/A, 4/A, 10-K, DEF 14A, 10-Q, 4, 11-K, 8-K, 25-NSE [ * ]
    – 10-K405/A
    8/24/94 7/22/08 005-38368 ’34 SC 13D, SC 13D/A, SC 13G, SC 13G/A [ * ]
    6/30/06 5/2/08 333-135542 ’33 S-3ASR, 424B5, 424B3 [ * ]
    9/6/07 333-145905 ’33 S-8
    12/8/06 333-139201 ’33 S-8
    9/28/06 333-137632 ’33 S-8
    4/26/06 333-133551 ’33 S-8
    7/30/04 333-117797 ’33 S-8
    8/20/01 6/10/04 333-67964 ’33 S-3, S-3/A, POS AM, 424B2, 424B3, 424B5 [ * ]
    7/30/02 333-97339 ’33 S-8
    10/20/00 333-48332 ’33 S-8
    1/28/99 333-71329 ’33 S-3, POS AM [ * ]
    8/17/98 11/3/98 333-61625 ’33 424B3, S-3
    6/3/98 333-55907 ’33 S-8
    12/2/97 5/18/98 333-41329 ’33 S-3, POS AM
    3/4/98 333-47297 ’33 S-3
    10/3/97 333-37149 ’33 S-3
    9/22/97 333-36085 ’33 S-8
    1/17/97 333-19975 ’33 S-3
    8/9/96 10/9/96 333-09887 ’33 S-3/A, S-3
    7/26/96 333-08905 ’33 S-8
    2/16/96 3/11/96 333-01009 ’33 S-3, S-3/A
    6/9/95 8/1/95 033-60137 ’33 S-3, S-3/A
    11/22/94 2/2/95 033-56547 ’33 S-3, S-3/A, 424B1
    11/1/94 033-56267 ’33 S-8
    ________
    * There were multiple parties involved in these filings.
    ———————————————————–

    3.1 Certificate of Incorporation for CMI, as amended.

    3.2* Bylaws of CMI as amended (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.2 to the
    Company’s Form 10-Q, for the quarter ended June 30, 1993).

    4.1* Indenture (the “Indenture”), dated as of December 1, 1985, between
    Countrywide Mortgage Obligations, Inc. (“CMO, Inc.”) and Bankers Trust
    Company, as Trustee (“BTC”) (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.1 to
    CMO, Inc.’s Form 8-K filed with the SEC on January 24, 1986).

    4.2* Series A Supplement, dated as of December 1, 1985, to the Indenture
    (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.2 to CMO, Inc.’s Form 8-K filed
    with the SEC on January 24, 1986).

    4.3* Series B Supplement, dated as of February 1, 1986, to the Indenture
    (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.1 to CMO, Inc.’s Form 8-K filed
    with the SEC on March 31, 1986).

    4.4* Series C Supplement, dated as of April 1, 1986, to the Indenture
    (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.4 to CMO, Inc.’s Amendment No. 1
    to S-11 Registration Statement (No. 33-3274) filed with the SEC on May
    13, 1986).

    4.5* Series D Supplement, dated as of May 1, 1986, to the Indenture
    (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.5 to the Company’s S-11
    Registration Statement (No. 33-6787) filed with the SEC on June 26,
    1986).

    4.6* Series E Supplement, dated as of June 1, 1986, to the Indenture
    (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.6 to the Company’s Amendment No.
    1 to S-11 Registration Statement (No. 33-6787) filed with the SEC on July
    30, 1986).

    4.7* Series F Supplement, dated as of August 1, 1986, to the Indenture
    (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.1 to CMO, Inc.’s Form 8-K filed
    with the SEC on August 14, 1986).

    4.8* Series G Supplement, dated as of August 1, 1986, to the Indenture
    (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.8 to CMO, Inc.’s S-11
    Registration Statement (No.33-8705) filed with the SEC on September 12,
    1986).

    4.9* Series H Supplement, dated as of September 1, 1986, to the Indenture
    (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.1 to CMO, Inc’s Form 8-K filed
    with the SEC on October 7, 1986).

    21

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    4.10* Series I Supplement, dated as of October 1, 1986, to the Indenture
    (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.11 to CMO, Inc.’s Amendment No. 1
    to S-11 Registration Statement (No. 33-8705) filed with the SEC on
    October 27, 1986).

    4.11* Series J Supplement, dated as of October 15, 1986, to the Indenture
    (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.1 to CMO, Inc.’s Form 8-K filed
    with the SEC on November 12, 1986).

    4.12* Series K Supplement, dated as of December 1, 1986, to the Indenture
    (incorporated by reference to 4.1 to CMO, Inc.’s Form 8-K filed with the
    SEC on March 16, 1987).

    4.13* Series L Supplement, dated as of December 1, 1986, to the Indenture
    (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.2 to CMO, Inc.’s Form 8-K filed
    with the SEC on March 16, 1987).

    4.14* Series M Supplement, dated as of January 1, 1987, to the Indenture
    (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.3 to CMO, Inc.’s Form 8-K filed
    with the SEC on March 16, 1987).

    4.15* Indenture (the “SPNB Indenture”), dated as of December 1, 1986, between
    CMO, Inc. and Security Pacific National Bank, as Trustee (“SPNB”)
    (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.1 to CMO, Inc.’s Form 8-K filed
    with the SEC on January 9, 1987).

    4.16* Series W-1 Supplement, dated as of December 1, 1986, to the SPNB
    Indenture (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.2 to CMO, Inc.’s
    Form 8-K filed with the SEC on January 9, 1987).

    4.17* Series N Supplement, dated as of February 1, 1987, to the SPNB Indenture
    (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.1 to CMO, Inc.’s Form 8-K filed
    with the SEC on March 16, 1987).

    4.18* Indenture, dated as of February 1, 1987, between Countrywide Mortgage
    Trust 1987-I (the “1987-I Trust”) and SPNB (incorporated by reference to
    Exhibit 4.18 to the Company’s Form 10-K for the year ended December 31,
    1986).

    4.19* Indenture, dated as of June 1, 1987, between Countrywide Mortgage Trust
    1987-II (the “1987-II Trust”) and SPNB (incorporated by reference to
    Exhibit 4.19 to the Company’s Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30,
    1987).

    4.20* Indenture Supplement, dated as of September 1, 1987, among Countrywide
    Mortgage Obligations III, Inc. (“CMO III, Inc.”), CMO, Inc. and BTC
    (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.1 to CMO III, Inc.’s Form 8-K
    filed with the SEC on October 9, 1987).

    4.21* Indenture Supplement, dated as of September 1,1987, among CMO III, Inc.,
    CMO, Inc. and SPNB (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.2 to CMO III,
    Inc.’s. Form 8-K filed with the SEC on October 9, 1987).

    4.22* Indenture dated as of November 20, 1990, between the Countrywide Cash
    Flow Bond Trust (“CCFBT”) and BTC (incorporated by referenced to Exhibit
    4.22 to the Company’s Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 1990).

    4.23* Indenture dated as of March 30, 1993 between Countrywide Mortgage Trust
    1993-I (the “1993-I Trust”) and State Street Bank and Trust Company (the
    “Bond Trustee”) (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.1 to the
    Company’s 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 1993).

    22

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    4.24* Indenture dated as of April 14, 1993 between Countrywide Mortgage Trust
    1993-II (the “1993-II Trust”) and the Bond Trustee (incorporated by
    reference to Exhibit 4.2 to the Company’s 10-Q for the quarter ended
    March 31, 1993).

    10.1* 1993 Amended and Extended Management Agreement, dated as of May 15, 1993,
    between CMI and Countrywide Asset Management Corporation (the “Manager”)
    (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 10.1 to the Company’s Amendment No.
    3 to S-3 Registration Statement (No.33-63034) filed with the SEC on July
    16, 1993).

    10.2* 1987 Amended and Restated Servicing Agreement, dated as of May 15, 1987,
    between CMI and Countrywide Funding Corporation (“CFC”) (incorporated by
    reference to Exhibit 10.2 to the Company’s Form 10-Q filed for the
    quarter ended June 30, 1987).

    10.3* 1993 Amended and Extended Loan Purchase and Administrative Services
    Agreement, dated as of May 15, 1993, between CMI and CFC (incorporated by
    reference to Exhibit 10.9 to the Company’s 10-Q for the quarter ended
    June 30, 1993).

    10.4* 1988 Amended and Restated Submanagement Agreement, dated as of May 15,
    1988, between CFC and the Manager (incorporated by reference to Exhibit
    10.4 to CMI’s Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 1988).

    10.5* 1985 Stock Option Plan adopted August 26, 1985, as amended February 12,
    1987 (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 10.6 to CMI’s Form 10-K for
    the year ended December 31, 1986).

    10.6* Form of Indemnity Agreement between CMI and CMI’s directors and officers
    (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 10.5 to CMI’s Form 10-Q for the
    quarter ended June 30, 1987).

    10.7* Form of Guaranty of Indemnity Agreement made by Countrywide Credit
    Industries, Inc. (“Countrywide Credit”) to CMI and CMI’s directors and
    officers (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 10.6 to CMI’s Form 10-Q
    for the quarter ended June 30, 1987).

    10.9* Servicing Agreement, dated as of November 15, 1986, among CMO, Inc. SPNB
    and CFC (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 10.1 to CMO, Inc.’s For

  21. Mr. Soliman, CMO, Inc. 1985 ‘servicing’ of Alt-A loans and Alternative investments c/o UCC Alternate Financial Statements c/o Nationsbank and BOA acquring ‘servicing’ rights through divestitures, acquistions, mergers, led to the tight pipeline controlled by the Manufacturers who placed into public domain for sale financial products and financial services as Purchaser and Seller c/o Mortgage Servicers.

    NASCOR
    SASCOR
    and

  22. Searched on google Norwest Mortgage GMAC Chase 1985 and received back valuable information if you understand in 1985 the servicing of alternative investements and Alt-A Loans was not controlled considered general purpose business.

    Nationsbank and BOA as foreign investors the leader scoured divestitures, mergers, acqusitions building the largest producers of non-conforming producers of alternative investmenets and Alt-A Loan servicers.

    The gang of 11 Bank Credit Facility did acquire via mergers control of the Lawyers TItle Corporation c/o Commonwealth and LandAmerica for which Norwest Corporation and Wells FArgo Bank NA Company benefactors, shareowners benefit during origination and during servicing and during defaults.

    Nationsbank and BOA did acquire:

    1985 CMO, Inc. Countrywide Mortgage Inc. GMAC mortgage formed 1985 Alt-A Loans serviced 1985, after GMAC Financial purchased Colonial Mortgage Service and Norwest Mortgage. How they all did alternate investments and alternate loans in 1996 and benefit c/o Norwest Corporations ‘subsidairy’ Norwest Asset Securities Corp from Servicing mortgage backed note debt secondary market sub-prime lenders c/o alternate investments and alternate loans.

    I searched Google for Norwest Mortgage GMAC Chase 1985 and up pops the best kind of factual – true information. The job responsibilities of a hard working Bank of America Mortgage Underwriting Manager

    November 2010 to present – No longer allowed to provide details of job duties

    This BOA Mortgage Underwriting Manager c/o Greater Minneapolsi St. Paul Area – Financial Services

    Summary
    Mortgage Banking Professional with over 25 years of experience specializinbg in Underwriting and Auditing.

    For those new to researching mortgages Underwriters are the Lenders. They approve the % of the loan against the appraisal and the brokers secure Lenders Policies on all funds as cash c/o Tempory Lenders in the event of default will protect as part of the subrogation of debt the Lender’s responsbile for the unsecured debt resold during default.

    http://www.linkedin.com/pub/terry-farkas/a/30b/aa1 – CachedGreater Minneapolis-St. Paul Area – Mortgage Underwriting Manager at Bank of America – Bank of America a mortgage underwriter for BOA since 11/2010 formerly with GMaC-RFC – GMAC RESCAP – started as Senior Underwriter of Chase. I’m sure a lovely person who does their job and is a lawful citizens who processed as an employoee of Chase, GMAC transcations c/o Wells FArgo Bank NA dba Wells FArgo ASset Securities Corp c/o NASCOR formerly thrugh others c/o largest producers of non-conforming alternate loans and alternate investmeents.

    Lead Quality Auditor at GMAC ResCap; Audit Manager at GMAC ResCap; Lead Quality Auditor at GMAC ResCap. Senior Underwriter at Chase; Senior Underwriter at Norwest Mortgage; Underwriter/Office Manager at … 1985 – 1987 ( 2 years) …

    1991-1995 Senior Underwriter Norwest Mortgage
    1995-1997 Senior Underwriter Chase
    One of 2 national Underwriters with DE designation & 203K
    One of 4 Farmers Home Loan underwriters nationwide
    Lead underwriter for Wholesale and Retail division
    Develop and train underwriting staff
    1997-2005 GMAC ResCap Lead Quality Autiro:
    •Second level file review to ensure accuracy & consistency
    •Train and develop audit staff members
    •Complete initial audit report drafts for presentation to Audit Manager. Identifiy key trends and audit findings and recommend solutions for improving process.
    •Update Policy and Procedure Manual, audit workpapers, and working documents
    •Developed Lead Training Manual to assist in the training of new associates and provide a source of truth for seasoned associates
    •Celebrate Leadership participant 2001
    GMAC ResCap Audit Manager
    2005 – February 2009 (4 years)
    Responsible for managing up to 11 direct report associates as well as outsourcing agencies to provide meaningful audit results, identify process risk, identify fraud and misrep, and mitigate loss when applicable.
    •Coordinate workflow and production processes to complete audits within established timeframes.
    •Present audit findings to channels via monthly meetings to provide trending and feedback information. Provide influential recommendations for process revisions and credit policy standards to improve the overall book of business.
    •Update Policy and Procedure Manual, audit workpapers and working documents
    •Review of audit findings with channels via monthly meetings to provide and accept feedback.
    •Create a working environment for associates to establish a climate of high performance expectations and continuous improvement.
    GMAC ResCap Lead Quality Auditor
    March 2009 – November 2010 (1 year 9 months)
    •Coordinate workflow and production processes to complete investor repurchase, MI rescission and post funding audits within established timeframes.
    •Write and publish weekly and monthly qc audit reports as well as adhoc report requests to provide detailed findings and identify process and origination risk.
    •Present audit findings to channels via monthly meetings to provide trending and feedback information. Provide influential recommendations for process revisions and credit policy standards to improve the overall book of business.
    •Update Policy & Procedure Manual, audit workpapers and working documents.
    •Train and develop staff members. Perform second level file review to ensure accuracy & consistency.
    •Create a working environment for associates to establish a climate of high performance expectations and continuous improvement

  23. Maher, you know I know you know. Is “surrender of control” anywhere in that argument? I think it is. Hence, the need for an “expert witness”, or a forensic accountant, looks like both, contracted by an attorney for appearance or deposition. And as always, thanks for the clues.

    Chris King: Love your work! Glad to see you HERE! Holy Noisemaker you are! Can’t wait to see you on the nightly news. Isn’t it funny how the ruling class refuses to tell the story? All that bank advertising. That’s why they don’t want the kids reading “Animal Farm”. They have complete control over the media. ALMOST! Keep it up! America’s counting on you.

    A-Man, the judge is bought and paid for.

    And finally, Douglas. Let me tell you about Government Motors/ALLY/GMAC/AMERICREDIT and I’m sure Chrysler?MOPAR/Chrysler Financial:

    1) The Federal Government is now the nation’s largest “subprime lender”.
    2) Add this to Fan/Fred/FHLB/FedRes/and every other (bank?) govt. holding company
    3) A new Buick Regal with an approximate MSRP of $30,250, has around $700 markup from invoice to list. The rest of the margins are collected to supplement the pension funds. Commissionable gross, after pack, equals a $125 commission. IF you can HOLD LIST PRICE! How about that $50,000+ Buick Enclave? Around 1700-2000 in markup, not $4000. Astounding.
    4) Top-tier borrowers now have to explain themselves as to why they NEED three cars. “EXCUSE ME?” Uh, yeah, the bank (ALLY) wants to know why you need three car loans. Sometimes, the customer says “Screw them! I’ll write a check!”, and I reply “Good thinkin’!”. Sometimes they need that third car for the kid, grandkid, house in Florida, whatever; but it’s none of the “governments business”. The decision should be “credit based”, not “need based”. That’s where we are.
    5) The country is also the largest contractor for landscaping services.

  24. Another question? How come the Banksters are Broke. If they got the TARP money The insurance Money for loans that were not paid?

    could it be because the chain of Title is broken that allowed them to sell the same loan multiple times?

    Just do the math.

    Your Honor the Judges can’t you do the 2nd grade math?

    The Judge in the B. Davies case is a Chicken a scaredy cat A woos.

    But maybe I cant blame him. Maybe I would be afraid of the big bad wolf?

    NEVER AGAIN.

  25. M. Soliman the attorneys, CPA contact information etc……
    We all need help. Plus how much do you charge now Soliman?
    Come on now.

  26. M. Soliman:
    I have one question for you in regards to your track record as a mortgage fraud expert retained to testimony in court? What is your opinion about retaining an expert in a mortgage foreclosure action, necessary? As a former expert witness, any advice for those who have ethics, are literate, who do not take advantage or prey on those people who trust you and do not have the “superior” knowledge you claim to have?

  27. Carie, they can keep telling themselves that these are “smart business moves”, but it’s eventually going to bite then in the ass and more. This is war, plain and simple. The War of Wall Street Aggression, and unless and until the government changes its pattern and practices in this burgeoning conflict they will have to be considered as having chosen the wrong side, the side of the terrorists, the side against the citizenry of the United States. Rev 2.0 will be the only recourse against the serfdom they’re initiating. Anonymous, no, not that anonymous 🙂 is saying they’re going to take over Wall Street next month on the 17th. Let’s hope they’re successful. Instead of just worrying about putbacks, Wall Street had better start concerning itself with pushbacks as well. We’ll see if God comes to Blankfein’s rescue.

  28. Okay—THIS is SCARY—check it out:

    http://azstarnet.com/real-estate/article_662a10e9-c317-5b92-a51b-9efa96fce37d.html

    scum of the earth…

  29. foreclosureweary, on August 27, 2011 at 3:49 pm said:

    WOW! I lost my case when BOA took my case federal–

    M. Soliman – A right of action claim fails in a state jurisdiction where confused with equitable claims to preserve ownership. The injunction should be filed for preserving award for compensatory and punitive damages. Not one complaint I have seen differentiates the two or fails to state state a monetary claim.

    In Res and in Ter arguments fail as equitable claims in Fed Court when you already appear and pleaded equitable claims at the state level.

  30. Anonymous (LL Staff)

    original creditor was never a mortgagee to begin with . . .

    This statement is abbreviated , incoherent, false and serves the lenders purpose.
    1) It is under GAAP an obligor
    2) The obligee is a bank NA
    3) The transfer of its liability is verified a bonefide transfer
    4) Its relationship, albeit less than arms , does not void the substance for the transfer
    5) Disqualifying its value as a creditor defeats the argument for avoiding its REPO at sale.

    The REPO at sale is a condition subsequent to cause the credit bid to fail.

    Under stand the distortion and negligence from a legal theory and practicality. Your thoughts are obliviously that of second hand views offered by a retired licensed practitioner .
    .
    I learned how to spell (LOL) Now you learn how to think…

    M.Soliman

  31. The A Man, on August 27, 2011 at 1:14 pm said:

    M. Soliman who is your attorney in the BoA case?

    William FineEsq
    Tom Rositto CPA
    M Brandt – Pres
    R Furto Controller

    Why do they doubt -they listen to hear say and buy into philosophy.

    But doubt the truth when steeped with fact. Over 22 wins and still they doubt.

  32. Anonymous – Fraud upon court — no SOL — who was your real adversary?? Behind which door?? Bank has the answer — but bank likely long gone. The problem is — the real party loves to falsely claim that original creditor is current creditor — violation of law — but, hey, if they can get away with it — they will do it — and they will win because they falsify.

    M. Soliman – Do a filing search on the transferee at sale. Your winging it again, and again , and again …..

  33. […] Livinglies’s Weblog Filed Under: Foreclosure Law News, Foreclosure News Tagged With: crisis, foreclosure, […]

  34. foreclosureweary

    One of the worst things is for adversary to take it to federal — say adversary because not sure it was even BofA. Much tougher in federal court — demand complete knowledge of law and precedent. Of course, precedent usually means — did not plead properly. And, judges do not question representation.

    Fraud upon court — no SOL — who was your real adversary?? Behind which door?? Bank has the answer — but bank likely long gone.

    The problem is — the real party loves to falsely claim that original creditor is current creditor — violation of law — but, hey, if they can get away with it — they will do it — and they will win because they falsify.

    And, of course, original creditor was never a mortgagee to begin with.

    Where are the class action foreclosure defense attorneys??? Non-existent — up against too much power — or just not competent — or, only looking for fees.

  35. WOW! I lost my case when BOA took my case federal–there really is a Santa Claus. The banks need to learn the lesson “what goes around comes around” or just plain old KARMA. It’s about time!

  36. E. Tolle

    Absolutely — you got pretty far — but, has anyone else here ever spoken to the IRS??? They know nothing — see nothing — do nothing — speak nothing.

    No wonder we have a big deficit problem.

  37. But of course, I forgot. Wall Street is our main Street as well, like it or not.

  38. @ ANONYMOUS, another major concern for the banks would be the tax implications, if in fact the banks weren’t running the administration. Yves Smith says this about Virginia calling the IRS about getting monies from failed REMICs:

    The IRS simply refuses to go there. I was given a pretty close to temporaneous report last year when a lawyer who understood the tax issues contacted the IRS; the enforcement officer who took his call, who was very senior, understood the implications immediately and was very keen. But she reported back later that the question had gone to the White House and the response was “We are not going to use tax as a tool of policy.” So enforcing statutes is somehow abusive? This is either a deeply internalized Wall Street centric view of the world, or just plain corruption, take your pick.

    http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/08/state-officials-starting-to-question-securitization-fail-whether-states-should-tax-rmbs.html

  39. Biggest threat to banks is insurance fraud/liability. NY AG onto it — and believe why he was removed from 50 state “settlement” negotiating committee.
    Government did not know full extent of what they were bailing out — when they quickly acted. Covering — getting much more difficult.

    THE A MAN — glad YOU are back.

  40. M. Soliman who is your attorney in the BoA case?

  41. B. Davies with all due respect and I have alot of respect to you. You need a new attorney.

    Our issues are two.
    Standing
    Accounting. Where did your $1,600 payment go (co-mingling of funds)?
    Where did your other payments go? Did it go to the correct party?

    This is my opinion I might be way off. Maybe you should get Mr Nguyen
    who succeeded in court to represent you?

    The only other issue is what Ms Beal tried to raise is the fact that it is now an unsecured debt.

    This is my two cents worth.

    Be Strong and Courageous.

  42. Nancy – And before buying Countrywide it tried to make a huge splash in wholesale lending and failed miserably only to get out with its tail between its legs. —————————————–

    I was BofA’s very last wholesale trade. Our attorneys forced the sale. Its what I include in our testimony for clients. If you only knew…

    M. Soliman
    expert.witness@live.com

  43. In foreclosure suits that I know of, BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP claims it was “formerly known as” Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP, so how can it put CW into BK? Wouldn’t that put itself into BK?

    Know what your speaking of- great subject matter and no clue….
    Suggestion – Look, search and you will find the answers to redress and fraud. Look at the ABA wire and who is named the trustee in a Statutory Business Trust .

    expert.witness@live.com

  44. PLEASE ADD ME TO YOUR EMAIL LIST SO I CAN GET COPIES OF YOUR POSTINGS EVERYDAY.
    Thank you,
    Cheryl Whitaker

  45. If you don’t think the courts favor the banks then read this transcript of hearing in front of the newly appointed Scott C. Clarkson.

    The courts HATE the Banks. The also hate gibberish arguments….

  46. Facts are BofA was acting as the FED and WELLS the cashier or COMPTROLLER for the private sector and Mortgage Home Lending. Lehman Bros argued its a free market and jumped in – and screwed it all up with competition. The Robust condition emerged and then collapse.

    Okay Press I have spoken – go steal this next “theory” to emerge fact.
    The cost to Fannie and Freddie was a Trillion $ upside by insuring loans after the fact. Is this theory? Go look at their rise to power and earnings fro 2005 thru collapse.

    What does it matter? it don’t . It cannot win you a home back…

    M.Soliman
    expert.witness@live.com

    Anonymous – (LL staff …)

  47. BOA IS GOING DOWN THE QUESTION IS: Is the United States going down with it?

    I really dont think people understand or comprehend how bad it really is?

  48. In foreclosure suits that I know of, BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP claims it was “formerly known as” Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP, so how can it put CW into BK? Wouldn’t that put itself into BK?

  49. http://www.scribd.com/doc/59161560/Davies-Transcript-of-May-3-2011-Hearing

    If you don’t think the courts favor the banks then read this transcript of hearing in front of the newly appointed Scott C. Clarkson.

  50. BofA ain’t going anywhere. The banks run the place and make the laws, just ask congress.

  51. National Mortgage News sign up for your own subscription first 2 week trial for free excellent resource. I hope all the experts will call Paul who is willing to write the truth. Example:

    Deconsolidation Nation for Mortgages?
    By Paul Muolo Let’s put Bank of America on the couch. If anyone can figure out its absolutely schizophrenic approach to mortgages over the past two decades drop me a line.

    Remember when it owned a subprime lender back in the 1990s and actually liquidated the thing even though it was making money? And before buying Countrywide it tried to make a huge splash in wholesale lending and failed miserably only to get out with its tail between its legs. And then it bought Countrywide thinking it was buying a premier lender/servicer at a bargain-basement price. I would guess that by the time the CFC Trojan Horse has run its course at B of A that disastrous purchase—the worst in history for mortgage banking—will cost the bank upwards of $40 billion. But enough Monday morning quarterbacking. All eyes in the industry are on the Charlotte-based bank because of this simple reason: the general belief is that within three years its presence in the market will be half of what it was a year ago and that means all that “market share” is up for grabs. We’ve hinted on the concept of “deconsolidation” before but you may want to read our expanded analysis in the Monday edition of National Mortgage News. Don’t subscribe? Call 800-221-1809…

    Meanwhile, mum is still the word on who bought B of A’s $73 billion servicing portfolio—you know, the one that Fannie Mae controls because it has the right to yank servicing at a moment’s notice. As we noted in a previous column, Green Tree Servicing was said to be the winning bidder but that company may not have actually bought MSRs. We’re told that Green Tree recently received a “large assignment”—the B of A’s MSRs. (How much we don’t know.) GT isn’t talking, neither is its parent company, that publicly traded Walter Investment Management. You would figure that this is a “material event” and that WIM would say something. But we’re also told that maybe the deal has not actually closed, which means no filing is necessary, at least not yet. Of course, B of A and Fannie are saying nothing. So maybe I should call my Senator who is on the Banking Committee…

    By now, you all know that refinance applications are piling up. Second-quarter originations figures were not great but the third quarter could turn out to be a barn-burner. However, second-quarter commercial fundings were quite strong, according to figures compiled by NMN and the Quarterly Data Report. In the next issue of the QDR, NMN will start publishing the nation’s top ranked commercial lenders as well. To order the QDR drop a line to Deartra.Todd@SourceMedia.com

    What’s going on with Kislak Mortgage these days? Good question. Tom Wind left several weeks ago and the company’s PR lady has not returned multiple telephone calls and emails lately. Any insight? Drop me a note at Paul.Muolo@SourceMedia.com

    The Federal Housing Finance Agency has yet to release its draft proposal on restructuring Fannie/Freddie servicing fees. We’re told that there is now “radio silence” in Washington on the issue. However, something might shake loose by the end of September…

    MORTGAGE HURRICANE STUFF: Yes, a big storm is on the way to the East Coast. I want all you mortgage surfing dudes who are contemplating a trip East to catch the wave to stay at home, unless of course you happen to be Dan Perl or Jeff Freud. Meanwhile, servicers should be checking the flood insurance policies on their portfolio…

    Just how low are mortgage rates? Warehouse consultant Larry Charbonneau says he’s refinancing into a 3.25% 10-year loan. The grizzled industry veteran lives in Texas…

    WASHINGTON NEWS: It’s been nearly two years since the Department of Housing and Urban Development implemented new policies for the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, including new versions of the good-faith estimate and HUD-1 disclosure documents. While the technology and automation exists to help mortgage lenders avoid GFE/HUD-1-related RESPA violations, industry participants say that even now, many lenders are still relying on manual processes—or no process at all—and end up having to pay the difference between underestimated and actual closing costs. For the full story see NMN and our website. (Reporting by NMN’s own Austin Kilgore.)

    MORTGAGE PEOPLE: 3Point Asset Management, Irvine, Calif., has hired Ron Millar as AVP in charge of sales and training. Millar joins the residential specialist from Arch Bay Capital.

    MUST ATTEND MORTGAGE CONFERENCES: On Sept. 19-20 NMN and SourceMedia will hold its Mortgage Regulatory Forum show at the Washington Marriott in the nation’s capital. Speakers include OCC chief John Walsh, Rep. Shelley Moore Capito, R-W.Va., and some congressman from Massachusetts whose last name is Frank. More info visit http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/conferences/mr/

    IMPORTANT DATA STUFF: MortgageStats.com is alive and well. This exclusive only data website has been updated to include not only full-year 2010 figures but first and second quarter information as well. MortgageStats boasts the nation’s top 400 lenders and servicers, including hard volume numbers and contact information. It also includes exclusive monthly analysis from me. (You can’t get this information anywhere else.) For more information drop an email to: Deartra.Todd@SourceMedia.com

    I’m on Twitter, discussing mortgage matters, fishing, vestibular disorders and more.

    THE LAST WORD: Global warming is here.

  52. BofA is going to bite the dust eventually. Buffet is going to make money “going short”. You can make money on the upswing, and you can make money on the downswing.

  53. Bob G. ,

    Buffet and Obama are pretty tight ,, Buffet has made all his money buying businesses with good cash flow at bargain prices due to some temporary problem ,, usually estate taxes on heirs that have a controlling interest… he is a leach that has used the government as his “big hammer” to force sales at hugely discounted prices, he doesn’t create value or exciting new products.. Buffet was probably told by Obama that BofA would not be allowed to fail and that his preferred shares would survive leaving him in control for the bargain price of only $5B… I don’t think he anticipated the attempt to remove to federal court.

    If you want examples of Obama playing similar games just look to the GM and MoPar deals where he wiped out secured bond holders to give the companies to his friends at the UAW.

    This is the Marxist in Chiefs signature move.

    I hope they remove to Federal Court just to bloody his nose on this deal.

  54. And speaking of banks…. interesting to see who’s been reading my journal this week….

    Huge fight over UUC 3, 4, 4A and Foreclosure looms large banks v. ULC:

    http://mortgagemovies.blogspot.com/2011/08/weekend-update-morris-nichols-arsht.html

    SATURDAY, AUGUST 27, 2011

    Weekend Update: Morris, Nichols Arsht & Tunnell & Uniform Law Commission follow KingCast/Mortgage Movies as the Banking Industry fights against reform of UCC Articles 3, 4 and 4A.

  55. I’m not so sure Bob,

    Let’s see.

    The arrogance of BofA et al and thinking (and getting treated so far as if) they are above the law could prove their downfall (hopefully).

    Simply butting CW into BK does not necessarily “solve” anything and in fact could further complicate their cash-flow problems. If you think CW is merely a loss for BofA, well things aren’t always as they appear to be (imagine that.) If they were as capable as you may think, they would have dumped CW a long time ago if it was costing them so much money (so who in power has made less money; been brought up on charges or sent to jail?.) Remember who the “servicer” is with no investment (or little) in these loans v. where the funds actually came and still come from not to mention “creative” bookeeping and “off balance sheet” accounting…not to mention the confiscation of houses and property they never invested in (except with Other Peoples Money)…

  56. BAC will simply put Countrywide into BK and that will be the end of that. Moreover, if that is the case, then BAC potentially escapes all liability for CWide, to include the $8.5 billion proposed settlement. Does anybody here really think that Warren Buffet didn’t consider the possibility of removal to Fed Court before plunking down $5 billion? Grais has brought checkers to a chess game. These guys are grasping at straws.

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