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EDITORIAL COMMENT: We’ll have to see how much of this politics. But these facts and  conclusions provide considerable support to claims by borrowers concerning the the validity of the mortgages, notes, liabilities, foreclosures and sales.

Naming Culprits in the Financial Crisis


A voluminous report on the financial crisis by the United States Senate — citing internal documents and private communications of bank executives, regulators, credit ratings agencies and investors — describes business practices that were rife with conflicts during the mortgage mania and reckless activities that were ignored inside the banks and among their federal regulators.

The 650-page report, “Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse,” was released Wednesday by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, whose co-chairmen are Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat, and Tom Coburn, a Republican of Oklahoma. The result of two years’ work, the report focuses on an array of institutions with central roles in the mortgage crisis: Washington Mutual, an aggressive mortgage lender that collapsed in 2008; the Office of Thrift Supervision, a regulator; the credit ratings agencies Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s Investors Service; and the investment banks Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank.

“The report pulls back the curtain on shoddy, risky, deceptive practices on the part of a lot of major financial institutions,” Mr. Levin said in an interview. “The overwhelming evidence is that those institutions deceived their clients and deceived the public, and they were aided and abetted by deferential regulators and credit ratings agencies who had conflicts of interest.”

The bipartisan report includes 19 recommendations for changes to regulatory and industry practices. These include creating strong conflict-of-interest policies at the nation’s banks and requiring that banks hold higher reserves against risky mortgages. The report also asks federal regulators to examine its findings for violations of laws.

The report adds significant new evidence to previously disclosed material showing that a wide swath of the financial industry chose profits over propriety during the mortgage lending spree. It also casts a harsh light on what the report calls regulatory failures, which helped deepen the crisis.

Singled out for criticism is the Office of Thrift Supervision, which oversaw some of the nation’s most aggressive lenders, including Countrywide Financial, IndyMac and Washington Mutual, whose chief executive was Kerry Killinger. Noting that the agency’s officials viewed the institutions it regulated as “constituents,” the report said that the office relied on bank executives to correct identified problems and was reluctant to interfere with “even unsound lending and securitization practices” at Washington Mutual.

The report describes how two risk managers at the bank were marginalized by its executives. One of them told the committee that executives began providing the regulator with outdated loss estimates as the mortgage crisis widened. After the risk manager told regulators that the estimates it had received were dated, Mr. Killinger fired him.

From 2004 to 2008, for example, the regulatory office identified more than 500 serious deficiencies at Washington Mutual, yet did not force the bank to improve its lending operations, according to the report. And when the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the bank’s backup regulator, moved to downgrade the bank’s safety and soundness rating in September 2008, John M. Reich, the director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, wrote an angry e-mail to a colleague. Referring to Sheila Bair, the F.D.I.C. chairwoman, he wrote: “I cannot believe the continuing audacity of this woman.” Washington Mutual failed two weeks later.

The office was abolished last year, and its operations were folded into the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Mr. Reich declined to comment. A lawyer for Mr. Killinger did not respond to a request for comment.

The report was produced by the same Senate committee that conducted an 11-hour hearing last April with Goldman executives and employees of its mortgage unit, who testified about their trading and securities underwriting practices.

At the hearing, some lawmakers questioned Goldman’s assertion that it had not bet against the mortgage market as real estate prices collapsed. And on Wednesday, Senator Levin pointed out that his committee had found 3,400 places in Goldman documents where its officials used the phrase “net short,” a reference to negative bets.

“Why would Goldman deny what was so obvious, that they were engaged in a huge short in the year 2007?” Senator Levin asked in a press briefing Wednesday morning. “Because they gained at the expense of their clients and they used abusive practices to do it.”

The report uncovered a new aspect of Goldman’s mortgage activity during 2007. That year, as Goldman tried to build its bet against housing, the report says, it drove down the cost of shorting the mortgage market by squeezing those who had made negative bets. Goldman tried to put on the squeeze, the report noted, so that it could add to its negative bets more cheaply and protect itself against the housing collapse.

Because Goldman was a large dealer in the marketplace, it had the power to drive prices in a certain direction. The report quotes from the self-evaluation of Deeb Salem, a mortgage trader, who wrote: “We began to encourage this squeeze, with plans of getting very short again.” He added, “This strategy seemed do-able and brilliant.”

Michael Swenson, head of trading in the structured product group at Goldman and Mr. Salem’s superior, also referred to the short squeeze, according to Senate investigators. In an e-mail, Mr. Swenson said that Goldman should “start killing” investors who were betting against mortgages. In testimony before the committee, however, he said he was simply trying to add balance to the market.

Goldman abandoned its plan in June 2007 when two Bear Stearns hedge funds collapsed because of bad mortgage bets.

A Goldman spokesman said in a statement: “While we disagree with many of the conclusions of the report, we take seriously the issues explored by the subcommittee. We recently issued the results of a comprehensive examination of our business standards and practices and committed to making significant changes that will strengthen relationships with clients, improve transparency and disclosure and enhance standards for the review, approval and suitability of complex instruments.”

The report also sheds new light on the bundling and trading of mortgages at Deutsche Bank, which had also made negative bets in that market.

Unlike Goldman, Deutsche Bank has not been accused of wrongdoing by government investigators. But the Senate report focuses on a trader named Greg Lippmann, who has since left the bank to join a hedge fund.

Mr. Lippmann was vocally negative about housing as early as 2005 and brought his idea of shorting the market to professional investors on Wall Street. He described risky mortgage securities before the crisis as “pigs,” according to the report. When he was asked to buy one such mortgage security, he responded that he “would take it and try to dupe someone,” according to the report.

Mr. Lippmann persuaded Deutsche to let him build a large short position, reaching $5 billion by 2007, the report says. The bank still lost money on other positive mortgage bets, but Mr. Lippmann’s trade helped reduce the company’s overall loss.

The report focused on one Deutsche collateralized debt obligation from 2006, called Gemstone VII, and described how Deutsche and other banks made $5 million to $10 million for every deal like Gemstone they created. In 2006 and 2007, banks created about a trillion dollars of C.D.O. deals — the most complex type of mortgage security and the instruments that sent the lending craze to dizzying heights.

In e-mails provided to the committee, Mr. Lippmann called the bank’s operation a “C.D.O. machine” and characterized such securities as a “Ponzi scheme.” But when the committee interviewed Mr. Lippmann, he backtracked, saying that his colorful descriptions were used to defend his negative view of the market.

In the Senate interview, Mr. Lippmann also said that he thought he was the person who persuaded the American International Group to stop writing insurance on mortgage securities. He told the committee that the head of the Deutsche Bank group that put together C.D.O.’s was upset when Mr. Lippmann persuaded A.I.G. to exit the business in 2006. Without A.I.G. there to insure the instruments, it would be harder to keep these lucrative factories humming.

Mr. Lippmann declined to comment on Wednesday.

Michele Allison, a spokeswoman for Deutsche Bank, said that the e-mails and other documents cited in the report indicated the divergent views within the bank about the housing market. “Despite the bearish views held by some, Deutsche Bank was long the housing market and endured significant losses,” she said in a statement.

32 Responses

  1. Structured Asset Securities Corp Series 1995-2
    8/30/1995 Inception
    12/31/1995 Report
    Registrant ?
    Amended 10KA for year ended 12/31/1995
    52-1949524 (IRS)
    c/o Norwest Bank Minnesota, NJ
    Governing Law of PSA – New York
    Commission 033-48771-04

    On Behalf of
    Structured Asset Securities Corp
    (Registrant) as Depositor

    The Chase Manhattan Bank NA as TRUSTEE
    pursuant to which Structured Asset Securities Corp were issued.

    Exhibit 99.1
    Master Servicing Activies or servicing activities:

    American Savings Bank FA as SERVICER
    Countrywide Credit Industries & Subsidiaries as SERVICER
    Dale Mortgage Bankers Corp “DMB” as SERVICER
    GE Capital Mortgage Services Inc as SERVICER
    Prudential Home Mortgage Co INc as SERVICER
    Wells Fargo & Co as SERVICER
    Zion Mortgage Co as SERVICER

    Exhibit 99.3 OBLIGATIONS under Pooling Agreement or Servicing Agreement as applicable:
    same as above PLUS…

    /s/ Agent for Trustee Chase Manhattan Bank NA
    Sherri J. Sharps
    Vice President
    By: Norwest Bank of Minnesota NA

    c/o Norwest Bank Minnesota NA
    11000 Broken Land Parkway
    Columbia MD 21044

    Dale Mortgage Bankers Group


    DLJ Merchant Banking
    -Axa Financial
    -Credit Suisse (USA) Inc.
    -Credit Suisse
    -Pinnacle Gase Resources
    -Goldman Sachs Group Inc.

  2. Menawhile: Wells Fargo Bank

    (Prior to marriage of WFC and Norwest)

    As of and for the year ended 12/31/1Wells Fargo and Companies has complied in all material respects with the minimum servicing standards set forth in the Mortgage Bankers Association of America’s Uniform Single Attestation Program for Mortgage Bankers.

    As of and for this same period, Wells Fargo and Companies had in effect a fidelity bond in the amount of $115,000,000 and an errors and ommissions policy in the amount of $48,000,000.

    /s/ William J. McClung, SVP
    January 16, 1996
    P.O. Box 85071 San Diego CA 921860-5071

  3. DLJ Mortgage PO Box 85071, San Diego CA (Tax)? Same PO Box for GMAC Mortgage, same for GMAC Speical Services, same for Wells Fargo Bank NA in 2009 presenting to US Bank NA as Trustee….

    1994 – 1995
    Structured Asset Securities Corp – Lehman – Deutsche Bank – Prudential – Chase Manhattan Mortgage – Wells Fargo Companies – Norwest Corp, Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp – GMAC-RFC
    Norwest Corp aka Wells Fargo & Co.

    07/10/1969 – Iowa Securities Co, Saint Paul MN
    12/31/1973 – BANCO Mortgage Minneapolis MN
    12/31/1983 – Renamed Norwest Mortgage Inc.
    06/28/1985 – Acquired by Norwest Mortgage Inc.
    (RSSD ID: 1037124)
    Parent Norwest Corp 6/27/1985 last $

    The Money Center 1149894

    BANCO Mortgage Co of Wisconsin 1255508

    Norwest Bank Iowa, National Assoc 660842

    NOW INC 1120905

    ELLIS Advertising 18524701 – Finance Co
    04/14/1977 Parent Wells Fargo & Co. still active
    05/21/2011 – Ellis Advertising is a subsidiary of Norwest Financial

    Norwest Trust CO NY 90618 flow to
    Norwest Bank Minneapolis NA 995151
    Norwest American Securities LTD 1120914
    Norwest Asia Ltd 112103 Hong Kong
    Norwest Mortgage Inc 1037124
    Iowa Securities Investment Corp 1255496
    Norwest Funding INc 138347
    Norwest Mortgage Bonds 1383504

    Formerly Norwest Mortgage Inc. 6/26/1985
    Articles of Amendment & Restatement of
    Articles of Incorproation
    Iowa Domestic Entity ID 3593:

    Norwest affirsm the original name of corporation was Iowa Securities Corp 2/10/1910.

    7/1/1985 name of corporation GMAC Mortgage Corp of Iowa (non-surviving)
    GMAC Mortgage Service Co of CA (non-surviving)into GMAC Mortgage Corp of PA
    8360 Old York Rd, Elkins PA 19117

    GMAC of PA the Surviving Corp 9/20/1994
    Glen W. Snyder SVP signature

    Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV’s) subsidiaries?

    Why is fictitous name in PA allowed as ‘GMAC Bank”?

    GMAC Mortgage Corporation of Iowa
    (formerly Norwest Mortgage, Inc.)
    7/1/1985 Norwest Corporation
    (Entity ID 134676 Status Inactive)
    Home Office:
    1200 Peavey Bldg, Minneapolis MN 55479

    (Trademark or Service Mark Eff Date 8/2/1982 Filing 9/10/1982)


    What was Norwest Trust CO?
    Northwestern Trust Co (a limited Purpose Trust)
    40 Wall St, NY NY

    09/03/1974 A limited Purpose Trust Non-Deposit Trust Co – Non Memember
    01/24/1977 Changed to Non-Deposit Trust Company-Memeber
    05/04/1983 – Renamed Norwest Trust Co NY
    08/11/1983 Renamed Norwest Trust Co….
    01/20/1987 Moved 2 Wall St, NY NY
    09/07/1988 Changed Non-Deposit Trust Co Non-Member
    04/08/1998 Institution Closed

    Confused: UCC Agreement for
    There is a UCC
    Direct Services
    Debtor Exact Full Legal Name ‘GMAC Mortgage Corporation’
    2010 Spring Rd Sjutie 300
    Oakbrook IA 60523
    Filed as Corporation ID 102315 Jurisdiction IA

  4. What’s Frederick Maryland got to do – got to do with it?

    (Private Family Trusts money) funded residential real estate transactions underwriter Lehman.

    Chevy Chase or Bank principal business activity of B.F> Saul Real Estate Investment Trust (began 1964) unincorporated business trust under Maryland law 10/24/1988 (Maryland mixed judicial non-judicial).

    Its real estate subsidiaries is ownership and developeome-producing properties.
    The TRUST owns 80% of outstanding stock of Chevy Chase Bank, whose assets accounted for 94% of the TRUSTS consolidated assets 9/30/1995. Trust is a Thirft Holding Com by virtual of its ownoership of a majority interest (65% of FSB’s must put deposits into real estate).

    8401 Connecticut Ave
    Chevy Chase MD 20815
    Comprehensive regulation, examination and supervision of OTS and to a lesser extent FDIC. (SAIF) Savings Assoc Insurance Fund administered by FDIC.


    Of interest when you read how many Chevy Chase defaults in Moody report.

  5. DLJ Commercial Mortgage Corp., 1998-CF1.

    Conduit Agency, Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV’s) are a means by which ‘thing’ IN REM transmitted. Latin (to lead together) e.g., Moodys saw the conduit was choked with rubbis.

    Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette. Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII, 1996-C1. Conduit …

    Link of Moody Report 1993-2002 important at bottom. Cut/Pasted Footnotes of paramont importance often neglected and should be read along with the report.

    Payment Defaults & Material Impairments of U.S. Structured Finance Securities 1993-2002:
    Summary December 2003
    Moodys Special Comment
    Moody’s structured ratings are assigned on the basis of expected loss, which is the product of the frequency of default and losses in the event of default. While the likelihood of default alone does not determine a rating, it is a critical component of the measurement of expected loss.
    This is the first study of defaults on Moody’s-rated structured finance securities. Some initial findings on loss severity given default are reported as well. Highlights of this special comment include:
    • A structured security is defined as being:
    – In payment default if it suffers an interest shortfall or principal writedown.
    – Materially impaired if it has defaulted and its default has not been cured, or if it has not yet defaulted but was assigned a Ca or C rating.
    (1993-2002) The largest number of materially impaired securities came from the ABS sector with 174 material impairments. This is followed by the RMBS sector with 121 material impairments. The CMBS sector had the least material impairments with 31. The ABS sector also sustained the highest material impairment rate while the CMBS sector had the lowest.
    Footnotes Page 3
    1. When external credit enhancement is employed in a transaction, the risk of default on the part of the credit enhancer also may have material impact on the overall risk of the transaction. In addition, collateral performance can be affected by the financial condition of the originator or the servicer.
    2. This discussion does not extend to the junior-most, unrated equity tranche, which is a residual claimant to the securitization’s cash flows.
    3. Credit events in structured transactions are further discussed in “Moody’s Approach to Rating Synthetic Resecuritizations,” Moody’s Structured Finance Special Report, October 2003.
    4. Prepayment interest shortfalls are losses of interest attributable to prepayments made before the end of a month. When a borrower prepays, interest is paid only until the prepayment date. The remaining interest for the month would be lost. Most servicers pay compensating interest to cover this type of interest shortfall, but only up to a specified percentage of the servicing fee received in the given month. The amount available to pay interest can also be reduced by application of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940, as amended, or comparable state legislation, that permits a reduction of the interest on consumer debt for military personnel. These types of shortfall are not reimbursable by the servicer and are allocated pro-rata among all certificate holders. In addition, SSCRA of 1940 application is not limited to mortgages. These interest shortfalls are not considered to be payment defaults either.
    5. Once written down, principal balances are almost never written back up. Moreover, when principal balances are written down, the balance against which future interest payments are calculated is typically reduced. Hence, in those instances, principal write-downs lead to permanent losses of interest, even if the write-down itself is later reversed. Not all asset types have write-down provisions. For these asset types, principal shortfalls may occur prior to maturity, but may not be realized. Our definition of payment defaults covers loss events explicitly reported in servicing reports, and those principal shortfalls that are not realized are not considered to be payment defaults.
    6. CDO tranches have not been included in this study because it is difficult to obtain detailed tranche-level payment information for all securities in this asset class. CDO defaults will be addressed in a future study.

    See Footnote seven regarding “The sample is drawn from the ABS, CMBS, and RMBS sectors. Asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), collateralized debt obligations (CDO),6 credit derivatives, structured notes, and securities wrapped by financial guaranty insurers or guaranteed by federal agencies or government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) are excluded.7”
    7. Guaranteed securities have been excluded because they would skew the default rate statistics: they have all been very highly rated, often as Aaa; no security that has been guaranteed and highly rated by Moody’s has ever defaulted; these financial guarantors do not originate or service structured transactions. We did not exclude
    tranches guaranteed by the originators of the assets, such as those guaranteed by Green Tree/Conseco.
    8. We collapsed like-rated tranches in order to avoid placing undue weight on a few securitizations that have many pari passu tranches in our estimates of default and material impairment rates. By construction, pari passu tranches have perfectly correlated default and loss experience, and therefore provide no additional information about the likelihood of default or loss.
    For the purposes of this study, however, we were unable to determine for all securities which tranches were indeed pari passu. By collapsing like-rated tranches within every deal, we have eliminated all pari passu tranches; however, we may have eliminated some non-pari passu tranches as well. Examples of such non-pari passu tranches include (a) tranches supported by different groups of loans, but rated the same in the same deal; (b) tranches whose corporate guarantor’s rating coincided with another rating in the deal. We closely examined our data to include these kinds of coincidentally like-rated securities.
    Additionally, we have collapsed tranches that had different maturity but carried the same rating. These tranches are generally pari passu so long as they are outstanding at a given point of time. The decision to collapse tranches that are likely to be pari passu is consistent with our corporate default studies which focus on the issuer rather than the issues as the unit of default analysis. In Appendix IV, we show default rates and material impairment rates based on the larger sample that does not collapse like-rated securities.
    9. These are securities that are either denominated in U.S. dollar and/or issued in the U.S. In addition, securities issued in Bermuda, the Cayman Islands and the Channel Islands, but denominated in US dollars are categorized as U.S. structured securities.
    10. HEL includes subprime mortgage loans, second-lien mortgage, HELOCs (home-equity-lines-of-credit), and HILs (home-improvement-loans).
    11. The last default identified in our list began at the end of 2002. As shown in Figure 5, cures after 8 or more months of default are rare. Therefore, we have updated cured status through July 2003.
    12. If a security went into default, became cured, but later went back into default, we ignore the “temporary cure” and treat the security as defaulted, using the initial default to determine the default date.
    13. Class A from Autobond Receivables Trust 1995-A and 1996-B were downgraded to Ca in February 2000. The first security was paid down in full in 2001 and the second was paid down in full in 2002.
    14. Please refer to “Default & Recovery Rates of Corporate Bond Issuers”, Moody’s Special Comment, February 2002.
    15. This is an adjustment for withdrawn ratings (WR) in a given calendar year. Such adjustments have been made for all default rates in this study. In addition, we assume each security can only default once and that is the first time it sustained a payment default. Once a security went into default, the security would exit from the rating universe and no longer be counted in future rating cohorts. As soon as a security sustained a payment default, we start tracking and computing its loss severity rate.
    16. All default rates in this study are weighted average default rates unless noted otherwise. Figure 11 – One-Year Payment Default And Material Impairment Rates By Rating, 1994-2002
    17. For all other rating transition rates in structured finance, please refer to “Structured Finance Rating Transitions: 1983-2002, Comparisons with Corporate Ratings and Across Sectors”, Moody’s Special Comment, January 2003.
    18. “Default & Recovery Rates of Corporate Bond Issuers: A Statistical Review of Moody’s Ratings Performance 1970-2001”, Moody’s Special Comment, 2002.
    19. There were five defaulters originally rated Caa, all within the CMBS sector. Four of them have remained Caa rated and one was downgraded to C.
    Figure 14 – Multi-Year Cumulative Material Impairments Rates By Original Rating, 1993-2002
    Years After Origination
    Original Rating 1 2 3 4 5
    Aaa 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 0.16% 0.24%
    Aa 0.54% 0.81% 1.14% 1.51% 1.60%
    A 0.03% 0.34% 0.65% 0.83% 0.86%
    Baa 0.26% 1.09% 2.27% 3.33% 3.87%
    Ba 0.43% 2.51% 5.16% 6.60% 7.16%
    B 0.90% 4.16% 9.10% 10.57% 11.30%
    Caa 4.00% 4.00% 8.27% 8.27% 8.27%
    20. We note that the majority of payment defaults, and to a lesser extent, material impairments, are in residential mortgage-backed securities and HEL securities whose seasoning pattern is most evident.
    22. If interest shortfalls were caused by appraisal reductions or loan modifications, investors will likely receive reduced interest payments for all future payment periods.
    Figure 20 – Cumulative Material Impairments Rates In CMBS By Cohort Rating, 1994-2002
    Years After Cohort Formed
    Cohort Rating 1 2 3 4 5
    Aaa 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
    Aa 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
    A 0.10% 0.26% 0.53% 1.03% 1.03%
    Baa 0.42% 0.99% 1.55% 2.23% 2.23%
    Ba 0.94% 2.20% 4.33% 5.17% 5.17%
    B 2.86% 7.07% 12.92% 15.68% 19.43%
    Caa 1.85% 4.70% 9.85% 9.85% 9.85%
    Note: Sample size for the Caa rating category three years after cohort formation is very small.
    23. For more information on these deals, please refer to “Moody’s Downgrades 101 Classes of Quality Mortgage MBS’, Moody’s Press Release, May 1998.
    24. For more information on these rating actions, please refer to “Moody’s Downgrades 94 Classes from DLJ’s Quality Mortgage Deals”, Moody’s Press Release, July 1999.
    25. In our corporate default research, information about lifetime cumulative loss rate is easier to obtain for two reasons. Corporate defaults usually lead to bankruptcy, which are typically resolved within about two years. Second, trading prices for defaulted corporate debt are often widely available and many studies have shown that trading prices one month after default are good proxies for ultimate recoveries.
    26. Strictly speaking, those defaulters cured within a short horizon suffered minor losses when the present value of the payments is considered, if the repayment did not include interest on interest shortfalls .
    27. There were five defaulters originally rated Caa. None of them suffered material losses.
    28. The number of observations available for computing average loss rates decreases with the length of seasoning. This is shown in Figure 24.
    29. Corporate loss severity estimates cannot be compared directly against structured finance loss severity estimates because corporate securities are typically par bonds and many structured securities are amortizing bonds.
    To order reprints of this report (100 copies minimum), please call 1.212.553.1658. Report Number: 80247

    See List of DEFAULTS – huge

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  7. e toll

    there are 2 flags OUR flag has vertical strips
    Through usage, horizontal stripes were adopted for use over military posts and vertical stripes adopted for use over civilian posts.
    i have the utmost respect for our soldiers those that uphold the republics concepts and truths .
    I hold vile contempt for THE military “the pentagon”dept of def, HOMELAND INSECURITY. THE US military leads the treason & war crimes.

  8. cubed2k–if you don’t listen to Alex Jones, you should–although I suspect that you do. We all should. Neil should be one of Alex’s regular guests. Great posts!

  9. The matrix=money=credit=debts=MBS=ABS= debits=accounting=GAAP=Central Banks=Banks=Interest.

    It is the weenie, what everybody is after.

  10. Anonymous,


    The target of Wall Street is Middle Class, ie don’t know about such things as MBS ABS. Oh, the dumbing of America. We just want workers, not thinkers.

    Some thinkers have come forward and exposed it. Need to continue.

    While nkhenry says things people post do not apply to Neil’s headlines and articles, I disagree. Let people post no matter what. And think.

    The beginning of wisdom is the definition of terms=words. So please people reading this website, please get the words defined by yourself, look them up in a dictionary. We have got to understand their language if you want to survive. If you do, it makes sense.

    While Mr Soliman speaks learn tongue, he does communicate in terms that one for us average Americans can understand. Convert legalize to English if you will.

    And Anonymous, yes, they us, the middle class, after all we do the work. That is why every loan from cars, homes, student loans, you name it——has been turned into Securization – MBS, ABS, and to confuse it all is debt buyers. You took out a loan, you agreed, YOU PROMISED, you owe, doesn’t matter to who, you owe, I bought your debt therefore you owe me.

    Please, lets remember these are public companies, banks, financial institutions, etc. It’s all circular.

  11. Neidermeyer,

    No, I’d like to see. Do you have a link?



  12. E Tolle,

    that is excellent as I display the America Flag on my now no payment mortgaged house for 1 year now,

    I will put it upside down.

    Thank You.

  13. cubed2k ,

    Did you see today where TurboTax Timmy was crying his eyes out saying that if we cut up his credit cards we’re all going to die? Washington is nothing but bad dinner theater…

  14. Investigation — predictably — focuses on “investments”.

    Most of the subprime investments were in derivative CDOs — derived from the MBS — which the financial institutions held themselves. The CDOs — are, again, derivatives, risky by their nature. These were sophisticated investors chasing high yield — in what was publicly disclosed as loans with high interest rates and low FICO scores (which were likely false). .

    So tired of victims being the investors. The victims were the homeowner targets. And, WaMu — more to them then the investigation reveals. Many loans just fabricated as high risk to assess high rates. Many loans put into false default — to assess a high rate by a refinance. Yield chasing — at our expense. Many participants. My opinion — derivative investors owe us back any money they wrongly earned.

    And, somewhere around in the huge page report — it states — loans were sold to investment banks. Or, securitized (receivables only) by the non-prime lender itself – not a AAA rated investment bank. What investor would purchase a AAA rated derivative from a non-prime mortgage lender — (not a AAA rated investment bank) who lends to low FICO score borrowers — and then assesses high interest rates??? Who would ever believe this is AAA???

    May have had non-sophisticated investors – who bought the fraud — but for most part — the investors wanted YOU!!!! They wanted your high paying interest rate. And, investors, along with banks, subprime lenders, and investment banks, would use every means and method to assure a high rate — that YOU would have to pay. Homeowners were funding nice cushy pensions for others — while they – themselves — were struggling to pay almost usury rates – all under fraud.

    Security derivative investors lost high yields??? We stopped funding — some consolation. Call us deadbeats — call us whatever you want — we are fighting back.

    Need more about homeowner and foreclosure fraud. This report is a political statement — that will get US NOWHERE. An excuse from Representatives to put the blame on Credit Reporting agencies – for their own failure to reign in Wall Street, stop the abuse against homeowners, and promote a stable economy not reliant on financial services fraud.

    Nevertheless, will take the report — it emphasizes that everything was bogus. Just when will we get to the point that Senators want to help the real homeowner victims??

  15. @ angry & NOT TAKING IT…..

    I know what you’re saying, and I realize how easy it is to fall into that frame of mind. Henry Miller once wrote:

    “We have two American flags always: one for the rich and one for the poor. When the rich fly it means that things are under control; when the poor fly it means danger, revolution, anarchy.”

    It’s time to get out our flags. Fly them upside down:

    Title 36, U.S.C., Chapter 10
    As amended by P.L. 344, 94th Congress
    Approved July 7, 1976

    § 176. (a) The flag should never be displayed with the union down, except as a signal of dire distress in instances of extreme danger to life or property.

    I think nows the time.

  16. Oh Mr Banker, Mr Mortgage Broker, Miss Real estate Lady, Mr Congressman, Mr Senator, Mr President… are the professionals, you know what you are doing……..we believe you………….

  17. Let me tell you why you are here. You’re here because you know something. What you know you can’t explain. But you feel it. You felt it your entire life, that there’s something wrong with the world, you don’t know what it is, but it’s there like a splinter in your mind driving you mad. It is this feeling that has brought you to this website. Do you know what I’m talking about?

  18. E. Tolle
    there is NO chance in saving OR reforming the hugely bloated corrupt complicit war mongering self serving prison for profit banking cabal evil agents known as the US GOVERNMENT .makes u want to hurl!

  19. Ron Paul says the Federal Reserve system is a failure. He is wrong if you are a bank or an insider. Ron Paul says the fed is trying to liquidate debt. HEY, what about our debt of bogus Mortgages. Ron Paul says the banks should have been allowed to fail and the bad mortgages written off.

    I like Max Keiser.

  20. Im in So Cal

  21. jay hayes
    are you in northern ca or socal?

  22. jay Hayes

    California the worst. It is bogus. Get help from Neil. Get to a knowledgeable BK attorney.

  23. judge

    Just the beginning — debt buyer in the masses.

    Heard today — if BofA was to modify the “DEBTs” — that is, meaningful modifications — they will be insolvent.

    Oh, and what did BofA tell Congress at hearings — “we were not in the subprime lending business.” True — they just purchased them.

  24. Help!!

    I just received a Notice of Default …today…
    it has MER’s as the beneficiary
    BNC Mortgage, Wells Fargo, and Ocwen as the servicer!

    Im in California.. any advice?

    If I go down Im going down fighting…

    I just need to know how to defend my home and my family… any ideas would be appreciated..

    Thanks in advance..

  25. Wow!!!!!!!!!! Cease and Desist order for Bank of America !!!

    This mean they have to stop foreclosures ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????

  26. Well, we now have the report, let’s see some jerks go to jail.

  27. I am with E. Toll e- We need a large coordination letting everyone know they should email, write, call , visit there representatives and tell them to support HR 1480 !!!!!!!!!!!!

    any ideas how to get the word out ???????

  28. People, let’s make this the turning point. Our moaning has produced nothing in the way of reforms or prosecutions from the elitists that rule. Either The Return Of Prudent Banking Act of 2011 gets passed, or a march on Washington and New York MUST ensue. WE NEED TO TAKE OUR GOVERNMENT BACK, OTHERWISE WE ARE DOOMED!

    We have to show the Masters of the Universe that we won’t stand for their crap anymore. Tilt! Game over! Let’s take it back!

  29. Yet another costly investigation that will end up “publicly shaming” the financial institution’s practices and “extraordinarily condeming” their management’s behaviour! Take that!

    People, call your reps and demand that they support Marcy Kaptur’s HR 1489 which will repeal portions of Gramm-Leach-Bliley and return provisions of Glass-Steagall. This is the ONLY way we’ll be able to stop the nonsense. And if the bill fails, be prepared to march on Washington and New York. Enough is enough!

  30. I think we should follow this up with a scathing report of our own on SENATORS WHO SIMPLY STOOD BY OR AIDED AND ABETTED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS whether it was stripping consumer rights, deregulation or taking away bankruptcy protections for CITIZENS HOMES. I can’t stand these 2 faced stooges, every single one of them.

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