COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary

SEE: ASF_White_Paper_11_16_10

There is of course a lot to discuss here. The attempt to legitimize fraudulent and defective and deceptive lending and litigation practices is at least entitled to a nod.

I’ll start the conversation off this way: They skipped over the beginning and started in the middle. Which only means that they are doing what they have always been doing. Documents don’t appear out of fairyland. Documents are worthless unless they recite the understanding of the parties within the context of necessary disclosures. As usual they want to start with documents and then begin the legal argument. This skips facts and evidence. They want us to ignore what happened and concentrate on what the documents say, regardless of what happened and regardless of what the law required. I’m not amenable to that approach. I think it is dishonest and a blatant attempt to sustain the continuing fraud of the American public, taxpayers and property owners.

My point is simply this: let’s start with the facts of what really occurred. Who loaned money? Who borrowed money? who was a payor, payee, guarantor, insurer? Did the originating documents actually describe the real transaction? If the documents described a fictitious transaction, what difference does it make whether the assignment was valid? Isn’t the assignment of zero a simple product of multiplication in which the answer is zero?

After we get the facts straight then it’s easy — either the documents are on point, compliant and truthful or they are not. Either way the law has plenty of precedent and statutes to deal with the outcome. The cornerstone of the argument in this white paper is a lie and it isn’t a white lie. The authors want you to first look at the documents and ASSUME their CURRENT recitations of PAST facts and recitations are true even though they are mostly in direct conflict with the reality of the actual transactional events.

Follow the money and you can’t go wrong. Follow the documents and you are in Wonderland where things like opposite day are ordinary.

13 Responses

  1. And then there’s Christopher Peterson’s testimony to Congress, where he flat out rips Mers a new one:

  2. The rest of the story:

    The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown

    Kurt Eggert
    Chapman University School of Law

    Connecticut Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 4, 2009

    This Article builds on existing criticism of securitizing subprime loans and argues that one of the primary causes of the subprime meltdown and the resulting economic collapse was the structure of securitization as applied to subprime and other non-prime residential loans, along with the resecuritization of the resulting mortgage-backed securities. Securitization weakened underwriting by discouraging originators from gathering “soft information” about the likelihood of borrower default and instead caused loan originators and other market participants to focus almost exclusively on such “hard information” as FICO scores and loan to value ratios. At each stage of the loan and securitization process, securitization encouraged market participants to push risk to the very edge of what the applicable market standards would tolerate, to make the largest, riskiest loans that could be sold on Wall Street, to bundle them using the fewest credit enhancements rating agencies would permit, and then to repeat the securitization process with many of the lower-rated mortgage-backed securities that resulted. Loan originators could profit by bargaining down the due diligence of other market participants and so reduce their own underwriting standards. Securitization also created a business model for subprime lenders whereby they could “profitably fail.” Thinly capitalized subprime lenders could generate large numbers of loans likely to default, along with substantial profits for the executives who directed them, and then simply exit the market when they predictably lost their access to the securitization pipeline.

  3. This white paper makes the case that – as long as there are proper endorsements/assignments/allonges AND there is possesion of the wet ink Note – no problems.

    Anyone who is fighting with the “show me the Note” strategy, AND there does not exist proper chain of title assignments and/or a Note – should quote this paper in their pleadings.

  4. Also, this white paper contains a lot of BS regarding the applicability of Article 9. It does not appear to recognize the distinction between taking a security interest in realty paper (note) and taking such interest in real property (house).

  5. I would love to get an email from you Neil, I have signed up for the combo a few months ago and still do not know what’s next. do I need to provide you with some info on my property? I need some info please before the next 195 is up again.

  6. Just a quick note to Neil, Alex, Lori, and Dan. Thank you for providing me with excellent service and showing me the “FACTS” about my loan. From the signing at escrow, all the way to Wall Street. The discoveries which you revealed in the COMBO and Securitization Report have prepared me for battle. Many thanks to LuminaQ and LivingLies.



    James G.

  7. I put the title agency on notice that I wanted proof of the wire transfer that funded my loan. She seemed okay with that. Then I told her there were two loans, one on the 10th and one on the 7th. I’ll see what kind of answer I get tomorrow.

    Hello Wells Fargo! (I know they’re watching)

  8. Lori…. I had some issue with title defects against a title insurance company that DID NOT discover at the county office at the time of a house purchase. Currently I am in fight with the title company. However, the house currently that I live went through MERS. And my house is not current in record keeping at the county office for the current loan that went through MERS. I am current for the mortgage not under water, but I would like to know though I am paying to a right entity to return my debt.
    Do you think that this service that you are offering is useful for me?
    Investor has been never changed as Fannie but all the servicers have been changed in the past from Countrywide to BAC. At first I have got a loan from a mortgage company that was the only paper that has been filed at the local county and they are used as a trustee of my loan. If you can respond, I really appreciate it.

  9. Today I found yet ANOTHER forged/backdated document at the recorders office (fake doc #7..and STILL counting…).
    I’ve got my TRO, working on the Injunction, hearing next week.
    Judge said my case was “interesting” (:)!
    (I’ve got a really great case, I’ve done my research)

    I filed in CA Superior Court Yolo Cty on Jan. 27.
    Yet, alas…I need a lawyer, ASAP.
    The FORMS are what’s killin’ me-HELP!
    Any council “who get’s it” in or around Yolo county?

  10. the Securitizatiin forum is justifying their existance

  11. I am so sick of this type of situation. Only the banks can get away with this! Why is that!? There has been some recent arrests for mortgage fraud– wow they still know how to arrest felons. This is fraud upon America and our government is at the helm. How pathetic is that! Debi

  12. So get your LOAN ORIGINATION DOCUMENTS and order aFORENSIC LOAN AUDIT, from LuminaQ
    (see top of page for tab)



  13. Thanks for straightening me up where to go, Neil. I am also wondering where those opponents are going and creating more BS to create more potential vehicles to steal money from the borrowers, the investors and the tax payers.

Contribute to the discussion!

%d bloggers like this: