FINDING THE “TRUST”: Truth and Consequences

COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary

Remember that “finding” the “trust” that “owns” the “loan” is a rabbit hole and you should not get stuck in the narrative of the banks. The truth is that we only find a pool that is called a “trust” or other entity that is probably not constituted and probably does not legally exist. The description of your “loan” as an asset in that pool is a self-serving declaration that is not supported by anything on or off record. In fact, the description of your Loan” as a “loan” may not even be correct since it more easily matches the description of a security. In either event the disclosures required under either the securities laws, the lending laws or both have not been met.

This article is directed at all those who are scratching their heads wondering what they should do, what services they require and what to do with what they have ordered. The COMBO loan specific title research and analysis is designed to take you through the first stages of getting the information you need to be able to challenge your servicer or pretender lender with facts instead of theory. The expert declaration nails down the conclusions of those facts and analyses into specific testimony that can be introduced into court as evidence. To date, we have not seen, in thousands of cases we have followed, a single expert declaration from the other side stating that our conclusions are wrong or even misleading.

There are three possible conclusions to the COMBO research:

  1. The securitization documents are found and everything flows from there.
  2. The securitization documents are not on public record because they used a different path, legal or not, in offering the securities that were used to form the pool of money from which fees and loans were funded.
  3. The securitization documents are not found because the loan was not securitized (around 4%) of all cases, and usually we can identify those at a glance.

The problem of course is that we don’t know the result until we have done all the research. We are working on that. We are also working on something that is already in pilot, wherein we identify the probably templates used in the securitization by matching criteria from your loans with known securitized chains. From that we can give you copies of the templates that were used by the securitization PARTIES and which have a high probability (over 90%) of being identical to the one that applies to you. You might be receiving one of those in the next few days. When we “complete” a project we are still not done with it. We recognize that are pieces of information that are not in public record that would be helpful to homeowners and their lawyers. So perhaps Dan and Alex will be able to give you soemthing that we will state is true even though we don’t have the exact documents, to wit:

  1. That based upon our knowledge of the parties and circumstances it is highly probable that the loan was securitized.
  2. That based upon the proprietary information in our own database, we have selected the most likely template that was used for the securitization of the loan (Copies attached)
  3. That based upon testimony from witnesses picked by these parties in other court proceedings we have determined that the normal practice of the industry was to if ignore the requirements of law for a transfer of the obligation, promissory note and security instrument (mortgage or deed of trust).
  4. That based upon our knowledge of the industry the participants in the securitization scheme worked under two premises: (a) the actual splitting of the obligation, note and mortgage leaving it to a later time to designate a holder and (b) the dividing of the revenue stream resulting from payments made by various parties including but not limited to (a) the undisclosed yield spread premium taken from the initial investment of the investor when they believed they were purchasing a mortgage backed security or derivative the alleged borrower, (b) any payments made by or on behalf of the borrower, (c) any mitigation of apparent loss through third party payments including but not limited to insurance, credit default swaps, overcollateralization or cross collateralization. In other words it was the cash that was moved not the documents.
  5. The property records show an alleged lender of record who is identified on the promissory note and the mortgage or deed of trust.
  6. The actual source of funds was the investor advancing money for mortgage backed instruments or a pool of funds emanating from multiple investors, which means the funding of the loan occurred before the loan closing with the borrower and sometimes before the prospective borrower had even made application for loan.
  7. Therefore we state with high degree of certainty that the lender of record (a) did not loan the money in this transaction and (b) accounted for the transaction as a fee-based service on their income statement rather than an asset (loan receivable) on their balance sheet.
  8. Based on the above, the promissory note executed by borrower did not name the actual lender. This was a table-funded loan. While some of the terms of the obligation were stated on the promissory note and security instrument, the note is not the sole evidence of the obligation, nor does it provide  mechanism for computation of the balance due because of the attempted securitization of the loan package that was never completed.
  9. The creditor(s) are not identified in the loan documents and are presently still unknown, although they meet the description as stated above.
  10. The mortgage or security instrument recorded in the original transaction is a wild deed. Any conveyances of any interest from the alleged title interest contained in the mortgage or deed of trust is therefore void.

The above description is contained in the expert declaration that we provide. The expert declaration involves additional research and reaches expert conclusions concerning the status of the title, the obligation, the promissory note and the security instrument. The information you have been given is based upon a search of available documentation combined with our other sources. The fact that the parties used a different path here toward securitization merely means that the expert declaration is probably required — whereas our standard reporting and analysis is usually sufficient for court purposes where the “trust” can be found.

Remember that “finding” the “trust” that “owns” the “loan” is a rabbit hole and you should not get stuck in the narrative of the banks. The truth is that we only find a pool that is called a “trust” or other entity that is probably not constituted and probably does not legally exist. The description of your “loan” as an asset in that pool is a self-serving declaration that is not supported by anything on or off record. In fact, the description of your Loan” as a “loan” may not even be correct since it more easily matches the description of a security. In either event the disclosures required either under the securities laws, the lending laws or both have not been met.

32 Responses


    Those CountryWide docs sure are different. Instead of the Depositor selling the certificates to the “Security Underwriters” the CWABS 2005-10 PSA very CLEARLY states the mortgages are transferred to the TRUSTEE. [There are only references to ‘Underwriters’ never ‘Security Underwriters’ by the way, and what is listed is “Underwriters: Countrywide Securities Corporation, Deutsche
    Bank Securities Inc. and J.P. Morgan Securities Inc.”]

    The CountryWide PSA also has the Trustee being responsible for creation of the Certificates! See Section 2.06 “Authentication and Delivery of Certificates.

    The Trustee acknowledges the transfer and assignment to it
    of the Trust Fund and, concurrently with such transfer and assignment, has
    executed, authenticated and delivered, to or upon the order of the Depositor,
    the Certificates in authorized denominations evidencing the entire ownership
    of the Trust Fund. The Trustee agrees to hold the Trust Fund and exercise the
    rights referred to above for the benefit of all present and future Holders of
    the Certificates and to perform the duties set forth in this Agreement. ”

    The info on the transfer of mortgages is in “Section 10.04 Intention of Parties.

    It is the express intent of the parties hereto that the
    conveyance of the Mortgage Notes, Mortgages, assignments of Mortgages, title
    insurance policies and any modifications, extensions and/or assumption
    agreements and private mortgage insurance policies relating to the Mortgage
    Loans by the Depositor to the Trustee be, and be construed as, an absolute
    sale thereof to the Trustee. It is, further, not the intention of the parties
    that such conveyance be deemed a pledge thereof by the Depositor to the
    Trustee. However, in the event that, notwithstanding the intent of the
    parties, such assets are held to be the property of the Depositor, or if for
    any other reason this Agreement or any Subsequent Transfer Agreement is held
    or deemed to create a security interest in such assets, then (i) this
    Agreement shall be deemed to be a security agreement (within the meaning of
    the Uniform Commercial Code of the State of New York) with respect to all such
    assets and security interests and (ii) the conveyance provided for in this
    Agreement and any Subsequent Transfer Agreement shall be deemed to be an
    assignment and a grant pursuant to the terms of this Agreement by the
    Depositor to the Trustee, for the benefit of the Certificateholders, of a
    security interest in all of the assets that constitute the Trust Fund, whether
    now owned or hereafter acquired.

    The Depositor for the benefit of the Certificateholders and
    the NIM Insurer shall, to the extent consistent with this Agreement, take such
    actions as may be necessary to ensure that, if this Agreement were deemed to
    create a security interest in the assets of the Trust Fund, such security
    interest would be deemed to be a perfected security interest of first priority
    under applicable law and will be maintained as such throughout the term of the
    Agreement. The Depositor shall arrange for filing any Uniform Commercial Code
    continuation statements in connection with any security interest granted or
    assigned to the Trustee for the benefit of the Certificateholders. “

  2. Joyce Louis,

    I can’t take credit for the article.
    I gave you the link where the article came from and what you read is the article that that I downloaded for everyone to read.

  3. The PSA states quite clearly that the Depositor is required to record the assignments of mortgage and mortgage note. Also, the PSA’s fail to show who the certificateholders are. References at the end to Cede and Company and Depository Trust Corp

  4. I just slogged my way thru the CWABS 2005-10 PSA and the example form letters. I find it VERY interesting that while I’m on the SEC site to see this PSA, the CERTIFICATES themselves are NOT registered.

    Is this STANDARD for securitized mortgages, or just CountryWide’s?

    Language in point: “EXHIBIT K



    CWABS, Inc.,
    as Depositor
    4500 Park Granada
    Calabasas, California 91302

    The Bank of New York,
    as Trustee
    101 Barclay St., 8W
    New York, New York 10286

    Re: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates,
    Series 2005-10, Class [ ]

    Ladies and Gentlemen:

    In connection with our acquisition of the above-captioned
    Certificates we certify that (a) we understand that the Certificates are not
    being registered under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Act”), or
    any state securities laws and are being transferred to us in a transaction
    that is exempt from the registration requirements of the Act and any such
    laws, (b) we are an “accredited investor,” as defined in Regulation D under
    the Act, and have such knowledge and experience in financial and business
    matters that we are capable of evaluating the merits and risks of investments
    in the Certificates, (c) we have had the opportunity to ask questions of and
    receive answers from the Depositor concerning the purchase of the Certificates
    and all matters relating thereto or any additional information deemed
    necessary to our decision to purchase the Certificates, (d) either (i) we are
    not an employee benefit plan that is subject to the Employee Retirement Income
    Security Act of 1974, as amended, or a plan or arrangement that is subject to
    Section 4975 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, nor are we
    acting on behalf of any such plan or arrangement, or using the assets of any
    such plan or arrangement to effect such acquisition or (ii) if the
    Certificates have been the subject of an ERISA-Qualifying Underwriting, we are
    an insurance company which is purchasing such Certificates with funds
    contained in an “insurance company general account” (as such term is defined
    in Section V(e) of Prohibited Transaction Class Exemption 95-60 (“PTCE
    95-60″)) and the purchase and holding of such Certificates are covered under
    Sections I and III of PTCE 95-60, (e) we are acquiring the Certificates for
    investment for our own account and not with a view to any distribution of such
    Certificates (but without prejudice to our right at all times to sell or
    otherwise dispose of the Certificates in accordance with clause (g) below),
    (f) we have not offered or sold any Certificates to, or solicited offers to
    buy any Certificates from, any person, or otherwise approached or negotiated
    with any person with respect thereto, or taken any other action which would
    result in a violation of Section 5 of the Act, and (g) we will not sell,
    transfer or otherwise dispose of any


    EX-4.1 211th Page of 239 TOC 1st Previous Next Bottom Just 211th

    Certificates unless (1) such sale, transfer or other disposition is made
    pursuant to an effective registration statement under the Act or is exempt
    from such registration requirements, and if requested, we will at our expense
    provide an opinion of counsel satisfactory to the addressees of this
    Certificate that such sale, transfer or other disposition may be made pursuant
    to an exemption from the Act, (2) the purchaser or transferee of such
    Certificate has executed and delivered to you a certificate to substantially
    the same effect as this certificate, and (3) the purchaser or transferee has
    otherwise complied with any conditions for transfer set forth in the Pooling
    and Servicing Agreement.

    All capitalized terms used herein but not defined herein
    shall have the meanings assigned to them in the Pooling and Servicing
    Agreement dated as of September 1, 2005, among CWABS, Inc., as Depositor,
    Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., as a Seller, Park Monaco Inc., as a Seller, Park
    Sienna LLC, as a Seller, Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, as Master
    Servicer and The Bank of New York, as Trustee.

    Very truly yours,

    Name of Transferee”

  5. Lucy:

    Wow! and I thought it was Geithner who set up the toxic asset program that gave loans to investors at no interest and no recourse to buy up those foreclosed houses for pennies on the dollar. The statement that Bush wanted these home loans made so they could later be transferred to the elite ownership society is way out there. I don’t believe for a minute that Daddy Bush back when we worked on his recovery program in 1992 to assist homeowners that he ever thought he would have had a son that would do such a thing. Pushing home ownership is good and it makes a stronger community in which our children and families can live. However, with the onset of deregulation which occurred on Clinton’s watch and Larry Summers and Robert Rubin, the regulatory took a back seat and never performed a days work after the regulation passed, intentional or no. I agree however with almost all of your other comments.

  6. We are fighting this very issue in Court as my client attempts to obtain a TRO and Injunction to stop the foreclosure. A Judge awarded the lender the right to foreclose even though my client had an invlaid power of attorney, an allonge based on an invalid POA and of course an Assignment of the note and Deed of Trust which has never been recorded. I wonder why, right? It is a felony to file fraudulent documents in Texas. Now, to that end, unfortuntely for this trustee who was continuing to try to foreclose, the new servicer of record sent out a 30 day letter advising that the real creditor was – the securities dealer and all of a sudden we believe we had a different ball game. When the Judge asked the def who were fthe foreclosure mill which we added to our claims, he admitted that the current owner was now the securities dealer (the depositor) and not the trustee but that he wasn’t representing any of them any more, I wonder why? None of the defendants – five of them showed up so my client got his TRO and stopped the sale. The original Judge who granted them a motion for summary judgment, did not have a clue and most pointedly, refused to consider all of the evidence which was provided to the Court. Clearly there was fraud on the Court, but that did not matter. At any rate, while my client’s case is in Appeals, I believe that they will continue to attempt foreclosure because the trustee appears to have the collection rights and the securities dealer now has the asset. They swapped them out evidently. Anybody want to help me out on this. We are due in Court on Friday and among the other 5 things we have against them, we thought we would once again bring it up that the standing of ownership is in question because no assignments of note and deed of trust have been recorded and no evidence of who owns the servicing rights is of record. I think we will ask them to return all of my client’s payments since there is no proof that the servicer has the right to collect anything or bring any action. The PSA is not in recordable form and I don’t see a copy of the servicing agreement between the owner of the note and the servicer. If the servicer purchased any part of this transaction, it has to be recorded under our law and that is a fact. Otherwise there are breaks in the water pipe and the wrong doing is flowing all over the place.

  7. And if Wells is the holder of the Class r-x certs, there goes their “failure to state a claim against the party” argument. Very nice. I like it.

  8. I keep thinking that since Citigroup Global Markets was the “securities underwriter”, and BearStearns was the counterparty, and mortgage insurance claims began in December 06. the debt has long since been extinguished (via the $62Billion writeoff Citi took in 08) or via the BearStearns transaction. Wells is collecting on an extinguished debt (that is unsecured) and trying to take the house to collect again (via the Class R-X certificates).

  9. Thank you, my friend. Throughout the process, Wells insisted that the modification was not allowed, then it changed to “failed to meet investor guidelines”, then it was “revealed” in a conversation with loss-mitigation that Wells was indeed the “holder and beneficiary” (I used those words exactly) of the subject bond. Plaintiff’s counsel always answered that the plaintiff’s identity was “confidential”. Hmmmm, if the lawyer can’t tell me but the loss-mit bitch can, then neither of them are telling the truth. I concur that the charged-off loan is indeed held by a hedger, and Wells is conducting the foreclosure on their behalf. “Unauthorized practice of law”? You betcha. But to keep it simple, I will pursue the “standing” argument. With what I have in front of the judge, it will be hard for him not to rule my way, or so I think.
    You mentioned that the CDS pays off the defaulted loan. I found the CDS’s for my trust in Maiden Lane. That would have come from AIG I would think; however, Wells could have dumped them as well. There relly is no way of knowing until discovery is granted. And the judges are not allowing it. Thanks again.

  10. angelo and usedkarguy,

    Aah – you ask a very good question – and I have addressed this before.

    In the PSA – under “Conveyance of Mortgage Loans” (almost every PSA has this except some Countrywide supposed securitiztions – which were never “true sales” or securitizations to begin with – the likely cause of their demise), every certificate to the trust is sold to the stated security underwriters. Many miss the stated security underwriters – but they are boldly printed near the top of the PSA. and Prospectus.

    The bottom tranches, however, are NOT sold to the security underwriters – ie – they are not securitized (no pass-through of current income – which is required for an MBS – MBS ONLY passes through current income.)

    Instead, the non-performing loans are subordinated, as they become delinquent, to the non-securitized bottom tranches that are most often owned – by the SERVICER (but others may also own these bottom tranches – including the originator – who may now be defunct).

    Once the servicer STOPS advancing delinquent mortgage payments to the trustee – on behalf of the borrower – the collection rights are SWAPPED out of the trust to an unidentified third party swap hold/debt buyer – or the servicer. At this point, the Servicer acts on behalf of the unidentified debt buyer/swap holder – or, on behalf of itself – since a servicer also may have the right to purchase collection rights on the “swapped out” non-performing debt.

    This is the crux of the matter. This is standing. This is the fraud that is being perpetrated in courts across the country. And, may I remind everyone, if the proper party is NOT identified in court – the debt continues to be owed to the proper party. As Joyce Louse pointed out, this is particularly dangerous for states that may enforce deficiency judgments.

    All of this is separate as to who actually funded the loan, and as to whether or not there was table-funding, and fraud in the mortgage loan origination – including inflated appraisals.

    “Collection rights swapped out” – is the key. And, these collection rights are executed by the bottom tranches – that were not securitized (pass-through of current income). Of course, this is reasonable since delinquent accounts have no current income.

    Until this issue is addressed – we will remain in limbo as to the real party/standing – and all foreclosure victims will continue to owe the “debt” to some unidentified party – who purchased the collection rights at a steep discount. And, this is even if the foreclosure is granted by the court.

    Oh, but profit is always the name of the game – and who the heck cares about the homeowner??. You were the target to being with!!!! You were the source of the targeted profits – and “deals” were made without any disclosure ever made to homeowners – at origination – or by foreclosure “swapped out” collection right contracts.

  11. Angelo, I think the “class x” or Z-tranche are the same thing. Irregular income from insurance, foreclosures, servicing fees (BPO’s, late charges, inspections, etc.) or any collections other than current pass-throughs are directed to the class-x certs. This would include modification payments or any other cash received from borrowers accepted after the loan in question has been defaulted. These ceritifcates are usually purchased by the Sponsor of the securitization.

    ANON? correct?


    I know we have discussed the “true sale” or lack there of a ways back, I just read your post about the derivative contracts and the non-compliant loans.

    I have a some quick questions, i was just re-reading the 425b supplement and there is a section that talks about a certain certificates class(class X certificates) that can purchase all of the remaining assets of the trust at on any distribution date. Would this possible be the distressed debt buyers that you speak of? here is the section that caught me eye..

    Optional Termination

    Subject to certain conditions specified in the pooling and servicing
    agreement, the holders of a majority of the Class X Certificates may purchase
    all of the remaining assets of the trust fund on any distribution date on or
    after the aggregate principal balance of the mortgage loans and any foreclosed
    real estate owned by the trust fund declines to or below 10% of the aggregate
    principal balance as of the cut-off date of the mortgage loans delivered to the
    trust fund on the closing date. If the holders of a majority of the Class X
    Certificates do not purchase the assets of the trust fund, subject to certain
    conditions specified in the pooling and servicing agreement, the master servicer
    may purchase all of the remaining assets of the trust fund after the aggregate
    principal balance of the mortgage loans and any foreclosed real estate owned by
    the trust fund declines to or below 5% of the aggregate principal balance as of
    the cut-off date of the mortgage loans delivered to the trust fund on the
    closing date. Any such purchase by the holders of a majority of the Class X
    Certificates or the master servicer will result in the early retirement of the

  13. The trust does not exist because had the banks actually securitized and transfered the loans into a trust both the loans and the securities would become worthless because then the loans have been paid in full and the securities have no value.

  14. I was able to find the TruTV links for the episode yesterday but the comment here was held for approval and then disappeared.

    Search online for “jesse ventura conspiracy theory” and then select each of these 4 segments: ‘Ron Paul and the FED’, ‘Government Sachs’, ‘Liars Loans’ and ‘Government Collusion’.

  15. Well, seems to me the powers that be (which can never happen) would be listening to people like those that are responding on this cite. No, they are going back to the very people who created and followed through on what would become one of America’s most notable tragic events – And why, because people in high places, rather than doing their jobs, made and followed through on such stupid statements. A FNMA representative said to a newspaper reporter when talking about homeowners who abandoned their homes rather than contacting the servicer, “they will feel the pain”. The President of the American Bankers Association made the comment when asked about the dangerous loan programs, “we can’t tell the banks what to do”, Oh really, well it appears that you took the taxpayer money quickly enough each year to do something.” And then Greenspan when he was told about the potential risk to the economy when these dangerous loan programs came on the scene said ” I didn’t think it was significant”, I am not sure how the man sleeps at night. But most of all, it literally made me sick when I was fighting it out at 6.30 in the morning with a citi employee said, “okay, call the regulatory about us, they are just going to send the call back to us”. There is no question but that homeowners across this nation after signing up for the loans, would very definitely meet the servicers at the Gates of Hell, because they would play a significant part in the housing demise which we now find ourselves in. I have plenty of cases that clearly back up the servicers phase of how they were instrumental in assuring that the homeowner would fail and 1.4 million with another 2 million on the horizon waiting while America is at this crossroads. What is the right thing to do, when do we do it and how do we pull it off. I have a plan.

  16. […] Follow this link: FINDING THE “TRUST”: Truth and Consequences « Livinglies's Weblog […]


    Support Representative Kaptur’s Bill: Time to Shut Down MERS and to Restore the Rule of Law
    L. Randall Wray
    Nov 23, 2010 8:12PM

    Every link of the home finance food chain was designed to promote fraud—from the mortgage brokers and appraisers who conspired to overvalue property to stick buyers with overpriced homes, to the mortgage lenders who preferred the riskiest mortgages to maximize interest and fees, on to the investment bankers that packaged them into securities that they bet would blow up, and to the credit rating agencies who conspired to certify the junk as triple A. We should not forget the hedge fund managers who worked closely with investment banks like Goldman to re-securitize the very worst stuff into CDOs, sold on to Goldman’s gullible customers, nor the mortgage servicers (who not coincidentally happen to be the same biggest banks that created the toxic mortgages) who now maximize late fees as they drag out foreclosures while preventing loan modifications.

    But that is not the end of the story, by any means. The next shoe that dropped was the recognition that the foreclosures, themselves are fraudulent. Heck, it wasn’t enough that banks are foreclosing on the wrong debtors, sometimes with two banks competing to foreclose on the same owner–they are also foreclosing on homeowners with no mortgages, who own their homes outright! Banks were caught hiring professional fraudsters to manufacture documents, including the “wet ink” notes that are required to prove that one is actually a creditor. Mere document forgery is not bad enough as bank management lies in court—committing perjury: they claim to have misplaced documents, lost them, cannot find them, looking for them, dog ate them, accidentally sent them through the wash. You know the drill if you have ever taught a class of freshmen.Yet, all is said to be in order—Bank of America claims to have reviewed its foreclosures and could not find a single improper action. After all, the homeowners are clearly deadbeats who are not making payments. A bunch of borrower fraud by clever high school dropouts that duped the nation’s most sophisticated “big boy” banks. Can the banks prove that? Uh, no, they have not kept adequate records to prove who owes what, who owns what, and who has paid what to whom. But they are sure the docs will show up, as soon as the banksters can forge them.

    Ah, yes, ain’t the “ownership society” (as ex-President Bush proclaimed it) just grand? It was always the plan to indebt homeowners and then to transfer their homes to the true owners in our society—those on the northside of the top 3% of the kinked income and wealth distribution. As planned, the elite are quietly buying up blocks of improperly foreclosed homes for pennies on the dollar. If we could just speed up the foreclosures, dump more homes onto the market, and push the prices down some more, we could complete the transition to Bush’s ownership society—ownership at the top, indebted renters or homeless vagrancy everywhere else.

    What has been truly shocking is the state of the paperwork. These are banks! One would think that they might have hired a few people to keep track of the documents, the payments, the delinquencies? But, no, they didn’t do that. Lost ‘em. Do you want to trust your life savings to these bozos—who have no idea where they might have misplaced something as important as the note that proves they are entitled to foreclose on a home when the debtor stops making payments on the mortgage? The same banks that misplace the payments, credit them to the wrong account, and send foreclosure notices to the wrong homeowners? Oh yes, I want them to handle my banking account with the automatic payments on auto loans for cars I never owned!

    In their defense, the banksters say that they never saw a wave of delinquencies coming, so they never hired the staff required to take care of all the paperwork. Michael Heid, co-president of Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, claimed “In hindsight, we were all slow to jump on the issue. When you think about what it costs to add 10,000 people, that is a substantial investment in time and money along with the computers, training and system changes involved.” Yes with delinquencies spiking since 2007, the banksters have been a wee bit slow on the uptake—almost 4 years into the crisis they are now starting to ramp up, you betcha! Servicing a mortgage was never thought to be sufficiently profitable that one would actually want to devote resources to collecting the payments, crediting the accounts, documenting the delinquencies, and foreclosing when things go bad. So much paperwork, so little profits.

    A critic might retort that they ought to hold off on the foreclosures until they actually do hire the staff and locate the necessary paperwork. But that would throw a monkey wrench into the plans for an ownership society. So many millions of homes to foreclose, so little time to throw those families out onto the streets.

    So they’ve been busy hiring “Burger King kids” with no education or training or expertise, who couldn’t tell a mortgage note from a Freedom fry. The banks make them executive Vice Presidents, hand them a notary stamp and a pen and tell them they need—oh—10,000 signed and notarized notes by end of business. Like, today, Buffy!

    Sorry, that dog won’t hunt. The truth is that the banks purposely destroyed the documents and created a superficially sloppy system because that made it easier to perpetrate fraud– accounting fraud, tax fraud, and document fraud–in order to enrich top management. Fraud. Fraud. Fraud.

    Let us just focus here on the role played by MERS—Mortgage Electronic Registry Systems Inc—which registers 66 million mortgages, or 60% of the total. This was created to defraud counties all across the country. In the old days, a mortgage got recorded and a fee was paid for the service, and each time the mortgage got resold another recording and fee was required. The purpose is to ensure clear claims on property—both to ensure that foreclosures are proper and to ensure that when foreclosed property is sold, the new owner can be ensured of clear title. The procedure dates back hundreds of years and is necessary if you want private property rights.

    But the banksters hated those recording fees, particularly because the securitized mortgages might be resold a dozen times—and who wants to pay a fee for each transaction. That is so 1980s. (Of course, banksters love to charge fees for every transaction—for every breath you as customer take–they just hate to pay them!) So MERS claimed to offer an alternative, circumventing the county fees and tracking electronically the transfers of ownership of mortgages. It was also more modern—no more wet ink notes that might get lost in the wash or eaten by the neighbor’s dog. The records would be electronic, more efficient, and certainly more foolproof. Right!

    No worries about errors of data entry, system crashes, hackers, or fabricated records. The whole thing would be idiot proof, and to prove that, MERS hired, well, idiots to run the thing. And the pudding’s proof is now featured in foreclosure cases at a court near you, with the idiots appearing before judges and trying to explain why the whole thing is an idiotic mess replete with errors of data entry, system crashes, hackers, and records fabricated by idiots squared and cubed, just like the securities based on the underlying sliced and diced mortgages put together by richly rewarded idiot savants now vacationing in the Caribbean.

    Besides, banksters had learnt their lesson from Ollie North and needed plausible deniability. Those pesky little documents might come back to haunt them should someone later file a lawsuit. We know that brokers pushed inappropriate and unaffordable mortgages onto home buyers. We know that brokers and bankers forged documents—often after the fact to make mortgages appear to fit requirements investors placed on securities. We know that Goldman sold toxic CDOs to customers then bet on failure. In short, we know that everyone involved in the food chain was perpetrating fraud. Fraud, with a capital F. It was, and remains, the preferred business model of Wall Street.

    MERS seemed to offer the perfect instrument for fraud, with its motto “process loans, not paperwork”. The Florida Mortgage Bankers Association admits that its members purposely destroyed the notes on the belief that electronic registry was sufficient, more modern, and carried no paper trail. Banks all over the country “misplaced” damaging documents, fed them to dogs and shredders, and then replaced them with conveniently more useful forgeries. Most notes were probably never transferred from the brokers—many of whom went bankrupt—putting mortgages and securities into a hellish limbo. Some reports indicate that fired workers took notes home as bargaining chips for back pay. They probably ended up lining bird cages and cat litter boxes. Can anyone say “clear chain of title”? In any event, who wants paperwork that might result in real jail time? Best to give it to the birds.

    MERS also helped to perpetrate tax fraud. Mortgages were typically securitized and pooled in a Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC) that would hold them in trust. Done properly this allowed them to take advantage of an IRS tax exemption. However, to avoid the county recording fees, MERS claimed to hold the mortgage loans so that it could allow them to be traded without paying the fees and filing the paperwork. But if MERS was holding them, how could they be in the REMIC trust? The IRS code is very strict—the paperwork must be conveyed to the REMIC. There must be a clear paper chain of title through the securitization and sales. Without the paperwork, the securitizations may not be legal, and could subject investors to back taxes and penalties. And in 45 states the notes are required for foreclosure.

    MERS is busy helping to foreclose on its theory that it holds the mortgages—yet it does not have any notes. And if MERS really is the holder then the REMIC was a tax fraud from day one. So MERS wants it both ways at once: for the purposes of the REMIC tax advantage, MERS is only a database; but for the purpose of the securitizations and avoidance of county fees, MERS is the owner of the mortgages. Nice work if you can get it—tax evasion and fee avoidance.

    In response to this mess, Representative Marcy Kaptur (Ohio) is going to introduce legislation to prohibit Fannie and Freddie from buying new mortgages that are registered in MERS. Since there is virtually no activity in mortgage markets save what Fannie and Freddie are doing, this would effectively take away all new business from MERS.

    Further, her legislation would direct HUD to study the creation of a federal land title system to replace MERS while protecting rights of state and local governments. This is a sensible solution that would modernize the recording and tracking of property ownership. At the same time it would put out of business the hopelessly incompetent MERS, which has partnered with the banksters to perpetrate foreclosure fraud. Bye bye fraudsters.

    Predictably, the industry has responded with an army of lobbyists who are spreading funds around Washington, hoping to buy the support that will be needed to protect MERS and the fraudsters. They want Congress to retroactively legalize everything MERS and the banksters did: legalize the avoidance of recording fees that cost counties billions of dollars; legalize the tax fraud that reduced Treasury revenue; legalize the illegal foreclosures; and legalize the securities fraud.

    Oh, and they want Congress to reward MERS for its supreme incompetence by granting it the monopoly rights to run a national registry of mortgage fraud. Sort of like picking “heckuvajob Brownie” to run disaster relief. Wait, we tried that, with predictable results.

    The truly scary thing is that MERS could win. Congress had already tried to legalize fraudulent forgery with its Interstate Recognition of Notarizations Act of 2009. President Obama used his pocket veto to decline to sign it. But we cannot be sure that he will block MERS’s latest attempt to ex post validate past illegal practices.

    Congress is being told that nothing short of legalization of fraud will end the crisis of improper foreclosures as well as the lawsuits by investors in the fraudulent securities. It is claimed that we must let the banks continue to seize homes—even where they can provide no proof that they are creditors. We must stop the suits by investors like the NYFed and PIMCO, who claim that the mortgages put into securities did not correspond to the representations made by the investment bankers. And we have got to prevent the counties from collecting the fees they are owed. In short, we have to legalize robbery to save Wall Street’s robber barons.

    Nothing could be farther from the truth. This crisis will not end until the fraud stops and the fraudsters are securely behind bars. The rule of law must be restored before faith in our institutions and our economy can be renewed. Both the right and the left can come together on this issue, to support Representative Kaptur’s legislation to stop government support for MERS. Prohibiting Freddie and Fannie use of MERS is the first step to restoring sanity in America.


    Servicer Foreclosure Analysis Part I: Who Really Hired Stern, Watson, Fishman or Florida Default To Foreclose On Your Home?

    by Anthony Martinez

    If you watch a magic trick long enough you start to figure out how the trick works. A magicians primary technique is to keep you focused on one thing while he is doing another so that in the end you are amazed. You leave the magic show with one of two thoughts one being WOW or the other asking…”How did he do that?” If you go back and watch the trick again and not focus on that thing the magician is trying to train your eyes on, you just might see what the magician never wanted you to see.

    I begin my analysis of every foreclosure case not looking at what the magical foreclosure Plaintiff wants me to look at. I immediately ask some very basic fundamental questions first. The basic grammar school learning technique of who, what, when, where and how. The thing is, I don’t apply it to the magical foreclosure plaintiff, I apply it to the party that got them in the door…their attorneys! See, as a discovery expert for the past 15 years or so, I’ve worked with over 45 of the top AMLAW 100 law firms throughout the world. Firms like Skadden Arps, Baker & McKenzie, Latham & Watkins, White & Case etc. and I’ve learned that the reason why they gross over 2 billion a year is because their clients can afford to pay their $750.00 an hour and better for legal fees. They are the big boys of the legal world no doubt and their clients are the money-making conglomerates of the corporate world. So when I see Chase, Citibank, Deutsche and Wells Fargo as the Plaintiff and a guy named Miguel from a firm called Law Offices of David J. Stern signing paperwork on their behalf, it immediately raises a red flag to me. Banks don’t hire law offices for a flat fee of $1,200. They hire entire FIRMS at $750.00 an hour to make sure they don’t lose! With that red flag in mind I begin my research.

    Over and over again I begin to find these so-called ”servicers” of all different names and pretty colors popping up. I begin to look at SEC filings and other documents to see all the players to a “pool” of loans applying my skillful and advanced grammar school training of who, what, when, where, why and how. I see the same red flag issue in the SEC documents. I see major big boys from wall street like Goldman Sachs and a slew of self-created special purpose corporate created vehicles to limit liability to the core entities and I see who’s representing them in these big “pools” of money…an AMLAW 100 law firm. Now I know the “who” factor so I move on to the “what” factor and that’s pretty simple enough. It’s a “pool” of loans. Not “a” loan but a “pool” of them so it’s billions of dollars at play and that makes perfect sense because big boys play with big money. I recognize all of the big names but then I see names I don’t know like Home Loan Services which wouldn’t be so bad until research uncovers how this servicer uses DBA’s in the name of the big boy banks to give the “appearance” you are dealing with one of the big boys. I’ve just found one of the illusions used in the magic trick!

    Now all of this is pretty academic until you factor back in Miguel from Sterns Law Firm who just graduated law school in 2008. Why did Deutsche Bank hire Stern and why did Stern let Miguel run with the case? There is a long analysis here but I will get to the crux of it. Deutsche Bank never hired Stern. Home Loan Services did. Why? Because everyone had their share of the big money pie EXCEPT the servicer who’s cut was in the monthly homeowner payments and when everyone stopped paying their mortgage, the servicer stopped getting its cut. The big boys were already paid off the deal long ago. When people stopped making their payments the big boys didn’t suffer because their money was already made but the monthly payment is how the servicer made his share. Agreements give servicers the right to foreclose in the name of the big boys. So who hired Stern, Watson, Fishman or Florida Default to foreclose on your home? The servicer!

    Stay tuned for Part II of this series coming shortly. Circumventing the Rules of Civil Procedure To Bring Suit In Another Parties Name.

  19. Per “TruTV” episode that has Jessie Ventura airing a Prof. Black interview: Goldman-Sachs is called ‘Government-Sachs’ because soooo many former GS employees are in the federal government.

    This program needs to be made available on the internet. Are TruTV episodes available for streaming?

  20. I learn more from you guys everyday anonymous my attorneys opinion lines up with yours re the “loan” transaction, being basically void at inception whereby I thought I was getting a certain loan product when infact it was something different …. To say the least. Guess my next call is back with the atty generals office and pick up where I left off befor they took my home without legal cause!
    it’s bad here on AZ, I’m sure you have all heard.but At least , for Now, a no deficiency state it’s all do deeply crooked your right about that

  21. Joyce Louise,

    Thank you. Did not mean to imply a clarification – but rather just an expansion on what you are saying.

    I worry about deficiency judgments (which many states have) on these foreclosures too. And, if foreclosures continue as is – in these deficiency judgment states – these deficiencies will be pursued – they have many years to pursue. Thus, a never ending nightmare for many homeowner victims.

    When a mortgage loan is charged-off, it should then be “unsecured.” The collection rights to the debt is then sold at a discount – with the original mortgage loan contract/note written off. The original mortgage loan contract is non-existent – with only a “default debt” remaining. Each time that default debt is sold – it is sold at a discount – cheaper and cheaper – until the profit potential to the debt buyer is – HUGE. And, these debt buyers, in some states, can pursue the deficiency amount on the original asset (home) for which the original loan mortgage contract has been charged off – making the profit potential even bigger..

    It is my belief that many of the loans were already classified as non-compliant/default debts when the loan was originated. This is because the loans never qualified as MBS. In effect, many of the loans were originated simply as a loan – not a mortgage loan tied to the actual asset (home) value and ability of the borrower to pay. The origination underwriting (different from security underwriter) just did not meet qualifications for a qualified mortgage loan – therefore, there can be no “security” underwriting.. The only reason trusts and derivative CDOs got qualifying ratings was because they combined non-qualifying loans with qualifying loans – thus, passing tests for higher credit ratings.

    While some of the loans may have appeared to be actually MBS qualified at origination – due to originator and broker “tricks” – they were actually not compliant – and were quickly converted to CDOs classes that were not MBS qualified. So – what do you have for loans not MBS qualified?? You have false securitiztion of nothing more than a debt – no pass-through (MBS must be pass-through) – just false securitiztion of a debt – owed to someone – call them an investor – if you must – but all it is -is a debt.

    Those loans that remained compliant – were marketed as securities to mortgage-backed security investors by particular classes broken down from a large pool of mortgage originations.. But, those loans not compliant were simply sold as “non-performing/non-compliant” debt to hedge funds/distressed debt buyers by classes of the pool – deemed “not compliant.”. And, these loans were never part of pass-through certificates/securities to the stated trust – they were packaged into derivative CDOs and once in default – removed from the derived CDOs by derivative contracts. And, non-compliant could also mean “missing documents” – such as missing mortgage title insurance documentation. Which, even though paid by the borrower – was not submitted to the custodian/trust for the earmarked trust until many months later (beyond the 90 REMIC inclusion period). Therefore, that loan had to be repurchased – but often, this was not done, the non-compliant loan was subordinated to lower tranches of the trust – which were only used for CDO derivative “synthetics” ie – sale of non-compliant debt – not MBS..

    So, there are different “investors” – i.e. – security investors – and (default) debt investors.

    Furthermore, many of these non-compliant loans – (receivables and loans written off by the bank) – were REFINANCED again!!! You cannot pay off a charged-off (or non-compliant) loan to the bank – it is impossible. Therefore, was anyone paid off on these REFINANCED charged-off/non-compliant loans – that were packaged into CDOs and derivative contracts?? Borrowers did not have a clue what was happening.

    And, they want to also collect deficiency judgments?? The government is not addressing because they do not know what to do. Politics is standing in the way. The banks needed/need these relationships with the hedge funds/distressed debt buyers – and will never expose the relationships. They do not have to – these guys are not regulated.

    There is no way to shut this down without a full AG investigation. You can not even get discovery in courts – they will claim it is private information. While some in power recognize that we cannot go forward with the same fraud (just try qualifying for a mortgage loan today – it is NOT easy) – they will continue to fight the exposure of the fraud that occurred in the mortgage “heyday” of Wall Street. We need investigation by AGs that understand what happened and what is really going in foreclosure courts.

    We are victims of power – and the fraud is massive.

  22. Anonymous:

    Thank you for that clarification. I was concerned there might be some confusion and you are right, it needed to be clarified.

    I worry about the deficiencies that they may try to collect on these wrongful foreclosures should that be the case.

  23. Just a cursory glance at these two nitwits, reps Biggert and Bachus….she, Judy Biggert R IL, voted against HR 3269, which says…Corporations do not exist to benefit themselves. They are given existence by their charters on the condition that the behavior of corporations provides benefit to shareholders and the public. When corporate honchos authorize huge executive compensation for themselves without due opportunity for shareholder approval, they pervert the conditions those of corporate charters.

    H.R. 3269, the Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act, is a piece of legislation designed to “to prevent perverse incentives in the compensation practices of financial institutions.” The bill prohibits executive compensation packages that put the financial health of their companies at risk, and requires a separate shareholder vote to approve executive compensation packages.

    How could anybody in their right mind vote agaisnt that?


    Then Bachus, ninth term in the house repping Jefferson and Shelby counties AL….let’s see….where have I heard of those before? Oh yeah….that’s the locale that Matt Taibbi wrote about in his Rolling Stone article relaying how JP Morgan paid off Sacs so that they could rampage solo there writing bonds for the Cahaba River project. A project that was supposed to come in at $250 million, ended up at $3 billion after JP sold them a $1.1 billion bond offering, switching it from a fixed rate to a variable…we all know how those things fared. They then wrote a corresponding $1.1 billion dollar deal for a synthetic rate swap that exploded.

    Local folk’s monthly sewer bill’s went up 400%. Taibbi wrote that it’s as if the county missed a credit card payment and woke up one morning to find that their APR had gone up a million percent.

    Now that’s congressional service to be proud of. Any of us who have lived in Alabama understood what Randy Newman wrote in one of his early songs, Bama’s always had two wheels on the road, and two in the ditch. That fact doesn’t suggest that it’s OK for these Wall street pimps to ride into town with rape and pillage on the mind. There need to be prosecutions way up the corporate food chain! And anyone found allowing conduct like this in their districts should reap the same consequences!

  24. Joyce Louise

    Believe your are new here. You make very good points – particularly your last post – you write “but it appears that some investigation of the transaction between the three parties be made asap” I agree. And, believe “trustees” – will soon remove themselves from foreclosure filings.

    Think we have to define the word “investor.” This is confusing to some.

    1) There are investors who are investors in mortgage-backed securities (pass-through “current” income security investors). These are the investors that are suing the banks, depositors, and security underwriters (most of the originators are gone – and they were not the ones who securitized the receivables anyway – except in the case of Countrywide since Countrywide was a jack of all trades).

    2) Then there are “investors” in your default debt (non-performing loan which is likely in foreclosure). These investors are not MBS pass-through security investors, but rather distressed debt buyers who purchase the collection rights from the bank (at steep discount) – and then make a profit on the foreclosure proceeds). These investors are the result of derivative contracts that remove the collection rights from the trust – and from the bank. These are the investors that are suing the borrowers – but withholding their identity in courts across the country.

    3) Then there are the investors – who servicers will claim – funded your loan at origination (if your loan was really funded at all.) These so called investors – have nothing to do with your loan today.

    “Investor” has been used loosely. We need to break apart the meaning. For example – an art collection buyer – is an investor – but is NOT a security investor.


    Posted by Foreclosure Fraud on November 26, 2010 · 2 Comments

    GOP Lawmakers: Elizabeth Warren’s Job ‘Undermines’ Constitution

    In the letters Reps. Spencer Bachus and Judy Biggert sent to the Treasury and the Federal Reserve, the GOP lawmakers challenge the legality of Elizabeth Warren’s authority to set up the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.

    By appointing Warren as special adviser in September, the president “undermined” the Constitution, Bachus and Biggert contend, in two nearly identical letters dated Nov. 22. From the letters:

    “First, the President’s decision to appoint Professor Elizabeth Warren as a special advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury and as a senior advisor in the White House with lead responsibility for establishing the Bureau, hiring its staff, and setting its agenda — as opposed to nominating the director of the Bureau, as contemplated by the Act — circumvented the advice-and-consent process and undermined one of the key checks and balances in our Constitution. While the Act confers upon the Secretary of the Treasury limited interim authority ‘to perform the functions of the Bureau’ (Section 1066(a)), Professor Warren is now exercising that authority.”

    You can check out the letter in its entirety below…



  26. If the loan per se was not transferred legally I also believe that the investors who purchased the bonds (securities) may only be able to sue the Depositor and the Trustee, together with the Master Servicer. They would all have to know whether or not the transaction was legal, that’s what they pay their attorneys for. So one might have to look at it as though the Trustee and Master Servicer are aiding and abetting the Depositor by allowing their corporate names, etc. to be tied into the investment that is registered with the SEC in the first place if we find that those have not been legally transferred. I am not saying that is the case, but it appears that some investigation of the transaction between the three parties be made asap. Now about those investors, I am not sure why they would want to sue a homeowner for something that he absolutely was not a party to. I hear rumblings about investors suing homeowners and that doesn’t seem to hunt. How they can sue the homeowners for something they paid their money to the Depositor (securities dealer). I am not an attorney can someone expand on this that knows the answer? The homeowner in some case just might be the “last man standing” that has some legal attachment to the note, if indeed these companies have gone out of business and are no longer operating.

    In 1980’s or thereabouts, Scam companies were mailing hello letters only to homeowners and the goodbye letter was not yet required and they mailed their mortgage payments to companies claiming to be the new servicer not knowing any better. REspa changed the rules. No assignment of servicing rights on file in the county and thousands of home owners mailed their payments between the first and tenth of the month to this company which was of course scamming them. By the time we contacted the FBI we were told that they had fled the coup with the payments. . From then on, Respa required a hello and a good bye letter, but that does not negate the fact the servicing rights under certain conditions of Respa must be recorded in the the County if it is not an affiliate company that took over the servicing.

    My client got both of the letters but never received an assignment transferring the rights as in the case of the Master Servicer. Nothing on file in the County so we are checking all of his correspondence again to be sure..

    I know there is a lot going on and a lot of information and it is critical that the real facts can be known, but this is such a mess, it is going to be difficult and we just have to do the best we can.

  27. I have explained in my brief that the “servicing rights” purchased by the lender are not “ownership rights”. The only connection of my loan to the “trust” is the suspect affidavit of the affiant. Plaintiff’s counsel was nice enough to enter into the record another affidavit of the suspect affiant; just one problem-the signatures don’t match. Let’s see Plaintiff explain that one away, eh? A”pooling and servicing agreement” does not constitute evidence of a legal transfer.

  28. Stan,

    You are presuming that a short list of investors could not make up the entire list of investors in an active trust. That is NO TRUE.

    Keep in mind that these ‘investors’ are not little individual investors. They are places like Blackstone.

    Take a look a the list of ‘investors’ that are suing BofA. Blackstone and the NY Fed are in the short list of investors that are suing for a number of the different CountryWide trusts.

    The list that has been released is short due to the SIZE of the investment made by each of these entities.

    Therefore, just because the list is SHORT does not necessarily mean that the trust does not actually exist.

    I have seen some source that claimed there were just 7 investors in my own mortgage’s pool. It began in 2005 and filed to stop reporting in 2006 due to the small number of investors.

    The filing that they are not going to do further filings because of the small number of investors does not necessarily mean that the pool went broke.

    Although my own mortgage’s pool does not do any further filings with the SEC, I have seen supposed copies of the reports that are being generated for the trustee and the investors.

  29. Joyce:

    Good food for thought, can you (or anyone else) expand on this theory? Specifically in light of the testimony of the executive from Countrywide who stated that CW held the loan docs for years waiting for an ‘event” to occur before transfering to the pool or trust or whatever. Does this mean everything was null and void and the “servicer” was illigally collecting funds from us? Theft?

  30. Just like Joyce said my trust is/was Lehman XS seiries 2007-9. The SEC report says that this trust asked in March of 2008 to be exempt from filing with the SEC. The only way they can be exempt is if they go broke-Lehman filed chapter 11- or the trust has less than 15 shareholders. Problem again is I can’t find a lawfirm that is big enought to handle this in Wis without a fortune in fees.

  31. I hope that I have not confused the issue and perhaps one of the experts could address it because we all know there are PSA’s out there represented by entities that are out of business.

    Thanks for all the good info you have provided.

  32. Question then: If the borrower’s loan allegedly was transferred to the trust, of which the trustee did not pay for and the Depositor did pay a value for, but the Depositor never took possession or endorsed the note, nor provided any assignment of the debt and lien, then I would be tempted to believe that the loan, note and mortgage, does not belong to the trust at all. The PSA nor the Mortgage Purchase AGreement have been recorded so there is absolutely no record of the trust other than that registered with the SEC. In that event, I notice that even the mortgage loan schedules have not been showing up on the SEC cite filings and they say a hard copy only was presented.

    Is it possible that the loan never made it to the trust legally, therefore, the trust does not own the note and mortgage. The loan was in default three years later when it the servicer presented a fraudulent assignment of the note and lien to the Trustee was prepared and executed by using an invalid POA.
    This particular pool does not accept defaulted loans. Seems to me like the Originator of the loan, not the table funder sponor, but the originator may be the owner of the note and mortgage. The trustee had a duty to endorse the note back over to the originator when the loan was not transferred to the trust with the required assignments or within the time frame of the PSA CLOSING DATE. Additionally,

    If the loan was never in the trust in the first place or not legally transferred then how is it that the Master Servicer had the right to service the loan in the first place and collect the payments. Most of these originators had to prepare an Assignment for the TRansfer of Servicing if the servicer was not an affiliate of their company, this according to respa as I understand it. Under the Property Codes in most states, they have a provision that allows servicers to foreclose. Therefore, if the loan was not accepted into the pool, then that loan was not subject to the Master Servicer that may be instructing the foreclosure attorneys to foreclose on behalf of a trust that may not legally own it. In otherwords, a hello letter and a goodbye letter do not get it as far as I am concerned unless the Master Servicer recorded the Servicing Rights as required by RESPA . If the originatorsd have gone out of business, is it possible that there is no creditor therefore the borrower would get his note back by Court Order or would the note be an asset of any existing company that purchase it unless they too went out of business.

    Just a few notes because it begs the answer to so many questions when you start delving into these cases that we have seen.

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