7 Responses

  1. I am not sure how the Taylor’s prevailed other than they got the house back without the bank getting sanctioned good. And they got it for less. Wells Fargo had to have known Ameriquest was involved and intentionally put these people through it damaging them and the community. They should have gotten the house back and free and clear.

  2. Pelucheven,

    Since the ‘Proof of Claim” filed with the court in my case is a copy produced by the Title company, mine is more like you wrote a check 5 years ago but never signed it, instead someone scanned it, now that person has printed a copy of what they scanned and sent it, complete with a stamp saying it is was printed from the archives, and now that has been submitted, still without any signatures on it.

    I really see no point in acquiring a copy from the title company. It is meaningless.

    I’m sure the court would not want me to present the parallel check, claiming to have paid the debt in full.

  3. Hate to take up the room here – but below is a list of some that may be the “investor” (i.e. Current Creditor) in your loan/property. There are, most likely, more.

    Sheet1
    A B C D
    1
    2 Distressed Funds
    3 The following is a list of companies that have or are rumored to have started raising distressed funds investing in mortgages or mortgage products
    4 Funds that were recently added or updated are highlighted in yellow.
    5 COMPANY FUND NAME TARGET SIZE SPECIFIC COLLATERAL INFORMATION
    6 400 Capital Management N/A Unknown Dislocated structured products, including CDOs, CLOs
    7 Absolute Return Partners ARP Credit Opportunities Unknown Fund of funds
    8 ADM Capital ADM Maculus Fund VI Unknown Invests in loans, convertibles, pre-IPO opportunities and debt with warrants, among other vehicles
    9 Agamas Capital Agamas Distressed Mortgage Opportunities Fund $100 million Distressed and undervalued structured products, including CDOs, subprime bonds, home-equity securities
    10 Aladdin Capital Management Aladdin Opportunity Fund $500 million RMBS
    11 Alchemy Partners N/A Unknown Mid-market private equity deals
    12 AllianceBernstein N/A Unknown Distressed legacy non-agency RMBS and CMBS
    13 Anchorage Advisors N/A Unknown Unknown
    14 Angelo Gordon & Co. AG Capital Recovery Partners VI $2 billion Unknown
    15 Appaloosa Management Unknown Unknown Unknown
    16 Apollo Management Unknown Unknown Unknown
    17 Ares Management Ares Corporate Opportunities Fund $4 billion Unknown
    18 Arminius Advisors Arminius Real Estate Opportunity Fund I $373 million German commercial real estate debt
    19 Arminius Advisors Arminius Real Estate Opportunity Fund II $538 million German real estate assets
    20 Artradis Management N/A $500 million Asian convertible bonds; will not use any leverage
    21 Ashmore Ashmore Global Consolidation and Recovery Fund $100 million Distressed emerging market assets
    22 Asia Alternatives Asia Alternatives Capital II $950 million Fund of funds targeting investments in China, Japan, India and South Korea
    23 Atlanta VDL Fund I Atlanta VDL Fund I $110 million Vacant home lots
    24 Avenger Funding N/A $25 million to start, $100 million by 2012 Distressed commercial properties
    25 Avenue Capital Group Avenue Capital Europe Special Situations Fund $2.2 billion Unknown
    26 Avenue Capital Group Avenue Special Situations V $6 billion Unknown
    27 AXA Investment Management N/A $500 million CDO super seniors
    28 Bayside Capital HIG Bayside Debt and LBO Fund IV $3 billion Unknown
    29 BenAlon Capital BAC Distressed Mortgage Partners $500 million Buying performing, sub-performing and non-performing mortgage loans. 3-year lock-up.
    30 Belvedere Capital Belvedere Fund III $500 million Performing and distressed US banks
    31 BlackRock BlackRock Mortgage Investors Fund $1 billion RMBS, CMBS and ABS CDOs
    32 Blackstone’s Monarch Start Funds $1.3 billion Mezzanine debt
    33 Blumberg Capital Partners N/A $1 billion Corporate, commercial, residential real estate assets and debt, mortgage-backed securities
    34 Brevan Howard N/A Unknown Distressed ABS, started in 2007
    35 Brookfield N/A $4 billion Distressed real estate assets
    36 Cantor Real Estate N/A $200 billion Dislocated land and construction products
    37 Carlson Capital N/A Unknown Unknown
    38 The Carlyle Group Carlyle Strategic Partners II $1.4 billion Unknown
    39 Castle Creek Capital N/A $500 million Makes control investments in distressed US banks
    40 Centaurus Capital N/A Unknown Will buy distressed credit, debt
    41 Centerbridge Partners Centerbridge Credit Partners $1.5-2 billion Unknown
    42 Centerline Capital Group N/A $1 billion Commercial real estate loans, CMBS, CDOs
    43 Cerberus Capital N/A Unknown Unknown
    44 Chotin N/A Unknown Unknown
    45 Church Street Advisors N/A Unknown Sound assets whose value is impaired due to worthless monoline wraps. Looking at variety of esoteric assets: tobacco, settlement securitizations, mutual fund fee transactions
    46 Citadel Investment Group N/A Unknown Unknown
    47 Clark Street Capital Partners N/A Unknown Buying distressed owner-occupied commercial real estate loans, namely SBA 504 loans.
    48 Clearwater Capital Partners Clearwater Capital Partners $1.7 billion Asian distressed assets
    49 Cohen & Co. N/A $500 million Mortgage securities with no leverage
    50 Colony Capital Colony Distressed Credit Fund $1 billion Performing products from financial institutions selling at distressed prices, including CMBS and first mortgages
    51 Corestate Capital N/A $394 million German, Austrian and Swiss properties
    52 C.P. Eaton N/A Unknown ABS
    53 Crestview Crestview Capital Partners II $2.5 billion Unknown
    54 Crown Capital Partners Crown Capital Financing Limited $250 million Buying distressed and other alternative debt and equity positions in middle-market Canadian companies.
    55 Dalton Investments Dalton Distressed Mortgage Opportunity Strategy $90 million Impaired subprime mortgage-backed securities, many of which expected to mature in 18-24 months
    56 Dalton Investments N/A Unknown Buys distressed senior secured debt, namely leveraged companies forced to restructure
    57 Declaration Capital DMR Mortgage Opportunity Strategy Unknown discounted home loan bonds
    58 DE Shaw Group N/A Unknown Unknown
    59 Eden Rock Capital Eden Rock Structured Finance Opportunities $500 million Invests in other funds investing in distressed ABS
    60 Ellington Management Ellington Financial $750 million Distressed mortgage bonds
    61 Encore Enterprises Inc. Encore Capital LLC Unknown Distressed real estate and notes
    62 EQT Partners N/A $632 million Leveraged buyout debt
    63 EvestMAC N/A $150 million Distressed mortgages
    64 EvestMAC EvestMAC Funding II $46 million Performing first-lien loans
    65 Falcon Real Estate Investment Company Falcon The Americas Real Estate Opportunities Fund Unknown Commercial real estate in U.S., Brazil, Colombia and Argentina
    66 Fasthold Capital N/A $500 million Discounted first- and second-lien performing and non-performing mortgages, about 60% performing, 40% non-performing
    67 Fides Capital Management Fides Real Estate Direct Lending & Distressed Opportunity Fund $150-300 million Distressed real estate assets and loans
    68 Fortress Investment Fortress Mortgage Opp Fund $2 billion Non-performing mortgages and distressed debt
    69 Fulcrum Strategy Partners N/A $500 million Investes mainly in credit of middle market companies
    70 Further Lane Securities N/A $50-$100 million Investment grade securitized products to trade on secondary market
    71 Further Lane Securities N/A Unknown Distressed ABS and MBS
    72 Gad Capital Management Gad Partners Fund II $1 million Convertible bonds and equities trading at distressed prices
    73 GAM N/A Unknown Fund-of-funds, buying distressed bank assets, investing in other managers whose lock-up periods are two years or more
    74 GE Commercial Finance N/A Unknown Distressed and undervalued ABS and MBS, possibly focused on deals backed by equipment leases or consumer assets
    75 Global Credit Advisors GCA Opportunities Fund Unknown Distressed and high-yield US and European corporate loans and bonds
    76 Global Investment House Global GCC Real Estate Fund II $500 million Invests in real estate projects in UAE, KSA and Qatar
    77 Global Leveraged Credit GLC Credit Opportunity $250 million Distressed loan securities, middle market loans
    78 Global Recovery Investments Global Recovery Fund Unknown Will buy exotic securities and bankrupt company bonds, loans and reorganized equity
    79 Goff Capital N/A Unknown Structured product fund
    80 GoldenTree Asset Management N/A $300 million AA and A CLO bonds trading in low- to mid-70s
    81 GoldenTree Asset Management GoldenTree MultiStrategy Financing $2 billion Uses low-term liabilities to invest in fixed income
    82 Goldman Sachs N/A $4 billion Mortgage-related assets
    83 Greywolf Capital N/A Unknown Several funds focused on distressed securities, special situations and capital structure arbitrage strategies
    84 GSC Group Pendulum II $100 million AA and AAA distressed ABS
    85 GSC Group Pendulum I $107 million Structured products
    86 Gulf Stream Asset Management N/A Unknown Multi-strategy credit hedge fund
    87 Gulf Stream Asset Management N/A Unknown Credit dislocation fund
    88 Harbinger Capital Partners Unknown Unknown Unknown
    89 Harding Advisory/LongWall Capital LongWall Opportunities Fund $500 million Discounted RMBS CMBS
    90 HIG Capital N/A Unknown Distressed ABS
    91 Highbridge Capital Management Highbridge Leveraged Loan Partners $1 billion Unknown
    92 Highland Financial HFH Ranger Fund $500 million ABS, MBS, launched
    93 Hildene Capital N/A $1 billion Impaired structured products including subprime MBS, CLOs and ABS CDOs; AAA equity, no individual credits
    94 ING Real Estate Investment Management N/A $1.5-$2 billion Single names and portfolios
    95 JC Flowers & Co. CIC-JC Flowers Distressed Debt Fund $5 billion Unknown
    96 KKR N/A Unknown Unknown
    97 LaSalle Investment Management UK Ventures Fund II £400 million ($632 million) Distressed properties in the UK
    98 LoanStar N/A Unknown Unknown
    99 Lone Star Funds Lone Star Real Estate Fund II $10 billion CMBS and distressed commercial real estate
    100 Lone Star Funds Lone Star Fund VII $10 billion Distressed financial institutions, CDOs, RMBS, corporate debt and consumer loans
    101 Luminent Mortgage Capital N/A $500 million Buying mortgage-related assets
    102 Marathon Asset Management Marathon Distressed Sub-Prime Fund $600 million Unknown
    103 Marathon Asset Management Marathon Structured Finance Fund Unknown Subprime MBS and other fixed income products
    104 Mariner N/A Unknown Unknown
    105 Markaz N/A $50-100 million Distressed US mortgage debt
    106 Matlin Patterson N/A $4 billion Has allocation for distressed mortgage products
    107 Mazuma Capital N/A Unknown Bank debt, residential mortgages, commercial real estate
    108 McDonnell Investment Managing McDonnell Loan Opportunity II $400 million Long-term liabilities to finance fixed income
    109 Metropolitan West N/A Unknown Unknown
    110 Morgan Creek Capital Management The Dislocation Fund $200 million MBS, CLOS, municipal bonds, leveraged loans, senior debt
    111 Morgan Joseph N/A Unknown Unknown
    112 Morgan Stanley Morgan Stanley Real Estate Fund VII Global $10 billion Distressed real estate assets
    113 MountainView Capital Holdings MountainView Mortgage Opportunities Fund $80 million First lien residential mortgages, mostly subprime and alt-A
    114 Mudrick Capital Mudrick Distressed Opportunity Fund Unknown Distressed stocks and debt
    115 New Sky Capital N/A $500 million Agency and non-agency mortgage whole loans, mortgage-backed securities, no lock-up periods or redemption limits
    116 NSM Capital N/A $500 million Stressed and distressed ABS and CDOs
    117 Oak Hill Advisory N/A $600 million High yield loans and securities
    118 Oaktree Capital Management OCM Opportunities Fund VIIB $10.9 billion Unknown
    119 Och-Ziff Capital Management N/A Unknown Unknown
    120 One William Street Capital Management N/A $1 billion Heavy distressed focus on trading CDOs, ABS and non-performing loans and other securitized products
    121 Oxford Funding Corp The Oxford Opportunistic Mortgage Fund Unknown Whole mortgage loan portfolios
    122 Paulson & Co. N/A Unknown ABS, MBS, including subprime
    123 Permal Investment Management Services N/A Unknown Buys assets from distressed hedge funds selling at discounts
    124 Phoenix Peak Group N/A $500 million Distressed RMBS and whole mortgages
    125 Pimco N/A $3 billion Distressed ABS, several funds
    126 Pimco Pimco Senior Credit Opportunities Fund $5 billion Senior and super senior securities backed by residential and commercial mortgages
    127 Praedium Group Praedium Fund VII $3 billion Unknown
    128 Premium Point Investment Group N/A Unknown Buying distressed fixed income assets
    129 Private National Mortgage Acceptance Company N/A Unknown Distressed residential whole loans using private investors money
    130 Resource America Resource Real Estate Opportunity Fund $140 million Various distressed assets
    131 Safe Ship Investment Fund Safe Ship Distressed Fund $200 million Ships selling at distressed prices
    132 Sankaty Advisors Sankaty Credit Opportunities Fund IV $3.5 billion Unknown
    133 SDI (Structured Default Investment) N/A Unknown MBS, several funds
    134 Siguler Guff & Company Distressed Opportunities Fund III $2 billion 75% invested in other distressed funds across all assets and the remainder for co-investments
    135 Sorin Capital N/A Unknown Unknown
    136 SPQR N/A Unknown Structured products
    137 Starwood N/A Unknown CMBS
    138 Stauffenberg Capital Stauffenberg Capital Real Estate Global $250 million Global distressed real estate
    139 Stockbridge Capital Partners Stockbridge Real Estate Fund III $3 billion Real estate assets
    140 Stockbridge Capital Partners Stockbridge Value Fund $600-800 million Properties on both U.S. coasts, as well as Austin, Dallas and Houston
    141 Stone Tower Structured Credit Recovery Fund Unknown Home loan bonds and other structured products
    142 StoneCastle Partners N/A Unknown CDOs of bank trust-preferred securities
    143 Surge Capital Catalyst Capital SPC $200-250 million AA and AAA tranches of ABS CDOs, RMBS
    144 Taconic Capital Taconic Market Dislocation Fund Unknown CLOs, CDS mimicking ABX
    145 TCW TCW Special Mortgage Credit Fund $1.5 billion Senior level MBS trading at distressed prices
    146 Terrapin Partners N/A Unknown Distressed ABS
    147 Third Avenue Management Third Avenue Focused Credit Fund Unknown Below investment grade debt including preferred stock, convertible bonds, bank loans and high-yield bonds
    148 TPG TAC 2007 Fund Unknown Distressed debt and bank loans
    149 Treadstone Partners Treadstone Partners I $60 million Unknown
    150 Treadstone Partners Treadstone Partners II $200 million Distressed corporate debt and assets of lower-to-middle-market companies
    151 Tudor Investment Stone Lion Fund Unknown Unknown
    152 Tufton Oceanic Tufton Oceanic Distressed Fund $200 million Ships selling at distressed prices
    153 Unigestion Distressed Hybrid Fund of Funds $750 million Private equity and hedge fund managers, consumer and commercial credit, corporate loans, mortgages, high-yield debt, distressed private equity, mezzanine and distressed real estate
    154 United Capital N/A Unknown Unknown
    155 Vina Capital N/A $400 million Distressed property assets in Vietnam, including hotel and apartment developments
    156 Walton Street Capital Walton Street Real Estate Fund VI $2.5 billion Residential land, home-builders, debt, commercial developments
    157 WAMCO N/A $1 billion Distressed ABS
    158 Wayzata Investment Partners Wayzata Opportunities Fund II $3.4 billion Unknown
    159 Westwood Capital Westwood Home Loan Recovery Fund 1 Unknown Non-performing mortgages on owner-occupied homes, says will return mortgages to performing w/in 12-18 months
    160 Wexford Capital N/A Unknown Unknown
    161 Wilshire Associates N/A $150 million Fund of funds, distressed assets
    162 WR Huff Asset Management N/A Unknown Unknown
    163 Zais Group SerVertis Fund 1 $1 billion Portfolios of troubled home loans and mortgage-related securities
    164 Zell Credit Opportunities Fund Zell Credit Opportunities Fund $625 million Distressed commercial real estate assets
    165 ZS Structured Credit Capital N/A Unknown Distressed ABS
    166 ZS Structured Credit Capital N/A Unknown Various opportunistic credit products

  4. Legal twist forces foreclosure redos
    Creates second chance for former owners
    http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2010/11/12/legal_twist_forces_foreclosure_redos/
    Zepheniah Taylor lost his Dorchester three-decker to foreclosure two times in 17 months. Now the 59-year-old grandfather has returned home to stay. The scenario, once implausible, is becoming more common in the crazed and fast-changing world of foreclosure
    Foreclosures spread outside Boston
    Hundreds — and possibly thousands — of Massachusetts homeowners are facing back-to-back foreclosures as lenders realize there were problems with property titles the first time around. Those lenders, often unable to obtain title insurance, are opting to start from scratch with what is being called a “re-foreclosure.’’

    The prospect of going through a foreclosure all over again may seem nightmarish for homeowners, but in a growing number of cases the do-overs are creating opportunities for them to repossess their homes.

    Such was the case with Taylor, who decided to fight the second foreclosure. The tactic paid off: He won the right to repurchase the home at current market value.

    “I’m starting over fresh,’’ said the father of eight and grandfather of nine. “It feels good. It is a new chance.’’

    Not all tenants enjoy such an outcome, however, and those who receive notice of a re-foreclosure often are confused.

    “They are weirded out,’’ said Zoe Cronin, a staff attorney with Greater Boston Legal Services, which provides legal representation to low-income people. Cronin said she knows of about a dozen recent re-foreclosures. “I’ve met former owners [who are] saying, ‘What is this? I got a letter saying I own my house again,’ ’’ she said.

    The recent burst in re-foreclosures can be traced to a 2009 Massachusetts Land Court ruling that called into question the validity of a home’s ownership in cases where foreclosure paperwork was incomplete or inaccurate.

    The finding is now being reviewed by the state Supreme Judicial Court. Its decision could determine whether tens of thousands of homes with foreclosures in their backgrounds have valid titles.

    At issue is who technically owns a property on the day it is seized by a lender. It’s often difficult to know for sure because during the housing boom millions of mortgages were bundled into bonds and sold to investors. That process, repeated over and over, created a twisted paper trail. As the number of foreclosures increased dramatically across the nation, the morass worsened.

    Many lenders believed they could still proceed with a foreclosure and later sort out the legal mess by proving they held the mortgage. That premise was rejected by the Land Court.

    While it is unclear how many property takings have been done over, Elizabeth J. Barton, chairwoman of the Massachusetts Bar Association’s Foreclosure Legislation Task Force, estimated the number could total in the thousands, based on action taken by lenders that was prompted by last year’s Land Court decision.

    She said lenders are primarily targeting properties for which they have been denied title insurance because the original foreclosure did not comply with the court’s ruling.

    Page 2 of 3 —

    “Title insurance companies hesitate to extend protection to a loan that violates the ruling,’’ said Barton, title counsel at Connecticut Attorneys Title Insurance Co., which has offices throughout New England. “A lot of lenders have had to re-forecloseThe problem of cloudy title histories also is providing a boost to an increasing number of homeowners who are going to court to force lenders to prove they have a legal right to seize their properties.

    Typically, homeowners argue against foreclosures by citing what they believe to be lenders’ shoddy paperwork and fraudulent documents. Concerns about such practices recently prompted 50 US attorneys general to spearhead an investigation into foreclosure practices, while some major lenders — including the nation’s largest, Bank of America Corp. — temporarily halted foreclosures to scrutinize their own practices.

    Housing advocates argue that even if homeowners have not paid their mortgages — which is almost always the case by the time a foreclosure is underway — lenders must still be able to prove they have a right to a property before taking it.

    The growing skepticism about foreclosure practices is helping more homeowners win their legal challenges, housing attorneys say. And lenders, hesitant to bring more questionable business practices to light, are more frequently retreating from court battles over foreclosed homes, making settlements with homeowners a more attractive option.

    “Banks are less and less anxious to go forward in front of a jury,’’ said Maureen McDonagh, a director at the WilmerHale Legal Services Center of Harvard Law School, a Jamaica Plain-based organization that provides legal help to low-income people. “People don’t trust the industry.’’

    Taylor’s foreclosure story began like millions of others nationwide. He and his daughter, Suzette, refinanced their mortgage in 2004 with a subprime loan, the kind of toxic debt that pushed the US economy into a tailspin in 2008. They borrowed $325,000 from Ameriquest Mortgage Co., at a two-year fixed rate of 6.99 percent. Taylor lived on the first floor with four of his children and two grandchildren; Suzette lived on the second floor, with her three children.

    When the mortgage reset in 2006, monthly payments rose to more than $3,000, from $2,160. That was too much for Taylor, who worked as a handyman at a local nonprofit and Suzette, a restaurant cashier. They tried to renegotiate the loan and even attempted to sell the property as a way out. Neither tactic worked, and in March 2008 the foreclosure went through.

    Or so they thought. The tangled foreclosure process came to work in the Taylors’ favor.

    Public records at the Registry of Deeds show that Wells Fargo, not Ameriquest, actually foreclosed on the home. That’s because the mortgage had been bundled into an asset-backed security and sold by Ameriquest, which did not file paperwork indicating the transfer to Wells Fargo until two months after the foreclosure..

    Wells Fargo said it could not comment on the Taylors’ situation because it only served as the trustee to the loan. The bank referred questions about the dual foreclosures to the company that serviced the loan, HomEq Servicing, which was sold earlier this year, leaving no one to respond to questions about particulars of the case.

    Wells Fargo said it could not comment on the Taylors’ situation because it only served as the trustee to the loan. The bank referred questions about the dual foreclosures to the company that serviced the loan, HomEq Servicing, which was sold earlier this year, leaving no one to respond to questions about particulars of the case.

    In June 2009 — more than a year after the foreclosure — the Taylors received a letter from Wells Fargo saying they were being foreclosed upon again. Just as before, their attempts to work out a deal with the lender went nowhere.

    The Taylors decided it was finally time to go. Zepheniah moved to an apartment with three of his sons; his adult daughters found separate apartments with their young children.

    But the story did not end there.

    Soon after the family left the three-decker, community activists from City Life/Vida Urbana knocked on the door. It was part of a canvassing effort by the Jamaica Plain housing group to urge residents to remain in foreclosed homes and fight eviction.

    They found a tenant upstairs and left a message for the Taylors — come home now.

    Zepheniah Taylor heeded their call and returned several months after leaving. He challenged the eviction in Boston Housing Court with the help of attorneys from Greater Boston Legal Services, claiming Wells Fargo made additional errors in the second foreclosure and still could not prove it had clear title to the home.

    Judge Jeffrey M. Winik postponed the Taylors’ eviction to allow the case to go to Land Court. But Wells Fargo instead sold the house to a nonprofit lender, Boston Community Capital, for $188,000. The nonprofit resold it to Taylor and another adult daughter, Tisa, for $233,900 — about $91,000 less than the 2004 mortgage.

    Taylor lives on the first floor with three sons — ages 9, 19, and 22. He rents out the second floor and is renovating the third.

    Housing advocates say the Taylors prevailed mostly because they were tenacious.

    “The problem is that so many of the homeowners already moved out and didn’t know the foreclosures were unlawful,’’ said Nadine Cohen, managing attorney for the consumer rights unit at Greater Boston Legal Services. “Those are the people who have really been harmed in all of this.’’

    Jenifer B. McKim can be reached at jmckim@globe.com.

  5. Some of us who have lost our home were lied at the time the loan was originated, were lied to by the servicers, things were being done with our obligation that were illegal and fraudulent, fees and commissions were paid that were not disclosed to us on our loan documents as a result of the origination and securitization process, the servicers and their owners the banksters lied to us for almos two years in the process of loan modification and after I went to EDGAR and searched their Pooling and Servicing Agreement id I find out the truth. The PSA only allowed a 3% limit on the modification of certain loans. That means that the servicer charged the Government for HAMP and never was their intention and ability to modify the loan end result foreclosure.

    I thought that countries like Venezuela, Iran, Greece, Mexico and others were just bastions of illegality, however, we have made of our system of laws a total disaster.

    we can now stand in court and say your honor, I have a copy a a check I sent the Servicer which says we paid them in full, I have an affidavit signed by my wife attesting for the veracity of this copy as true and definite evidence of the payment. And in furtherance I have the affidavit notarized by my under aged son with a notary stamp he got from some Chinese website and by the way your honor we also have an affidavit that the real check was really eaten by my dog some time ago.

    You see your honor, what is good for the goose is also good for the gander, if the bank is allowed to foreclose on me and my family with bogus documents, accounting, notaries and witnesses and they defense is that all that is just technical, then we demand this court admits my made up evidence and that if there are any issues that may be considered under the law as fraud and misrepresentation, they should be also accepted as pure procedural technicalities, since I was late for my court appearance today and we came up with all of this in a hurry. If you dismiss the case without prejudice as you are doing with all the banks with all their fake documents, then I should be given the same latitude. After all aren’t we all created equal under our Constitution? or is it that these patrician institutions have more rights and privileges than the commoners?

  6. Huffington post is really getting it This is a national internet Newspaper that is really spreading the word.
    Foreclosure Robo Signers
    We must get this on the Washington post Wallstreet journal New York Times Latimes and all the rest.

    http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/13/foreclosure-robo-signers-statements_n_783031.html#s181852

  7. This was not a surprise by any means and if the AG’s do not thoroughly investigate what has happened to the taxpayers’ money (the people’s money) that the government has used taxpayer money as an additional tool to funnel money (bailout) to the banks . Money that will not be repaid to the taxpayer like they did with the TARP. Everyone is just now beginning to see how it works. Short sales were the name of the game and we should, as taxpayers filling the bill, be able to see the loan ledgers for each final sale and what amount of taxpayer money was paid to the banks so they could say they were helping the homeowner. How can there by any deficiences if the government is paying the lender for that part of the short sale whereby the lender allows a homeowner to sell short. Was it really short or what? Can anyone come up with those ledgers. There have been thousands of short sales and it would be interesting to know if the government particpated with the lender.

Leave a Reply

%d bloggers like this: