is it one of them or is it all of them? Mr. Cuomo, are you listening?

According to two EMC analysts, they were encouraged to just make up data like FICO scores if the lenders they purchased loans in bulk from wouldn’t get back to them promptly

Editors’ Note: With Bear Stearns “underwater” it is difficult to come up with scenario where there won’t be criminal charges brought against the bankers and traders who worked there. They are low-hanging fruit, easily made the scape goat and easily subject to inquiry since nobody has any allegiance to them. They have no reason to stay silent except for self-incrimination. If some are offered immunity they will sing like birds in the meadow.

On the other hand Cuomo is aiming for the wrong target and could end up losing his cases unless he aims right. If this report is correct, then Cuomo is looking for the the real criminal culprit in the ratings fraud. What is wrong with that approach is that he is attempting to single out ONE defendant out of a group. They ALL knew, as the article goes on to say, what they were doing with ratings, just as they all knew what was going on with property appraisals just as they all knew that there was no underwriting of the loans.

Underwriting, which was the process of verifying the loan data from soup to nuts was abandoned because the party initiating the loan had no dog in the race. They were using investor dollars to fund the loan. Their income was based upon closing the loan without regard to risk. In fact, as has now been acknowledged after three years of me harping on the subject, the more likely it was that the loan would fail, the higher the profit and fees to everyone.

In the world of securities, underwriting was once the product of verifying the facts and risks of an investment through “due diligence”. Like the home loans there was no due diligence underwriting. The object was to sell something that LOOKED good even though they knew the loss was a sure thing — something the investment bankers needed and wanted.

They wanted the investments to fail because they were selling it (securitizing specific loans, parts of loan pools and entire loan pools) into multiple SPV packages, effectively selling the same loans over and over again.

They were taking the yield spread caused by the lower rate the investors were willing to accept because they perceived the investment as being little or no risk. The loan interest charged to borrowers was much higher, sometimes by multiples. This causes a SPREAD, which means that in order to give the investors the dollar income they we re expecting, they could promise, based upon exhibits that were fabricated in part, that the investor would get the desired revenue.  But the income was coming from loans to borrowers at much higher “nominal” rates. In plain language they were able to invest only a portion of the investors money into funding mortgages that were guaranteed to fail. The rest of the money they kept for themselves. Each time they re-sold the security as described above, the entire proceeds were kept by the ivnestment banking house. As long as the pools failed, nobody would demand an accounting.

The investors might make claims for the losses but they were stuck with being tagged as qualified investors who should have known better, even if they were some small credit union who had no person on staff capable of performing verification or due diligence on the investment in mortgage-backed securities.

But fund managers (especially those  who received bonuses due to the higher returns they reported) were highly unlikely candidates to demand an accounting since they either had no clue or cared less as to what was REALLY done with the proceeds of their investment. AND then of course there are the fund managers who may or may not have overlooked, through negligence of intentionally, the quality of these investments. They may have received some sort of perks or kickback for investing in these dog-eared securities. Since the manager is in charge, he or she would be required to ask for things that they really don’t want to hear about.

The ratings companies were put in the exact same position as the the appraisers of the homes subject to mortgage. Play or die. Here is what we assisted you in coming up with a human and computer algorithm to arrive at the value of this investment. In securities, the value was expressed as AAA down to BBB and below. Here are the securities which we reverse engineered to fit that algorithm. Now give us the triple ratings as we agreed, take our fees which are higher now for your cooperation and don’t ask any questions. If someone did ask questions or raised alarms at the ratings agency or appraisal companies they were blacklisted.

So you tell me — is it one of them or is it all of them? Mr. Cuomo, are you listening? Contrary to the report below, this is no grey area. It is really very simple. Just because you have a pile of documentation doesn’t make it theft. Look at the result to determine the intent. That’s what you are supposed to do in Court.

More Corruption: Bear Stearns Falsified Information as Raters Shrugged

MAY 14 2010, 2:25 PM ET |  Comment

Made up FICO scores? Twenty-minute speed ratings to AAA? If government prosecutors like New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo want answers to why the mortgage-backed securities market was so screwed up, they should talk to Matt Van Leeuwen from Bear Stearn’s servicing arm EMC.

Reports indicated on Thursday that Cuomo is pursuing a criminal investigation surrounding banks supplying bad information to rating agencies about the quality of the mortgages they signed off on. But so far he hasn’t been able to prove where in the chain of blame the due diligence for the ratings broke down.

What Cuomo needs to establish is: whose shoulders does it fall on to verify the information lenders were selling to investment banks about the quality of their loans? And who was ultimately responsible for the due diligence on the loans that created toxic mortgage securities that were at heart of our financial crisis?

False Information and the Grey Area

Employed during the go-go years of 2004-2006, and speaking in an interview taped by BlueChip Films for a documentary in final production called Confidence Game, Van Leeuwen sheds some light onto the shenanigans going on during the mortgage boom that might surprise even Cuomo. As a former mortgage analyst at Dallas-based EMC mortgage, which was wholly owned by Bear Stearns, he had first-hand experience working with Bear’s mortgage-backed securitization factory. EMC was the “third-party” firm Bear was using to vet the quality of loans that would purchase from banks like Countrywide and Wells Fargo.

Van Leeuwen says Bear traders pushed EMC analysts to get loan analysis done in only one to three days. That way, Bear could sell them off fast to eager investors and didn’t have carry the cost of holding these loans on their books.

According to two EMC analysts, they were encouraged to just make up data like FICO scores if the lenders they purchased loans in bulk from wouldn’t get back to them promptly. Every mortgage security Bear Stearns sold emanated out of EMC. The EMC analysts had the nitty-gritty loan-level data and knew better than anyone that the quality of loans began falling off a cliff in 2006. But as the cracks in lending standards were coming more evident the Bear traders in New York were pushing them to just get the data ready for the raters by any means necessary.

In another case, as more exotic loans were being created by lenders, the EMC analyst didn’t even know how to classify the documentation associated with the loan. This was a data point really important to the bonds ratings. When Bear would buy individual loans from lenders the EMC analyst said they couldn’t tell if it should be labeled a no-doc or full doc loan. Van Leeuwen explains, “I wasn’t allowed to make the decision for how to classify the documentation level of the loans. We’d call analysts in Bear’s New York office to get guidance.” Time was of the essence here. “So, a snap decision would be made up there (in NY) to code a documentation type without in-depth research of the lender’s documentation standards,” says Van Leeuwen.

Two EMC analysts said instead of spending time to go back to the lender and demand clarification, like if verification of income actually backed these loans, the executives at Bear would just make the loan type fit. Why? One EMC analyst explains, “from Bear’s perspective, we didn’t want to overpay for the loans, but we don’t want to waste the resources on deep investigation: that’s not how the company makes money. That’s not our competitive advantage — it eats into profits.”

Twenty Minutes for AAA

It’s easy to paint Bear as the only villain here — but what were the rating agencies thinking?

Susan Barnes of Standards and Poor’s testified before Congress last month saying banks like Bear were responsible for due diligence in the transactions described above: “For the system to function properly, the market must rely on participants to fulfill their roles and obligations to verify and validate information before they pass it on to others, including S&P.”

Yet, was it reasonable for agencies to stand behind ratings when due diligence was done by an affiliate of Bear? That’s like buying a car from a guy whose mechanic brother said it was great, and then finding out it was a lemon.

Equally amazing was how responsive the raters were even on the big deals. Van Leeuwen says, “The raters would provide a rating on a $1 billion security in 20-30 minutes.” Describing it as “a rubber stamp,” Van Leeuwen said that the ratings agencies slavish devotion to their computer models “was vital” because it allowed Bear to “cram mortgages through the process.”

The greatest asset Bear had in its quest to squeeze every ounce of profit from the mortgage-backed securities market was the methodology of the big ratings agencies. The bankers knew what kind of loan detail was needed to get that coveted AAA rating. After they prepped the rating agencies for what they ‘thought’ they loans would look like, they would buy loans in bulk, and then spend a day scrubbing them.

Bear’s decision to cut corners and to fail to take the time to make sure the raters got correct information about the quality of loans was big no-no. But rating bonds based on fast reactions, instead of thoughtful analysis and reliable due diligence, also might place some responsibility on the agencies’ shoulders.

26 Responses

  1. Mr. Cuomo has announced he is running for Governor – I believe next step is President. Mr. Cuomo – you say you stand for the people – but you are only defending investors – what about the people?? Where is the effort to protect the people??? The people are the source of investment. They must come first.

  2. Deborah

    You need exact name of the party you are suing and summons via the registered agent.

    I am not an attorney – but large corporations have many subsidiaries and affiliates. Do not believe “Bank of America” is an entity. You need exact name of entity you are suing. ie – Bank of America Corporation, or Bank of America, NA., etc. etc.

  3. Can someone answer a question for me Please??

    Does it matter what Bank of America/Countrywide I serve a summons on as long as it is Bank of America?

  4. Raja

    I cannot look at because I am not attorney. But, I wish you the best –

    A

  5. ANONYMOUS
    Thanks for the response and help. I have made a 114 slide power Presentation, covering almost many steps. I did send this to Neil on his personal email and never heard anything. The file is so big, it has to be sent via, ” yousend.com”. I have sent this to Neil to check this and post it somewhere and looks that he is busy and do not have time. I have written Discovery requests too, which I used in my case, and they admitted it by non-response.My email is “therajafamily@gmail.com” Please email me so that I can send this stuff to you and then after going through this, and doing corrections, you can post it somewhere for the needy people.

    Once again for the quick response.
    Thanks and Be Safe

  6. Daniela Mars

    Please call me at 540-687-0004, then I will try to tell and lead you to the required information. initially it takes time and then it becomes very easy.

    Thanks and Be Safe

  7. Raja,

    Can you teach me how to get to the same information that you have ?

    thank you .

  8. Raja

    Sorry – did not mean to imply multiple loans – it just looks like that is what THEY are doing by your posted record.

    I cannot advise because I am not a lawyer. Sounds like you will be able to “push them around the corner” yourself. You appear very knowledgeable.

    Will tell you one thing – Indy is not, and was never the creditor. They remained a servicer in the process. Lehman would likely have been your creditor – since they are the ones that purchased a lot of Indy loans. A servicer is never the creditor. And neither is Deutsche Bank – Do not let them tell you otherwise.

    Think you should reopen Bankruptcy for invalid proof of claim as to discharge. You do not have a proper discharge. Get another bankruptcy attorney if you have to. Go from there. Do not let bankruptcy discharge stand as is. if claims are not validly discharged in bankruptcy – then claim still stands with the actual and real creditor. Still owed. This problem has surfaced in debt collection – and many bankruptcy attorneys have come to now know that claims in bankruptcy are often fraudulent. They came to know this because years later debt collectors try to collect the same discharged debt. Bankruptcy attorneys should know better by now – but it requires extra work to enforce compliance of disclosure of actual creditor – which attorneys do not always want to do.

    If you can do this – it may then help you your “push”.

    I am not an attorney and this is not meant to be construed as legal advise and only for educational purposes.

  9. ANONYMOUS
    Sir, it is not for multiple properties.It is for my primary residence. One loan is on the Deed of Trust and on primary note. The other they created which does not have any concern with my settlement papers. Now they are trying to foreclose on the fraudulent loan number.Now Indy Mac is trying to get out from this mess and they have filed the motion to substitute Deutsche Bank for Indy Mac. I have sued more than 13 defendants including the MERS, Substitute Trustee, Title company, settlement company( these both are Trustee on Deed of Trust). They attached the fake fabricated assignments/affidavits from the tale of too many hats(ERICA JOHNSON) and LPS is also involved too.By substituting the Deutsche Bank they have proved my points which I raised in Bankruptcy court, because they wanted to substitute the Deutsche Bank when my case was in Bankruptcy court. I raised the GAAP and GAAS ( FASB accounting but this was going over the head of Bankruptcy Judge) They filed the motion to lift the stay, I objected and raised standing. They did not let the hearing take place as they were requesting repeated continuance and I kept on objecting but the judge was granting the continuance. Finally I talk to the judge and he fixed the case for final hearing. the final hearing did not take place as my discharge was done prior to the hearing. I have filed the case against them in the county circuit court and the judge gave me injunction on 06/03/2009 without bond.( Bank ruptcy judge mentioned in the order that.” Debtor remains free to go to any court to sue them”. The loan was rescinded timely and they received it and showed the non compliance.(rescission was self imposed). In addition to this using the default clauses in QWR , I filed the Satisfaction of mortgage with the affidavit of non compliance in the county land records. They never responded the QWR, Discovery and the rescission and admitted by non response.
    Please see all these trusts, some of them are showing the private securitization. Please help me as i have already pushed them in the corner and now only a push is required.

    Thanks and Be Safe

  10. Raja

    Whoa. Is this for multiple properties? And, was there multiple refinances (they just shuffled these around). Well, if the security underwriter (parent corp.) is the same for all these series – does not matter – they are the creditor – unless they sold it off elsewhere.

    Lehman was big buyer of Indy Mac loans.

    No wonder Indy and Lehman went under.

  11. Raja

    Whoa. Is this for multiple properties? And, was there multiple refinances (they just shuffled these around). Well, if the security underwriter (parent corp.) is the same for all these series – does not matter – they are the creditor – unless they sold it off elsewhere.

    Lehman was primary buyer of Indy Mac loans.

    No wonder Indy and Lehman went under.

  12. ANONYMOUS
    Thanks a lot sir. Here is the list of other trusts involved in my loan. The serial # 7 we already discussed.

    1. Indy Mac INDX Mortgage, Loan Trust 2006-AR11 10k for 03/29/2007 Ex. 33.2, filed on 03/29/2007, 5:45 PM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-01 Accession # 1020242-7-435
    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    3696 680 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 672 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74 $ 213, 520.00
    2. Indy Mac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006 AR9, 10K, 03/29/2007 Ex. 33.2, filed on 03/29/2007 at 5:14 PM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-02 Accession # 1020242-7-434
    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213,520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    3. Indy Mac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006 – AR6, 10k for 03/29/2007 Ex. 33.2 filed on 03/29/2007, 5:16 PM ET,SEC file#333-132042-03,Accession # 1020242-7-431
    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213,520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    4. Redirected Asset Securitization Trust 2006 A5CB, 10K for 03/29/2007 Ex.33.2, filed on 03/30/2007 at 10:12 am ET. SEC File # 333-132042-04, Accession # 1020242-7-464
    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74
    5. Indy Mac MBS/ Inc Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset- Backed Trust Series. INDS 2006-I, 10K, for 03/29/2007 Ex. 33.2 filed on 03/30/2007 SEC File # 333-132042-05, Accession # 1020245-7-454
    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    6. Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006 – A6, 10K, for 03/29/2007 Ex.33.2 filed on 03/30/2007, at 10:19 AM ET. SEC File # 333-132042-06, Accession # 1020242-7-466
    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    7. Indy Mac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006- AR8 10K, Ex.33.2, filed on 03/29/2007 at 5:15 PM ET SEC File # 333-132042-07, Accession # 1020262-7-433
    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    8. Indy Mac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR15, 10K for 03/29/2007 Ex.33.2 filed on 03/29/2007 at 5:39 PM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-08, Accession #1020242-7-439
    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74
    9. Indy Mac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006 AR13,10K for 03/29/07 EX 33.2 filed on 03/29/2007 at 5:45 PM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-13, Accession # 1020242-7-437
    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    10. Indy Mac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006- AR-13, 10K, for 03/29/2007, Ex.35.1 filed on 03/30/2007 at 5:41 PM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-10, Accession # 1020242-7-514
    Service Compliance Report for Asset Backed Securitization
    11. Indy Mac MBS / Inc / Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Trust Series INDS 2006-A, 10K for 03/31/2006 Ex. 33.2, filed on 12/14/2007 at 7:55 AM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-11, Accession # 1020242-7-1337
    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    12. Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-A7CB for 03/29/2007 Ex.33.2, filed on 03/30/2007 at 10:20 AM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-12, Accession # 1020242-7-467
    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    13. Indy Mac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR-13, 10K, EX.33.2, for 03/29/2007 filed on 03/29/2007 at 5:45 PM ET, SEC File # 333-132048-13, Accession # 1020242-7-437
    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    14. Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-A8, 10K, for 03/29/2007 Ex. 33.2, filed on 03/30/2007 at 10:20 AM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-14, Accession # 1020242-7-468
    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    15. Indy Mac INDA Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR1 for 03/29/2007 Ex. 33.2, filed on 03/30/2007 at 10:6 am ET, SEC File # 333-132042-15, Accession # 1020242-7-450
    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    16. Indy Mac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR-19, 10K , for 03/29/2007 Ex.33.2, filed on 03/29/2007 at 5:39 PM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-16, Accession # 1020242-7-440
    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    17. Indy Mac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Trust / Series INABS 2006-C, 10K, for 03/30/2007 at 10:16 AM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-17, Accession # 1020242-7-478
    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    18. Indy Mac INDB Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1, 10K for 03/29/2007 Ex. 33.2, filed on 03/30/2007 at 10:07 AM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-18, Accession # 1020242-7-449
    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    19. IndyMac Residential Mortgage Backed Trust/ Series 2006-12, 10K for 03/29/2007 Ex.33.2, filed on 03/30/2007 at 10:04 AM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-19, Accession # 1020242-7-456
    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    20. IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR21, 10K for 03/29/2007 Ex.33.2, filed on 03/29/2007 at 5:51 PM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-20, Accession # 1020242-7-441
    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    21. IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Trust/Series 2006-H2, 10K, for 03/30/2007, Ex. 35.1, filed on 04/02/2007 at 8:43 am ET, SEC File # 333-132042-21, Accession #1020242-7-523

    Service Compliance

    22. IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR25, 10K, for 03/29/2007, Ex.33.2, filed 03/29/2007 at 5:52 PM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-22, Accession # 1020242-7-443

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    23. Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-A9CB, 10K, for 03/29/2007 Ex.33.2, filed on 03/30/2007, at 10:20 AM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-23, Accession # 1020242-7-469

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    24. IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-RI, 10K, for 04/02/2007 Ex.33.1, filed on 04/02/2007 at 11:33 AM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-24, Accession # 1020242-7-543

    Annual Reports with Certifications from Deutsch Bank

    25. IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR23, 10K, for 03/29/2007 Ex. 33.2, filed on 03/29/2007 at 5:50 PM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-25, Accession # 1020242-7-442

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    26. Indy Mac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR12, 10K, for 03/29/2007 Ex.33.2, filed on 03/29/2007 at 5:46 PM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-26, Accession # 1020242-7-436

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    27. IndyMac INDA Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR2, 10K, for 03/29/2007, Ex. 33.2, filed on 03/30/2007 at 10:06 AM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-29, Accession # 1020242-7-451

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    28. Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-A10, 10K, for 03/29/2007, Ex.33.2, filed on 03/30/2007 at 10:20 AM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-28, Accession # 1020242-7-470

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    29. IndyMac INDA Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR2, 10K, for 03/29/2007, Ex.33.2 filed on 03/30/2007 at 10:06 AM ET, SEC File # 33-132042-29, Accession # 1020242-7-451

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    30. Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-A11, 10K, for 03/29/007, Ex.33.2 filed on 03/30/2007 at 9:45 AM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-30, Accession # 1020242-7-471

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    31. IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR27, 10K, for 03/29/2007, Ex.33.2 filed on 03/29/2007, 5:51 PM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-31, Accession # 1020242-7-444

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    32. IndyMac MBS Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Trust/ Series, INABS 2006-D, 10K, for 03/29/2007, Ex.33.2, filed on 3/30/07 at 10:14AM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-32, Accession # 1020242-7-474

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    33. IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR31, 10K, for 03/29/2007, Ex.33.2, filed on 03/29/2007 at 5:51 PM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-33, Accession # 1020242-7-446

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    34. IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR-29, 10K, for 03/29/2007, Ex.33.2, filed on 03/29/2007 at 5:51 PM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-34, Accession # 1020242-7-445

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    35. IndyMac Home Equity Loan Asset Backed Trust/Series INDS 2006 2B, 10K, for 03/29/2007 Ex.33.2 filed on 03/30/2007 at 10:05 AM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-35, Accession # 1020242-7-455

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    36. IndyMac Residential Mortgage Backed Trust/ Series 2006 L3, 10 K, for 03/29/2007, Ex.33.2 filed on 03/30/2007 at 10:03 AM ET, SEC File #333-132042-36, Accession # 1020242-7-457

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    37. IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Trust/Series 2006-H3, 10 K, for 03/30/2007, Ex.33.2 filed on 04/02/2007 at 8:42 AM ,ET, SEC File # 333-132042-37, Accession # 1020242-7-524

    Compliance Report

    38. IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FLX 1, 10K, 03/29/2007, Ex. 33.2, filed on 03/30/2007 at 10:05 AM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-38, Accession # 1020242-7-453

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    39. Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-A12, 10K, for 03/29/2007, Ex.33.2 filed on 03/30/2007 at 10:15 AM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-39, Accession # 1020242-7-472

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    40. IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR-14, 10K for 03/29/2007, Ex.33.2 filed on 03/29/2007 at 5:43 PM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-40, Accession # 1020242-7-438

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    41. IndyMac INDA Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR3, 10K, for 03/29/2007, Ex.33.2 filed on 03/30/2007 at 10:06 AM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-41, Accession # 1020242-7-452

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    42. Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-A13, 10K, for 03/29/2007 at 10:09 AM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-42, Accession # 1020242-473

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    43. IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR-33, 10K, for 03/29/2007 Ex.33.2 filed on 03/29/2007 at 5:51 PM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-43, Accession # 1020242-7-447

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    44. Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-R2, 10K, for 03/30/2007, Ex.33.2 filed on 03/30/2007 at 5:56 PM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-44, Accession # 1020242-7-515

    Annual Report, Article of Incorporation

    45. Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006 A-15, 10K, for 03/29/2007, Ex.33.2 filed on 03/30/2007 at 10:20 AM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-45, Accession # 1020242-7-475

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    46. Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006 A-14 CB, 10K, for 03/29/2007, Ex.33.2 filed on 03/30/2007 at 10:09 AM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-46, Accession # 1020242-7-474
    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    47. Indy Mac MSB Inc. FWP Indy Mac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR-16 on 11/09/2006, filed on 11/09/2006 at 5:28 PM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-47, Accession # 905148-6-6647

    Free Writing Prospectus

    48. IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR35, 10K, for 03/29/2007 Ex.33.2 filed on 03/29/2007 at 6:37 PM ET, SEC File #333-132042-48, Accession # 1020242-7-448

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    49. IndyMac Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR-35, 10K, for 03/29/2007, Ex.33.2 filed on 3/30/07 at 6:37 PM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-49, Accession # 1020242-7-448

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    50. IndyMac/ NDX of Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR-37, 10K, Ex.33.2 filed on 03/30/2007 at 10:03 AM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-50, Accession # 1020242-7-458

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    51. IndyMac Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR33 , 424B5 on 11/30/2006, filed on 11/30/2006 at 1:26 PM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-51, Accession # 891092-6-3665

    424B5 Prospectus

    52. IndyMac / NDA Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR-1, 10K, for 12/31/2007, Ex.33.2 filed on 03/28/2008 at 5:42 PM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-52, Accession # 1020242-8-252

    List of All Series

    53. Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-AR-16, 10K, for 03/28/2007, Ex. 33.2 filed on 03/30/2007 SEC File # 333-132042-53, Accession # 1020242-7-476

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    54. IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR-41,6 filings for 01/03/2007-06/12/2007, filed on 03/30/2007 at 10:01 AM ET, SEC File # 333-132042-54, Accession # 1020242-7-460

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74

    55. IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR-39, 6 Filings 01/03/2007-03/30/2007, filed on 03/29/2007 at 8:05 PM ET, SEC File # 333-132092-55, Accession # 1020242-7-459

    Loan # Sale # Sale Name Amount of sale
    6762 665 ITF INDX 2006 AR4 03/31/2006 $ 258,214.28
    6762 666 ITF INDX 2006, AR5 03/30/2006 $ 378,000.00
    6762 374 ITF LX5 2006 16N, 09/29/2006 $ 199,489.59
    6762 4108 4108 LMT 2006-9 12/29/2006 $ 287,726.73
    3696 680 INDX 2006 AR15 Settled 05/30/2006 $ 213, 520.00
    3696 672 INDX 2006, AR6 04/28/2006 $ 572,688.74
    Please help me in resolving this puzzle

    Thanks and Be Safe

  13. Raja

    I cannot advise – I am not an attorney. Sold 48 times to 81 trusts?? Impossible – as once a loan is removed from trust, it is a default debt – and cannot be securitized. Some scratch and dent buyers may set up “trusts” – but these are not pass-through security trusts since the underlying asset has already been written off.

    Your trust (the one they use now and in violation of REMIC and PSA) is one of those trusts set up as a “shell” to conceal sale of mortgage loans to security underwriter’s parent. These trusts were never a “true sale” because they violate conditions that the “seller” may not be affiliated, or maintain continued control, over the assets in a true sale. Many articles available about this – but complicated.

    Here is why yours was likely not a true sale – from the prospectus.:

    GENERAL

    The depositor, IndyMac MBS, Inc. will purchase the mortgage loans in the mortgage pool from the sponsor, IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. (“INDYMAC BANK”), pursuant to a pooling and servicing agreement dated as of the cut-off date among IndyMac Bank, as seller and servicer, the depositor and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee, and will cause the mortgage loans to be assigned to the trustee for the benefit of holders of the certificates (such mortgage loans, the “MORTGAGE LOANS”).

    Section 2.01. Conveyance of Mortgage Loans.

    (a) The Seller, concurrently with the execution and delivery of this Agreement, hereby transfers to the Depositor, without recourse, all the interest of the Seller in each Mortgage Loan,

    METHOD OF DISTRIBUTION

    Subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the underwriting agreement between the depositor and Lehman Brothers Inc. (“LEHMAN” or the
    “UNDERWRITER”), the depositor has agreed to sell the Offered Certificates to the Underwriter and the Underwriter has agreed to purchase from the depositor the Offered Certificates.”

    From me –
    1)The Depositor (Indy Mac subsidiary) purchases the loans from itself (the sponsor and seller – also an Indy Mac subsidiary). In true sales – it must be “bankruptcy remote” – which is the purpose – and cannot be bankruptcy remote if seller retains control – as Indy Mac, in this case, does.
    2) Under Conveyance – they just say “transfer” – do not even say purchase – as stated in “general”.
    3) All certificates to Trust are sold to Lehman Brothers Inc (security underwriter)- subsidiary of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. – the parent. Thus, loans were really sold to the parent LBH Inc. with servicing rights retained by Indy Mac. Remember, securitization is simply the removal of (note) receivables to off-balance sheet conduit – and in the accounting process, converts the loans to “securities”. Once loan is in default – it is the parent (LBH) that writes it off – and removes non-performing receivable pass-through from securitized trust “pool” via the “servicer” – in this case Indy. .

    What happened next is the problem. Given your history and the players involved – it is possible that you may never find who really owns collection rights (your current creditor) – but it is not Deutsche.

    Bankruptcy courts are stricter as to proof of claim.

    I am not an attorney as this is not meant to be construed as legal advise but only for educational purposes.

  14. ANONYMOUS
    Thanks for the response. My loan was sold more than 48 times in different trusts for more than 91 Million. I obtained the sale record from the SEC. I submitted the entire sale record under various trusts, with the affidavit to the judge.Then the attorney for Indy Mac filed motion to substitute Deutsche Bank and produced the fake, fabricated assignment in violation of PSA and REMIC, where they mentioned only One Trust ” Indy Mac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006 AR8″ I have PSA and Prospectus and their assignment is Fake with Notary misconduct and fake signatures. My email is “therajafamily@gmail.com” . I am fighting these since 2007.These days I am preparing the motion to strike and request for sanctions. Please advise.

  15. Raja

    Could be wrong – but I know of no joint venture between Indy Mac and Deutsche Bank. Assignments to Deutsche Bank, trustee are simply invalid – Deutsche Bank, as trustee, is never the creditor.

    However, Deutsche Bank Securities, as security underwriter, is on some Indy Mac securitizations, which means Deutsche Bank AG purchased the loans at origination. Have to know the Trust.

  16. Conspiracy of Banks Rigging States Came With Crash

    http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=axH24KWxjVDE&pos=10

  17. ANONYMOUS,

    Please throw some light on the Deutsche Bank(King of Thieves) with the joint venture of Indy Mac Family.

  18. usedkarguy

    Mortgages were sold with “servicing retained” and “servicing released.” Most Wells Fargo originated mortgages were “servicing retained.” Entities like Wells Fargo and Countrywide were not actual investment bank/commercial bank security underwriters (although they were wanna -be). This also applies to Angelo’s “Countrywide Securities” – which was likely just marketing of distressed mortgage loans not to be securities (Triple rated) for Mortgage- Backed Securities.

    Appears mortgage loan, in your case was sold to Citigroup, and Wells Fargo likely retained servicing rights. But would like to see exact name of Trust – and Depositor.

    Really sorry about foreclosure. May want to look at rules for “fraud on the court” or independant action for “fraud on the court.” You need to find an attorney in your state. If foreclosure has not gone through – may want to ask for stay.

    Neidermeyer

    Wells Fargo took many routes – have to know the trust.
    Discovery depends on your judge.

    We have a right to know our real creditor. We were given this right through FDCPA – but must know the creditor to know whether there is compliance. And, we are given definition of creditor by the May 2009 TILA Amendment.

    Not only are we losing homes to fraud, we are being denied the opportunity to negotiate directly with our creditor.

    My best to both of you.

    I am not an attorney and this is not meant to be construed as legal advise and only for educational purposes.

  19. From your post:

    “AND then of course there are the fund managers who may or may not have overlooked, through negligence of intentionally, the quality of these investments. They may have received some sort of perks or kickback for investing in these dog-eared securities. Since the manager is in charge, he or she would be required to ask for things that they really don’t want to hear about.”

    THIS ( http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601010&sid=axH24KWxjVDE ) article in today’s Bloomberg News Service (Conspiracy of Banks Rigging States Came With Crash) seems to confirm your hypothesis.

  20. ANONYMOUS, how would the chain of title go with Wells Fargo Home Mortgage as originator, Wells Fargo sponsor, custodian, administrator, servicer, special, master, HSBC Trustee, Bear Stearns counterparty, Citigroup Global as Securities underwriter?

    Neidermeyer, we need to stay in touch. I am also seeking to get HAMPed at the solicitation of Wells Fargo (upon advice of counsel) after litigating ten months and losing to a judgment of foreclosure. They seem a bit confused when I call.

  21. Types of Investment Scams

    Investment scams can take many forms—and fraudsters can turn on a dime when it comes to developing new pitches or come-ons for the latest fraud. But while the wrapper or hook might change, the most common securities frauds tend to fall into the following general schemes:

    Pyramid Schemes—where fraudsters claim that they can turn a small investment into large profits within a short period of time—but in reality participants make money solely by recruiting new participants into the program. The fraudsters behind these schemes typically go to great lengths to make their programs appear to be legitimate multi-level marketing schemes. Pyramid schemes eventually fall apart when it becomes impossible to recruit new participants, which can happen quickly as illustrated below.

    Stage Participants Notes
    Level 1 8 Each participant recruits 8 new investors
    Level 2 64 Level 2 pays off Level 1—and so on
    Level 3 512
    Level 4 4,096
    Level 5 32,768
    Level 6 262,144
    Level 7 2,097,152
    Level 8 16,777,216
    Level 9 134,217,728
    Level 10 1,073,741,824 More than triple the US population
    Level 11 8,589,934,592 More than the world’s population

    Ponzi Schemes—in which a central fraudster or “hub” collects money from new investors and uses it to pay purported returns to earlier-stage investors—rather than investing or managing the money as promised. The scam is named after Charles Ponzi, a 1920s-era con criminal who persuaded thousands to invest in a complex price arbitrage scheme involving postage stamps. Like pyramid schemes, Ponzi schemes require a steady stream of incoming cash to stay afloat. But unlike pyramid schemes, investors in a Ponzi scheme typically do not have to recruit new investors to earn a share of “profits.” Ponzi schemes tend to collapse when the fraudster at the hub can no longer attract new investors or when too many investors attempt to get their money out—for example, during turbulent economic times.

    http://www.finra.org/Investors/ProtectYourself/InvestorAlerts/FraudsAndScams/P118010

  22. ECONOMIC GENOCIDE LEADS TO GENOCIDE.

    GOD BLESS AMERICA

  23. http://www.ag.ny.gov/online_forms/email_ag.jsp

    This is the link to send info to the Attorney General.
    I just sent all you guys wrote here.

    you are amazing!

  24. ANONYMOUS

    I like the way you peiced this together. You should be teaching classes. Your thoughts are helpful..Thanks

    BSE

  25. Anonymous,

    I LOVE YOUR REPLIES… Thanks!

    I’m in limbo now waiting for WFC/DB to act.. my lawyer is working a HAMP mod/cramdown and is demanding info that we all know WF will not be forthcoming with to force the issue.

    This 12/2006 loan is securitized and I have the CUSIP but my question is will these intermediary underwriting steps which included undocumented transfers ever be available in discovery? What route did WF loans (through their subprime Option One sub) take .. direct to WF? Through Bear?

    The fraud in underwriting is explosive material as is the forged doc scandal at LPS…

    Thanks for your comments ..

  26. Some important points from this article and after looking at Bear Stearns SEC filed documents.

    1) Bear Stearns purchased whole mortgage loans in bulk. Anyone out there have a sale/assignment to Bear Stears in their chain of title?? I do not think so.

    Bear Stearns SEC diagram of process actually shows that Bear Stearns subsidiary EMC Mortgage Corporation purchased the whole loans in bulk from Encore Credit Corporation (a junk debt buyer who Bear Stearns acquired in 2006).

    2) EMC (subsidiary) sells loans to off-balance sheet conduit – the “Depositor” – Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Inc. – or Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Inc. -both subsidiaries of Bear Stearns.

    In order to do this Bear Stearns removes the loan asset receivables from their balance sheet and sells to these offf-balance sheet conduit subsidiaries via EMC.

    3) Depositor sets up a Trust and sells all certificates to the Trust to Bear Stearns underwriter subsidiary – Bear Stearns & Co. Inc.

    4) Underwriter scrubs security certificates to get better rating and sells “pass through” of receivable certificates (now securities), either directly or repackaged into CDOs, to beneficiary security investors. In order to be a security, receivables must be current.

    A accounting “trick” has occurred (anyone remember Enron??) – the loan receivables are removed from on balance sheet to an off-balance sheet conduit subsidiary in the now converted form of “securities”. Bear Stearns does not have to disclose these “conduit” “securities” on balance sheet – and does not have to disclose that they purchased (and continue to own) the whole loans. The Note remains with Bear Stearns only receivables to the note are passed-through. But where is assignment/sale to Bear Stearns?? They did not do because Bear Stearns wanted to hide ownership via unreported off-balance sheet conduit.

    5) Bear Stearns hires “trustee” to oversee pass-through cash payments and Master Servicer (either their own subsidiary or another party for which Bear’s servicer subsidiary is sub-servicer) to collect loan payments. Servicer owns bottom tranche in Trust to which all non-performing loans are subordinated for removal from Trust (cannot have non-performing loan support a security).

    Whole loans remain with Bear Stearns – for which there is never a sale/assignment document.

    Fico scores are used for basis of ratings. Loans are scrubbed to reflect better FICO scores – which were likely false anyway since credit reports are loaded with errors to borrowers detriment. However, since loans came from junk debt buyer – Bear Stearns was assured high interest payments targeted to poor credit borrowers – who they knew would never be able to pay loans back. What an absurd concept to target high-interest loans to poor credit borrowers!! An the borrower thought their asset (home) was worth much more because of inflated appraisal.

    Mr. Cuomo is likely going to run for President in future. Need to send message to Mr. Cuomo that the borrower victims need to made whole from the fraud. If there are criminal actions on behalf of investor – there also has to be criminal actions on behalf of borrower.

    How about it Mr. Cuomo???

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