Weisband Commentary

Judge Holloway clearly took some giant steps forward in both clearly explaining the application of law with respect to standing. But I think she was comparing apples and oranges when she came to the conclusion that she should not impose restrictions on the right to foreclose that were “greater than” those imposed by state law.

The mistake, I believe, is that the standard she was using was non-judicial process, which by definition is private. She skipped over the part that counted. Arizona has a judicial foreclosure process and like every other state in the country, such process must conform with due process requirements that are the law of the land.

By finding that GMAC and MERS lacked standing but opining that they don’t have to establish ALL the requirements of real party in interest, she sent the inadvertent signal to pretender lenders that they can still use non-judicial foreclosure as a hail Mary pass over the requirements of due process under Federal and State constitutional law.

The underlying defect and theme of foreclosure litigation is that non-judicial process was not intended and cannot be used to sidestep due process.  The Judge should have compared the requirements of real party in interest to JUDICIAL foreclosures in Arizona and not the private contract of non-judicial foreclosure.

There she would have found that everything was in sync and that the pretender lenders don’t have the option of getting a pass (get out of jail free card) on due process. The inevitable final conclusion of this legal debate is simply that non-judicial process does not apply to securitized loans. We are not there yet, but we are moving closer every day.

16 Responses

  1. These are my opinions and not worth anything, since I don’t know anything anyway, so there is no way to give legal advice or act as an attorney if you don’t know anything in a capacity to be giving such advice or acting in such a manner. I publicly state I don’t know anything.

    An “unperfected” security interest is one in which the lender has a written document granting a security interest in the borrower’s collateral, but no public notice has been given of the lender’s security interest. The risk with an unperfected security interest is that a third party could come along and buy the collateral from the borrower without realizing that a lender had a security interest. In that event, the lender’s security interest is useless against the third party’s superior claim to the newly-purchased collateral. The only way a lender can protect against a third party purchase of the collateral is to “perfect” the security interest by making it a matter of public record. This is done in the case of mortgages by recording the mortgage (a mortgage is a fancy name for a security interest in real property) in the county recorder’s office.

    The bank or entity behind MERS is not perfected, they have not made their claim a matter of public record by Assignment and usually the assignment happens just prior to a foreclosure.

    We need to perfect our claim in the public, via a “fixture filing”.

    MERs is not a beneficiary nor does it hold legal title to the property. A ‘fixture filing’, filed in the county where the property is, could be a MERS Achilles heel. MERS has to file an Assignment prior to their foreclosure. Once a fixture filing is filed prior to the Assignment, the bank has to deal with any ‘perfected’ claim to the real property, ie ‘fixture’ (home), they are attempting to foreclose on.

    A fixture filing takes both a UCC-1 to select “Real Estate”, and a UCC1ad to select “fixture filing”.
    Collateral has to be described…it’s best to use their description for the real property as it is in the Deed or Mortgage, don’t change that legal description, and your description of the house, ie two story, three bedroom, brick exterior, etc.

    Deeds and foreclosures fall under UCC-9 Secured Transaction – which is a long, complicated, and confusing document. It takes a good book to explain what that section allows.

    Even though pretender lenders are violating a lot of UCC-9 s terms and are foreclosing non-judicially, they are following what ‘is’ allowed to get away with what is ‘not’ allowed.
    UCC-9 defines an Organization as a Person (among other things), it defines an Individual as not a Person. You need to know what a Person is. Chances are, your Deed or Mortgage, called you a Person when it stated your name.

    Their strength is the fact that they have a document filed in the public as initial evidence of their interest in the property, even if they don’t have the note.
    The rely on this public notice to railroad you in a non-judicial foreclosure.

    In my case, the pretender never did an assigment. As a result of a merger, a new entity was created, but they insist, they only changed their name. I have claimed identity theft with the credit agencies. I’ve never done business with this entity and there is no public document on file to show a relationship with this entity, so I am stating my identity has been stolen, until or unless they make something public as to their purported relationship with me. Prior to the merger, I had a relationship with an entity and it was public. Just like the current airline merger, a ‘new’ entity is created…it’s more than a mere name change. I have located the SEC filings that show more than a name change has happened. The layers of deception and the unlimited ability for a bank to create money ‘out of thin air’ will give them all the money they need to trespass against me, unlimited. It would allow them get away with theft of my home, if I didn’t protect my interest and file a document in the public that will show up when a title search is done. With both documents in the public, one is superior to the other, one is perfected, the other is unperfected.

    The title is clouded until the security interest claims are handled.
    It will be difficult to force an unlawful detainer on a person who’s filed an interest in the property in the public. (why is it called ‘unlawful’?)

    I filed a “fixture filing”. They told me to contact their law firm, I made first contact via a “to whom it may concern” letter. The firm got the letter on April 15. I then got my first letter from an attorney at the firm on May 1, and that first letter said I had until May 22, to request documents, but I also got a letter from the same attorney, on May 5th saying they were foreclosing on June 1. [So much for having until May 22nd, to request documents.]
    I keep all documents…I am using it as evidence for my claim with the attorney general of the state.
    In Texas they have to give 21 days notice of foreclosure, and the first day can include he day of filing in the county. I have to watch to see if they will file on May 12th, so far, nothing is filed.

    My fixture filing is a superior claim over any other claim by this entity who is not on my Deed of Trust and who is not filed in the public, nor has a real claim to the property.

    I refuse to go into a court and leave this up to an attorney or judge. If they want to take it to the streets (literally by doing a foreclosure sale, in the public, outside the doors of the courthouse), then I will deal with it in the public, too.

    If you feel like you have to ‘fight’, then your case may be weak.
    I am not fighting. There are no enemies.
    I am using the tools available to me to look out for my interest.
    They are using the same tools to support their fraudulent interest.

    We are losing because they are feeding us information and redirecting our energy in so many places. I read some of these posts that go into details about what they did with the papers after we signed. That’s too complicated to learn and to fight in court. That’s an entire system or process that is agreed upon by the parties participating in it. When I get back to my paper that I signed – the agreement we had – I can find a lot of things wrong, and that’s why I’m not fighting.
    I know what’s wrong, I read, I listen, I learn. I had to figure out what they had and how powerful it was, and I had to figure out how I can help myself. I had to know what they knew. I had to figure out what part of the UCC we were under so I could figure out what their rights were and what limitations they had.

    Read your state’s Statute of Frauds – a promise or agreement is not enforceable unless it’s in writing, a contract for the sale of real estate or affecting any interest in the real estate must be in writing.

    This fixture filing will show up in their title search. Debtor must Sign this document. There is no place for a signature on a UCC, but you can make a place to sign it anywhere.
    Debtor signature:

    Fixture filing needs two UCC forms, UCC1 and UCC1ad. One is marked for Real Estate, the other is marked for ‘fixture filing’. The clerk is not supposed to/nor going to give advice, they are just supposed to make sure the document is file-able. So if you forget to check a box or something, that’s not their job to tell you what you didn’t do, it’s their job to reject. When you get the right things selected and it’s file-able, they will accept it, but if you forget to write something in the collateral, or sign, or describe properly, or strengthen your claim with other wordings that are strong and undisputable, it’s not their job to tell you. It’s not their job to tell you it’s right or wrong. They accept it, charge you a fee, file it, and send you the original at the Debtor address.

    We’ll have to stop watching t.v. so much and start learning how to take care of ourselves. We did this to ourselves, by allowing someone else take over and create documents we signed, trusting they were trustworthy, and they knew we trusted them, so they did untrustworthy things.
    I did it, too.

    I could pay the entity, but it’s the principal of the thing. The principal is, what happens if I can’t pay, or if another entity comes up and states a claim, or someone in my family is harmed by their actions. I’m doing this to ‘learn’ what I need to learn, to keep my home when I know it’s mine and not theirs. I’ve done other things I haven’t mentioned that I know with absolute certainty this is ‘my home’ and no one has a lawful claim to it.

    You are doing as you promised, to protect the property from others who are stating a lawful claim to it, by filing a fixture filing to protect that property, from MERs and whoever they choose to assign it to when they try to take it from you.
    We all agree, if the holder of the note who had an interest secured (filed in the public) in the home, surfaced, we’d pay them. These foreclosures are occurring from other than holders of both the Note, and the Deed.

    We defend the property if we file a “fixture filing”. No amount of money that they can spend in the process, can get rid of your ‘perfected’ public claim to the property and the equity (including sweat equity) you have put into it while having possession, use, and time with it. They will have to talk to you if they want it, now. It’s unconscionable to take a persons home when they’ve put in 10, 20, 30 years and have equity.
    A “fixture filing” is public record of your secured interest in the physical home that sits on the real property they are trying to take, and they either have to go away, move your fixture (which they can’t, becaue it’s part of the property – that’s why it’s called a fixture) or recognize you have equity (real money equity / sweat equity / both) in that home and they have to deal with you. If they want it bad enough, they can pay for it with the unlimited funds they have access to.

    This may be a better remedy that going into a bankruptcy court.

    I don’t know, yet. From what I’ve tried to understand in UCC-9, a creditor, including a pretender has a statute of limitations of six years to collect a debt, so that may be how long they have to try to remove you from your property. A fixture filing by default is ‘temporary’ and lasts 5 years, and has to be continued within the six months “before” it expires or you lose the initial filing date. There is a way to make it permanent, but that’s beyond the scope of this comment. There’s a way to file again “in lieu of a continuation”, but that’s beyond the scope of this comment.
    We need something solid and better than bankruptcy to keep our home. Those who get modifications now and manage to put off a foreclosure can possibly find themselves in the same boat within the next 6 years, if their employer decides to rotate employed for unemployed or their salary is drastically reduced in the future due to some unforseen circumstances, like retirement or other.

    Search ‘legal’ definition of words like ‘lawfully” “seized’, “fee simple” – look for information on ‘fixture filing(you won’t find examples),’, ‘perfected and unperfected security interest’
    look at some Real Estate UCC filings in your county for an ‘idea’, there aren’t many that have used this filing to publicly, show an interest in their home, I believe its because we have been uneducated to its uses and its power in this situation.
    A properly filed fixture filing can protect your home and it’s contents from a trustee in a bankruptcy, so imagine what it can do in a situation of a foreclosure.

    All of this is my opinions and not worth anything, since I don’t know anything.

  2. Start with asking the attorneys who they really represent. This is a big problem. Real party in interest, a long-term focus, is irrelevant if the attorneys do not represent the party they claim to represent.

    How to fix?? Do not know – because judges “buy” what attorneys set forth – without question- and without valid discovery.

  3. @ Willow

    Two well said posts and right on point!

  4. As to all issues regarding a financial interest by judges:

    State courts are funded by taxpayer money and fees generated by the courts for filings, fines, and so forth. This would include recording fees imposed by the County Recorder’s office for the recording of documents because most, if not all, County Recorders are part of the court system. When MERS stepped in as a private recording system, they circumvented the County Recorder’s office and effectively denied the court system of recording fees.

    If any Judge sitting anywhere in this country who is wondering why his court house is falling apart, maintenance isn’t being done, supplies are not being bought, his staff is cut, his salary isn’t being paid, he needs to look no farther than MERS and the Mortgage Meltdown.

    Foreclosing on homes denies the state of steady property tax revenue to fund the State’s obligations. Out of work citizens denies the state of income tax revenues. Circumventing the County Recorder’s offices takes money from the court’s accounts to fund the court system. In turn, it under cuts the ability of courts to do the job they are assigned to do. Therefore, it would seem that the Judiciary and the State has a huge economic interest in regulating these pirates. As money is being siphoned off and diverted elsewhere (Wall Street), the life blood of the Courts and the State is being drained.

    All causes have effects and all effects have causes. Follow the money! If the Governors, State Lawmakers, Jurists, and the AG’s office can’t figure out the obvious implications of this melt down, can’t figure out that it is in their best interest to regulate this foreclosure mess, then they do not deserve their jobs.

    The objective here by Wall Street is both sinister and obvious. Undermining the State’s ability and the Court’s ability to function as intended by siphoning off fees and taxes and funneling those revenues to international banking cartels causes the State and the fair administration of Justice to wither. Since nature abhors a vacuum, without the State’s ability to administer the functions of the state and the courts ability to administrate justice, a democracy (however imperfect) can not continue and the rise of an Aristocracy, in what ever form it takes, is the only outcome.

    If the Court’s can not see or understand that it is in their own BEST INTEREST to shut these leaches down; that they, too, have a huge stake in the outcome, then they themselves have no one to blame for the disintegration of the Justice system.

    If they are overwhelmed by the onslaught of litigation in foreclosure cases and can not handle all the claims, then they better get a fucking clue as to why this is happening because the onslaught of litigation itself is the CLUE; that injustice is being done not only to the homeowners but to the State in which these courts reside and to the Court system itself, of which that are an integral part. The entire foreclosure mess IS a healthy, safety and welfare issue for the state and the fair administration of justice.

    It would behove both the Federal and State Courts to get on the same page and start deciding these cases with one voice and for their own damn benefit. Shit rolls down hill and they are not immuned from the fall out. What ever directly affects the homeowner affects the State and whatever affects the State affects the Courts.

  5. I’ve got a question for Neil and his Legal Beagles.

    1. If the court holds that it doesn’t matter where the funds come from to fund the loan does it matter where the funds come from to satisfy the obligation? If Joe gives money to Fred to loan to Bob, can Bob get money from Aunt Sallie to pay the loan?

    2. It seems to me, under an Equal Protection argument, that if the courts are going to protect the lenders on one side of the equation as to where their funds come from to fund the loans, then they also must protect the borrow on the other side of the equation as to where the funds come from to pay the obligation, as well. No?

    3. If the holder of the note can assign his right, title and interest in the property and thereby assign to third parties the right to receive funds from the borrower, then by the same token, the borrower can assign his obligation to pay on the note to third parties, as well. No?

    4. If the note is assigned to third parties, does it matter at what stage of this chain the obligation is satisfied?

    5. Does the payment by the third parties to the assignees have to be intentional? Do those third parties have to intend to pay the obligation or can third parties unintentionally pay the obligation? It seems to me, that intention or unintention to pay, has little impact on the net effect of satisfying the obligation.

    6. If the securitization of the note has no effect on the borrower’s obligation to pay, then by the same token, under Equal Protection, any form of payment on the note by undisclosed third parties, whether intentional or not, from any source, can satisfy the obligation.

    7. If, by color of title, the subsequent assignees are not obligated to prove an unbroken chain of right, title and interest in the note, then, by the same token under Equal Protection and by color of title, the borrower has no obligation to show an unbroken chain of payment.

    8. If an assignee steps in to the shoes of the original lender and can thereby enforce the obligation, then, by the same token, under Equal Protection, any third party who paid any assignee steps into the shoes of the borrower and thereby satisfy the obligation. As such, any insurance paid for default, would have extinguished the obligation since the purpose of the insurance was to protect the assignee from default. If that’s true, then it seems the only person or entity that would have a right to reimbursement would be the insurance carrier since the assignee has already been compensated for the default and the carrier is out the money it paid on the policy because of said default.

    9. To force the borrower to continue to pay on an obligation to any assignee which has been satisfied by a third party through insurance or any other method of payment would constitute unjust enrichment. If the assignee collected funds, in any form, that insured against default and that claim was paid, then the assignee can not come back to the court and claim the obligation wasn’t paid. That would constitute a fraud on the court and unjust enrichment as the assignee is precluded from collecting twice on the same obligation. Thus, the common law concept of “latches” applies. Once the assignee is paid, from whatever source, on the default, his part in the story is finished and he is barred from further action for collection on an obligation that, in effect, has been extinguished. At this point, the intention of the parties to satisfy the obligation is irrelevant. The effect was the same. The obligation has been satisfied.

    10. Thus, if the foregoing is true, then the neither the borrower who receives his home free and clear nor the subsequent assignee who has received proceeds from any source connected to the obligation, has been unjustly enriched. The insurance carrier assumes the risk of default, and it would seem, has collected premiums from the assignees or investors, to ensure against default. So, effectively, the carrier has been paid for the policy, as well. The carrier may well have a cause of action against the borrower for the default that triggered the claim, but I don’t know enough about insurance law at this point to know for sure.

    Your thoughts and comments Neil would be appreciated.


  6. A Deed of Trust/Mortgage is a security interest that is filed by a mortgage company instead of a UCC financing statement (UCC-1).

    Mers’ name is in the Deed/Mortgage (security interest) but they have no real interest secured by the real proper…so their filing is really fraudulent. The only way to challenge the fraud is in court.

    When they try to foreclose, and do a title search, and encumbrance makes it difficult for them to do anything with the property, until they pay the encumbrance.

    If people put sweat equity into their home, and pay for upkeep and replacement appliances, decorated/painted walls, remodeled rooms, and other improvements and the yard work, etc..,

    Maybe there could be some superior lien (encumbrance) filed, that is recorded in real estate records locking up the property and making it harder to foreclose.

    They have to clear that lien before they can take the home.

    Private contracts cannot be challenged. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be made.

    They use the word encumbrance in their Deed/Mortgage document.

    Legal definition of encumbrance (incumbrance) n. a general term for any claim or lien on a parcel of real property. These include: mortgages, deeds of trust, recorded abstracts of judgment, unpaid real property taxes, tax liens, mechanic’s liens, easements, and water or timber rights. While the owner has title, any encumbrance is usually on record (with the County Recorder or Recorder of Deeds) and must be paid for at some point.

    I read in this Nebraska link about encumbrances and UCC-9 (Secured Transactions)

    Is there a type of remedy in there somewhere.
    Is there a remedy in an encumbrance that is superior to their encumbrance?

    I’ve seen fixture filings on water treatment systems, and air conditioning units by companies trying to make sure they get paid in a foreclosure, since it’s part of the property, once installed. There must be something to this.

    Any ideas?

    Is there anybody who understands UCC that can comment or point us in a direction?

  7. the reason is obvious judges have a financial interest in all foreclosures, 5 U.S.C. § 8440a and 5 U.S.C. § 8440b are Federal laws which invest in them through TSPs. they are continuingly relying on the non-judicial process because they don’t want to get their hands dirty. and what about a jury isn’t that a part of due process?

  8. Recent testimony from Jamie Galbraith before the Subcommittee on Crime on the role that fraud played in the financial crisis:

    Statement by James K. Galbraith, Lloyd M. Bentsen, jr. Chair in Government/Business Relations, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, The University of Texas at Austin, before the Subcommittee on Crime, Senate Judiciary Committee, May 4, 2010: Chairman Specter, Ranking Member Graham, Members of the Subcommittee, as a former member of the congressional staff it is a pleasure to submit this statement for your record.

    I write to you from a disgraced profession. Economic theory, as widely taught since the 1980s, failed miserably to understand the forces behind the financial crisis. Concepts including “rational expectations,” “market discipline,” and the “efficient markets hypothesis” led economists to argue that speculation would stabilize prices, that sellers would act to protect their reputations, that caveat emptor could be relied on, and that widespread fraud therefore could not occur. Not all economists believed this – but most did.

    Thus the study of financial fraud received little attention. Practically no research institutes exist; collaboration between economists and criminologists is rare; in the leading departments there are few specialists and very few students. Economists have soft- pedaled the role of fraud in every crisis they examined, including the Savings & Loan debacle, the Russian transition, the Asian meltdown and the dot.com bubble. They continue to do so now. At a conference sponsored by the Levy Economics Institute in New York on April 17, the closest a former Under Secretary of the Treasury, Peter Fisher, got to this question was to use the word “naughtiness.” This was on the day that the SEC charged Goldman Sachs with fraud.

    There are exceptions. A famous 1993 article entitled “Looting: Bankruptcy for Profit,” by George Akerlof and Paul Romer, drew exceptionally on the experience of regulators who understood fraud. The criminologist-economist William K. Black of the University of Missouri-Kansas City is our leading systematic analyst of the relationship between financial crime and financial crisis. Black points out that accounting fraud is a sure thing when you can control the institution engaging in it: “the best way to rob a bank is to own one.” The experience of the Savings and Loan crisis was of businesses taken over for the explicit purpose of stripping them, of bleeding them dry. This was established in court: there were over one thousand felony convictions in the wake of that debacle. Other useful chronicles of modern financial fraud include James Stewart’s Den of Thieves on the Boesky-Milken era and Kurt Eichenwald’s Conspiracy of Fools, on the Enron scandal. Yet a large gap between this history and formal analysis remains.

    Dr. James K. Galbraith — Professional Fed Killer >>

    How The Federal Reserve Bought The Economics Profession >>

    Formal analysis tells us that control frauds follow certain patterns. They grow rapidly, reporting high profitability, certified by top accounting firms. They pay exceedingly well. At the same time, they radically lower standards, building new businesses in markets previously considered too risky for honest business. In the financial sector, this takes the form of relaxed – no, gutted – underwriting, combined with the capacity to pass the bad penny to the greater fool. In California in the 1980s, Charles Keating realized that an S&L charter was a “license to steal.” In the 2000s, sub-prime mortgage origination was much the same thing. Given a license to steal, thieves get busy. And because their performance seems so good, they quickly come to dominate their markets; the bad players driving out the good.

    The complexity of the mortgage finance sector before the crisis highlights another characteristic marker of fraud. In the system that developed, the original mortgage documents lay buried – where they remain – in the records of the loan originators, many of them since defunct or taken over. Those records, if examined, would reveal the extent of missing documentation, of abusive practices, and of fraud. So far, we have only very limited evidence on this, notably a 2007 Fitch Ratings study of a very small sample of highly-rated RMBS, which found “fraud, abuse or missing documentation in virtually every file.” An efforts a year ago by Representative Doggett to persuade Secretary Geithner to examine and report thoroughly on the extent of fraud in the underlying mortgage records received an epic run-around.

    When sub-prime mortgages were bundled and securitized, the ratings agencies failed to examine the underlying loan quality. Instead they substituted statistical models, in order to generate ratings that would make the resulting RMBS acceptable to investors. When one assumes that prices will always rise, it follows that a loan secured by the asset can always be refinanced; therefore the actual condition of the borrower does not matter. That projection is, of course, only as good as the underlying assumption, but in this perversely-designed marketplace those who paid for ratings had no reason to care about the quality of assumptions. Meanwhile, mortgage originators now had a formula for extending loans to the worst borrowers they could find, secure that in this reverse Lake Wobegon no child would be deemed below average even though they all were. Credit quality collapsed because the system was designed for it to collapse.

    A third element in the toxic brew was a simulacrum of “insurance,” provided by the market in credit default swaps. These are doomsday instruments in a precise sense: they generate cash-flow for the issuer until the credit event occurs. If the event is large enough, the issuer then fails, at which point the government faces blackmail: it must either step in or the system will collapse. CDS spread the consequences of a housing-price downturn through the entire financial sector, across the globe. They also provided the means to short the market in residential mortgage-backed securities, so that the largest players could turn tail and bet against the instruments they had previously been selling, just before the house of cards crashed.

    Latter-day financial economics is blind to all of this. It necessarily treats stocks, bonds, options, derivatives and so forth as securities whose properties can be accepted largely at face value, and quantified in terms of return and risk. That quantification permits the calculation of price, using standard formulae. But everything in the formulae depends on the instruments being as they are represented to be. For if they are not, then what formula could possibly apply?

    An older strand of institutional economics understood that a security is a contract in law. It can only be as good as the legal system that stands behind it. Some fraud is inevitable, but in a functioning system it must be rare. It must be considered – and rightly – a minor problem. If fraud – or even the perception of fraud – comes to dominate the system, then there is no foundation for a market in the securities. They become trash. And more deeply, so do the institutions responsible for creating, rating and selling them. Including, so long as it fails to respond with appropriate force, the legal system itself.

    Control frauds always fail in the end. But the failure of the firm does not mean the fraud fails: the perpetrators often walk away rich. At some point, this requires subverting, suborning or defeating the law. This is where crime and politics intersect. At its heart, therefore, the financial crisis was a breakdown in the rule of law in America.

    Ask yourselves: is it possible for mortgage originators, ratings agencies, underwriters, insurers and supervising agencies NOT to have known that the system of housing finance had become infested with fraud? Every statistical indicator of fraudulent practice – growth and profitability – suggests otherwise. Every examination of the record so far suggests otherwise. The very language in use: “liars’ loans,” “ninja loans,” “neutron loans,” and “toxic waste,” tells you that people knew. I have also heard the expression, “IBG,YBG;” the meaning of that bit of code was: “I’ll be gone, you’ll be gone.”

    If doubt remains, investigation into the internal communications of the firms and agencies in question can clear it up. Emails are revealing. The government already possesses critical documentary trails — those of AIG, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve. Those documents should be investigated, in full, by competent authority and also released, as appropriate, to the public. For instance, did AIG knowingly issue CDS against instruments that Goldman had designed on behalf of Mr. John Paulson to fail? If so, why? Or again: Did Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac appreciate the poor quality of the RMBS they were acquiring? Did they do so under pressure from Mr. Henry Paulson? If so, did Secretary Paulson know? And if he did, why did he act as he did? In a recent paper, Thomas Ferguson and Robert Johnson argue that the “Paulson Put” was intended to delay an inevitable crisis past the election. Does the internal record support this view?

    Let us suppose that the investigation that you are about to begin confirms the existence of pervasive fraud, involving millions of mortgages, thousands of appraisers, underwriters, analysts, and the executives of the companies in which they worked, as well as public officials who assisted by turning a Nelson’s Eye. What is the appropriate response?

    Some appear to believe that “confidence in the banks” can be rebuilt by a new round of good economic news, by rising stock prices, by the reassurances of high officials – and by not looking too closely at the underlying evidence of fraud, abuse, deception and deceit. As you pursue your investigations, you will undermine, and I believe you may destroy, that illusion.

    But you have to act. The true alternative is a failure extending over time from the economic to the political system. Just as too few predicted the financial crisis, it may be that too few are today speaking frankly about where a failure to deal with the aftermath may lead.

    In this situation, let me suggest, the country faces an existential threat. Either the legal system must do its work. Or the market system cannot be restored. There must be a thorough, transparent, effective, radical cleaning of the financial sector and also of those public officials who failed the public trust. The financiers must be made to feel, in their bones, the power of the law. And the public, which lives by the law, must see very clearly and unambiguously that this is the case. Thank you.

  9. @ angry and not taking it

    Using all caps when texting or email is old school.

    It doesn’t mean they’re shouting. Some do it just because it’s easier to read with old eyes.

    Now when it comes to legal docs, all caps refers to your straw man or the corporate entity created by the federal and state governments.

    That’s why all your bills and legal docs ur name is in all caps.

    They can’t contract with a living person.

    Do a google search.

    All the best

  10. THE A MAN..
    ” take it to the streets” – what else is left? The courts make it clear ..ITS JUST US.
    btw whats with all CAPS? its ok with me if your SHOUTING. wtf we’ve quite toooooooooooooooo long!

  11. Aloha guys,
    Interesting case. If you read down a little, this judge actually sites my case when I challanged Countrywides standing. We really thought we had this one put away but Judge Faris allowed Countrywide to let Fannie Mae ratify. We are moving for a motion to vacate because he verbally granted Countrywides motion for summary judgment but questioned their standing. Countrywide introduced new evidence after the judges verbal granting and during the MOD stage, which convinced him that they were a real party in interest, FRCP 17.

    We are going to try to argue that we did not have a fair opportunity to defend the evidence they submitted, which by the way, and based on this decision, would have burned them.




  13. this was a “stay relief ” decision . only.
    the point being missed is that for ” stay relief” to require a greater burden of proof, than foreclose would be absurd , the right to foreclose was not addressed or before the court, so a ruling re; foreclosure would have been inappropriate if procedure has anything to do with it. stay relief is a very narrow procedure most judges will not step outside the lines of with other matters not specific to “stay relief’.
    “but opining that they don’t have to establish ALL the requirements of real party in interest” was averted falling back on a colorable claim only as far as “stay relief” was concerned, this was not the court doc re the decision so i cant tell who’s comment the following was made by-
    “In this case, however, the evidence does not demonstrate that the Note and DOT were transferred to the Trust, and, without that evidence, there is no demonstration that GMAC is the servicer of the Note.
    if that comment is correct then it appears to me its not all that complicated why the judge ruled as she did.

  14. Even if they had all their docs in a row, wouldn’t the issue at that point be the splitting of the note from the DOT and now you would raise the UCC3 issues and the fact the the note is no longer a note and a host of other issues?

  15. Well said! Hope that day arrives soon !!!

  16. This is excellent. Thanks!

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