Follow the Trail —Don’t get lost in the documents


See for Deutsch bank references Prospectus offered all over the world: Anyone who had a Deed of Trust with: Indymac, Wells Fargo, Countrywide, GMAC, Ocwen, American Home, Residential Funding Company, Washington Mutual Bank, BofA, and many others you might want to check this link out. SHARPS%20CDO%20II_16.08.07_9347

Editor’s Note: The only thing I would add is that the obligation arose when the borrower executed a note, but the creditor got a securitized bond with different terms, deriving its value from your note and thousands of others. Once you realize that the obligation is NOT the same as the Note, which is only EVIDENCE of the obligation, and that the MORTGAGE is NOT the obligation, it is only incident to the note, THEN you will understand that following the money means following the obligation, not the note or the mortgage. And figuring out what effect there was on the obligation at each step that the note was transferred, bought or paid, is the key to understanding whether the note became a negotiable instrument, and if it did, if it retained that status as a negotiable instrument.

FROM Jan van Eck

to foreclosurefight:

What you are missing in your attempt to analyze this is that you are trying to follow the “mortgage,” not the Note. the reason you are doing this is that only the “mortgage,” as the Security Instrument, is being recorded on the land records – so it is all you get to see.

the reason your adversaries, whoever they really are, “withdrew” from the relief from Stay Motion in the BK Court is that they do not have the Note. Somebody else does. And you have no clue as to who that is.

You have to start by determining what has happened to the Note, and how the Indorsements on the Note flow. And you have not seen the Note, not in years, so the raw truth is that you have no clue.

the “mortgage” never went into any “Trust.” Mortgages do not go into trusts. Only the Note (“maybe”) went into a trust – and only if it had proper Indorsement. Since Deutsche is involved, you can safely bet that it did not. Deutsche is NOTORIOUS for perpetrating fraud on the Courts and by fabricating documents. You may assume that EVERYTHING that Deutsche shows up with is a fraud, and has been fraudulently fabricated, typically in their offices on Liberty Street in Downtown Manhattan NY.

What is missing in your convoluted chain of title is that there was a ton of other parties involved in setting up that “Trust”, including some Delaware sham entity known as the “Depositor,” and then another sham known as the “Seller,” and more. When you burrow through that Prospectus you will find those entities listed. Now you have to dig out the Note, and find if those entities are individually and sequentially listed on the Note by consecutive Indorsements. Since Deutsche had their sticky fingers in the pie, you already know that they did not.

What State are you in? Yes, you need new counsel. You should never have gotten into this with old counsel.

You can still defeat them, but you probably will have to go file in District (Federal ) Court. You will have to sue Deutsche. Think in terms of suing them in the USDC for the Sou.Distr. NY, in White Plains, NY. Now you are not tangled up in the State-Fed politics of your local judges.

You cannot ask for Quiet title as you are asking for that in the State Court. You have to go in with entirely new grounds or they will not hear your case. So you sue them for fraud in interstate commerce. Try the “Commerce Clause” in the US Constitution (Amendment 16? I forget), to try to get “jurisdiction.” You get “venue” easily as Deutsche Bank is in NY. You do not need to show up; you just file and do your papers by mail. If yo ask for enough money, e.g. 40 million, then DB has something to start worrying about.

Right now, DB has no downside. If they lose, all they lose is some paper on some worthless piece of property in some state that is flooded with empty foreclosed houses that nobody can sell. So what do they care? DB probably does not even know or care that your lawsuit is going on; you are just dealing with lawyers that are running up their tab with DB, and DB has so many tabs that they do not try to keep track of it all. So you have to expose them to some serious hurt. A gigantic lawsuit is a good place to start.

You may assume that everything DB and those attys produce is utterly fraudulent. I have seen documents produced where the entire Trust Agreement was fabricated, and notarized by a notary who did not even get his first commission until two years after he swore that the parties were standing in front of him. Welcome to Wall Street banks – the international predator banks.

Besides Deutsche, Credit Suisse is also notorious for this type of flagrant fraud upon our Courts.

25 Responses


    We had an Unlawful Detainer Hearing this morning for which I was fully prepared to defend against Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee their capacity to sue, service of process issues, fraudulent documents, etc.

    Get this…

    At the beginning of the hearing…their “Attorney” asked the Judge to DISMISS THEIR OWN EVICTION CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE…


    When/if they do decide to refile I will be fully prepared to argue their capacity to sue, etc.

    I have them by the balls as they are not even Registered with our Secretary of State to do business; nor are they registered with the Department of Commerce…


    Eventually they will tie themselves in knots that they can’t get out of!!!

  2. Foreclosure Radar’s data is highly suspect as their publicly stated methodology for tracking sales rather than the actual foreclosures in rem appears flawed. They have an overview of those pending foreclosures that they can locate, but their database has a variety of data drops, inaccurate lien data, wrong assessors data and more. Hard to call them accurate or reliable when their paying customers receive such poor quality data service.

  3. forfighter: They can perform many of the functions within the trust, including servicing, master and special servicing, custodian, securities administrator, sponsor, depositor, etc. They need an arms length seller (Securities Underwriter) and an arms-length trustee and counterparty. Problem is, none of these relationships are true “arms-length” parties, they are co-conspirators.

  4. How can Ameriquest act as the Originator, Seller, and Sponsor according to the Prospectus for our particular “Trust”???

    If Ameriquest is acting in all of these capacities, and assigning to Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc. as “Depositor”, then is this even a “True Sale” and how does one attack this issue???

  5. After reading Neil Garfield, article of Deutsche Bank,I see the mortgage never went into the trust only the note. i wounder if in my bankruptcy I should change my filing to read Non bank,instead of creditor or lender, as I would not be conveying the sense that this is a legitmate loan, or that the opposition is a party of interest, seeing I’m in a securitization scheme. maybe then U.S. Bank the ‘Trustee” would have to prove that they are the owner or not. any info or support would be of help

  6. tadly

    Your post is very informative. Given – the government is to blame. What the heck have they been doing??

    Your quote:
    “When we’re managing the receivership, we still have that statutory obligation to maximize value for the creditors of the failed bank,”

    from me- “maximizing value” for the banks/creditor/hedge funds/private equity – is the end goal of the government.

    New Obama progan is bogus – attorney said to me ” But the lender has to approve” – What LENDER will approve anything if there is no profit in it for them?????

    Litigation must be ongoing – NO compromise- Mr Garfield..

  7. Here is an interesting article
    Harder Part

    American Banker | Wednesday, February 24, 2010

    By Jeff Horwitz

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    Related Links

    * IndyMac Buyers Pick Up Another Failed Bank – February 22, 2010
    * FDIC Rebukes Internet Video – February 16, 2010

    In less than a year, the private-equity buyers of IndyMac Bank — the $32 billion-asset California thrift seized in July 2008 and run by regulators for six months — have turned a $1.6 billion profit.

    Now called OneWest Bank, the company is outperforming rivals on various fronts, including working out troubled assets, and it should have plenty more opportunities: It has acquired two more failed banks in the past three months, and it’s one of the few banks in the region with ample capital to do more deals.

    Yet thriving on a mess that has already cost tens of thousands of IndyMac borrowers their homes is an awkward situation, and not just for the team of billionaire backers including George Soros, John Paulson and Christopher Flowers.

    Shortly before OneWest’s latest acquisition, the FDIC was forced to take the unusual step of publicly defending OneWest’s loss-sharing agreement from a pair of video bloggers. For a bank with aspirations to become a sizable regional player, weathering the criticism may be as crucial as its ability to cobble together the assets of busted banks.

    The franchise the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. inherited featured terrible geography, reverse mortgages, securitized option adjustable-rate mortgages and the highest cost funding of any bank in the country. By paying off IndyMac’s high-cost depositors, the FDIC immediately shrank the bank’s deposits to $6.5 billion from $19 billion.

    Under its new team, led by Chief Executive Terry Laughlin, the bank has made a limited return to lending. In the fourth quarter it originated about $1 billion of mortgages, selling half and keeping half on its balance sheet. It also built up its deposit base to more than $11 billion by yearend, filling the gap with Federal Home Loan bank advances.

    But it’s the terms of the FDIC deal that have yielded the bank’s outsize earnings. OneWest paid $13.9 billion for IndyMac’s assets — a 23% discount to their face value that more than covered OneWest’s $2.5 billion “first loss” obligation. Should the amount ever be reached, and it hasn’t yet, the FDIC would absorb first 80% and then 95% of further losses. In return, OneWest committed to modifying all of the IndyMac mortgages it serviced — so long as doing so would save investors money. According to the agency, none of the more than 80 potential buyers it solicited produced a better offer than OneWest’s, which it estimated will cost the insurance fund more than $11 billion.

    OneWest’s accounting suggests that the bank believes that every penny of the losses its portfolio took this year was covered by the initial discount it got on IndyMac — it neither made provisions nor booked losses on the loans. What interest payments did roll off the portfolio were pure profit, amounting to $210 million in net income in the fourth quarter alone. On top of that, the bank earned $900 million in additional noninterest income. That total would presumably include gains in the net value of its servicing portfolio — — most servicers did well last quarter — but covering all of the difference would be a stretch, said Bert Ely of Ely & Co., suggesting that much of it may be the result of amortizing the gap between what OneWest paid and the actual value of the portfolio.

    Even if the deal provided for a lot of easy money for the private-equity firm, OneWest’s duties over the past year have hardly been a matter of sitting back and letting the checks roll in. It’s also responsible for addressing the very cause of IndyMac’s failure — a massive portfolio of terribly performing loans. Doing that has required administering the FDIC loan mod program that launched the Home Affordable Modification Program.

    When the FDIC took over IndyMac, it created an ambitious effort to rehabilitate the mortgages the bank serviced, 60,000 of which were 60 or more days past due. Because securitized loans made up 90% of IndyMac’s servicing portfolio, John Bovenzi, the former FDIC deputy chairman who was IndyMac’s CEO during receivership, said that for most borrowers a straight principal writedown was out of the question. What the bank could do, however, was permanently drop interest rates, lowering total payments over the life of the mortgage.

    Investors who owned the mortgages were initially worried that the FDIC would seek to lower payments indiscriminately. But Bovenzi said none ultimately protested after they understood that mods would only occur when they could be expected to save all parties money.

    “If foreclosure made more economic sense, we weren’t going to do the loan modification,” he said, and this rule still applies to OneWest’s current modifications done under Hamp. “When we’re managing the receivership, we still have that statutory obligation to maximize value for the creditors of the failed bank,” Bovenzi said.

    IndyMac worked through a backlog of best candidates for mods first, Bovenzi said — the minority whose loans had solid documentation. And even getting those through the program required significant effort.

    “We used Federal Express instead of regular mail because people actually open Federal Express,” he recalled. When the pool of the most eligible borrowers was exhausted after a few months, the FDIC started offering conditional modifications. All together, out of 46,500 loans deemed eligible at the time of IndyMac’s sale to OneWest, the FDIC had completed 8,512 mods and mailed out more than 32,000 offers. But in that same period it initiated almost 28,000 foreclosures in California alone.

    Since the handoff from the FDIC, OneWest has frequently come under suspicion of “systemically working to push home loan borrowers into foreclosure,” as The Sacramento Bee reported this week in describing a string of local consumer lawsuits. Indeed, OneWest’s and the FDIC’s IndyMac agreement has drawn howls for producing too much profit and too few loan mods. Yet while it’s true that the bank’s mod program was slow to yield results — the bank barely managed 1,000 permanent modifications in the first six months it was in charge — its statistics have recently jumped, with the bank modifying 3,087 and making official offers to modify 5,048 more. And though Internet critics and others have frequently said that OneWest has been eager to foreclose on homes in order to trigger its loss-sharing agreement with the FDIC, to date the opposite appears to be true.

    Foreclosure Radar data for IndyMac’s home market of California shows that the number of foreclosure proceedings initiated on loans OneWest services has been cut in half since the bank took over from the FDIC — a decline that far exceeds the general slowdown in foreclosures in the state. OneWest’s notices of trustee sales, which immediately precede the seizure of a home, have similarly dropped.

    “They are not foreclosing at a pace that makes them stand out,” said Sean O’Toole, Foreclosure Radar’s founder.

    And while a theoretical case could be made that it would be profitable for OneWest to foreclose rapidly in order to trigger its FDIC loss-sharing agreement, the bank is contractually obligated to the FDIC not to do so. Moreover, said Michael Krimminger, FDIC special adviser for policy, “the incentives are designed to get more loans past the net present value test” required to qualify for a modification. The FDIC is monitoring OneWest’s performance.

    Foreclosure Radar’s data shows that OneWest appears to be far better at dealing with the process than far more established lenders in the state. In instances where third-party investors buy a property in foreclosure, they pay on average 10% more of the property’s market value. And when OneWest takes properties back in trustee sales, it pays less to do so.

    In California, O’Toole said, OneWest seems to run a far more organized operation. It is the only lender he is aware of, he said, that regularly announces its initial bid at trustee sales a week in advance, giving third-party investors the chance to do due diligence.

    “By that simple act, they get much more aggressive bidding on their properties,” O’Toole said.

    Those results should benefit the FDIC whenever it does start paying out on its loss-sharing agreement with OneWest. (According to the agency, it still hasn’t.) Yet given the bank’s massive earnings this year, observers like Ely question whether the FDIC didn’t overpay for the performance.

    By comparison, the purchasers of BankUnited Corp., the only other FDIC private-equity deal similar in size to OneWest, have received a 25% return on equity in the seven months since taking control of the bank. The FDIC and OneWest declined to discuss the bank’s performance.

  8. After reading the article on Deutsch Bank, I see a lot of help from people in postings, so I have one to for anyone who knows about” Structured Asset Securities corp, Structured asset Investment Loan trust Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series” I.m trying to save our home, in Bankruptcy (Mass) as it was the only way to stay the sale at the last minute, of the last day,as the so call lender U.S.Bank ? and there servicer HomEq Servicing agent a A-hole, would do nothing and Hamp
    was not in play by the servicer, who did take, tarp money, and Barclay Capital , U.S. Bank also, but no help. What I’m looking for is help looking up on the SEC site, to read the pooling and Servicing agreement
    Its; U.S.Bank National association as Trustee under Securitization Servicing agreement dated dec. 1, 2005, structured Asset Securities Corp. Structured asset Investment loan trust Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2005-11.
    You can email me at

    Thank you, Mark

  9. I love this site and information. More and more we are finding out the truth about all the deception. If you would like to join me in starting a conversation about this and other related subject call Robert Ponte 860-599-5557 Namaste’

  10. Help!
    In Wis they do not have allonges. When I told the plaintif that the assignments of the note were not in good standing they submitted a summary judgement for assignment of judgement and rights to US Bank as Trustee for Lehman XS Trust Series 2007-9 nunc pro tunc. Did this just make the judgement unsecured. Can I issue a warranty deed and then do a quiet title?
    Stan Putra
    Racine Wi.

  11. PJ

    I am not Mr. van Eck – who is extremely knowledgeable in this area – but your question is very good and I hope Mr. van Eck will answer. Your point is very well taken. – In the process of buy and sale of securities – prices change – sometimes dramatically.

    According to some prestigious hedge fund/private equity traders (have contact) – the buy and sale of securities is distinct from note ownership and balance sheet (on or off) recording. Are these traders wrong? They claim the note always remains with the bank – and only cash payments are passed-through to security investors. Thus, the security prices change but note ownership remains (at recorded price) with the bank. However, the bank’s write down of the note – will affect the derived (current) security prices. Thus, banks are reluctant to write down the actual note.

    How are these traders wrong??? In my opinion, securities involve the pass-through of the cash payments. Security investors are only entitled to these pass-through of payments for default loans if, and only if, the servicer continues to advance payments to the trust. Once the servicer ceases payment advances – the note, from which cash payments were derived – is no longer a “note receivable” or part of the trust, and is considered “non-accrual” – no longer a pass through. Can someone please explain why this is not so???

    I just see that attorneys rely on court opinions that do not really acknowledge that securitization is only a method of passing through current cash payments. How are investors entitled to anything that is not current and is removed from current cash pass-through securitiy trusts?? Further, entities hide behind the name of the original trust to claim ownership – when they have long since had nothing to do with the original trust, it’s trustee, or servicer. Unfortunately, judges rarely question attorneys on true and accurate representation. Thus, attorneys get away with representing anyone – but under the name of someone long removed.

    PJ – your are right – “face value” matters. Only face value of securities change. Your note face value remains the same until the bank that sold receivable pass-throughs – writes-off of the face value of your loan. It is all about accounting – not current securities.

    You are Very intuitive. I have seen a lot – and you are closing in on what is really going on.

    . Disclaimer – I am not a lawyer, and this is not to be construed as legal advise and only for educational purposes.

  12. 2 Jan van Eck,

    A person takes a loan in 2000, it is assigned to an entity and sold into the “secondary market” in 2006. The assignment shows the original amount in 2000 when the obligation was originated. During the span of six years all payments were made, in effect and reality reducing the “principle” amount.

    The question is that when the loan was sold into the secondary market as a MBS, to a trust through a conduit, was it sold at the face value of origination, or the face value at the date it was sold.

    This may be a rhetorical question from a simple mind, but if CDO was paid on the originationing obligation value of a loan (which all assignments show) and not the actual value the loan was worth at the time of assignment, would that not be proof of further fraud?

  13. Nye,

    Love it!!! 🙂

  14. I’m following I’m following

  15. Nye,

  16. This may sound crude, but it’s the only analogy that’s easy for people and judges to understand. A woman goes to a party or is promiscuous and sleeps with 6 men in a night or week. The following week she is pregnant. There is one man who is the best looking, strongest, best shape and richest of them all, so she wants him to be the father. Two other men who find out she’s pregnant claim paternity. NOW, before the age of DNA and computers and all, it was simply someone’s word and testimony against another.

    However, with the advent o DNA testing and sequencing genes, we can tell who the father is. So, a judge would understand the following:

    Judge, this has been a very promiscuous note. It’s gotten around (transfered, pledged, sold, assigned) quite a bit and it never used protection (recording in public records and indorsing note). After being with at least a dozen different partners, our note is now pregnant (ripe for pay off/liquidation).

    The MOM (MERS, servicers) says Daddy #1 is the daddy, but the baby (original note) has blond hair and blue eyes judge and the mom and claimed dad are both dark hair and dark eyes so we’re suspicious.

    Two dark hair and brown eyes men come forward and state: Judge we both slept with this woman during the time she claimed to be pregnant. Now, 3 different men have potential paternity.

    NOW, THE ONLY WAY you can determine who the father (holder in due course) is to take blood samples (accounting, servicing, custody, and investor reports and data) from EACH MAN (servicer//transferee etc..) to see who’s DNA it was and all the others to determine the dad and who owes child support.

    Unless you do the DNA (forensic analyses of all docs and records), it doesn;t matter what the bank lawyers, or servicers say, it what really transpired here!

    Without seeing where that NOTE (not mortgage) came on and off anyones books; how it was endorsed and when; who has possession and custody and who negotiated the note and PAID for it, you’ll never be able to answer the age old question, “WHO’S YOUR DADDY?”

  17. can you provide the correct link to the “Deutsch bank references Prospectus offered all over the world” your link comes up blank.

    I have a case in Federal District Court in Hawaii against DB, WFB, NCM,NEW, and other services.

    DB has brought a motion to dismiss being heard on May 5, 2010 any info and support would help.

  18. Here’s the link from Tony’s post on another thread

  19. Please fix your “SHARPS” link … it doesn’t work!

  20. Question for Neil: Say the Dates of when a Promissory Note and Deed of Trust were signed and the Date of Notorization Differ by 2 Days. How might a consumer use this to his advantage?

  21. Unfortunately, in Pennsylvania, the pretender lenders are allowed to foreclose on EITHER the note OR the mortgage. Challenge possession of the note, and they are coming in “In Rem” and foreclosing the mortgage, using copies gleaned from the Recorder’s Office. When the homeowner then attempts to get the original Note returned, because the debt has been satisfied via foreclosure, it starts them on a slippery slope to nowhere, usually sent round and round in circles by the banks and judicial system. Thousands of Pennsylvanians are waiting for the other shoe to drop when the “holders of the notes” come in for their piece of the corpse.


  23. Neil,
    The link to the PDF isn’t coming up. Please read the 2nd paragraph on this.

    Here is an excellent video;


  24. Link does not work.

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