First, rule 1.110(b) is amended to require verification of mortgage foreclosure complaints involving residential real property. The primary purposes of this amendment are (1) to provide incentive for the plaintiff to appropriately investigate and verify its ownership of the note or right to enforce the note and ensure that the allegations in the complaint are accurate; (2) to conserve judicial resources that are currently being wasted on inappropriately pleaded ―lost note counts and inconsistent allegations; (3) to prevent the wasting of judicial resources and harm to defendants resulting from suits brought by plaintiffs not entitled to enforce the note; and (4) to give trial courts greater authority to sanction plaintiffs who make false allegations. Next, the Task Force proposed a new form Affidavit of Diligent Search and Inquiry. In its petition, the Task Force explained that many foreclosure cases are served by publication. The new form is meant to help standardize affidavits of diligent search and inquiry and provide information to the court regarding the methods used to attempt to locate and serve the defendant. We adopt this form as new form 1.924, with several modifications. The

13 Responses

  1. That’s a novel idea, have the note, hold the note, and be the owner of the note BEFORE you foreclose.

  2. HELP: The way I read it the courts are getting tired of the challenges … and of them being found to be valid ,, ie. the courts know both defendants and the courts are being abused by plaintiffs lawyers… If you go to the TASK FORCE ON RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE CASES document you’ll see April Charney was part of the task force .. bottom line to me … plaintiffs attorneys will ignore the change as this is something they are already expected to do ,, to them it seems redundant and a great way to turn away 60%+ of their business while running up their expenses hiring researchers and assistants. The courts in Florida are likely to keep operating as they have been also ,, they are swamped. I see no real change; 97% of defendants will continue to lose ,, mostly because they don’t have representation or they don’t even show up…


  3. BT- you could get the case dismissed and then see what happens with the Plaintiff attempting to foreclose your home. I have not seen many stand alone Quiet Title actions in Floirda, unless someone else has.

  4. Im confused???? Is florida moving to resolve securtization a good thing for home owners or bad? are they going to resolve it in the favor of the pretend lenders?

  5. “New Rules”

    Beware of trojan horses!

    It has alsways been the law that only the “holder” can file a foreclosure suit. All we need to do is inforce the “old rules” ( law). In the past the judicairy has lowered the bar to the financial institutions, that must stop.

  6. FLorida Motion to Dismiss- I have a foreclosure that is about to be dismissed for lack of prosecution in 12 months. ONCE that is granted for my securitzed mortgage, shouldn’t i sue for Quiet title?

  7. Subject: Why banks are not doing loan modifications

    No matter whether you’re a Democrat, Republican, Independent, Green Party or – heaven forbid – a non-voter, you should watch this short video.

    No MBA required to understand it.


    You will be shocked!

  8. In english, what does this rule mean for homeowners whose lender is a securitized trust?

  9. Is this the homerun it looks like for those of us that know for certain (verified by pretender lender) that our loans were securitized and sold into the European debt markets at the retail level? I was about to hire a lawyer with the gameplan of negotiating a better mortgage mod and using those negotiations as a way of demanding verification of the ownership (and validity) of the actual note.. I am a smart guy and COULD handle this but I know that experience and knowing the local judges counts for a lot in this game.

  10. High & Low Finance
    Financial Perversions Sold During Credit Boom


    CloseLinkedinDiggFacebookMixxMySpaceYahoo! BuzzPermalink By FLOYD NORRIS
    Published: February 11, 2010
    Would you buy a “XXX” security?

    Those securities do exist, providing evidence of the perversion of finance during the credit boom that ended so abruptly in 2007 and 2008.

    That perversion was not of the type you might associate with the label XXX. The letters instead refer to the number of a regulation that insurance companies found inconvenient, and wished to get around.

    Here are some of the features that make XXX securities memorable:

    ¶They were based on the assumption, endorsed by the bond rating agencies, that insurance regulators were requiring life insurers to retain too much capital.

    ¶Therefore, investors could take on a large part of the risk of the insurance with complete safety. That would be only the “excess” part, as calculated by the insurance company

    ¶The securities were sold as virtually risk-free cash equivalents, enabling the investor to get out, at par, once a month. Supposedly sophisticated investors sank more than $30 billion into them.

    ¶The securities were explained in complex prospectuses that almost nobody even obtained, let alone read.

    ¶They were guaranteed by bond insurers, like Ambac, further persuading people there was nothing to worry about.

    There was, it turns out, plenty to worry about. Espen Robak, the president of Pluris Valuation Advisors, says some of the securities are trading from 5 to 28 cents on the dollar.

    The continued existence of these securities provides a reminder that the auction-rate securities market, which collapsed two years ago, is not going to go away. Low-yielding securities remain on the books of unfortunate investors or the brokerage firms that were forced to buy back the securities from some, but often not all, of their customers. Some of these investments will be around for decades, offering a reminder of a time of financial folly.

    To make it even more galling for the investors, the brokerage firms that sold the paper to them get additional payments from the issuer every time there is a failed auction.

    Auction-rate securities were supposed to accomplish the magic of allowing borrowers to get long-term money at short-term rates. They accomplished that by holding Dutch auctions, usually every week or month, to set the yields for the next period. There were penalty rates to be imposed if auctions failed, which were supposed to assure that borrowers, if they remained creditworthy, would refinance the debt.

    We now know that for months the auctions were becoming harder and harder to complete. The Wall Street firms that had underwritten the securities put in their own bids to prevent failure, while at the same time stepping up marketing of the securities. Finally, in the Valentine’s Week massacre of 2008, virtually all firms stopped supporting auctions. The market collapsed.

    Since then, there has been a gradual shrinkage of the market. More than 80 percent of the $165 billion of municipal auction-rate securities have been redeemed, but just a quarter of the $85 billion in student loan paper has been redeemed. The other major market was auction-rate preferred securities, often issued by closed-end mutual funds. About half the $60 billion of those has been retired, according to Pluris figures.

    Then there is the toxic part of the market. That includes the XXX debt.

    Regulation XXX, as issued by insurance commissioners, required life insurers to use government mortality tables when they calculated how much they needed to keep in reserves. The insurers deemed that unreasonable because they did not insure just anyone. They excluded those who might be greater risks. So they should be able to hold lower reserves than the rules required.

    Wall Street came up with a way to lay off the excess risk onto a nonrecourse company. That company would be financed by investors who bought an array of auction-rate securities that reset every month.

    Unfortunately for the investors, if too many people died, and the reserves were not really excess, the original insurance company could grab the cash. That protected policyholders, but it made the investments risky.

    After the auction-rate market froze, holders of securities began to try to find out what they owned, and what it was worth. That turned out to be difficult.

    Most of the holders, Mr. Robak said, “could not produce prospectuses.” It had never occurred to them to get such documentation on what they thought was a cash equivalent investment. So they called the brokers who had sold the securities, and found they did not have them either. Finding them took time.

    The prospectuses now provide an incredible and perplexing reading experience.

    Take one of the larger issuances, for something called Ballantyne Re, an entity set up in Ireland by Scottish Re to spare it the need to hold those “excess” reserves. A 2006 offering underwritten by Lehman Brothers raised $1.65 billion in nine different classes of securities.

    One tranche of that issue, originally rated AAA by Moody’s, Fitch and Standard & Poor’s, now has a CC rating from S.& P., which is about as low as you can go before default. The other agencies have withdrawn their ratings. Pluris values it at 14 cents on the dollar. It is making full payments only with help from the bond insurer Ambac, which itself is in trouble.

    I have read a lot of prospectuses over the years, but I cannot recall any as baffling as this 240-page document. The purchasers of the securities may be just as well off for not having read it, although perhaps the sheer complexity would have led them to wonder whether they really wanted to invest money on terms that would yield no more than two percentage points over one-month Libor, a total now under 2.3 percent.

    The prospectus includes complicated diagrams of how the cash would flow and page after page of sometimes opaque risk factors. But my favorite part is an analysis by Milliman, an actuarial firm. It was provided by Ballantyne to help investors weigh the likelihood that the insurance policies would perform as expected — that is, whether the “excess” reserves really were excess.

    “In order to fully understand this report,” Milliman cautioned, “any user of the report should be advised by an actuary with a substantial level of expertise in areas relevant to this analysis to appreciate the significance of the underlying assumptions and the impact of those assumptions on the illustrated results.”

    In other words, the expert tells you that you cannot hope to understand his work unless you hire your own expert. Would you need to hire another expert to understand that expert’s work?

    Imagine some future doctoral student in financial history coming across this prospectus and trying to understand why anyone would have bought the securities.

    He or she is likely to be puzzled. The potential upside was minimal; the potential downside was immense.

    If the Ambac guaranty somehow turned out to be less than solid, there were a lot of things to be considered. Factors that would determine whether the securities would pay off, the prospectus helpfully said, “include, but are not limited to” whether assumptions were correct about mortality, future interest rates, investment performance and policyholder decisions to cancel or replace policies.

    Why did the securities sell? Not because of anything in the prospectus. The securities promised a little better yield than other AAA-rated paper. That mattered to some money managers and corporate treasurers. Anyway, they were told by brokers, they could always sell at the next auction, for full face value. Why waste a lot of time evaluating a one-month investment?

    Only after disaster struck did people start to find out what they had bought. The lucky ones had municipal paper that would be redeemed within a year of two. The unlucky ones had XXX securities.

    It was an era of trust. Because that trust is not likely to return quickly, those who want to revive the securitization market have an uphill road ahead of them.

    Floyd Norris comments on finance and economics in his blog at nytimes.com/norris.

  11. I’m in Florida–the new summons (Lis Pendens) now just state that the bank (PLaintiff) is owner and holder of the Note–it’s the new game in town. (We know they don’t have it.)

  12. YES!! WE CAN!!! I would have liked to see what about those who have already lost their Homes…


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