Judge Maltese in New York Gets It: Deutsch Bank v Abbate

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Thanks to Jeff and Judge Maltese:

“At the time that the plaintiff improperly commenced the action, the pathway to the Courthouse should have been blocked. Deutsche Bank had no legal foundation to foreclose a mortgage in which it had no interest

where there is no evidence that plaintiff, prior to commencing the foreclosure action, was the holder of the mortgage and note, took physical delivery of the mortgage and note, or was conveyed the mortgage and note by written assignment, an assignment’s language purporting to give it retroactive effect prior to the date of the commencement of the action is insufficient to establish the plaintiff’s requisite standing.

Where the plaintiff has no legal or equitable interest in a mortgage, the plaintiff has no foundation in law or in fact.

A plaintiff who has no standing in an action is subject to a jurisdictional dismissal since (1) courts have jurisdiction only over controversies that involve the plaintiff, (2) a plaintiff found to lack “standing is not involved in a controversy, and (3) the courts therefore have no jurisdiction of the case when such plaintiff purports to bring it.”[FN16]

Here is another New York case.

I think the NY Judges are ” GETTING IT”

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATE HOLDERS OF CARRINGTON MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2005-OPT2, ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2005-OPT2, Plaintiff

against

Debra Abbate, CARMELA ABBATE, KIM FIORENTINO, BOCCE COURT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., NEW YORK CITY ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL BOARD, NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT ADJUDICATION BUREAU, NEW YORK CITY PARKING VIOLATIONS BUREAU, and “JOHN DOE No. 1″ through “JOHN DOE #10,” the last ten names being fictitious and unknown to the plaintiff, the person or parties intended being the person or parties, if any, having or claiming an interest in or lien upon the Mortgaged premises described in the Complaint, Defendants.

100893/07

Plaintiff was represented by the law firm of Frenkel Lambert Weiss & Weisman.

Defendant was represented by Robert E. Brown, Esq.

Joseph J. Maltese, J.

The defendants Kim Fiorentino, Debra Abbate, and Carmella Abbate’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint is granted in its entirety.

This is an action to foreclose a mortgage dated February 24, 2005, upon the property located at 25 Bocce Court, Staten Island, New York. The mortgage was originated by Suntrust Mortgage Inc. (”Suntrust”) and was recorded in the Office of the Clerk of Richmond County on April 26, 2005. The plaintiff filed the Summons, Complaint, and Notice of Pendency on March [*2]1, 2007.[FN1] However, Suntrust assigned the first mortgage on this property to Option One Mortgage Corporation, which was executed on July 6, 2007. Another assignment to plaintiff Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (”Deutsche Bank”) was executed on March 7, 2007. Both assignments, which were recorded on July 23, 2007, contained a clause expressing their intention to be retroactively effective: the first one to date back to February 24, 2005, and the second one to February 28, 2007.[FN2] On November 19, 2007, this court issued an order of foreclosure and sale on the subject property. This court also granted two orders to show cause to stay the foreclosure on January 9, 2008 and April 8, 2008.[FN3]

Discussion

The Appellate Division, Second Department ruled and reiterated in Kluge v. Kugazy the well established law that “foreclosure of a mortgage may not be brought by one who has no title to it . . . .”[FN4] The Appellate Division, Third Department has similarly ruled that an assignee of a mortgage does not have a right or standing to foreclose a mortgage unless the assignment is complete at the time of commencing the action.[FN5] An assignment takes the form of a writing or occurs through the physical delivery of the mortgage.[FN6] Absent such transfer, the assignment of the mortgage is a nullity.[FN7]

Retroactive Assignments of a Mortgage are Invalid
The first issue this court must resolve is whether the clauses in the July 6, 2007 and March 7, 2007 assignments setting the effective date of the assignment to February 24, 2005 and February 28, 2007 respectively are permissible. This court rules that, absent a physical or written transfer before the filing of a complaint, retroactive assignments are invalid.

Recently, trial courts have been faced with the situation where the plaintiff commenced a [*3]foreclosure action before the assignment of the mortgage.[FN8] In those cases the trial courts have held,

. . . where there is no evidence that plaintiff, prior to commencing the foreclosure action, was the holder of the mortgage and note, took physical delivery of the mortgage and note, or was conveyed the mortgage and note by written assignment, an assignment’s language purporting to give it retroactive effect prior to the date of the commencement of the action is insufficient to establish the plaintiff’s requisite standing. . .[FN9]

In this case, the plaintiff failed to offer any admissible evidence demonstrating that they became assignees to the mortgage on or before March 1, 2007; as such, this court agrees with its sister courts and finds that the retroactive language contained in the July 26, 2007 and March 7, 2007 assignments are ineffective. This court therefore rules that it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter when the plaintiff has no title to the mortgage at the time that it commenced the action.

The next issue this court must resolve is whether the defendants waived subject matter jurisdiction because they did not raise that issue in their prior applications to this court.

Affirmative Defense of Standing

At the outset of any litigation, the court must ascertain that the proper party requests an adjudication of a dispute.[FN10] As the first step of justiciability, “standing to sue is critical to the proper functioning of the judicial system.”[FN11] Standing is a threshold issue; if it is denied, “the pathway to the courthouse is blocked.” [FN12]

The doctrine of standing is designed to “ensure that a party seeking relief has a sufficiently cognizable stake in the outcome so as to present a court with a dispute that is capable [*4]of judicial resolution.”[FN13] “Standing to sue requires an interest in the claim at issue in the lawsuit that the law will recognize as a sufficient predicate for determining the issue at the litigant’s request.”[FN14] Where the plaintiff has no legal or equitable interest in a mortgage, the plaintiff has no foundation in law or in fact.[FN15]

A plaintiff who has no standing in an action is subject to a jurisdictional dismissal since (1) courts have jurisdiction only over controversies that involve the plaintiff, (2) a plaintiff found to lack “standing is not involved in a controversy, and (3) the courts therefore have no jurisdiction of the case when such plaintiff purports to bring it.”[FN16]

On November 7, 2005, in the case of Wells Fargo Bank Minn. N.A. v. Mastropaolo [“Mastropaolo”], this court found that “Insofar as the plaintiff was not the legal titleholder to the mortgage at the time the action was commenced, [the Bank] had no standing to bring the action and it must be dismissed.”[FN17] Erroneously, this court “[o]rdered, that the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion is denied in its entirety and that this action is dismissed with prejudice.”[FN18]

This Court should have ordered that this matter was dismissed without prejudice, which would have given the plaintiff the right to start the action again after it had acquired title to the note and mortgage. Unfortunately, the plaintiff, did not seek a motion to reargue that error, which would have been corrected promptly. Instead, the plaintiff appealed the decision to the Appellate Division, Second Department, which rightfully reversed the decision 18 months later on May 29, 2007 based upon the dismissal with prejudice as opposed to a dismissal without prejudice to refile the action. However, in what appears to be dicta, the court went on to discuss whether lack of standing is tantamount to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court further stated that the failure of the initial pro se defendant to make a pre-answer motion or a motion to dismiss, the defense of lack of standing would be waived. But the Appellate Division did not address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, which may not be waived. [*5]

In the instant case, this court is again faced with similar facts, which raise the issue that the Bank must have title to the mortgage before it can sue the defendant. Clearly, having title to the subject matter (the mortgage) is a condition precedent to the right to sue on that mortgage. This has always been the case, but since the Appellate Division, Second Department’s comments in Mastropaolo, that issue has been clouded.

At the time that the plaintiff improperly commenced the action, the pathway to the Courthouse should have been blocked. Deutsche Bank had no legal foundation to foreclose a mortgage in which it had no interest at the time of filing the summons and complaint. Lack of a plaintiff’s interest at the beginning of the action strips the court’s power to adjudicate over the action.[FN19] Lack of interest and controversy is protected by the umbrella of subject matter jurisdiction. Whenever a court lacks jurisdiction, a defense can be raised at any time and is not waivable.[FN20] In other words, for there to be a cause of action, there needs to be an injury. At the time that the action was commenced, the instant plaintiff suffered no injury and had no interest in the controversy. Since the plaintiff filed this action to foreclose the mortgage before it had title to it, there was no controversy between the existing parties when the action commenced. Therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the present case. The defendants are consequently entitled to a dismissal without prejudice because the court lacked jurisdiction over a non-existent controversy.

Accordingly, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that the defendants Kim Fiorentino, Debra Abbate, and Carmella Abbate’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint is granted, without prejudice to the plaintiff having the right to refile within the time provided by the Statute of Limitations; and it is further

ORDERED, that the parties and counsel shall appear before this court to further conference this matter on November 20, 2009 at 11:00AM.

ENTER,

DATED: October 6, 2009

Joseph J. Maltese

Justice of the Supreme Court

12 Responses

  1. A more legible copy of this decision can be found at:

    http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2009/2009_52154.htm

  2. ANOTHER NY CASE….THINGS ARE CHANGING!!!!

    SIJE’REME COURT – STATE OF NEW YORK
    I.A.S. PART 17 – SUFFOLK COUNTY
    l l o i i PE’I.l<R. H. MAYER
    Justice of the Supreme Court
    . X _l_______l___________—__—_—-_———–
    WI;I,I S F ARGO BANK NATIONAL
    ,4SS0(_'1.4 I ION, as trustee for BANK OF
    AMERIC' 2 reclo:;urr: actions, and evidentiary proof of proper service of said special summons; (5) failure
    to submit e\ identiary proof, including an affidavit from one with personal knowledge, of compliance with
    tlic requirements of CPLR 532 15(g)(3) regarding the additional notice by mail of summonses in
    forwlosurrt xtioiis. and proof of proper service of said additional mailing; and it is further
    ORDERED that, inasmuch this action was initiated prior to September 1,2008 and no final order
    of judgment has been issued, and inasmuch as the plaintiff has identified the loan in foreclosure as a
    “cubprimc home loan” as defined in RPAPL $1304, pursuant to 2008 NY Laws, Ch. 472, Section 3-a, the
    defendant lionieovmer is entitled to a voluntary settlement conference, which is hereby scheduled for
    December 116,2009 at 9:30 am before the undersigned, located at Room A-259, Part 17, One Court Street,
    Rikerhead. VY 1 1(>01 (63 1-852- 17601, for the purpose of holding settlement discussions pertaining to the
    rights and cibligations of the parties under the mortgage loan documents, including but not limited to,
    determining whether the parties can reach a mutually agreeable resolution to help the defendant avoid losing
    his or her hcime. and evaluating the potential for a resolution in which payment schedules or amounts may
    be ~fiodificdo r other workout options may be agreed to, and for whatever other purposes the Court deems
    appropriate and it is further
    ORDERED that at any conference held pursuant to 2008 NY Laws, Ch. 472, Section 3-a, the
    plaintii’f’ s h~l la ppt’ar in person or by counsel, and if appearing by counsel, such counsel shall be fully
    mthorized to dispclse of the case, and all future applications must state in one ofthe first paragraphs ofthe
    aitorncy’k afirmation whether or not a Section 3-a conference has been held; and it is further
    ORDERED that the piairitiff shall promptly serve a copy of this Order upon the homeowner
    delelidant( s ) at all hown addresses via certified mail (return receipt requested), and by first class mail, and
    upon all othcr defendants via first class mail, and shall provide proof of such service to the Court at the time
    of any schctluled Conference, and annex a copy of this Order and the affidavit(s) of service of same as
    exhihits to any niotion resubmitted pursuant to this Order; and it is further
    ORDERED that with regard to any scheduled court conferences or future applications by the
    plaintiif. if the Court determines that such conferences have been attended, or such applications have been
    submitted. ui ithout proper regard for the applicable statutory and case law, or without regard for the required
    proofs delinxited herein, the Court may, in its discretion, dismiss this case or deny such applications with
    prejudice c i ~ i do r impose sanctions pursuant to 22 NYCRR 5 130-1, and may deny those costs and attorneys
    fees atrenda i t mith the filing of such future applications.
    [* 2]
    bt’ells I.;rrgo Bank v Melgar
    l t ~ d t3?0~. 3761 9-2007
    P q e .r’
    I n tliis foreclosure action, the plaintiff filed a summons and complaint on December 4,2007, which
    essentiaIl> Jleges that the defentiant-homeowner(s), Martha L. Melgar and Pedro Reyes, defaulted in
    payments u ith reprd to a mortgage, dated May 5,2005, in the principal amount of $258,400.00, and given
    by the deteildnnt-homeowner(s) for the premises located at 68 Cranberry Street, Central Islip, New York
    1 I722 Tile original lender, WMC Mortgage Corp., apparently had the mortgage assigned to entities other
    than this p l i~nt iff: however, there is no proof of assignments annexed to the moving papers and no proof
    that this pla ntiff is the proper plaintiff. The plaintiff now seeks a default order of reference and requests
    amendmeni of the caption to substitute tenant(s) in the place and stead of the “Doell defendants. For the
    reasom set i r t h hereiin, the plaintiffs application is denied.
    In slqqx)rt of this application, the plaintiff submits an affidavit from Valerie Clark, Sr. Vice
    I’rvsident 01 Saxon Mortgage Services as the alleged attorney-in-fact for the plaintiff, and a non-party to
    this action: iowevcr, there is no sufficient evidentiary proof that such person or entity has authority to act
    on behall’ 01 the lender-mortgage holder.
    In rc levant part, CPLR $32 15(a) states: “When a defendant has failed to appear, plead or proceed
    tu trial ofai- action re,ached and called for trial, or when the court orders a dismissal for any other neglect
    to proceed. the plaintiff may seek a default judgment against him.” With regard to proof necessary on a
    motion for cefault in general, CPLR 32 1 5(f) states, in relevant part, that “[oln any application forjudgment
    by default, the applicant shall file proof of service of the summons and the complaint . . . and proof of the
    facts constiluting the claim, the default and the amount due by affidavit made by the party . . . Where a
    verified complaint has been serveld, it may be used as the affidavit of the facts constituting the claim and
    h e amount due: in such case, an affidavit as to the default shall be made by the party or the party’s attorney.
    Proof‘ot’iiiaili yg the notice required by [CPLR 32 15(g)], where applicable, shall also be filed.”
    With regard to a judgment of foreclosure, an order of reference is simply a preliminary step towards
    obtaining a default judgment (Home Sav. ojxm., FA. v. Gkanios, 230 AD2d 770,646 NYS2d 530 [2d Depi
    1996 1 ) Without an affidavit by the plaintiff regarding the facts constituting the claim and amounts due or,
    11-1 the alteri-ative. ‘in affidavit by the plaintiff that its agent has the authority to set forth such facts and
    mouiits due, the sfatutory requirements are not satisfied. In the absence of either a proper affidavit by the
    party or 3 ccymplairt verified by the party, not merely by an attorney with no personal knowledge, the entry
    of judgment by default is erroneous (see, Peniston v Epstein, 10 AD3d 450, 780 NYS2d 919 [2d Dept
    2004 1 : Gi.tringu \ * Wrighl, 274 AD2d 549, 7 13 NYS2d 182 [2d Dept 20001; Finnegan v. Sheahan, 269
    4D2tl 401. 7G NYS2d 734 [2d Dept 20001; Hazim v. Winter, 234 AD2d 422, 651 NYS2d 149 [2d Dep1
    1 996 1 )
    In support of’the motion, the movant fails to submit the required affidavit made a party. Further.
    uithnut a pioperly of’ered copy of a power of attorney, the Court is unable to ascertain whether or not a
    plaintitTs s:rvicin;A agent. for example, may properly act on behalf of the plaintiff to set forth the facts
    constituting the claim, the default and the amounts due, as required by statute. In the absence of either a
    verijied coiilplalnt x a proper affidavit by the party or its authorized agent, the entry ofjudgment by defauli
    IS erroneouj ( \ee iLl’ullins 1’. DiLorenzo, 1 99 AD2d 2 18; 606 NYS2d 16 1 [ 1 st Dept 19931; Hazim v. Winter.
    234 1\1)2d -22.65 1 NYS2d 149 [2d Dept 19961; Finnegan v. Sheahan, 269 AD2d 491,703 NYS2d 734
    Il!d I k p t r’OOO]). I‘lierefore, the application for an order of reference is denied.
    \n‘itli regard to a mortgage assignment which is executed after the commencement of an action and
    [* 3]
    U’ells Furgo Bmk v Melgar
    Index !Vo. 3 761 9-2007
    Page 4
    which statt s that i t is effective as of a date preceding the commencement date, such assignment is valid
    wherc the c elaulting defendant appears but fails to interpose an answer or file a timely pre-answer motion
    that assert4 the defense of standing, thereby waiving such defense pursuant to CPLR 321 1 [e] (see, HSBC
    13crnk 03‘41 ’ /hmr’noi?d,5 9 AD3d 679, 875 NYS2d 490 1445 [2d Dept 20091). However, it remains settled
    that foreclc sure ol’a mortgage may not be brought by one who has no title to it and absent transfer of the
    debt. the assignmcnt of the mortgage is a nullity (Kluge v Fugazy, 145 AD2d 537,536 NYS2d 92 [2d Dept
    1988 11. I 11-tliermore. a plaintiff has no foundation in law or fact to foreclose upon a mortgage in which the
    plaintifl’ha~n o legal or equitable interest (Kutz v East-Ville Realty Co., 249 AD2d 243, 672 NYS2d 308
    [ 1” Ilept 1098 1). I f an assignment is in writing, the execution date is generally controlling and a written
    dssignment claiming an earlier effective date is deficient, unless it is accompanied by proof that the physical
    delivci? of the notc and mortgage was, in fact, previously effectuated (see, Bankers Trust Co. v Hoovis, 26 3
    ’iDZd 93 7 (338.6’14 NYS2d 245 [1999]). Plaintiffs failure to submit proper proof, including an affidavit
    from one with per:,onal knowledge, that the plaintiff is the holder of the note and mortgage, requires denial
    01 the plaintiff’s application for an order of reference.
    I- or Iinxc1cmu-e actions commenced on or after February 1,2007, RPAPL 5 1303( 1) requires that the
    “toreclosin g party in a mortgage foreclosure action, which involves residential real property consisting of
    ouner-occupied o qe-to-four-family dwellings shall provide notice to the mortgagor in accordance with the
    provi\ions of thi. section with regard to information and assistance about the foreclosure process.”
    I’ursumt to KPAPL 1303(2), the “notice required by this section shall be delivered with the summons and
    complaint to commence a foreclosure action . . . [and] shall be in bold, fourteen-point type and shall be
    printed on I:olorecl paper that is other than the color of the summons and complaint, and the title of the
    notice shall be in bold. twenty-point type [and] shall be on its own page.” The specific statutorily required
    language afthe nctice is set forth in RPAPL §1303(3), which was amended on August 5,2008 to require
    additional language fbr actions commenced on or after September 1, 2008.
    I hc plaintiff’s summons and complaint and notice of pendency were filed with the County Clerk
    on er after- Februarj 1,2007, thereby requiring compliance with the notice provisions set forth in RPAPL
    8 1-30; Plaintiff has failed to submit proper evidentiary proof, including an attorney’s affirmation, upon
    which the t ‘ourt may conclude that the requirements of RPAPL 5 I303(2) have been satisfied, specifically
    regarding the content. type size and paper color of the notice. Merely annexing a copy of a purportedly
    compliant notice does not provide a sufficient basis upon which the Court may conclude as a matter of law
    that the plaintiff has complied with the substantive and procedural requirements of the statute. Since the
    plaintiff ha: failed to establish compliance with the notice requirements of RPAPL $1303, its application
    fix an order of reference must be denied.
    I ( pro\ idt additional protection to homeowners in foreclosure, the legislature enacted RPAPL,
    1320 to I equire a mortgagee to provide additional notice to the mortgagor-homeowner that a foreclosure
    aciion has t)een commenced. I n this regard, effective August 1, 2007 for foreclosure actions involving
    rcs~clential property containing not more than three units, RPAPL 5 1320 imposes a special summons
    requiremenl. in adJitiion to the usual summons requirements. The additional notice requirement, which
    niust be in I-oldfacc type. provides an explicit warning to defendant-mortgagors, that they are in danger of
    losing their iome and having a defaultjudgment entered against them ifthey fail to respond to the summons
    bv sen ing 611 ansuer upon the mortgagee-plaintiff s attorney and by filing an answer with the court. The
    notice also infhrim defendant-homeowners that sending a payment to the mortgage company will not stop
    tlic foieclostire act ion, and advises them to speak to an attorney or go to the court for further information
    [* 4]
    Wells k argo Bank v Mrlgar
    Index .No. 3 761 9-2007
    Puge i
    on ho\\, to answer the summons. The exact form and language of the required notice are specified in the
    siaiuie P1aintlft.s failure to submit an attorney’s affirmation of compliance with the special summons
    requiremen1 s of RPAPL 5 1320, and proof of proper service of the special summons, requires denial of the
    plaintiff%\ application for an order of reference.
    \x, itti regard to a motion for a defaultjudgment sought against an individual in an action based upon
    nonpa) mcnt of‘a contractual obligation, CPLR $32 15(g)(3)(i) requires that “an affidavit shall be submitted
    that additional notice has been given by or on behalf of the plaintiff at least twenty days before the entry
    of such judgment. by mailing a copy of the summons by first-class mail to the defendant at his place of
    residence 11- an eni!elope bearing the legend ‘personal and confidential’ and not indicating on the outside
    of the em elope that the communication is from an attorney or concerns an alleged debt. In the event such
    mailing is rt.turned as undeliverable by the post office before the entry of a default judgment, or if the place
    ofresideiu ofthe defendant is unknown, a copy of the summons shall then be mailed in the same manner
    to the defendant at the defendant’:; place of employment if known; if neither the place of residence nor the
    place ofernploynimt ofthe defendant is known, then the mailing shall be to the defendant at his last known
    residence Pursuant to CPLR 32 1 5 (g)(3)(iii), these additional notice requirements are applicable to
    residential riortgage foreclosure that were commenced on or after August 1 2007. Since the moving papers
    fail 1 o establish compliance with the additional mailing requirements of CPLR $32 15(g), the application
    for an ordsi ol’refvrence must be denied.
    0 ’lhi. constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.
    Ilated tober 5 , 2009

  3. thanks abby!!!!!!!

  4. 1,364 Responses
    Abby in CA, on October 25th, 2009 at 10:55 pm Said:
    Go Here to Rate Judges!!
    http://www.robeprobe.com/index.php

  5. Some jurisdictions, courts and jurists are awake, and awakening. For people in jurisdictions that don’t care, that refuses to rule in accordance with the facts and the law…

    How can we persuade a reticent court?

    I’ve been involved and following the many developments in this overall issue but I’ve yet to find a way to “wake up” the judge in my case.

  6. None of these banks have an interest because they go about indorseing the security instrument-that is unlawful and unconscionable to begin with. My question is what is the quickest remedy? Quiet title action? Release of lien? Termination of security interest? How can it be done in the most expedited manner?
    Matt

  7. QUIET TITLE- is it just me for any of us with loans claimed to owned by XYZ Trust 2006-123 needs to sue for quiet title.

    Can anyone help with info on how to do it? goodle is not helpful.

  8. Dear Mr. Garfield,

    Last week we had good friend who lost his home, he never called us to get any assistance, now we are helping him and his family get it back.

    His loan appears to belong to Fannie Mae upon an initial review of his foreclosure docs.

    In Fanny and Feddie cases, they sold the loans to investors, and they purchased MBS , repackaged them and resold them.

    The lawyer is a little hesitant as to how to approach a Fannie MAE and FREDDIE now that they are on WELFARE.
    FANNIE CLAIMS TO OWN THE LOAN< BUT THEY NEVER SHOWED ANY ORIGINAL NOTE TO ANYONE AND HAVE REFUSED TO SHOW ANY DOCUMENTATION.

  9. Dear NY and Charlie A,

    At the beginning most people when to talk to them about how this fraud has come to this amount of despair to a whole bunch of us, they look at you funny.

    Now when the listen to us on radio interviews and when you see them in the court house, they now ask us how did we find out the truth and how they can also get the bastards.

    Now is the time to press on the accelerator even harder, now it is the time to raise our voices and help others who have none.

    Remember this a a war of ideas, methods and cash. But I trust that Thomas Jefferson was right and that our Constitution will at the end be respected and our rights asserted.

    I thank you guys and ladies for being there for everyone else and for always sharing the good news and reassure us when we may feel down. You may lose a battle but the war rages on.

    THANKS to all of you and specially to Mr. Grafield and Brad.

    Jose

    Mortgage Analysis and Consulting, LLC
    8300 Old Court House Rd
    Suite 230A
    Vienna, VA 22182

    703-946-5851
    703-442-8828

    http://www.toxicmortgageloan.com
    http://www.hipotecatoxica.com

  10. Every time i see once of these cases posted gives me more and more hope that all pieces are beginning to fall in place, hopefully, for many of us in different states it won’t be too late. What i am intrigued about the most though is what stand will the government take in this mess once it becomes evident ( as if it needs to be more evident) that the mess it’s of a larger scale than what it seems to be or than what the government wants it to be. What makes me be skeptical about their “future” stand is the fact that they do have an “interest” on many of the mortgages out there.
    I think that the biggest factor that will determine their actions will definitely be OUR protests on the subject, meaning once again that homeowners organization it’s crucial so that our voices will be heard loud and clear across the nation, so loud that the thieves and cockroaches along with their partners in crime will have nowhere to run and hide.
    Regardless of the politicians’ stand, we have to continue organizing be it here in this great blog or with actual physical bodies out in our communities. Our “would be” protectors CAN NOT be trusted any longer(not that I ever had). Many of us, the victims, have to stop thinking as such and simply become our own shield and spread the word across America. I believe that even the “sold out” judges will have no choice to eventually get on with the program and stop looking the other way, educate themselves on the securitization process(scam) and start looking to every case with a magnifying glass and remove their bias glasses. The time is here, the time is now!!! Judgment day for the SCAM-MERS is here!! To victory America!!!!

  11. IT’S HAPPENING FOLKS…..

  12. great website for the report discussed in this blog post.

    http://www.consumerlaw.org/

    article on PDF

    http://www.nclc.org/issues/mortgage_servicing/content/Servicer-Report1009.pdf

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