Kansas: Waking up to discover the mortgage market was a giant criminal enterprise

Matt Taibbi in Huffington Post:

Waking up to discover the mortgage market was a giant criminal enterprise

A landmark ruling in a recent Kansas Supreme Court case may have given millions of distressed homeowners the legal wedge they need to avoid foreclosure. In Landmark National Bank v. Kesler, 2009 Kan. LEXIS 834, the Kansas Supreme Court held that a nominee company called MERS has no right or standing to bring an action for foreclosure. MERS is an acronym for Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, a private company that registers mortgages electronically and tracks changes in ownership. The significance of the holding is that if MERS has no standing to foreclose, then nobody has standing to foreclose – on 60 million mortgages. That is the number of American mortgages currently reported to be held by MERS. Over half of all new U.S. residential mortgage loans are registered with MERS and recorded in its name. Holdings of the Kansas Supreme Court are not binding on the rest of the country, but they are dicta of which other courts take note; and the reasoning behind the decision is sound.

via Landmark Decision: Massive Relief for Homeowners and Trouble for the Banks.

This is a potentially gigantic story. It seems that a court has ruled that about half of the mortgage market has been run as a criminal enterprise for years, which would invalidate any potential forelosure proceedings for about, oh, 60 million mortgages. The court ruled that the electronic transfer system used by the private company MERS — a clearing system for mortgages, similar to a depository, that is used for about half the mortgage market — is fundamentally unreliable, and any mortgage sold and/or transferred through MERS can’t be foreclosed upon, at least not in Kansas.

Coincidentally I’d been working on something related to this all day yesterday. All over the country, lawyers are contesting foreclosures because of similar chain-of-custody issues. I have some material about this coming out in my next Rolling Stone story, so I can’t get into this too much, but suffice to say the lenders and the banks were extremely sloppy about their paperwork (at best — there is a fraud angle as well) and jammed up the system with missing and/or mismarked mortgage notes. Since a sale isn’t legal unless there’s full transfer of the physical note, a lot of the sales of mortgage-backed securities were not entirely legal, since the actual notes were often not transferred.

Nothing like waking up in the morning and finding out a whole sector of the economy is completely screwed. Are these good times or what?

Although this particular case pertains to MERS, non-MERS mortgages were often even worse. Anyway I have more on this coming next week. Thanks again to Eric at MonkeyBusiness for the heads-up.

17 Responses

  1. Reblogged this on Paulreardon's Blog.

  2. ← The Bank Will Foreclose While Telling You They Will Modify
    CALIFORNIA BANKRUPTCY COURT HOLDS THAT MERS CANNOT TRANSFER NOTE FOR WANT OF OWNERSHIP
    Posted on July 15, 2010 by Foreclosureblues
    Editor’s Note…This is the key that unlocks the door, it bears repeating. http://foreclosureblues.wordpress.com/

    CALIFORNIA BANKRUPTCY COURT HOLDS THAT MERS CANNOT TRANSFER NOTE FOR WANT OF OWNERSHIP; CITES BOYKO, LANDMARK (KANSAS), LAMY, AND VARGAS CASES
    JULY 9, 2010

    The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California has issued a ruling dated May 20, 2010 in the matter of In Re: Walker, Case No. 10-21656-E-11 which found that MERS could not, as a matter of law, have transferred the note to Citibank from the original lender, Bayrock Mortgage Corp. The Court’s opinion is headlined stating that MERS and Citibank are not the real parties in interest.

    The court found that MERS acted “only as a nominee” for Bayrock under the Deed of Trust and there was no evidence that the note was transferred. The opinion also provides that “several courts have acknowledged that MERS is not the owner of the underlying note and therefore could not transfer the note, the beneficial interest in the deed of trust, or foreclose on the property secured by the deed”, citing the well-known cases of In Re Vargas (California Bankruptcy Court), Landmark v. Kesler (Kansas decision as to lack of authority of MERS), LaSalle Bank v. Lamy (New York), and In Re Foreclosure Cases (the “Boyko” decision from Ohio Federal Court).

    The opinion states: “Since no evidence of MERS’ ownership of the underlying note has been offered, and other courts have concluded that MERS does not own the underlying notes, this court is convinced that MERS had no interest it could transfer to Citibank. Since MERS did not own the underlying note, it could not transfer the beneficial interest of the Deed of Trust to another. Any attempt to transfer the beneficial interest of a trust deed without ownership of the underlying note is void under California law.”

    Read that again: “Any attempt to transfer the beneficial interest of a trust deed without ownership of the underlying note IS VOID UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW.” This conclusion was based upon California law cited in the opinion that the note and the mortgage are inseparable, with the former being essential while the latter is “an incident”, and that an assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, “while an assignment of the latter [the mortgage] alone is a nullity.” As MERS must own the note in order to assign the incident deed of trust, MERS is legally precluded from assigning the deed of trust for want of ownership of the note, and cannot assign the note in any event as it never owned it. MERS’ lack of ownership interest in promissory note is a matter of decided case law based on a record stipulation of MERS’ own lawyers in the MERS v. Nebraska Dept. of Finance decision.

    This opinion thus serves as a legal basis to challenge any foreclosure in California based on a MERS assignment; to seek to void any MERS assignment of the Deed of Trust or the note to a third party for purposes of foreclosure; and should be sufficient for a borrower to not only obtain a TRO against a Trustee’s Sale, but also a Preliminary Injunction barring any sale pending any litigation filed by the borrower challenging a foreclosure based on a MERS assignment.

    The Court concluded by stating: “Since the claimant, Citibank, has not established that it is the owner of the promissory note secured by the trust deed, Citibank is unable to assert a claim for payment in this case.” Thus, any foreclosing party which is not the original lender which purports to claim payment due under the note and the right to foreclose in California on the basis of a MERS assignment does not have the right to do so under the principles of this opinion.

    This ruling is more than significant not only for California borrowers, but for borrowers nationwide, as this California court made it a point to cite non-bankruptcy cases as to the lack of authority of MERS in its opinion. Further, this opinion is consistent with the prior rulings of the Idaho and Nevada Bankruptcy courts on the same issue, that being the lack of authority for MERS to transfer the note as it never owned it (and cannot, per MERS’ own contract which provides that MERS agrees not to assert any rights to mortgage loans or properties mortgaged thereby).

    We thank one of our dedicated readers for providing this opinion to us.

    Jeff Barnes, Esq.;, http://www.ForeclosureDefenseNationwide.com

  3. “Throughout history, executioners have always worn masks. In the American mortgage lending industry, MERS has become the veiled man wielding the home foreclosure axe.”

  4. MERS Loses In Arkansas, case MIRRORS Kansas Decision

    FILE:

    MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEM, INC., APPELLANT, VS. SOUTHWEST HOMES OF ARKANSAS, APPELLEE

    No. 08-1299

    SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS

    2009 Ark. LEXIS 121

    March 19, 2009, Opinion Delivered

    NOTICE:

    THE LEXIS PAGINATION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE PENDING RELEASE OF THE FINAL PUBLISHED VERSION.

    SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Rehearing denied by Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys. v. Southwest Homes of Ark., Inc., 2009 Ark. LEXIS 458 (Ark., Apr. 23, 2009)

    PRIOR HISTORY: [*1]

    APPEAL FROM THE BENTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, NO. CIV07-223-2, HON. DAVID S. CLINGER, JUDGE.

    DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED.

    COUNSEL: George Nicholas Arnold – Counsel for the Appellant.

    Howard Keith Morrison – Counsel for the Appellant.

    Thomas D. Stockland – Counsel for the Appellee.

    JUDGES: JIM HANNAH, Chief Justice. IMBER, DANIELSON and WILLS, JJ., concur.

    OPINION BY: JIM HANNAH

    OPINION

    JIM HANNAH, Chief Justice

    Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. (”MERS”) appeals a decision of the Benton County Circuit Court denying its motion to set aside a decree of foreclosure and to dismiss the foreclosure action. 1 MERS alleges that the circuit court erred in ordering foreclosure because as the holder of legal title it was a necessary party that was never served. We affirm the circuit court and hold that under the recorded deed of trust in this case, James C. East, as trustee under the deed of trust, held legal title. Because MERS was at most the mere agent of the lender Pulaski Mortgage Company, Inc., it held no property interest and was not a necessary party. As this case presents an issue of first impression, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-2(b)(1).

    1 Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc.’s (”MERS”) motion was [*2] entitled Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment; however, the circuit court found, and the parties agree, that MERS was never served. Because MERS was never served, it could not have failed to respond to that service and suffer a default judgment. The relief sought was that the decree of foreclosure be set aside and the foreclosure action be dismissed.

    This case arises from foreclosure on a 2006 mortgage granted in a one-acre lot. A prior deed of trust also encumbered the property. In 2003, Jason Paul Lindsey and Julie Ann Lindsey entered into a deed of trust on a one-acre lot in Benton County to secure a promissory note. The lender on that deed of trust was Pulaski Mortgage, the trustee was James C. East, and the borrowers were the Lindseys. MERS was listed on the deed of trust as the “Beneficiary” acting “solely as nominee for Lender,” and “Lender’s successors and assigns.” The second page of the deed of trust states that “the Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by the Borrower and further that MERS as nominee of the Lender has the right to exercise all rights of the Lender including foreclosure.” The deed of trust was recorded.

    In [*3] 2006, the Lindseys granted the subject mortgage on the same property to Southwest Homes of Arkansas, Inc. to secure a second promissory note. This mortgage was recorded. On February 9, 2007, Southwest Homes filed a Petition for Foreclosure in Rem against the Lindseys under the 2006 mortgage. The Lindseys, the Benton County Tax Collector, and “Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. (Pulaski Mortgage Company)” were listed as respondents. Pulaski Mortgage was served; however, MERS was never served. Pulaski Mortgage did not file an answer. 2 A Decree of Foreclosure in Rem was entered on April 4, 2007, and the property was auctioned to Southwest. An Order Approving and Confirming Commissioner’s Sale was entered on May 8, 2007. In February 2008, MERS learned of the foreclosure and moved for relief, arguing it was a necessary party to the foreclosure action. The circuit court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.

    2 Pulaski Mortgage was the lender of record. No assignment of the deed of trust was recorded nor had Pulaski Mortgage’s security interest been satisfied of record.

    MERS asserts that it held legal title to the property and, therefore, it was a necessary party to any action [*4] regarding title to the property. The deed of trust indicates that MERS holds legal title and is the beneficiary, as well as the nominee of the lender. It further purports by contractual agreement with the borrower to grant MERS the power to “exercise any and all rights” of the lender, including the right of foreclosure. However the deed of trust provides that all payments are to be made to the lender, that the lender makes decisions on late payments, and that all rights to foreclosure are held by the lender.

    No payments on the underlying debt were ever made to MERS. MERS did not service the loan in any way. It did not oversee payments, delinquency of payments, or administration of the loan in any way. Instead, MERS asserts to be a corporation providing electronic tracking of ownership interests in residential real property security instruments. See In re MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 8 N.Y.3d 90, 861 N.E.2d 81, 828 N.Y.S.2d 266 (2006). According to MERS, it was developed by the “real estate finance industry” and was designed to facilitate the sale and resale of instruments in “the secondary mortgage market, which include one of the government sponsored entities.”

    MERS contracts with lenders to track security [*5] instruments in return for an annual fee. MERSCORP, supra. Those who contract with MERS are referred to by MERS as “MERS members.” According to MERS, MERS members contractually agree to appoint MERS as their common agent for all security instruments registered with MERS. 3 MERS asserts that it holds the authority to exercise the rights of the lender, and for that purpose, it holds bare legal title. Thus, it is alleged that a principal-agent relationship existed between MERS and Pulaski Mortgage under the contract terms of the deed of trust. 4

    3 The Kansas Court of Appeals, in Lankmark National Bank v. Kesler, 40 Kan. App. 2d 325, 192 P.3d 177 (2008), likewise found that Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. acts as an agent. We note the analysis in this case is consistent with our own but also note that the Kansas Supreme Court granted review of the Landmark case.

    4 MERS is listed as a nominee on the deed of trust. A nominee is “a person designated to act on behalf of another, usu. in a very limited way.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1076 (8th ed. 2004). A nominee is also a “person who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others or who receives and distributes funds for the benefit [*6] of others.” Id. As discussed above, MERS was not designated to act on behalf of another under the facts of this case. Further, it held no title in this case where title vested in the trustee, and finally, it received and distributed no funds for the benefit of others.

    “An agent is a person who, by agreement with another called the principal, acts for the principal and is subject to his control.” Taylor v. Gill, 326 Ark. 1040, 1044, 934 S.W.2d 919, 922 (1996) (quoting AMI 3d 701 (1989)). Thus, MERS, by the terms of the deed of trust, and its own stated purposes, was the lender’s agent, including not only Pulaski Mortgage but also any successors and assigns.

    MERS asserts authority to act, arguing that once it becomes the agent on a security instrument, it remains so for every MERS member lender who acquires ownership. This authority is alleged to arise from the contractual relationship between MERS and MERS members. Thus, MERS argues it may act to preserve the rights of the lender regardless of who the lender may be under the MERS electronic registration. We specifically reject the notion that MERS may act on its own, independent of the direction of the specific lender who holds the repayment [*7] interest in the security instrument at the time MERS purports to act. “[A]n agent is authorized to do, and to do only, what it is reasonable for him to infer that the principal desires him to do in the light of the principal’s manifestation and the facts as he knows or should know them at the time he acts.” Hot Stuff, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphic Corp., 50 Ark. App. 56, 59, 901 S.W.2d 854, 856 (1995) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 33 (1958)). Nothing in the record shows that MERS had authority to act. Here, Pulaski Mortgage was the lender and MERS’s principal. Pulaski Mortgage was a named party in the foreclosure action. Thus, MERS was not acting as the lender’s agent at the time it moved to set aside the decree of foreclosure.

    However, MERS also argues that it holds a property interest through holding legal title. Specifically, it purports to hold legal title with respect to the rights conveyed by the borrower to the lender. We disagree.

    “A deed of trust is ‘a deed conveying title to real property to a trustee as security until the grantor repays a loan.’” First United Bank v. Phase II, Edgewater Addition, 347 Ark. 879, 894, 69 S.W.3d 33, 44 (2001)(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary [*8] 773 (7th ed. 1999)); see also House v. Long, 244 Ark. 718, 426 S.W.2d 814 (1968). The encumbrance created by the deed of trust may be described as a lien. See, e.g., First Amer. Nat’l Bank of Nashville v. Booth, 270 Ark. 702, 606 S.W. 2d 70 (1980).

    Under a deed of trust, the borrower conveys legal title in the property by a deed of trust to the trustee. Phase II, supra. “In this state, the naked legal title to real property included in a mortgage passes to the mortgagee, or to the trustee in a deed of trust, to make the security available for the payment of the debt.” Harris v. Collins, 202 Ark. 445, 447, 150 S.W.2d 749, 750 (1941). The trustee is limited in use of the title to passing title back to the grantor/borrower in the case of payment, or to the lender in the event of foreclosure. See Forman v. Holloway, 122 Ark. 341,183 S.W. 763 (1916). The lender holds the indebtedness and is the beneficiary of the deed of trust. House, supra. A trustee under a deed of trust is not a true trustee. Heritage Oaks Partners v. First Amer. Title, Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 4th 339, 66 Cal. Rptr.3d 510 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). Under a deed of trust, the trustee’s duties are limited to (1) upon default undertaking foreclosure [*9] and (2) upon satisfaction of the debt to reconvey the deed of trust. Id.

    In the present case, all the required parties to a deed of trust under Arkansas law are present, the borrower in the Lindseys, the Lender in Pulaski Mortgage, and the trustee in James C. East. Under a deed of trust in Arkansas, title is conveyed to the trustee. Harris, supra. MERS is not the trustee. Here, the deed of trust renamed James C. East as the trustee. The deed of trust did not convey title to MERS. Further, MERS is not the beneficiary, even though it is so designated in the deed of trust. Pulaski Mortgage, as the lender on the deed of trust, was the beneficiary. It receives the payments on the debt.

    The cases cited by MERS only confirm that MERS could not obtain legal title under the deed of trust. MERS relies on Hannah v. Carrington, 18 Ark. 85 (1856); however, that case stands for the proposition that a deed of trust vests legal tide in the trustee. We are also cited to Shinn v. Kitchens, 208 Ark. 321, 326, 186 S.W.2d 168, 171 (1945), where this court stated that “[t]he trustee named in the deeds of trust was a necessary party at the institution of the foreclosure suit, as also, of course, was Kitchens, [*10] the holder of the indebtedness.” East, as trustee, was a necessary party. MERS was not. Finally, we are cited to Beloate v. New England Securities Co., 165 Ark. 571, 575,265 S.W. 83 (1924), where this court stated that the real owner of the debt, as well as the trustee in the mortgage, are necessary parties in the action to recover the debt and foreclose the mortgage. Again, this case supports the conclusion that East was a necessary party and MERS was not.

    Further, under Arkansas foreclosure law, a deed of trust is defined as “a deed conveying real property in trust to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor or any other person named in the deed to a beneficiary and conferring upon the trustee a power of sale for breach of an obligation of the grantor contained in the deed of trust.” Ark. Code Ann. § 18-50-101(2) (Repl. 2003). Thus, under the statutes, and under the common law noted above, a deed of trust grants to the trustee the powers MERS purports to hold. Those powers were held by East as trustee. Those powers were not conveyed to MERS.

    MERS holds no authority to act as an agent and holds no property interest in the mortgaged land. It is not a necessary party. In [*11] this dispute over foreclosure on the subject real property under the mortgage and the deed of trust, complete relief may be granted whether or not MERS is a party. MERS has no interest to protect. It simply was not a necessary party. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 19(a). MERS’s role in this transaction casts no light on the contractual issues on appeal in this case. See, e.g., Wilmans v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 Ark. 668, 144 S.W.3d 245 (2004).

    Finally, we note that Arkansas is a recording state. Notice of transactions in real property is provided by recording. See Ark. Code Ann. § 14-15-404 (Supp. 2007). Southwest is entitled to rely upon what is filed of record. In the present case, MERS was at best the agent of the lender. The only recorded document provides notice that Pulaski Mortgage is the lender and, therefore, MERS’s principal. MERS asserts Pulaski Mortgage is not its principal. Yet no other lender recorded its interest as an assignee of Pulaski Mortgage. Permitting an agent such as MERS purports to be to step in and act without a recorded lender directing its action would wreak havoc on notice in this state.

    Affirmed.

    IMBER, DANIELSON and WILLS, JJ., concur.

    CONCUR BY: PAUL E. DANIELSON

    CONCUR

    CONCURRING [*12] OPINION.

    PAUL E. DANIELSON, Associate Justice

    I concur that the circuit court’s order should be affirmed, but write solely because I view the decisive issue to be whether MERS was, pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a) (2008), a necessary party to the foreclosure action. It can generally be said that “[n]ecessary parties to a foreclosure action are parties whose interest are inseparable such that a court would be unable to determine the rights of one party without affecting the rights of another.” 59A C.J.S. Mortgages § 708 (2008). See also 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages § 647 (2008) (”[A]ll persons who are beneficially interested, either in the estate mortgaged or the demand secured, are proper or necessary parties to a suit to foreclose.”). Moreover, “[p]ersons having no interest are neither necessary nor proper parties, and the mere fact that they were parties to transactions out of which the mortgage arose does not give them such an interest as to make them necessary parties to an action to foreclose the mortgage.” Id. Indeed, our rules of civil procedure contemplate the same.

    Rule 19(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure speaks to necessary parties:

    (a) Persons to Be [*13] Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or, (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, or, (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff, but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant; or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff.

    Ark. R. Civ. P. 19(a) (2008).

    Here, a review of the deed of trust for the subject property reveals four parties to the deed: (1) Jason Paul Lindsey and Julie Ann Lindsey, “Borrower”; (2) James C. East, “Trustee”; (3) MERS, “(solely as nominee for Lender, as hereinafter defined, and Lender’s successors and assigns)”; and (4) Pulaski Mortgage Company, “Lender.” The question, then, is whether MERS, [*14] as nominee, was a necessary party that had an interest “so situated that the disposition of the action in [its] absence may” have impaired its ability to protect its interest or left a subsequent purchaser or other subject to a substantial risk by reason of its interest. The answer is no; MERS, as nominee, was not a necessary party to the foreclosure action, because it held no such interest.

    Initially, I must note that my review of the deed’s notice provision reveals that the deed clearly contemplated the Lender as the party with interest, in that it provided:

    13. Notices. . . . Any notice to Lender shall be given by first class mail to Lender’s address stated herein or any address Lender designates by notice to Borrower. Any notice provided for in this Security’ Instrument shall be deemed to have been given to Borrower or Lender when given as in this paragraph.

    Here, as stated in the circuit court’s order of foreclosure. Pulaski Mortgage, as Lender, was served with notice of the foreclosure action, in accord with paragraph thirteen.

    But, in addition, MERS claims that because it holds legal title, it has an interest so as to render it a necessary party pursuant to Rule 19(a). Indeed, pursuant [*15] to the deed of trust, MERS held “only legal title to the interests granted” by the Lindseys,

    but, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS, (as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns) has the right to exercise any and all of those interests, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and to take any action required of Lender including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling this Security Instrument.

    “Legal title” is defined as “[a] title that evidences apparent ownership but does not necessarily signify full and complete title or a beneficial interest.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1523 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). Thus, as evidenced by the definition, holding legal title alone in no way demonstrates the interest required by Rule 19(a).

    MERS further claims that its status as nominee is evidence of its interest in the property, making it a necessary party. However, merely serving as nominee was recently held by one court to be insufficient to demonstrate an interest rising to the level to be a necessary party. In Landmark National Bank v. Kesler, 40 Kan. App. 2d 325, 192 P.3d 177 (2008), review granted, (Feb. 11, 2009). MERS also [*16] asserted that it was a necessary party to the foreclosure suit at issue. There, the district court found that MERS was not a necessary party, and the appellate court affirmed. Just as here, MERS was a party to the mortgage “solely as nominee for Lender.” 40 Kan. App. 2d at 327, 192 P.3d at 179. Based on that status, the Kansas court found that MERS was in essence, an agent for the lender, as its right to act to enforce the mortgage was strictly limited. See id.

    Agreeing with MERS that a foreclosure judgment could be set aside for failure to join a “contingently necessary party,” the Kansas court observed that a party was “contingently necessary” under K.S.A. 60-219 if “the party claims an interest in the property at issue and the party is so situated that resolution of the lawsuit without that party may ‘as a practical matter substantially impair or impede [its] ability to protect that interest.’” Id. at 328, 192 P.3d at 180 (quoting K.S.A. 60-219). Notably, the language of K.S.A. 60-219 quoted by the Kansas court is practically identical to the language of Ark. R. Civ. P. 19(a).

    The Kansas appellate court noted that MERS received no funds and that the mortgage required the borrower [*17] to pay his monthly payments to the lender. See id. It also observed, just as in the case at hand, that the notice provisions of the mortgage “did not list MERS as an entity to contact upon default or foreclosure.” Id. at 330, 192 P.3d at 181. After declaring that MERS did not have a “sort of substantial rights and interests” that had been found in a prior decision and noting that “a party with no beneficial interest is outside the realm of necessary parties,” the Kansas court concluded that “the failure to name and serve MERS as a defendant in a foreclosure action in which the lender of record has been served” was not such a fatal defect that the foreclosure judgment should be set aside. Id. at 331, 192 P.3d at 181-82.

    It is my opinion that the same holds true in the instant case. Here, Pulaski Mortgage, the lender for whom MERS served as nominee, was served in the foreclosure action. But, further, neither MERS’s holding of legal title, nor its status as nominee, demonstrates any interest that would have rendered it a necessary party pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 19(a). For these reasons, I concur that the circuit court’s order should be affirmed.

    IMBER and WILLS, JJ., join.

  5. Brothers!

    Use the power of a Request for discovery documents, Interrogatories and ADMISSIONS!!!!

    Request some very damning Admissions, most states have a 30 day statutory response, if none, you can Compel the Court to have the Admissions DEEMED.

  6. Pex…..

    Please answer Eman205 if you have factual information to cite?

    Please share. I am wandering around right now trying to put the puzzle together of my situation and WAMU is a piece of my trouble.

  7. Let’s share this info with every one out there. Do not wait for the news media to do it, they take too long.

    It is on us to push forward.

    http://www.hipotecatoxica.com
    http://www.toxicmortgageloan.com
    http://www.pesmaclaw.com

  8. In the case where one bank bought the other bank, I’m pretty sure they will be treated as one continuous entity.

  9. A Man. They are not a law firm. Richard Kessler is a licensed Attorney in Washington DC and is also a part owner of a Corporation in Florida that has been trying to persuade the Florida Supreme Court to appoint his Company to carry out conciliation and alternate dispute resolution for a fee. I spoke to him some months ago when Sarasota first declared their intention of recalling a Judge to start their own Rocket Docket Court based upon the Lee County model, when he spoke with enthusiasm for Securitization and tried to persuade me to his view that negotiated settlements with the people I call Banksters was the way ahead. I do not believe that you negotiate with criminals just because it is not so easy to fight them. However, I agree this is a gutsy thing he has done n the Federal Court against the three Judges by acting as Counsel for Plaintiff by Special Appearance and for the Limited Purpose of these Proceedings. For Pacer subscribers it is Case 8:09-cv-01017-JSM-EAJ where the full court papers can be viewed. I am extremely interested in this case and am presently in discussion with my personal Attorney, who also is the Attorney acting for a number of my forensic mortgage loan audit Corporation’s clients, with a view to promoting a similar lawsuit against the Judges in the 20th Circuit at Lee County, where the guilty parties are not confined to the Chief Judge and two Rocket Docket Judges. If we are successful in putting it together, I hope we will be able to represent a large number of victims and have a different end game intended to benefit those victims by keeping or retrieving their homes and possibly even greater benefits. Now that we have the various decisions in other States, culminating in the Kansas decision and can prove from SEC filings and actual cases that Securitization was a deliberate Ponzi scheme launched upon an unsuspecting nation by Criminals aided and abetted by foreclosure mill Attorneys who knowingly submit mountains of deficient and defective documents to Courts throughout the country it is time for us to go on the offensive. I cannot think of any better place to start than the birthplace of the Rocket Docket – Lee County Florida, to include any Appellate Court Judges and even the Supreme Court itself, which by its recent Task Force Report does just what Richard Kessler states it does in his Verified Complaint.

  10. Pex…??? What about where the lender took over, Like JP Morgan taking over Wamu? or as I remember also…BOA taking over Wacovia mortgages? They are not the “original note holders” so how can they foreclose LEGALLY? Seems to me they have “no legal authority” and they are truely PRTENDER LENDERS now, aren’t they?

  11. You have to be careful about what this case means. MERS can still foreclose on the house if the originating lender (the one named on the original note) is still the note holder. If they sold the note and remained as servicer, it will still appear on the face of all the relevant documents that they are still the note holder.

  12. thank you for your quick response. I appreciate it.
    Aviv

  13. The A Man: Here is what I think. The pleading is a good one and should be directed as an emergency mandamus motion to the Supreme Court of each state seeking an order that requires Judges to hear cases and motions on the merits. Specifically, Judges should be prohibited from treating a non-judicial sale as a judicial event thus applying, in effect the doctrine of res judicata when the matter has NOT been litigated. Proceedings for eviction and unlawful detainer should be stated as proper venue for bring up issues of fraudulent, fabricated documentation foreclosure sales and abuse of process. Actions claiming damages should be enabled at the stage of unlawful detainer or eviction if the homeowner has not already filed suit. If the homeowner has filed suit the cases should be automatically consolidated to prevent inconsistent results in the same case. As an emergency motion under original jurisdiction of the highest court in the state you are far more likely to get (a) a favorable outcome and (b) faster relief. This is not about whether the homeowners are right the pretenders lenders are wrong. It is about the issues being heard and properly considered by courts of competent jurisdiction — a basic and fundamental right of access to court guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and most state constitutions.

  14. There is a lawfirm in Florida that have the guts to sue 3 judges in Florida. http://www.msfraud.org/law/lounge/foreclosurejudges.pdf
    I also would like livinglies (Neals) opinion on this law firm. Their website is http://www.cancelthe mortgagenow.com

    thanx

    P.S. NEAL AND BRAD ARE RITEOUS PEOPLE. .

  15. […] But only if they try!  You must read these blogs, artcile and get help.  contacting Neil Garfield at Living Lies or an attorney who gets it is crucial to your success saving your home.  If you need help now or […]

  16. […] 2009 · Leave a Comment Read here what is just starting to get out in the media about the Kansas court case defeating Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems aka, MERS.  You will see them listed on your […]

  17. Great as I understand it other courts give weight to state supreme court rulings, if there supreme court has not addressed the issue.
    My case is in Florida. Any thoughts on how to introduce this ruling here?
    John Anderson
    jandersonpaper@yahoo.com

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