In November of 2008, AIG answered a request from the SEC that requird them to explain the inner workings of Credit Default Swaps. While they appear to have finessed certain issues, this is the clearest glimpse of how it worked.
There are several classes of transactions but each of them involves some “delivery” of the underlying “performance obligation.” Thus any claim from, for example, US bank as Trustee for MBS series XXXX, would be a nullity if they received payment under a CDS contract (in addition to the fact that the “Trustee” never owned the “underlying” loans in the first place). And it is quite apparent that performing loans were also paid off if they were part of an over-collateralized scheme, which was prevalent. So even mortgages that are current in their payments may have been paid off by AIG, and probably AMBAC and other insurers. And of course the money for these payoffs came from the US Taxpayers who now own around 80% of AIG. The following is an excerpt from that letter. See the whole letter at AIG CDS SEC CORRESP 1 filename1
Triggers and Settlement Alternatives
CDS transactions entered into by counterparties for regulatory capital purposes, together with a number of arbitrage transactions (comprising approximately $47 billion or 38.6 percent of the net notional amount for the arbitrage portfolio at September 30, 2008), have cash-settled structures (see Cash Settlement below) in respect of a basket of reference obligations, where AIGFP’s payment obligations may be triggered by payment shortfalls, bankruptcy and certain other events such as write-downs of the value of underlying assets as further described below. By contrast, under the large majority of CDS transactions in respect of multi-sector CDOs (comprising approximately $57 billion or 46.5 percent of the net notional amount for the arbitrage portfolio at September 30, 2008) AIGFP’s payment obligations are triggered by the occurrence of a non-payment event under a single reference CDO security, and performance is limited to a single payment by AIGFP in return for physical delivery by the counterparty of the reference security. See Physical Settlement below. A number of CDS transactions in respect of CLOs have similar settlement mechanisms. In addition, the arbitrage portfolio includes transactions with a net notional amount of $4.9 billion that allow holders to put securities to AIGFP at par in the event of a failed remarketing of the referenced security. AIGFP cannot currently determine if and when it may be required to perform its obligations in the future including the timing of any future triggering events or the amount of any additional purchases, individually or in the aggregate, that might be required.
Physical Settlement. For CDS transactions requiring physical settlement, AIGFP is required to pay unpaid principal and accrued interest for the relevant reference obligation in return for physical delivery of such reference obligation by the CDS buyer [Editor’s Note: Who is the Buyer and do they have possession, custody, control or ownership of the “performance obligation?} upon the occurrence of a credit event. After purchasing the reference obligation, AIGFP may sell the security and recover all or a portion of the purchase price paid under the CDS, or hold such security and be entitled to receive subsequent collections of principal and interest. There can be no assurance that the satisfaction of these obligations by AIGFP will not have a material effect on AIG’s liquidity. AIGFP generally is required to settle such a transaction only if the following conditions are satisfied:
• A “Credit Event” (as defined in the relevant CDS transaction confirmation) must have occurred. In all CDS transactions subject to physical settlement, “Failure to Pay” is specified as a Credit Event and is generally triggered if there is a failure by the issuer under the related CDO to make a payment under the reference obligation (after the expiration of any applicable grace period and, in certain transactions, subject to a nominal non-payment threshold having been met).
In addition, certain of the AIGFP CDSs, with an aggregate net notional amount totaling $7.7 billion, provide credit protection in respect of CDOs that require minimum amounts of collateral to be maintained to support the CDO debt, where the value of such collateral is affected by among other things the ratings of the securities and other obligations comprising such collateral. In the event that the issuer of such a CDO fails to maintain the minimum levels of collateral, an event of default would occur, triggering a right by a specified controlling class of CDO note holders to accelerate the payment of principal and interest on the protected reference obligations. Under certain of the CDSs, upon acceleration of the reference obligations underlying a CDS, AIGFP may be required to purchase such reference obligations for a purchase price equal to unpaid principal and accrued interest of the CDO in settlement of the CDS. As a result of this over-collaterization feature of these CDOs, AIGFP potentially may be required to purchase such CDO securities in settlement of the related CDS sooner than it would be required to if such CDOs did not have an over-collaterization feature. As of November 5, 2008, eight CDOs for which AIGFP had written credit protection on the super senior layer had experienced over-collaterization related events of default. One of these CDOs was accelerated in the second quarter of 2008, and AIGFP extinguished a portion of its CDS obligations by purchasing the protected CDO security for $103 million, which equaled the principal amount outstanding related to this CDS. AIGFP extinguished the remainder of its CDS obligations related to this CDO on November 6, 2008 by purchasing the protected CDO security for $59 million, which equaled the remaining principal amount of this CDO security subject to CDS protection. AIGFP’s remaining CDS net notional exposure with respect to CDOs that have experienced over-collateralization events of default was $2.4 billion at November 5, 2008. While AIGFP believes that these defaulted transactions are most likely to result in a payment by
AIGFP, AIG cannot estimate the timing of any required payments since the timing of a Credit Event may be outside of AIGFP’s control.
In addition, certain of AIGFP’s CDSs provide credit protection in respect of CDOs that provide if the CDO issuer fails to pay amounts due on classes of CDO securities that rank pari passu with or subordinate to such referenced obligations, an event of default would occur, triggering a right by a specified controlling class of CDO noteholders to accelerate the payment of principal and interest on the protected reference obligations. As in the case of CDOs with the over-collateralization feature, the existence of such an acceleration feature potentially may result in AIGFP being required to purchase the super senior reference obligation in settlement of the related CDS sooner than would be required if such CDO did not have such acceleration feature.
| • | The CDS buyer must deliver the reference obligation within a specified period, generally within 30 days. There is no payment obligation if delivery is not made within this period. | ||
| • | Upon completion of the physical delivery and payment by AIGFP, AIGFP would be the holder of the relevant reference obligation and have all rights associated with a holder of such securities. |
| Cash Settlement. Transactions requiring cash settlement (also known as “pay as you go”) are in respect of protected baskets of reference credits (which may also include single name CDSs in addition to securities and loans) rather than a single reference obligation as in the case of the physically-settled transactions described above. Under these credit default swaps: |
| • | Each time a “triggering event” occurs a “loss amount” is calculated. A triggering event is generally a failure by the relevant obligor to pay principal of or, in some cases, interest on one of the reference credits in the underlying protected basket. Triggering events may also include bankruptcy of reference credits, write-downs or postponements with respect to interest or to the principal amount of a reference credit payable at maturity. The determination of the loss amount is specific to each triggering event. It can represent the amount of a shortfall in ordinary course interest payments on the reference credit, a write-down in the interest on or principal of such reference credit or any amount postponed in respect thereof. It can also represent the difference between the notional or par amount of such reference credit and its market value, as determined by reference to market quotations. | ||
| • | Triggering events can occur multiple times, either as a result of continuing shortfalls in interest or write-downs or postponements on a single reference credit, or as a result of triggering events in respect of different reference credits included in a protected basket. In connection with each triggering event, AIGFP is required to make a cash payment to the buyer of protection under the related CDS only if the aggregate loss amounts calculated in respect of such triggering event and all prior triggering events exceed a specified threshold amount (reflecting AIGFP’s attachment point). In addition, AIGFP is typically entitled to receive amounts recovered, or deemed recovered, in respect of loss amounts resulting from triggering events caused by interest shortfalls, postponements or write-downs on reference credits. | ||
| • | To the extent that there are reimbursements received (actual or deemed) by the CDS buyer in respect of prior triggering events, AIGFP will be entitled to receive equivalent amounts from the counterparty to the extent AIGFP has previously made a related payment. |
Filed under: CDO, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage | Tagged: bailout, bankruptcy, borrower, credit, disclosure, foreclosure defense, foreclosure offense, fraud, Lender Liability, lenders, securitization, trustee |
Joe Briggs: The reason I don’t think it is a fabrication is the source was good, the link was valid and the content is completely consistent with other reports. As for the reason it wasn’t shown on “letterhead” I believe that to be a matter of formatting.
If this letter is legitimate, why isn’t it on AIG letterhead and why is it in Word? If this did come from AIG, it would more than likely be in a PDF and have the AIG logo. I think someone may have been duped.
“…AIGFP would be the holder of the reference obligation and would have all rights associated with such SECURITIES”. NOT MORTGAGES, SECURITIES. So the mortgages WERE DEFINITELY turned into securities, and cannot be turned back into mortgages. Case closed? Comments?