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SEE GARFIELD’S GLOSSARY AND TACTICAL GUIDELINES 

http://livinglies.me/glossary-mortgage-meltdown-and-foreclosure/

THE UNDERLYING THEME OF THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN WHICH HAS SIGNIFICANCE TO FORECLOSURE DEFENSE IS THAT FOR EACH “LOAN” TRANSACTION THERE WERE CORRESPONDING INVESTMENTS IN ONE OR MORE ASSET BACKED SECURITY, BOTH (MORTGAGE AND ABS) DEPENDENT ON EACH OTHER FOR THEIR CREATION.

THE SPREADING OF RISK, THE OBLIGATION FOR PAYMENT, AND THE SEPARATION OF THE OBLIGATION TO PAY FROM THE TERMS OF THE SECURITY INSTRUMENT (MORTGAGE) GIVE RISE TO NUMEROUS OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE CLAIMS, DEFENSES, JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES, AND BUSINESS QUALIFICATION ISSUES IN VARIOUS STATES BY THE BORROWER WHO IS AT RISK OF FORECLOSURE OR WHO HAS BEEN DAMAGED BY THE LOAN TRANSACTION.

THE THEORY IS FURTHER EXPANDED BY THE NOTION THAT THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF THE LOAN TRANSACTION WAS CONVERTED FROM A STANDARD PURCHASE MONEY FIRST, SECOND AND/OR THIRD MORTGAGE TO THE SALE OF TWO SECURITIES ON A SINGLE CHAIN — THE ABS INVESTOR WHO SUPPLIED THE MONEY AND THE PROPERTY INVESTOR WHO SUPPLIED THE SIGNATURES. 

PAYMENT:

In the context of the mortgage meltdown experience, payment was converted from one source to many. See SPV (Structured Purpose Vehicle). This was necessary because of the the purpose of the SPV and the collateralized securities issued from it to investors — the spreading of risk. It is therefore possible for an investor owning an ABS (Asset Backed Security) issued from an SPV to be paid in full without a single payment from any particular borrower. Thus the payment obligation on the note and mortgage at the loan closing was one of many options by which the obligation could be met. There is no doubt that efforts were made to make payments from the funds created in SPV’s through sale of their CDO/CMOs, and that contribution from third parties in the securitized chain starting with the “lender” all the way through guarantees, buy-back obligations and cross collateralization and credit swap vehicles. It is for this reason, among others, that the loan closing was itself the sale of a security based upon an inflated asset appraisal to support an inflated security rating, in which the borrower and the investor in the ABS were “assured” of a passive return on their investment through ever-increasing housing prices. Thus the securitized chain consists of two securities at its base — the “loan” and the ABS — and a myriad of other derivative securities and hedge products together with insurance policies that guaranteed the quality of the underwriting process at the lender level and at the investment banking level. 

Whether those who paid have any claims against any other obligors — including but not limited to the borrower — is unknown. But it is highly probable that those claims are unsecured and therefore dischargeable in bankruptcy. And it is highly probable that such claims are subject to offset, counterclaims and affirmative defenses based upon violations of TILA, RESPA, RICO, common law fraud and state unfair and deceptive business or lending practices together with state and federal securities regulation at the lender underwriting level and at the investment banking underwriting level.

SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLE (SPV)

THE “ENTITY” CREATED BY THE INVESTMENT BANKING FIRM TO HOLD AN INTEREST IN THE CASH FLOW AND/OR OWNERSHIP OF THE NOTE AND/OR OWNERSHIP OF THE SECURITY INSTRUMENTS (BY ASSIGNMENT, WHICH ARE RARELY RECORDED IN PROPERTY RECORDS) AND/OR OWNERSHIP OF THE RISK OF LOSS. It is the SPV that is the “company” which “issues” securities for the purpose of selling those securities (stock, bonds etc.) to qualified investors. The typical “security” that has been issued during the mortgage meltdown is the mortgage backed security (MBS) and more specifically, the collateralized debt obligation (CDO) and more specifically the collateralized mortgage obligation. The terms CDO and CMO are frequently used itnerchangeably but CDO connotes a larger class of securities that CMO.

CMO/CDOs vary in structure and underlying assets, but the basic principle is the same. Essentially a CDO is a corporate or other legal entity (LLC, LLP, Trust etc.) constructed to hold assets as collateral and to sell packages of cash flows to investors. A CDO is constructed as follows:

• A Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) acquires a portfolio of credits. Common assets held include mortgage-backed securities, Commercial Real Estate (CRE) debt, and high-yield corporate loans.

• The SPV issues different classes of bonds and equity and the proceeds are used to purchase the portfolio of credits. The bonds and equity are entitled to the cash flows from the portfolio of credits, in accordance with the Priority of Payments set forth in the transaction documents. The senior notes are paid from the cash flows before the junior notes and equity notes. In this way, losses are first borne by the equity notes, next by the junior notes, and finally by the senior notes. In this way, the senior notes, junior notes, and equity notes offer distinctly different combinations of risk and return, while each reference the same portfolio of debt securities. These levels of risk are called “tranches”. 
• A TYPICAL PROVISION OF THE CMO/CDO ISSUED BY THE SPV IS THAT THE PROCEEDS OF SALE CAN BE USED FOR PAYMENT OF THE PROMISED RETURN. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS IN FORECLOSURE DEFENSE IS THAT THE PARTY TO WHOM PAYMENT IS TO BE MADE IS RECEIVING FUNDS FROM AN INTERMINGLING OF (A) THE FUND CREATED FROM THE SALE OF THE SPV SECURITIES (B) INCOME FROM THE LOWER TRANCHES (C) GUARANTEES OF THE SELLER OF THE SECURITIES, THE ORIGINATING LENDER (D) CLAIMS AGAINST THE SECURITY RATING AGENCY WHICH OFTEN RATED THE CMO/CDO ONLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TOP TRANCHE WHICH MISSTATED THE RISK ASSOCIATED WTH THE ENTIRE SECURITY. THIS OVERSTATEMENT OF THE VALUE OF THE SECURITY IS IDENTICAL TO THE APPRAISER’S OVERSTATEMENT OF THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY AND THE LENDER’S OVERSTATEMENT OF THE RISKS AND THEREFORE THE VALUE OF THE LOAN. 
• In both cases (rating agency and appraiser) the public was deceived by intentional inflation of value. In both cases, there were specific financial incentives for the rating agency to overrate the security and for the appraiser to overvalue the property an for the lender to overrate the borrower’s financial ability or willingness to pay in accordance with the terms of the note and mortgage. In neither case was the potential liability and the potential litigation over these inherently bad practices ever disclosed to either the borrower or the investor. 

Filed under: CDO, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Mortgage | Tagged: affirmative defenses, counterclaims, foreclosure defense, jurisdiction, mortgage securitization, payment |